140 Amendments of Philippe LAMBERTS related to 2013/2277(INI)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
Citation 1
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 7, Article 9, Article 136 in combination with Article 121 , article 151, Article 152, Article 153, Article 168 and Article 174 thereof,
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
- having regard to the European Social Charter,
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas several Executive Directors (EDs) of the IMF pointed to the immense risk of the programme, and in particular with regard to debt sustainability, with IMF staff stating that "on balance, staff considers debt to be sustainable over the medium term, but the significant uncertainties around this make it difficult to state categorically that this is the case with a high probability", whereas the Australian Executive Director "emphasised the risk of repeating mistakes made during the Asian crisis, in terms of imposing too much structural conditionality", whereas IMF staff " acknowledged that the programme will certainly test the Greek society", whereas the Executive Directors of Argentina, Brazil, India, Russia and Switzerland "lamented that the program has a missing element: it should have included debt restructuring and Private Sector Involvement (PSI), to avoid according to the Brazilian ED, a bailout of Greece's private sector bondholders, mainly European financial institutions"; (source: IMF Office Memorandum May 10, 2010)
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission, acting as an agent of the Eurogroup is responsible for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘'in liaison with the ECB’' and ’'wherever possible together with the IMF’', the financial assistance hereinafter referred to as ‘'EU-IMF assistance’';
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas it is difficult to meaningfully separate the assistance to programme countries from the Commission's role in economic policy coordination (see Legal Opinion of EP legal service from 12.9.2013)
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas technical assistance provided by the Commission and the ECB to programme countries constitutes implementation of Union law within the meaning of article 226 TFEU (see Legal Opinion of EP legal service from 12.9.2013)
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas the IMF has decided in the context of the first Greek programme to modify by an emergency procedure its Exceptional Access Policy criterion on debt sustainability in order to make it possible to lend to Greece, Ireland and Portugal and in so doing has therefore deviated from its fundamental principle to lend only to countries where a rigorous and systemic analysis indicates that there is a high probability that the country's public debt is sustainable in the medium term;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fa. whereas the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which has its roots in the principles of legal certainty and good faith, is also a central element of the general principle of legal certainty in European Union law; whereas the legitimate expectation doctrine holds that "those who act in good faith on the basis of law as it is or seems to be should not be frustrated in their expectations"; whereas a European Union institution, once it has induced implicitly or explicitly a party to take a particular course of action, must not renege on its earlier position if doing so would cause the party to suffer loss;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)
Recital F c (new)
Fc. whereas the concept of legal certainty is recognised one of the general principles of European Union law by the European Court of Justice since the 1960s; whereas this principle implies that law must be certain, in that it is clear and precise, and its legal implications foreseeable;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F d (new)
Recital F d (new)
Fd. whereas the principle of conferral laid-down in article 5 TEU provides that the Union should act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets; thereby shielding the banking sector from losses by transferring large amounts of programme country sovereign debt from the balance sheet of the private sector to the balance sheet of the public sector; (ETUC Input)
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Recital I a (new)
Ia. whereas the costs of services to service users are rising in some Member States, which means that many people are no longer able to afford an adequate level of service to meet their basic needs, including access to vital treatments.
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas, given that several millions of citizens in Greece are not covered anymore by social security, a growing proportion of patients do not receive medically necessary care and treatments.
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the EU institutions which are member of the Troika; whereas such accountability would notably requires the EU Members of the Troika to be heard in the European Parliament before taking up its duties on the basis of a clear mandate and to be subject to regular reporting to and democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and restop speculation on sovereign debtre the balance of payments of the Member States concerned; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programmes to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades;
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
Recital L a (new)
La. whereas an IMF Working Paper on "The Distributional Effects of Fiscal Consolidation" highlights that "Using episodes of fiscal consolidation for a sample of 17 OECD countries over the period 1978–2009, (...) fiscal adjustments have typically had significant distributional effects. In particular, (...) fiscal consolidation episodes have: (i) increased inequality by 0.1 percentage point (about 0.4 percent) in the very short term, and by 0.9 percentage point (about 3.4 percent) over the medium term; (ii) led to a significant and long-lasting fall in the wage income share of about 0.8 percentage point of GDP; and (iii) raised long-term unemployment by about 0.5 percent over the medium term.";
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L b (new)
Recital L b (new)
Lb. Whereas in the recent crisis years the gap of poor and rich has widened across the Union and the programme countries in particular, with the wealthiest of society disposing of ever more wealth.
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L c (new)
Recital L c (new)
Lc. whereas the IMF expressed that it would have favoured the bail in of unsecured creditors from early on
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States even though common patterns can be observed such a rapid increase in capital inflows during the years preceding the crisis;
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘'insolvency’' and ’'non- sustainability’' of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and decades of imprudent fiscal policy as well as very high levels of private debt, with the government deficit reaching 15.7% of GDP in 2009, and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97.4%, reaching 1297% in 2009 and 156.9% in 2012;
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Questions the reasons why the Bank of Greece, being part of the ESCB, in November 2010 significantly contributed to intensifying market turmoil by publicly warning investors that ECB liquidity operations could no longer be taken for granted in the case of Greek sovereign debt (ETUC input)
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Amendment 199 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that Greece entered recession in Q4 2008; notes that the country experienced six quarters of negative GDP growth rate in the seven leading to the assistance programme being activated; notes that there is a close correlation between the increase in public debt and the cyclical downturn, with public debt increasing from EUR 254.7 billion at the end of Q3 2008 to EUR 314.1 billion at the end of Q2 2010;
Amendment 201 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Points out that the IMF has admitted to lowering the bar for debt sustainability specially for the Greek programme, has acknowledged that "the baseline macro projections can also be criticised for being too optimistic", and accepted that "the depth of ownership of the program and the capacity to implement structural reforms were overestimated"; highlights that the IMF concludes that "Greece's recent experience demonstrates the importance of spreading the burden of adjustment across different strata of society", and urges staff "to be more sceptical about official data during regular surveillance."; stresses that the IMF concluded that within the Troika "there was no clear division of labour", that "areas of expertise and experience differed", that "none of the partners seemed to view the arrangement as ideal"; points to the IMF's assessment that "earlier debt restructuring could have eased the burden of adjustment on Greece and contributed to a less dramatic contraction in output", that "the delay provided a window for private creditors to reduce exposures and shift debt into official hands" and that "that shift occurred on a significant scale and left the official sector on the hook"; shares the view of the IMF that there is an urgent need for "more effective risk- sharing arrangements within the euro area" and "a true banking union" (source IMF May 20, 2013 "Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement")
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Portuguese economy had suffered from low GDP and productivity growth for a number of years, and that this lack of growth as well as large capital inflows, and that these patterns , combined with the impact of the global financial crisis, had resulted in a large fiscal deficit and a high public and private debt level, driving up Portugal’'s refinancing costs in capital markets to unsustainable levels; notes in this context that the overall macroeconomic fundamentals deteriorated very rapidly from a reasonably good levels in 2007 when Portugal’'s growth rate reached 2.4%, its fiscal deficit 3.1%, its debt level 62.7% and its current account deficit 10.2% of GDP, with the unemployment rate standing at 8.1% to a deep and unprecedented recession;
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking crisis of unprecedented dimensions, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6.3% in 2009 (1.1% in 2010) from a positive growth level of 5% of GDP in 2007, unemployment to increase from 4.7% in 2007 to 13.7% in 2010 and - its most detrimental impact -, the government balance of payments to experience a deficit in 2010 of 30.6%, down from a surplus in 2007 (0.2%); and the public debt soaring from 23% of GDP in 2007 to more than 120% at the end of 2013; further notes in the decade prior to the assistance programme that the Irish economy experienced a prolonged period of negative real interest rates;
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme in 2013, speculatioerious concerns about the systemic instability in the Cypriot economy had been ongoingknown for a long time, owing inter alia to the exposure of Cypriot banks to overleveragits overleveraged and risk seeking banking sector and its exposure to highly indebted local property companies, the Greek debt crisis, the downgrading of Cypriot government bonds by international rating agencies, the inability to refund public expenditure from the international markets, and the initial reluctance of the governmentits public authorities to restructure the troubled financial sector;
Amendment 237 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the initial agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing , the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that, following five reviews and the insufficient success of the first programme, a second programme had to be adopted in March 2012, which has been reviewed three times since; deplores that the IMF did not take effectively into account the objections of one third of its board members in regards to the distribution of benefits and burden resulting from the first Greek programme
Amendment 272 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary union; deplores that the IMF did not appropriately learn its lessons from experiences of its programmes applied in other contexts.
Amendment 298 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the constraints of monetary union; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear of a melt-down of the euro area was palpable, political agreements had to be reached, the world economy was in a severe downturn, and a number of countries which were intended to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways;
Amendment 302 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Regrets the absence at any stage since the beginning of the crisis or since the beginning of the action of the Troika of assessments of the situations in terms of governance and financing of essential public services by the populations and how to guaranty minimal access to them.
Amendment 318 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. RegretStrongly criticises the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’' rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;
Amendment 323 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure in a difficult political environmentthat the macroeconomic adjustment programme of a Member State requesting financial assistance has to take into account the national reform programme adopted in the context of such strategies, including the headline targets translated in national objectives according to Regulation n°472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability;
Amendment 344 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Regrets that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; regrets that thePoints out that the EU institution involvement in the designing and implementation of programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties, including Art. 168(7) TFEU; and that the actions of the ECB and the Commission can and should be submitted to permanent scrutiny to check the consistency of their action with the obligation to protect the fundamental rights enshrined in the treaties; underlines that any inconsistency with such obligations might hence constitute a breach of Union Law.
Amendment 362 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Endorses the Council of Europe's demand that the programmes' impact of human rights should be better taken into account, also endorses the Council of Europe's demand to strengthen the effectiveness of judicial and non-judicial National and European institutions entrusted with the protection and promotion of fundamental rights , such as ombudsmen, to handle complaints about social and economic rights while seeking their independent advice in the decision making process leading to the adoption of austerity measures and budgets, so as to better understand their impact on fundamental rights and living conditions
Amendment 363 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. deplores the demand in MoUs to privatise water supply as is the case in Portugal, points out that member states should refrain from these measures in the future since access to water is an essential precondition for human development
Amendment 364 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16 . Points out that of the three Troika members, the ECB and the Commission are even more reluctant than the IMF to admit to mistakes made and hence foster the discussion on improved solutions
Amendment 372 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levelmany of the short-term cost-reduction measures currently being implemented, such as the introduction of up-front access to healthcare fees, higher out-of- pocket expenditure or exclusion from access to care of vulnerable groups , have not been fully assessed for their wider social and economic consequences or potentially discriminatory effects and long-term implications, including dangers to public health and possible consequences for life expectancy; underlines the fact that such measures have disproportionate negative impacts on vulnerable groups;
Amendment 396 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points out especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal; and stresses that this high youth unemployment, constitutes not only a generational injustice but also imperils the opportunities for future economic development
Amendment 428 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the pTrogramme forika mission to Ireland and the expected end of the programme formission to Portugal; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken;
Amendment 433 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Draws attention on the dramatic decline of the public gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP in the programme counties between 2008 and 2013 which has been three times as severe as the drop for the euro area as a whole(1,9 Vs. 0,6 point of percentage): this again constitutes a major handicap for the economic recovery of these countries;
Amendment 434 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19b. Notes that the spread between lending rates on small and large loans in the euro area more than doubled between 2008 and March 2013, hampering the financial situation of SMEs , and that programme countries have been disproportionately affected by such a trend;
Amendment 450 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that adequate economic modelscountry specific as well as Eurozone wide economic models, build on prudent assumptions, independent data, involvement of stakeholders, transparency and equitable distribution of adjustment efforts, are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respecttook place in the years preceding the setting up of the programme;
Amendment 471 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident whenreinforced by the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections that were put into place;
Amendment 477 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Regrets that the delayed restructuring of Greek debt and the inappropriate contributions of high private incomes and wealth, mainly due to the opposition of EU components of the Troika, and more particularly of the ECB, aggravated the debt sustainability prospects of the country; points out that the accumulated historic experience of sovereign debt crisis has shown that debt restructurings have often come too late and were insufficient, thereby impeding economic recovery, deterring investment and creating opportunities for private creditors to cash out in a run up to the inevitable restructuring, leaving the official creditors – that is the taxpayers - to bear the burden.
Amendment 478 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Deplores the formalistic response of the ECB with regard to its non-objection to ELA programmes that were manifestly not in conformity with the ECBs rules on the support to insolvent financial institutions. Highlights that while procedures might have been respected, the non-objection led to the financing of insolvent banks.
Amendment 488 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Deplores however the sometimesystematically biased and over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of cross-border spill-overs and political resistance to change in some Member States; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that as a result fiscal targets could not be fulfilled;
Amendment 516 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Takes note of the European Commission report on the "Fiscal consolidations and spillovers in the Euro area periphery and core" which highlights that "the symmetry of the fiscal adjustments in all euro area countries at the same time has hampered this adjustment, with negative spill-overs of consolidations in (...) core euro area countries further aggravating growth in deficit countries. These negative spillovers have made adjustment in the periphery harder, and have further exacerbated the temporary worsening of debt-to-GDP ratios in programme and vulnerable countries"
Amendment 521 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted in several reports, including the ex-post evaluation of the first assistance programme of Greece, to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not mainly due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the Commission and the IMF was not followed up; recalls that the IMF acknowledged once again its forecast error on the fiscal multipliers in the case of Greece and other Eurozone Member States in December 2013, with the multiplier for Greece proving to be at about 1.7.; points out that such a high fiscal multiplier means that this rhythm of austerity has led to a rising debt level, and hence a deterioration of the sustainability of public finances; stresses that this underestimation was used to justify excessive cuts in spending which had intolerable social consequences for significant parts of society
Amendment 537 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Points out that while the IMF’'s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, underlines that the Commission has never clearexplicitly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation; deplores that the objective of reforming both the industrial basis and institutional structures in programme countries rendering them more sustainable and effective has received less attention than the abovementioned objectives. (This amendment is based on a contributions by researchers of the Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK).)
Amendment 554 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that too little attention has been given to avoiding or alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries;
Amendment 575 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
Paragraph 28 a (new)
28a. Deplores the deliberate restriction of collective bargaining practices, such as in Portugal where the number of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements fell from more than 5 million ( 2010) to 300000 (2012), as well the record high unemployment in the programme countries. In this respect, highlights the need for an investigation into the prima facie contravention by the ECB and the Commission of article 153 paragraph 3 of TFEU. (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 576 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 b (new)
Paragraph 28 b (new)
Amendment 577 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 c (new)
Paragraph 28 c (new)
28c. Condemns measures such as cutting minimum wages and weakening collective bargaining systems, since these impact heavily on domestic demand and as such on economic and employment performance (ETUC input)
Amendment 578 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 d (new)
Paragraph 28 d (new)
Amendment 579 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 e (new)
Paragraph 28 e (new)
28e. Points out that the troika has been responsible for predicating the success of the programmes on favourable external conditions that failed to materialize;
Amendment 580 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 f (new)
Paragraph 28 f (new)
28f. Calls for total transparency regarding the preparation and implementation of actions of the Troïka and the respective positions of IMF, European Commission and the ECB.
Amendment 581 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 g (new)
Paragraph 28 g (new)
28g. Acknowledges that "the troika symbolises the exercise of enormous powers by technocratic actors and, as such, echoes the traditional critic of the EU 'democratic deficit'; underlines that the functioning of the troika must lead not only to a better assessment of the real nature and scope of EU powers regarding its Member States, but also to identify more clearly the way EU decisions are made and the 'input legitimacy' they are based on"[i]; [i] Betoncini and Kreilinger (2013)
Amendment 583 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the Troika’'s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency;, the internal labour division between its members, the articulation with the Eurogroup and the ESM have been characterized by a lack of accountability, clarity and transparency; underlines that such a lack of clarity, transparency and accountability has created significant potential conflicts of interests and has undermined the effective exercise by the European Parliament of its political control functions laid down in the Treaties; points out that such situation has raised serious legal concerns, including inter alia an on-going legal challenge before the CJEU regarding the implementation of the principle of conferral laid down in article 5 TEU according to which the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties;[i] [i] case law T-541/10 'ADEDI and Others v Council of the European Union
Amendment 600 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29a. Points out that "from a legal perspective, Moue have become the object of high controversy regarding their compatibility with the National, European and International Law and in particular human dignity, the right to property, labour, social and economic rights in combination with the principles of legal certainty, rule of law, equality, proportionality and subsidiarity which are alleged to be violated in a certain number of legal cases, including in the case of Greece, where the Council of Europe concluded that the Greek State is in violation of the right to social security enshrined in the European Social Chart;
Amendment 601 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 b (new)
Paragraph 29 b (new)
29b. Underlines that the strict conditionality applicable to loans granted in the framework of assistance programmes goes at the expense of the political space of the Member States under assistance as the national constitutional executive and legislative branches have little effective choice but to implement the measures necessary to meet concrete targets laid down in Moue;
Amendment 602 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 c (new)
Paragraph 29 c (new)
29c. Underlines in particular that in the framework of the troika the Eurogroup members decide whether to provide assistance and control the actual lending through the ESM and that in the framework of the troikas the Commissions is formally an agent of the Eurogroup; stresses that such a situation is in sharp contrast with the normal function conferred to the Commission in the Treaties which is to act as an independent principal protecting the EU interest and implementing EU rules within the limits established by the treaties; emphasizes that such situation has represented a significant potential of conflict of interests in different EU policy areas such as social policy and state aid provisions;
Amendment 610 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Points out that due to its ad hoc naturethese actions were of an ad hoc nature and regrets that there was no appropriate legal basis for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law;
Amendment 622 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. NotesIs deeply alarmed by the admission by the President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without considering their specific policy implications; including its impact on social cohesion; points out that such admission sheds worrying lights into the blurred scope of the 'technical advising' and 'Eurogroup agency' roles devolved to both the Commission and the ECB in the framework of the design, implementation and assessment of assistance programmes; underlines that a grey zone between 'technical advising' and effective decision is created or at least favoured as long as there is no is not clarity neither transparency and a clear delimitation on the mandate provided to the 'technical advisers'; deplores in that perspective the lack of a clear and accountable case-by- case mandates provided by the Council and the Eurogroup to the Commission;
Amendment 628 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31 a (new)
Paragraph 31 a (new)
31a. Underlines that the crisis-induced changes to the legal framework of the EU and its Member States do not only affect the economic decision making process at the European and at the level of Member States and namely the role of National Parliaments but also in a much more direct way the legal position of individuals; emphasizes therefore that such measures have been subject -and as the recent experience suggests- might be more and more subject to legal challenges before national Courts and before the ECJ and the ECHR given the far reaching consequences of assistance programmes for the delicate system of democratic legitimation of public power in the multidimensional legal order of the EU and the role that national and EU institutions play in this regard;
Amendment 629 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31 b (new)
Paragraph 31 b (new)
31b. Stresses that a formal democratic accountability is a necessary condition for effective democratic accountability and legitimacy but not a sufficient condition; points out that potential conflicts on interest inherent to the troika framework represent a threat to effective democratic accountability of the assistance programmes; emphasizes that a lack of effective democratic accountability is prejudicial to the consistency of the assistance programmes with fundamental rights objectives and obligations of EU institutions and Member States;
Amendment 630 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31 c (new)
Paragraph 31 c (new)
31c. Stresses in particular that the ad-hoc involvement of EU institutions in the troika framework has created significant hurdles regarding the Council, the Eurogroup, the Commission and the ECB duties of democratic accountability by limiting the European Parliament effective rights to request the Court of Justice of the European Union to review the legality of the decisions underpinning the assistance programmes, as the formal decisions regarding the conditionalities attached to the programmes as well as the decisions to provide financial assistance are taken by Member States within the ESM and outside the community framework, and therefore, do not directly fall under the scope of potential legal actions that the Parliament could bring to the Court against other EU institutions as laid-down in article 263 TFEU; emphasizes that such developments have had far reaching consequences for the delicate system of balance of power within the Union and is prejudicial for the principle of sincere cooperation laid-down in the treaties;
Amendment 631 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31 d (new)
Paragraph 31 d (new)
31d. Is of the opinion that replacing the ad hoc troika system by an improved legal structure fully established under the community method is a necessary condition for addressing the deficit of democratic legitimacy and accountability of the programmes, increasing legal certainty; resolving and avoiding potential conflicts of interests; and thereby, creating a degree of ownership necessary for improving the effectiveness of the measures taken to tackle the consequences of the crisis adopted in the Union and more particularly in euro area Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability;
Amendment 632 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31 e (new)
Paragraph 31 e (new)
31e. Points out that the adoption Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 constitutes a first -even though insufficient- step towards such replacement; underlines however that further steps, are required with that purpose in the short, medium and long-term; underlines in particular than an effective and full integration of assistance programmes into the community framework will require a transformation of the ESM into an European monetary Funds within the community framework so as to achieve a more accountable and efficient integration of the different tasks involved in the preparation and follow-up of assistance programmes;
Amendment 633 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31 f (new)
Paragraph 31 f (new)
31f. Welcomes in particular the codification in EU law of procedures and standards for enhanced surveillance of euro area Member States threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability; including inter alia the provisions regarding the evaluation of the sustainability of the government debt; the more transparent procedures regarding the adoption of macroeconomic adjustment programmes including the need to integrate adverse spill-over effects as well as macroeconomic and financial shocks and the scrutiny rights devolved to the European Parliament; the provisions regarding the involvement of social partners; the requirements to take explicit account of national practices and institutions for wage formation; the need to ensure sufficient means for fundamental policies, such as education and health care; and the exemptions granted to Member States under assistance from the relevant requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact; underlines and welcomes the fact that such codification establishes an explicit ECJ jurisdiction on the legal acts referred to in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 640 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Takes note ofQuestions the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution; warns that there is a conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such aswage and social policies, competition policies and state aid; (ETUC input)
Amendment 661 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limitcircumscribed by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is therefore on uncertain legal ground; is imbued with potential conflicts of interest
Amendment 664 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 a (new)
Paragraph 34 a (new)
34a. Notes that it is not possible to determine on the basis of published documents whether the ECB takes or not responsibility for programme decisions;
Amendment 665 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 b (new)
Paragraph 34 b (new)
34b. Points out that the ECB close involvement in EU-IMF assistance programmes has carried significant potential conflicts of interest as it has made its own actions conditional on decisions that it is itself part of; points out that such situation places the ECB into a problematic 'driver in the backseat position';
Amendment 666 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 c (new)
Paragraph 34 c (new)
34c. Notes that the ECB, unlike the IMF and the Commission does not produce assessment or programme monitoring documents even though it issues joint statements with the other troika members about programme implementation; point out that the ECB relies on its own crisis related instruments such as the collateral policy and the ex-ante and ex-post control mechanism on emergency liquidity assistance (ELAs) provided by national central banks within the euro area to banks within their jurisdiction;
Amendment 667 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 d (new)
Paragraph 34 d (new)
34d. Notes that such conflicts have been particularly patent regarding its highly controversial role on the Greek sovereign debt restructuring (by delaying unreasonably the whole process and subsequently granting to itself a super- senior status and a waiver from the restructuring proceedings); as well as in Ireland by its insistence that private unguaranteed bondholders to be fully repaid although the Irish programme made no reference to such requirement;
Amendment 668 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 e (new)
Paragraph 34 e (new)
34e. Points out that there several official sources have confirmed that the Irish government planned to impose losses on the unsecured and unguaranteed bondholders in the banks recapitalized with taxpayers money; points out that that both the IMF and the Irish authorities assessed that has the government done so, its liabilities would have been reduced by several billion euros and the value of its support to the surviving Irish banks enhanced, and thereby their solvency would have been improved since their guarantor would have benefited from significant savings in not paying bondholders; notes that the former ECB president objected such measure threatening to withdraw liquidity support to the Irish banks by considering them as insolvent, which would have resulted in a disorderly collapse of the Irish banking system;
Amendment 669 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 f (new)
Paragraph 34 f (new)
34f. Points out that there are thus compelling allegations that the solvency concept used by the ECB lacks legal certainty and in particular that there a several grey areas surrounding the ELAs provisions in all Member States under assistance such as such as around the treatment of State guarantees underwriting ELAs provisions; reminds the implicit and explicit threats put forward by the ECB to withdraw liquidity support;
Amendment 680 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives; and the effective scrutiny capacity of National parliaments
Amendment 687 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35a. Considers that the democratic accountability of the ECB, the Commission and the IMF should be increased by establishing in-depth hearings with the European Parliament at all stages of the processes. (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 694 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance granted by Member States of the Eurozone, thus putting governments, including those of the Member States directly concerned, at the centre of any decisions taken;
Amendment 701 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points to the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by natureconstruction, is bound by the unanimity rule, and is subject to political influence exerted by finance ministers, heads of state and government as well as national parliaments;
Amendment 711 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)
Paragraph 37 a (new)
37a. Strongly regrets that as in the case of Cyprus late night meetings and resulting inappropriate decisions of the Eurogroup became the rule, due to months of collective procrastinating and lack of foresight, including insufficient bank sector health checks as well as imprudent debt sustainability assessments more generally,
Amendment 712 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 b (new)
Paragraph 37 b (new)
37b. strongly criticises the way external consultants were hired, points out that the awarding of contracts often took place without a public tender - in the case of Ireland clearly due to Troika pressure and in case of Spain due to pressure from the European Commission, criticises that no attention was paid to conflicts of interest as in the case of Blackrock that was holding 3 % of the shares of the Bank of Ireland or in the case of Wyman that has clients in the banking world in programme countries, and ascertains that almost always including one of "big four" auditing firms, notes the unreasonably high fees paid to external consultants.
Amendment 713 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 c (new)
Paragraph 37 c (new)
37c. Notes that the ECB, unlike the IMF and the Commission does not produce assessments or programme monitoring documents even though it issues joint statements with the other troika members about programme implementation; point out that the ECB relies on its own crisis related instruments such as the collateral policy and the ex-ante and ex-post control mechanism on emergency liquidity assistance (ELAs) provided by national central banks within the euro area to banks within their jurisdiction;
Amendment 714 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 d (new)
Paragraph 37 d (new)
37d. Notes that it is not possible to determine on the basis of published documents whether the ECB takes or not responsibility for programme decisions;
Amendment 715 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 e (new)
Paragraph 37 e (new)
37e. Points out that the ECB close involvement in EU-IMF assistance programmes has carried significant potential conflicts of interest as it has made its own actions conditional on decisions that it is itself part of; points out that such situation places the ECB into a problematic 'driver in the backseat position';
Amendment 716 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 f (new)
Paragraph 37 f (new)
37f. Underlines that the IMF involvement as lender of last resort providing up to one third of the funding puts the institution in a minority role and carries the risk to jeopardize its ability to conduct its role objective; observes that in addition of accepting that programmes to be devised and negotiated by the troika, the IMF decided to modify its Exceptional Access Policy (EAP) criterion on debt sustainability in order to make it possible to lend to Greece, Ireland and Portugal and has therefore waived its fundamental principle to lend only to countries whenever a rigorous and systemic analysis indicates that there is a high probability that the country's public debt is sustainable in the medium term;
Amendment 717 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 g (new)
Paragraph 37 g (new)
37g. Observes that the IMF has adopted a critical stance on the policy objectives and conflicts of interests of its European partners involvement in the programmes and more particularly its involvement in the two Greek programmes; agrees with the observers that have accurately pointed out that the fund "is risking damaging its reputation by intervening in programmes in which it does not even have faith[i]"; underlines that such risk is particularly high if the fund level of involvement as a lender avoids it to retain the critical option of exiting the programme in case of disagreement; [i] Statement of Guillermo Ortiz, former Mexican central bank governor.
Amendment 733 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6 a (new)
Subheading 6 a (new)
Short term by the end of 2014
Amendment 734 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38a. Calls on the next Parliament to pursue the work of this inquiry report and develop further its key findings by means of a next report; calls in particular to further investigate the allegations of maladministration in accordance with the provisions of article 226 TFEU including allegations related to: - potential infringements related to the implementation of the European fundamental rights including the Social Rights Chart; - the respect of the principle of conferral and the EU institutional balance of powers; - conflicts of interest within the troika institutions referred to explicitly in this report; - the provision of liquidity support by means of conventional monetary policy and ELAs; - the bank restructuring proceedings in the framework of assistance programmes and in particular the bank restructuring in Greece where a large amount of taxpayer money was injected into the banking system without the programme providing for a nationalisation of the sector; - the practices related to audit and procurement in the framework of the assistance programmes; - the treatment of bondholders and in particular the allegations related to fraudulent practices affecting retail clients in Cyprus and the absence of an effective remediation mechanism;
Amendment 735 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 b (new)
Paragraph 38 b (new)
38b. Intends to use the key findings of this report and the follow-up report to consider, where appropriate, bringing actions to the ECJ as provided for in article 263 TFEU;
Amendment 736 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 c (new)
Paragraph 38 c (new)
38c. Asks the troika to proceed to new debt sustainability assessments and as a matter of urgency to address the need to reduce the Greek public debt burden as well as the severe capital outflows from Greece which contributes significantly to the vicious circle of the current economic depression in the country;
Amendment 737 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 d (new)
Paragraph 38 d (new)
38d. Reminds the Commission and the Parliament of its position adopted in plenary regarding Regulation (EU) No 472/2013; emphasises in particular that the European Parliament laid down provisions in this position which increase further the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process leading to the adoption of macroeconomic adjustment programmes, providing for a clearer and well- delimitated mandate and overall role for the Council, the Commission and the ECB; asks the Commission to reassess and integrate such provisions into the framework of a future proposal to amend Regulation(EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 738 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 e (new)
Paragraph 38 e (new)
38e. Recalls in the same context that the European Parliament position introduced provisions requiring the macroeconomic adjustment programmes to include contingency plans in case baseline forecasts scenarios would not materialize and in case of slippage due to circumstances outside the control of the Member State under assistance, such as unexpected international economic shocks; underlines that such plans are a prerequisite of prudent policy making given the fragility and poor reliability of economic models underpinning programme forecasts as illustrated in all Member States under assistance programmes;
Amendment 739 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 f (new)
Paragraph 38 f (new)
38f. Calls on the Commission to start interinstitutional negotiations with the European Parliament in order to define a common procedure for informing the competent committee of the European Parliament on the conclusions drawn from the monitoring of the macroeconomic adjustment programme as well as progress the made in the preparation of the draft macroeconomic adjustment programme provided for in article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 740 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 g (new)
Paragraph 38 g (new)
38g. Asks, in conformity with its prerogatives, the European Agency of Fundamental Rights to proceed to an encompassing impact assessment of the on-going and completed assistance programmes;
Amendment 741 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 h (new)
Paragraph 38 h (new)
38h. Reminds the Commission to conduct and publish internal ex-post evaluations of its recommendations and its participation in the Troika; asks the Commission to include such assessments in the review report foreseen in Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 742 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 i (new)
Paragraph 38 i (new)
38i. Asks the Commission to proceed to a thorough examination in the light of State Aid rules of liquidity provisions by the European system of Central Banks;
Amendment 743 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 j (new)
Paragraph 38 j (new)
38j. Asks the ECB to conduct and publish internal ex-post evaluations of the impact of its recommendations and its participation in the Troika;
Amendment 744 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 k (new)
Paragraph 38 k (new)
38k. Recommends the ECB to update its guidelines on ELAs and its collateral framework regulations in order to increase the transparency of liquidity provisions in Member States under assistance;
Amendment 745 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 l (new)
Paragraph 38 l (new)
38l. Calls upon the ECB to limit its role in the troika to that of a silent observer obtaining information and hence refrain from being an party to programme negotiations that by their nature cover a scope that extends far beyond the remit of monetary policy and risks hence undermining its independence;
Amendment 746 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 m (new)
Paragraph 38 m (new)
38m. Reminds the Council and the Commission that article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 provides that Member States in receipt of financial assistance on 30 May 2013 shall be subject to that Regulation as from that date; calls upon the Council and the Commission in conformity with article 265 TFEU to act in order to streamline and align the ad hoc financial assistance programmes with the procedures and acts referred to in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 747 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 n (new)
Paragraph 38 n (new)
38n. Looks forward to the adoption of an updated Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 providing for balance of payment assistance to non-euro area Member States; reminds the Council and the Commission of the requests included in the Huebner report adopted by the Parliament in 2013; emphasizes in particular the need to streamline the provisions of the updated Regulation with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;
Amendment 748 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 o (new)
Paragraph 38 o (new)
38o. Points out that the integration within the Commission's overall strategy and working programme for the next term of the recommendations addressed to the Commission in this report will be a very important factor for the European Parliament's assessment of the candidates for the next President of the Commission and for the Commissioner responsible for the Economic and Monetary Affairs;
Amendment 749 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 p (new)
Paragraph 38 p (new)
38p. Asks the Council to activate the framework it decided on direct recapitalisation and the treatment of legacy assets so as to break-down the vicious circle between sovereigns and the banks and alleviate the public debt burden in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus;
Amendment 750 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 q (new)
Paragraph 38 q (new)
38q. Asks the Council and Eurogroup to respect the commitment made by the President of the European Council to negotiate an interinstitutional arrangement with the European Parliament in order to establish an appropriate interim mechanism for increasing the accountability of the ESM; calls also in that context for the disclosure of minutes of the ESM governing council;
Amendment 751 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 r (new)
Paragraph 38 r (new)
38r. Recommends the Commission, the Eurogroup and the FMI to explore further and integrate appropriate proposals relating to on-going and future programmes the concept of 'contingent convertible bonds' where the returns of newly issued sovereign debt in Member States under assistance are linked to economic growth;
Amendment 752 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6 b (new)
Subheading 6 b (new)
Medium term
Amendment 753 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 s (new)
Paragraph 38 s (new)
38s. Calls on the IMF to redefine the scope of any future involvement in EU related assistance programmes to that of a catalytic lender providing minimum financing and expertise to the borrowing country and EU institutions while retaining the option of exit in case of disagreement;
Amendment 754 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 t (new)
Paragraph 38 t (new)
38t. Recalls its position to transform the ESM into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) which would be a vertically integrated and dedicated EU institution responsible for assisting Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability; point out that such framework would avoid the conflicts of interest inherent to the Commission's current role as an Eurogroup agent and its much more encompassing role of 'guardian of the treaty'; recommends Member States to increase the ESM resource ceiling;
Amendment 755 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 u (new)
Paragraph 38 u (new)
38u. Underlines that the ECJ 'Pringle' case-law and jurisprudence opens the possibility to bring the ESM within the community framework with a constant Treaty on the basis of article 352 TFEU; calls therefore upon the Commission to put forward by end of 2014 a legislative proposal with that objective;
Amendment 756 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6 c (new)
Subheading 6 c (new)
Long term
Amendment 757 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 v (new)
Paragraph 38 v (new)
38v. Calls for a Treaty review that would provide for a European Parliament validated mandate for future assistance programmes and for an assent procedure for the final approval of these programmes; intends to use its prerogatives to initiate a treaty revision proposal with that purpose during the next legislature;
Amendment 758 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 w (new)
Paragraph 38 w (new)
38w. Calls for the extension of the ordinary legislative procedures to all social and economic policy areas not yet fully covered by such procedures such as the excessive deficit procedure, competition policy as well as the policies adopted under article 352 TFEU;
Amendment 759 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 x (new)
Paragraph 38 x (new)
38x. Is of the opinion that a treaty revision will be required in order to fully anchor the EU crisis prevention and resolution framework within a legally sound and economically sustainable ground; underlines that further steps aiming at reducing negative spill-over effects and favouring positive spill over effects in the EMU still need to be put in place such as, inter alia, a mechanism for the mutualisation of sovereign debt and deposit guarantee schemes, macroeconomic stabilizers for the EMU and asymmetric shock mitigation mechanisms, including EU mechanisms for unemployment insurance, a genuine banking Union and a meaningful common backstop for banking resolution, a broader economic, social and environmental convergence process as well as an upward harmonization of tax policy;
Amendment 760 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 y (new)
Paragraph 38 y (new)
38y. Encourages the IMF and asks the Commission and the Council to bring the IMF to a common position to reignite the debate around an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) with a view to adopting a fair and sustainable multilateral approach in this domain;
Amendment 777 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and dDemands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESM; Stresses that the ESM should evolve towards a Community-based mechanism as provided for in the ESM Treaty.
Amendment 800 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Calls for the real and effective involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future; In those cases where social partner organisations are indeed able to reach a joint agreement or view, the troika should respect this and abstain from imposing its policy; (ETUC input)
Amendment 801 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Calls for the involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future;, and to incorporate human rights safeguard clauses in these programmes as proposed by the Council of Europe
Amendment 819 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and consider the revision of MoUs on the basis of the latest empirical results;, initiates an independent and in-depth analysis of the macroeconomic assumptions and models underpinning the programmes, and proposes the revision of MoUs on the basis of the latest empirical results; (This amendment is based on a contributions by researchers of the Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK).)
Amendment 833 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 a (new)
Paragraph 42 a (new)
42a. Calls on the Troika to take duly into account cross-border interrelations such as fiscal spill-overs and global value chains when adjusting their models, recommending measures and reforms and monitoring their implementation;
Amendment 834 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 b (new)
Paragraph 42 b (new)
42b. Demands that complementary to structural funds the Commission tables a proposal for an asymmetric shock absorption mechanism to support temporarily Member States and especially programme countries whose catch up process with respect to the Growth and Jobs Strategy is imperilled
Amendment 835 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 c (new)
Paragraph 42 c (new)
42c. Calls on the ECB and NCBs to publish comprehensive information on ELAs in a timely fashion, including concerning the conditions for support such as solvability, the way the ELAs are financed by the NCBs, the legal framework and practical functioning
Amendment 836 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 d (new)
Paragraph 42 d (new)
42d. Calls for an independent inquiry into the awarding of contracts to external consultants, the lack of public tender, the very high fees paid and the conflicts of interests.
Amendment 866 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 a (new)
Paragraph 44 a (new)
44a. Demands that comprehensive social impact assessments of changes in social security systems and provision of care services due to austerity measures be carried in order to avoid making a bad situation worse, creating long-term problems and undermining other policy goals: that is a task for the EU in the Troika and in the assessment of National Reform Plans.
Amendment 867 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 b (new)
Paragraph 44 b (new)
44b. Points out that innovative legislative tools and actions should be developed to ensure access to basic services such as access to vital health care services and treatments.
Amendment 870 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44 c (new)
Paragraph 44 c (new)
44c. Calls for examination of the possibility to develop a health rescue fund in order to guaranty access to essential services and treatments;
Amendment 898 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Paragraph 45 a (new)
45a. Calls on the Commission and the co- legislators to draw the lessons from the troika experience when designing and implementing the next steps of the EMU; including when revision regulation 412/2013
Amendment 899 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 b (new)
Paragraph 45 b (new)
45b. Considers that the work started with this report should be followed up and deepened by the new EP legislature in December 2014 at latest.
Amendment 900 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 c (new)
Paragraph 45 c (new)
45c. Suggests that the International Labour Organisation (ILO) specifically monitors the impact of labour market reforms in the crisis to ensure that the ILO core labour standards are respected in these reform efforts (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 901 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 d (new)
Paragraph 45 d (new)
45d. Considers that the European Parliament should actively exploit its access to the ECJ to ensure that the Commission, the Council and the ECB respect the key provisions of the European Treaties (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 902 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 e (new)
Paragraph 45 e (new)
45e. Stresses that also times of crisis the European institutions need to respect Union law and no exceptional situation can lead to the suspension of Union law. They are bound by fundamental rights, particularly by the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Social Charter (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 903 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 f (new)
Paragraph 45 f (new)
45f. Urges the board of the ESM to enter into a social dialogue with European social partners by way of for example, the creation of a Social Partner Dialogue Board (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 904 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 g (new)
Paragraph 45 g (new)
45g. Calls on Commission and Council to ensure full involvement of DG Employment and national Social Ministries in MoU discussions and decisions, at both an EU and a national level, to ensure that the social dimension is a key consideration in the negotiations, and the social impact is minimized. (This amendment is based on a contribution by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).)
Amendment 905 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 h (new)
Paragraph 45 h (new)
45h. Recommends that future emergency programmes be placed under the sole responsibility of the European Commission; that the latter assumes responsibility for any assistance and advice accepted from third parties such as the ECB, IMF or other bodies
Amendment 906 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 i (new)
Paragraph 45 i (new)
45i. Recommends that in order for assistance programmes to be vested with appropriate democratic legitimacy, both negotiation mandates as well as the resulting MoU's be submitted to a binding (yes/no) vote by the European Parliament