20 Amendments of Geoffrey VAN ORDEN related to 2009/2217(INI)
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas an impasse has been reached in Afghanistan: a coalition of occupying powers in place but unable to defeat the Taliban, and an insurgency movement unable to prevail against these military forces; and whereas there is no obvious end in sight despite the efforts of the international community, the insurgency continues, and there has been little improvement in the lives of Afghan people in many areas,
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Is aware of the set of factors hampering progress in Afghanistan but, given space constraints, has chosen to focus in this report on four main elements where, it believes, efforts expended will result in very significant improvements that could turn the course of events: international aid and coordination; implications of the peace process; impact of police training; elimination of opium cultivation through alternative development;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Believes, therefore, that a newno coherent EU strategy for Afghanistan will have to take as its starting point two premises: an acknowledgement of the continuing deterioration in security and socio- economic indicators in Afghanistan despite almost a decade of international involvement and investment; and the need to encourage a profound shift in the mindset of the international community, which has all too often in the past shaped plans and decisions with scant regard for Afghan involvement, properly coordinated with NATO, currently exists;
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Reiterates that the EU and its Member States should support Afghanistan in the construction of its own state, with stronger democratic institutions capable of ensuring national sovereignty, state unity, territorial integrity, sustainable economic development and the prosperity of the people of Afghanistan, and respecting thecertain historical, religious, spiritual and cultural traditions of all ethnic and religious communities in Afghan territory, while recognising the need for fundamental change in the attitude towards women;
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Strongly believes that women's rights are part of the security solution – it is impossible to achieve stability in Afghanistan withoutin the importance of Afghan women enjoying their full rights in political, social and economic life; calls on the Afghan authorities to include women in every stage of the peace talks and reconciliation/reintegration efforts;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that the cost of eliminating poverty in Afghanistan is equivalent to the cost of five days of warfare;deleted
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Notes, too, that the cost of waging war for one week would provide 6 000 schools, enough to ensure a future without illiteracy for all children in Afghanistan;deleted
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Points out that, contrary to the widespread perception that Afghan Government corruption is responsible for the lack of provision of essential services to its citizens, the majority of resources for socio-economic development have been channelled through international organisations, regional development banks, NGOs, international contractors etc,, and nots well as through the central governmenAfghan government; urges the Afghan government and the international community to exercise greater control in order to eliminate corruption and to ensure that aid reaches its target;
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls, too, on all the main humanitarian and development bodies active in Afghanistan (from EU Member States and the US to the UNDP and UNOPS, and from the World Bank to the main NGOs) to drastically prune their operating expenses by allocating funds (at least 80% more than at present) directly to Afghan institutionsand ensure that aid actually reaches its target;
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Believes that much of the blame for the present impasse in Afghanistan rests with early miscalculations by coalition forces who foresaw a speedy military victory over the Taliban and an easy transition to a stable country run by a legitimate government with strong Western backing;deleted
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Recognises that the only possible solution is a political one, and that negotiations with the Taliban – which should take place against the backdrop of a ceasefire – lie at the heart of this process, with the aim of forming a government of national unity which can put an end to the civil war that has raged in the country for almost three decades;
Amendment 285 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Urges the EU to encourage the US to move away from its policy of circumventing domestic institutions in the delivery of international aid and the privatisation of security, as well as its parallel and seemingly contradictory (to the peace process) attempt to "decapitate" the insurgency leadership using drones and US Special forces, which is of questionable legal status and results in frequent civilian casualtiesRecognises the role of NATO ISAF as the single most important mission underway in Afghanistan; urges European allies to fully commit to that mission both financially and in terms of military personnel; and to ensure proper coordination of any EU civil activity with NATO;
Amendment 326 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 49
Paragraph 49
49. Believes that the vagueness of EUPOL's remit and the uncertainty of its achievements to date prevent it from acquiring the legitimacy it deserves; deplores the fact that three years after its deployment EUPOL still has not reached ¾ of its authorised strength - (287 out of an authorised 400) and that coordination with other agencies has been so poor;
Amendment 333 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51
Paragraph 51
51. Believes that one of the main factors behind the ineffectiveness of overall training has been the practice, predominantly by the US, of relying on private contractors to train the policeesence of too many actors employing different training methods; regrets the wasting of scarce resources on these competing training missions;
Amendment 337 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52
52. Notes that, while the EU and its Member States do not share the US approach, their commitment to the creation of a professional Afghan police force risks being compromised by the prevalence of practices such as the "fast- track" approach (poor vetting of recruits, six weeks of training with no textbooks because of trainee illiteracy, minimal field training, recruits then given a badge, uniform and gun and sent out on patrol) implemented by a few big US security companie neither the EU nor the US can claim any satisfaction with their respective police training missions;
Amendment 343 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54
Paragraph 54
54. Recommends unequivocally, therefore, that responsibility for police training no longer be carried out by private contractors;deleted
Amendment 357 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
Paragraph 56
56. Recommends that salaries for the Afghan police be increased and that the whole recruitment process be reviewed, only admitting recruits with a basic standard of literacy, who are not drug users and are better qualified psychologically and physically than the present cohort;deleted
Amendment 365 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
Paragraph 59
59. Notes, however, that the opium problem was not considered a priority by the Bush Administration, which preferred to cooperate with the warlords in the name of the war on terror;deleted
Amendment 371 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
Paragraph 62
62. Draws attention, however, to the findings of a recent UNODC report, whereby the Taliban only capture 4% of the annual narcotics trade, and local farmers 21%, with 75% going to government officials, the police, local and regional brokers, and traffickers; in short, notes that NATO allies are in fact getting the lion's share of the profits from the drugs trade;
Amendment 384 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 68
Paragraph 68
68. Stresses that this office should be directly responsible to the Afghan President, employing a number of Afghan staff and be headed by a figure who has the trust of both the President and the international community, the latter to provide technical assistance;