14 Amendments of Helmut SCHOLZ related to 2013/0253(COD)
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a regulation
Citation 1
Citation 1
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union in particular Article 3(3) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,
Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28
Recital 28
(28) Liquidation of a failing institution under normal insolvency proceedings could jeopardise financial stability, interrupt the provision of essential services, and affect the protection of depositors. In such a case there is a public interest in applying resolution tools. The objectives of resolution should therefore be to ensure the continuity of essential financial services, to maintain the stability of the financial system, to reduce moral hazard by minimising reliance on public financial support to failing institutions, and to protect depositors and to contribute to sustainable and balanced economic growth.
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
Recital 29
(29) However, the winding up of an insolvent institution through normal insolvency proceedings should always be considered before a decision could be taken to maintain the institution as a going concern. An insolvent institution shouldmay be maintained as a going concern for financial stability purposes and with the use, to the extent possible, of private funds. That may be achieved either through sale to or merger with a private sector purchaser, or after having written down the liabilities of the institution, or after having converted its debt to equity in order to do a recapitalisation.
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29 a (new)
Recital 29 a (new)
(29a) The current economic crisis was largely caused by the financial industry where many actors have become too-big- to fail and had to be bailed-out with public funds. In contrast to any market- economy logic, losses were socialised and profits privatised. The key role of financial institutions is to channel savings into productive investments and the financial sector should be reduced to its core functions. Hence, institutions that have reached a size and level of interconnectedness which is likely to pose a systemic threat to the functioning of the economies of single Member States or the European Union as a whole should be resolved applying the respective tools as this will in the long term lead to more balanced and sustainable growth.
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
Recital 31
(31) The limitations on the rights of shareholders and creditors should comply with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The resolution tools should therefore be applied only to those institutions that are failing or likely to fail, and only when it is necessary to pursue the objective of financial stability in the general interest. In particular, resolution tools should be applied where the institution cannot be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings without destabilizing the financial system and the measures are necessary in order to en or to institutions that have reached a critical size, and only when it is necessary to pursure the rapid transfer and continuation of systemically important functions and where there is no reasonable prospect for any alternative private solution, including any increase of capital by the existing shareholders or by any third party sufficient to restore the full viability of the institutionobjective of financial stability and sustainable and balanced economic growth in the general interest.
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32
Recital 32
(32) Interference with property rights should not be disproportionate and should always be in line with the protection of the general public interest. As a consequence, affected shareholders and creditors should not incur greater losses than those which they would have incurred had the institution been wound up at the time that the resolution decision is taken. In the event of partial transfer of assets of an institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, the residual part of the institution under resolution should be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. In order to protect existing shareholders and creditors of the institution during the winding up proceedings, they should be entitled to receive in payment of their claims not less than what it is estimated they would have recovered if the whole institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4
Article 7 – paragraph 4
4. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the Commission and the Board may take where an entity referred to in Article 2 or a group meet the conditions for resolution. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or of system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with this Regulation. Where this cannot be guaranteed because an entity has reached or is likely to reach a critical size, the board shall ensure that the entity adapts its business strategy accordingly so that in case of failure or crisis orderly resolution can be achieved.
Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2
Article 8 – paragraph 2
2. When drafting a resolution plan for entities referred to in Article 2, the Board shall assess the extent to which such an entity is resolvable in accordance with this Regulation. An entity shall be deemed resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying to it the different resolution tools and powers without giving rise to significant adverse consequences for financial systems, including circumstances of broader financial instability or system wide events, of the Member State in which the entity is situated, or other Member States, or the Union and with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by the entity. Entities which have reached a critical size and which are deemed not to be resolvable with the existing tools referred to in Article 19 shall be restructured accordingly. In this case property rights shall be subordinated to the general public interest.
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) to ensure the continuity of criticalbasic banking functions;
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d a (new)
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d a (new)
(da) to contribute to sustainable and balanced economic growth:
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
When pursuing the above objectives, the Commission and the Board shall seek to avoid the unnecessary destruction of value and to minimise the cominimise the cost of resolution and act in the overall general interest rather than in the interest of sharesholutionders and creditors.
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
Article 16 – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. If allone of the conditions established in paragraph 2 areis met, the Board shall recommend to the Commission that the entity be placed under resolution. The recommendation shall include at least the following:
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, an entity referred to in Article 2 or a group shall be deemed to be no longer viable only if bothif one of the following conditions areis met:
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 5
Article 52 – paragraph 5
5. After hearing the Board, in its plenary session, the Commission shall propose a list of candidates to the Council and the European Parliament for the appointment of the Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Director. The Council shall appoint the Executive Director and the Deputy Executive Director after hearingobtaining the consent of the European Parliament.