8 Amendments of Heide RÜHLE related to 2008/2148(INI)
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas there is a growing number of pan-European banks, whose activities span several countries; whereas financial stability arrangements, notably banking supervision, remain meanwhile nationally anchored,
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas financial supervision has not kept pace with market integration; whereas the interlocking of many national authorities has created complexity and blurred the lines of responsibility for supervision and crisis management,
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Recital B c (new)
Bc. whereas in case of an unfolding financial crisis, no national authority acting as ultimate supervisor of a pan- European bank would have the full means to respond to it, since it would always need to rely on full cooperation from its fellow supervisors, working in different legal settings,
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)
Recital B d (new)
Bd. whereas statutes, competences, enforcement and sanctioning powers of supervisors continue to differ importantly; and whereas prudential fragmentation imposes costs on the financial system,
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B e (new)
Recital B e (new)
Be. whereas existing tools of the Member States are no longer adequate to contain the impact of financial crisis in ways that minimize collective costs and avoid moral hazard,
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas a European view of risk exposures, a European prudential oversight body, and a European structure to allow for rapid exchange of information and a clear assignment of supervisory responsibilities are still lacking,
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
Recital H b (new)
Hb. whereas banking supervision is ensured through a complex set of tools involving the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), bilateral and multilateral "memorandums of understanding" (MoU); whereas these kinds of tools are not sufficient to respond quickly and effectively to a financial crisis, considering that CEBS is an advisory body, with no decision-making powers, that MoUs are non-binding, and that the ECB has no official supervisory mandate,
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital N a (new)
Recital N a (new)
Na. whereas the need to strengthen the interaction between micro-supervision and macro-prudential oversight makes it a strong case for enhancing the role of the ECB in supervision, while ensuring political accountability,