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26 Amendments of Philippe LAMBERTS related to 2009/2173(INI)

Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19 a (new)
– having regard to Parliament’s written declaration of 19 February 2008 on investigating and remedying abuse of power by large supermarkets operating in the European Union1;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A (new)
1 OJ C 184, 6.8.2009, p. 23. A. whereas Member State governments have granted guarantees on bank funding as a response to the financial crisis since October 2008; whereas the issuance of guaranteed bonds has been sizeable and has provided banks with a significant source of funding and insurance against the risks faced by the financial system;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B (new)
B. whereas bank profits have been inflated by the subsidy implicit in such public interventions;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C (new)
C. whereas empirical analyses suggest that the Member State governments’ guarantees have generated a number of effects and distortions, such as a reduction of the spread of private bonds, which need to be taken into account when considering extending them in 2010;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D (new)
D. whereas the ability of transnational businesses to make extensive use of tax havens and offshore centres as part of their tax avoidance strategies contravenes the principle of fair competition; whereas in practice, differential tax treatment favours undertakings that are large or international over those that are small, domestic or new (start-ups);
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E (new)
E. whereas tax governance is an important pre-condition for maintaining favourable conditions for fair competition, and for enhancing the functioning of the internal market;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F (new)
F. whereas tax competition erodes the fiscal sovereignty of Member States because they seek to undercut each other’s tax rates in a ‘race to the bottom’; whereas, in practice, this has resulted in a shift of the tax burden to workers and low-income households and has forced cutbacks in public services;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the Commission’s Report on Competition Policy 2008 and its particular focus on antitrust and merger rules;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that competition policy and the strict enforcement of the competition rules are essential for a proper functioning and competitive European markets, and for the protection of consumerin particular, takes the view that the fight against cartels is central to ensuring that consumers benefit from a competition regime through lower prices and a broader choice of products and services;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Underlines that Articles 106 and 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union authorise State aid regimes providing that they have clearly beneficial effects for the population and do not harm the general activities of the Union; in particular, stresses that State aid can be used to correct market failures, thereby improving the functioning of the market and enhancing European competitiveness, to reduce differences in living standards between regions in the European Union, pursue policy objectives such as R&D, the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises, social cohesion, and environmental and cultural protection; considers it essential, therefore, when assessing whether State aid is compatible with the Treaty, to find the right balance between the negative effects of State aid on competition and its positive effects in terms of common interests;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Takes the view that State aids policies taken in relation to financial institutions and the economic recovery process were helpful to stabilise financial market and to tackle the effects of the credit crunch on the real economy; points out that those State aids were based on Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty (now Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) which allows for aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. CNotes that State aid policy is an integral part of competition policy and that State aid control reflects the need to maintain a level playing field for all undertakings carrying out activities in the single European market; in this context, wonders to what extent State aid granted to the financial market has caused distortions of competition; calls for an independent report to be drawn up about the potential moral hazarddistortive effects of state intervention in the financial sector; asks the Commission to report on restructuring progress made by the beneficiaries of State aid and to provide more clarity concerning the repayment of State aid and possible sanctions for failure to repay;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Is concerned about the subsidies and distortions generated by the guarantees on bank funding granted by Member State governments; demands that the Commission assess the extent of subsidies related to guarantees on bank funding and thus analyse their conformity with EU competition law and the measures needed to correct any distortions related to those guarantees;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. NotShares thate views of the Commission is more flexible concerning the timing of phasing- out State support andthat the phasing out of government support for the EU’s financial sector should start with guarantee schemes, depending on individual Member States’ circumstances; more broadly, takes the view that the timing of exit should take into account a broad range of elements, including macro-economic and financial sector stability, the functioning of credit channels; notes that the Commission is more flexible concerning the time granted for restructuring and making divestitures; calls for guidance by the Commission so that phasing out can start once the economic situation permits, and State intervention is not unduly prolonged; believes that exit strategies should be elaborated as soon as possible, while ensuring that the opinions of the social partners are duly taken into account;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Insists upon the need to coordinate exit strategies, in particular as regards the phasing out of the support to the banking sector; underlines that such coordination is essential to avoid any distortion of competition resulting from a situation where banks could be subsidised to some extent in those countries where bank support programmes are retained in contrast to countries where such programmes are phased out;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12a (new)
12a. Insists that State aid should be compatible with the goals of the Lisbon- Göteborg Strategy and the climate-energy package; urges Member States to remove harmful subsidies which, inter alia, foster fossil fuel consumption or production that increase greenhouse gas emission; more broadly emphasises the need to undertake Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) of policies and Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) of projects foreseen in the ambit of the recovery package;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. CRecalls that State aid should not be used to postpone or avoid the necessary restructuring of companies facing structural difficulties; calls on the Commission to publish, during the course of 2010, a comprehensive report on the effectiveness of State aid granted for ‘green recovery’ (bringing about a substantial shift towards sustainability, in particular in the automotive sector, whereby aid should be strictly conditional to the production of more environmentally sustainable vehicles) and State aid for environmental protection;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Expresses its concern about the fact that in the automotive industry, large manufacturers enjoy too much market power over their smaller suppliers and third-party service providers; calls on the Commission to address that problem, in particular because the victims of the imbalance in bargaining power are predominantly SMEs, which continue to represent the basis of many Member States’ economies;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14b. Calls on the Commission to sustain, within the telecom sector, its efforts to achieving greater transparency in the charge rates for fixed and especially mobile operators;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14c. Emphasises the need to address effectively the challenge presented by tax havens and off-shore centres as regards, inter alia, unfair competition and financial stability;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 d (new)
14d. Reiterates its call for the introduction of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base; likewise stresses, especially in a context of increasing public deficit, the need to ensure minimum coordination of corporate tax rates as a way to combat ‘race-to-the-bottom’ competition;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Reiteratescalls that cartels harm the economy and represent some of the most serious violation of competition law; believes that such infringements of competition law counteract the interests of citizens of the Union since they imply that the advantages of lower prices resulting from competition cannot be passed on to consumers; reiterates in this context its position regarding the White Paper on Damages; endorses the principle of enforcement by consumers, whilst avoiding an excessive legal claims culture; welcomes the announcement by the Commission that the legal basis of the forthcoming proposal will ensure that the measure will be adopted by co-decision;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the very firm stance the Commission has taken on anti-competitive behaviour in recent years, which causes great harm to consumers and to the economy; is concerned, however, that the instrument of ever higshares the views of the Commission that higher fines need to be imposed on repeat offenders to ensure their compliance with competition law; alternatively, encourages the Commission, in particular, to make use of the simplified procedure in ther fines may be too blunt andeld of anti- cartel enforcement and of the Leniency Programme as a way to uncover cartels; suggests thatexamining a wider range of more sophisticated instruments might be more effective as a deterrto deter undertakings to enter into cartel arrangement ; favours a ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach, with penalties to punish bad behaviour and incentives to reward good behaviour;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Takes the view that when multiple infringements of competition law are committed by the same company, stronger deterrence measures are needed to implement antitrust rules in cartel cases or to combat abuses of dominant position; highlights, in this context, that Microsoft is the first company in the history of EU competition policy to be required to make periodic penalty payments for non- compliance with a previous decision from the Commission; considers, in the light of this, that Microsoft should currently not be eligible for future public procurement procedure in accordance with the EU public procurement rules;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
28a. Questions the role played by the consolidation of the financial market, which occurred through a merger- acquisition process, on the contagion of risks; recalls that if they are "too big to fail", large financial institutions are encouraged to maximise the risks they take; urges the Commission, therefore, to address the "too-big-to-fail" moral hazard by addressing, inter alia, the structure of organisations; in particular, points out that the right balance must be struck between sufficient size conductive to diversification and fair competition to meet consumer needs at reasonable costs;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29a. Underlines that significant changes occurred in the competitive structure of the food supply chain in recent years, which have resulted in a higher degree of concentration along the whole of the food supply chain; highlights the considerable price differences between food producer prices and the prices paid by consumers; reaffirms, in this context, the importance of market regulation instruments to avoid the abuse of market power by major corporations, especially by big supermarkets which are abusing their buying power to force down prices paid to suppliers; calls upon the Commission to investigate the margin share in the production and the distribution chains in line with Parliament’s resolution of 26 March 2009 on food prices in Europe1; requests the Commission to propose appropriate measures, including regulation, to protect consumers, workers and producers from any abuse of dominant position or negative impacts identified in the course of that investigation;
2009/12/09
Committee: ECON