BETA

75 Amendments of Philippe LAMBERTS related to 2016/0362(COD)

Amendment 31 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
(2) The implementation of the TLAC standard in the Union needs to take account of the existing institution-specific minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ('MREL') applicable to all Union credit institutions and investment firms as laid down in Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council13 . As TLAC and MREL pursue the same objective of ensuring that Union institutions have sufficient loss absorbing capacity, the two requirements should be complementary elements of a common framework. Operationally, the harmonised minimum level of the TLAC standard for G-SIIs ('TLAC minimum requirement') should be introduced in Union legislation through amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/201314 , while the institution-specific add-on for G-SIIs and the institution- specific requirement for non-G-SIIs, referred to as minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities, should be addressed through targeted amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No 806/201415 . The relevant provisions of this Directive as regards loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of institutions should be applied together with those in the aforementioned pieces of legislation and in Directive 2013/36/EU16 in a consistent way. __________________ 13 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190 14 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1 15 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1 16 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
(3) The absence of harmonised Union rules in respect of the implementation of the TLAC standard in the Union would create additional costs and legal uncertainty for institutions and make the application of the bail-in tool for cross- border institutions more difficult. That absence of harmonised Union rules also results in competitive distortions on the internal market given that the costs for institutions to comply with the existing requirements and the TLAC standard may differ considerably across the Union. It is therefore necessary to remove those obstacles to the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortions of competition resulting from the absence of harmonised Union rules in respect of the implementation of the TLAC standard. Consequently, the appropriate legal basis for this Directive is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as interpreted in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) The MREL should allow institutions to absorb losses expected in resolution and recapitalise the institution post-resolution. The resolution authorities should, on the basis of the resolution strategy chosen by them, duly justify the imposed level of the MREL in particular as regards the need and the level of the requirement referred to in Article 104a of Directive 2013/36/EU in the recapitalisation amount. As such, that level should be composed of the sum of the amount of losses expected in resolution that correspond to the institution's own funds requirements and the recapitalisation amount that allows the institution post- resolution to meet its own funds requirements necessary for being authorised to pursue its activities under the chosen resolution strategy. The MREL should be expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure and leverage ratio measures, and institutions should meet simultaneously the levels resulting from the two measurements. The resolution authority should be able to adjust upwards the recapitalisation amounts in cases duly justified to adequately reflect also increased risks that affect resolvabiliorder to add a safety marisging from the resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profile and therefore in such limited circumstances require that oreseen for covering costs that may arise from implementing either recapitalisation amounts referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 45c(3) and (4) are exceededsolution actions or a business reorganisation plan.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
(10) To enhance their resolvability, resolution authorities should be able to impose an institution-specific MREL on G- SIIs, O-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/20131a in addition to the TLAC minimum requirement laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. That institution-specific MREL may only be imposed where the TLAC minimum requirement is deemed by competent authorities as not sufficient to absorb losses and recapitalise a G-SII under the chosen resolution strategy. ______________ 1a Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
(11) When setting the level of MREL, resolution authorities should consider the degree of systemic relevance of an institution and the potential adverse impact of its failure on the financial stability. They should take into account the need for a level playing field between G-SIIs and other comparable institutions with systemic relevance within the Union such as O-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/20131a. Thus MREL of institutions that are not identified as G-SIIs but the systemic relevance within the Union of which is comparable to the systemic relevance of G-SIIs should not diverge disproportionately from the level and composition of MREL generally set for G-SIIs. _____________ 1a Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) Similarly to powers conferred to competent authorities by Directive 2013/36/EU, this Directive should allow resolution authorities to require institutions to meet higher levels of MREL while addressing in a more flexible manner any breaches of those levels, in particular by alleviating the automatic effects of those breaches in the form of limitations to the Maximum Distributable Amounts (MDAs). Resolution authorities should be able to give guidance to institutions to meet additional amounts to cover losses in resolution that are above the level of the own funds requirements as laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, and/or to ensure sufficient market confidence in the institution post-resolution. To ensure consistency with Directive 2013/36/EU, guidance to cover additional losses may only be given where the 'capital guidance' has been requested by the competent supervisory authorities in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU and should not exceed the level requested in that guidance. For the recapitalisation amount, the level requested in the guidance to ensure market confidence should enable the institution to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for an appropriate period of time, including by allowing the institution to cover the costs related to the restructuring of its activities following resolution. The market confidence buffer should not exceed the combined capital buffer requirement under Directive 2013/36/EU unless a higher level is necessary to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meet the conditions for its authorisation for an appropriate period of time. Where an entity consistently failsFor the recapitalisation amount, the level requested in the guidance to ensure market confidence should enable the institution to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for an appropriate period of time. Where an entity consistently fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance, it should be subject to partial limitations of the MDAs. Whenever the failure of an entity to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance, the resolution lasts longer than six months, the relevant authorityies should be able to require that the amount of the MREL be increased to cover the amount of the guidanceexercise their powers to address breaches to the MREL. For the purposes of considering whether there is a consistent failure, the resolution authority should take into account the entity's reporting on the MREL as required by this Directive.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 16
(16) Any breaches of the TLAC minimum requirement and of the MREL should be appropriately addressed and remedied by competent and resolution authorities. Given that a breach of those requirements could constitute an impediment to institution or group resolvability, the existing procedures to remove impediments to resolvability shcould be shortened to address any breaches of the requirements expediently. Resolution authorities should also be able to require institutions to modify the maturity profiles of eligible instruments and items and to prepare and implement plans to restore the level of those requirements within a pre- specified timeframe.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 27 a (new)
(27 a) The entry into force of this Directive signifies a change to the regulatory environment which may affect the rules of the 2013 Banking Communication. It is therefore appropriate that the Commission urgently reviews the 2013 Banking Communication to adapt its standards to the provisions of this Directive and to eliminate existing inconsistencies.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
4 a. In Article 4 the following paragraph (1a) is added: “1a. Where simplified obligations according to this Article are applied, the competent authority may waive the requirements referred to in Article 5(1) or where the resolution authority deems it feasible and credible to liquidate the institution under normal insolvency proceedings or other equivalent national procedures the resolution authority may waive the requirements referred to in Article 10(1). The right of the competent authority and of the resolution authority to gather relevant information shall remain unaffected.”
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 b (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 4
4 b. In Article 5, paragraph (4) is replaced by the following: “4. Recovery plans shall include, where applicable, an analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank facilities and identify on a regular basis, that would be at least quarterly, those assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral. ” Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 c (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 8
4 c. In Article 5, paragraph (8) is replaced by the following: “8. Member States mayshall provide that competent authorities have the power to require an institution to maintain detailed records of financial contracts to which the institution concerned is a party. Competent authorities shall require, in particular, that institutions make available, within 24 hours of being requested by the competent authority or resolution authority, comprehensive documentation describing the current liabilities of the institution and their place in the creditor hierarchy.” Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 d (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 10 – subparagraph 1
4 d. In Article 5(10), the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: “10. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards further specifying, without prejudice to Article 4, the information to be contained in the recovery plan referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article. as well as for specifying what constitutes a significant deterioration of the financial situation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and for the changes to the legal or organisational structure of the institution, its business or its financial situation referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article.” Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 e (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 2
4 e. In Article 6, paragraph (2) is replaced by the following: “2. The competent authorities shall, within sixthree months of the submission of each plan, and after consulting the competent authorities of the Member States where significant branches are located insofar as is relevant to that branch, review it and assess the extent to which it satisfies the requirements laid down in Article 5 and the following criteria: (a) the implementation of the arrangements proposed in the plan is reasonably likely to maintain or restore within a specified timeframe the viability, liquidity and financial position of the institution or of the group, taking into account the preparatory measures that the institution has taken or has planned to take; (b) the plan and specific options within the plan are reasonably likely to be implemented quicklywithin a specified timeframe and effectively in situations of financial stress and avoiding to the maximum extent possible any significant adverse effect on the financial system, including in scenarios which would lead other institutions to implement recovery plans within the same period. ” Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 f (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 5
4 f. In Article 6, paragraph (5) is replaced by the following: “5. Where the competent authority assesses that there are material deficiencies in the recovery plan, or material impediments to its implementation, or where the resolution authorities make recommendations referred to in paragraph 4, the competent authority shall notify the institution or the parent undertaking of the group of its assessment and require the institution to submit, within twoone months, extendable with the authorities’ approval by one month, a revised plan demonstrating how those deficiencies or impediments are addressed. Before requiring an institution to resubmit a recovery plan the competent authority shall give the institution the opportunity to state its opinion on that requirement. Where the competent authority does not consider the deficiencies and impediments to have been adequately addressed by the revised plan, it mayshall direct the institution to make specific changes to the plan. Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 g (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 6
4 g. In Article 6, paragraph (6) is replaced by the following: 6. If the institution fails to submit a revised recovery plan, or if the competent authority determines that the revised recovery plan does not adequately remedy the deficiencies or potential impediments identified in its original assessment, and it is not possible to adequately remedy the deficiencies or impediments through a direction to make specific changes to the plan, the competent authority shall require the institution to identify within a reasonablespecified timeframe changes it canis able to make to its business in order to address the deficiencies in or impediments to the implementation of the recovery plan. If the institution fails to identify such changes within the timeframe set by the competent authority, or if the competent authority assesses that the actions proposed by the institution would not adequately address the deficiencies or impediments, the competent authority may or direct the institution to take any measures it considers to be necessary and proportionappropriate, taking into account the seriousness of the deficiencies and impediments and the effect of the measures on the institution’s business. The competent authority may, without prejudice to Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU, direct the institution, within a timeframe specified by the authority, to: (a) reduce the risk profile of the institution, including liquidity risk and restore within a specified timeframe a liquidity position or liquidity coverage ratio to a certain threshold above the minimum requirement established in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) enable timely recapitalisation measures; (c) review the institution’s strategy and structure; (d) make changes to the funding strategy so as to improve the resilience of the core business lines and critical functions; (e) make changes to the governance structure of the institution. The list of measures referred to in this paragraph does not preclude Member States from authorising competent authorities to take additional measures under national law. ” Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 h (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 7
4 h. In Article 8, paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: "7. Upon request of a competent authority in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4, EBA may only assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in accordance with Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 in relation to the assessment of recovery plans and implementation of the measures of point (a),(b),(c) and (d) of Article 6(6). " Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 i (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
4 i. In Article 9(1), the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: "1. For the purpose of Articles 5 to 8, competent authorities shall require that each recovery plan includes a framework of indicators established by the institution which identifies the points at which appropriate actions referred to in the plan may be taken. The indicators shall at least include a minimum set of triggers referred to in paragraph 5 of Article 27. Such indicators shall be agreed by competent authorities when making the assessment of recovery plans in accordance with Articles 6 and 8. The indicators may be of a qualitative or quantitative nature relating to the institution’s financial position and shall be capable of being monitored easily. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions put in place appropriate arrangements for the regular monitoring of the indicators. Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 j (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 2
4 j. In Article 10, paragraph (2) is replaced by the following: "2. When drawing up the resolution plan, the resolution authority shall identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where necessary and proportionappropriate, outline relevant actions for how those impediments could be addressed, according to Chapter II of this Title. " Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 k (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 4
4 k. In Article 10, paragraph (4) is replaced by the following: "4. The resolution plan shall include an analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank facilities and shall identify those assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral. while providing a prudent estimation of its average yearly value in aggregate for central bank liquidity purposes taking due account of relevant haircuts." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 l (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 7 – point i
4 l. In Article 10(7), point (i) is replaced by the following: “(i) an explanation by the resolution authority as to how the resolution options could be financed without the assumption of any of the following: (i) any extraordinary public financial support to the entity under resolution or entities acquiring parts of its business besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 100; (ii) any central bank emergency liquidity assistance; or (iii) any central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms; ” Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 m (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 7 – point p
(p) where applicable,4 m. In Article 10(7), point (p) is replaced by the following: (p) the minimum requirement for own funds and contractual bail-in instruments pursuant to Article 45(1), and a deadline to reach that level, where applicable; Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 n (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 7 – point p a (new)
4 n. In Article 10(7), the following point (pa) is inserted: “(pa) a detailed and comprehensive list of capital and debt instruments per each ranking category as established according to national insolvency proceedings and where available a detailed list of the holders of these instruments. The list shall be updated within 24 hours of any change to the liability structure and be made available to competent or resolution authorities within 24 hours of a request by such an authority.” Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 o (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 8
4 o. In Article 10, paragraph (8) is replaced by the following: "8. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the power to require an institution and an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) to maintain detailed records of financial contracts to which it is a party. The resolution authority mayshall specify a time- limit within which the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is to be capable of producing those records. The same time-limit shall apply to all institutions and all entities referred to in point (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) under its jurisdiction. The resolution authority may decide to set different time-limits for different types of financial contracts as referred to in Article 2(100). This paragraph shall not affect the information gathering powers of the competent authority. " Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 4 p (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
4p. In Article 11(1), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: “In particular the resolution authorities shall have the power to require within 24 hours, among other information, the information and analysis specified in Section B of the Annex. ” Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 5 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 2
5 a. In Article 12, paragraph (2) is replaced by the following: "2. The group resolution plan shall be drawn up on the basis of the requirements set out in Article 10 and the information provided pursuant to Article 11. " Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 6
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) on the basis of the requirements set out in Article 10, set out the resolution actions planned to be taken for resolution entities in the scenarios referred to in Article 10(3), and the implications of those resolution actions for the other group entities referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1), for the parent undertaking and for subsidiary institutions;
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 14
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 5 – point h1
(h1) require, within three weeks of the date of receipt of a notification made in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, an institution or an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) to submit a plan to restore within one year compliance with Articles 45f andto 45g, and the requirement referred to in Article 128(6) of Directive 2013/36/EU;.
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 5 – point j1
(j1) require within three weeks of the date of receipt of a notification made in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article an institution or entity referred to in point(b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1), to change the maturity profile of items referred to in Article 45b or points (a) and (b) of Article 45g(3) to ensure continuous compliance with Article 45f or Article 45g.;
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 16 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 8 a (new)
16 a. In Article 17, the following paragraph (8a) is added: “8a. Taking into account, where appropriate, experience acquired in the application of the guidelines referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article, EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify further details on the measures provided for in paragraph 5 of this Article and the circumstances in which each measure may be applied. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 3 July 2017. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.”
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 214 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) the entity has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the resolution authority that the instrument is sufficiently loss absorbing and can be bailed-in without undue complexity.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
The resolution authority's decision under this paragraph shall contain the reasons for that decision on the basis ofSuch reasons shall be limited to the following elements:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 – point c
(c) the amount of subordinated liabilities shall not exceed the amount necessary to ensure that creditors referred to in point (b) shall not incur losses above the level of losses that they would otherwise have incurred in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the entity or its subsidiaries that are institutions, but not resolution entities are recapitalised to a level necessary to enable them to continue to comply with the conditions for authorisation and to carry out the activities for which they are authorised under Directive 2013/36/EU, Directive 2014/65/EU or equivalent legislation ('recapitalisation') in addition to a safety margin determined by the resolution authority as provided for in the last subparagraph of paragraph 3 of this Article;
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Where the resolution plan provides that the entity shall be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) for that entity shall not exceed an amount sufficient to absorb losses in accordance with point (a) of the first subparagraphvability assessment concludes that liquidation of the institution under normal insolvency proceedings is feasible and credible, the recapitalisation amount shall be zero, unless the resolution authority determines that a positive amount is necessary on the grounds that liquidation would not achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as an alternative resolution strategy.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceedat least amount to the greater of the following:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
(i) the amount of losses to be absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 104a and 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU of the resolution entity at sub- consolidated resolution group level, as well as the combined buffer requirements as defined in Article 128(1)(6) of Directive 2013/36/EU, or any higher amount necessary to comply with the Basel I floor requirement.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
(ii) a recapitalisation amount that allows the resolution group resulting from resolution to restore its total capital ratio referred in Article 92(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and its requirement referred to in Article 104a and 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU at resolution group sub- consolidated level in addition to a safety margin determined by the resolution authority as provided for in the last subparagraph of this paragraph;
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 302 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparapgraph 4
The resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to in the previous subparagraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and mayshall adjust upwards those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect resolvabilitin order to ensure that the resolution group resulting from resolution has sufficient resources in order to cover any additional or costs that may arisinge from implementing either resolution group’s business model, funding profile and overall risk profileactions or the business reorganisation plan (“safety margin ”).
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4 a (new)
The resolution authority shall adjust the amount of losses to be absorbed referred to in the previous subparagraphs taking into account information requested from the competent authority relating to the institution’s business model, funding model, and risk profile, and in order to reduce or remove an impediment to resolvability or absorb losses on holdings of MREL instruments issued by other group entities as well as whenever the combined buffer requirement is assessed not to be relevant to the need to ensure losses can be absorbed in resolution.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. When estimating the institution’s regulatory capital needs after implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, the resolution authority shall use the most recent reported values for the relevant total risk exposure amount or leverage ratio denominator, as applicable.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
4. Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for entities that are not themselves resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceedat least amount to the greater of any of the following:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 316 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point i
(i) the amount of losses to be absorbed in resolution that corresponds to the requirements referred to in Article 92(1)(a),(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Articles 104a and 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU of the entity as well as the combined buffer requirements as defined in Article 128(1)(6) of Directive 2013/36/EU or any higher amount necessary to comply with the Basel I floor, and
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 336 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 4
The resolution authority shall adjust the amount of losses to be absorbed referred to in the previous subparagraphs taking into account information requested from the competent authority relating to the institution’s business model, funding model, and risk profile, and in order to reduce or remove an impediment to resolvability or absorb losses on holdings of MREL instruments issued by other group entities as well as whenever the combined buffer requirement is assessed not to be relevant to the need to ensure losses can be absorbed in resolution. The resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amounts referred to the previous subparagraphs in accordance with the resolution actions foreseen in the resolution plan and mayshall adjust upwards those recapitalisation amounts to adequately reflect risks that affect in order to ensure that the resolution group resulting from resolution has sufficient resources in order to cover any additional costs that may arise from implementing either recapitalisation needs arising from the entity's business model, funding profile and overall risk profisolution actions or the business reorganisation plan (“safety margin”). When estimating the institution’s regulatory capital needs after implementation of the preferred resolution strategy, the resolution authority shall use the most recent reported values for the relevant total risk exposure amount or leverage ratio denominator, as applicable.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 344 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. Where the resolution authority expects that certain classes of eligible liabilities might be excluded from bail-in pursuant to Article 44(3) or might be transferred to a recipient in full under a partial transfer, the requirement referred to in Article 45(1) shall not exceed an amount sufficient toat least:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 346 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 6
6. The resolution authority's decision to impose a minimum requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities under this Article shall contain the reasons for that decision, including a full assessment of the elements referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 356 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 3 – point a
(a) be less than20 per cent of a prudent estimate of the potential losses which the deposit guarantee scheme would have had to bear, had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, taking into account the priority ranking of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 108 of Directive 2014/59/EU;
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 361 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45c – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1
EBA shall draft regulatory technical standards which shall further specify the criteria referred to in paragraph 1 on the basis of which the requirement for own funds and permissible liabilities is to be determined in accordance with this Article and for further specifying a detailed methodology for determining additional unexpected and unforeseen losses in accordance with article 45e as well as for determining the costs that may arise from implementing either resolution actions or the business reorganisation plan as referred to in paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 362 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45d – title
Determination of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities for entities of G-SIIs,O-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Article 6 paragraph 4 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 364 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45d – paragraph 1– introductory part
1. The requirement referred to in Article 45(1) of a resolution entity that is a G-SII or part of a G-SII shall, O-SIIs and institutions subject to direct supervision by the SSM or part of a G-SII, O-SIIs and institutions not considered as less significant in accordance with Article 6 paragraph 4 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 shall at least consist of the following:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 365 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45d – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the greater of the following: (i) the requirement referred to in Article 92a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; and(ii) 8% of total liabilities and own funds.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 372 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
2. The resolution authority mayshall impose an additional requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 only:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 374 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45d – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) where the requirement referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1 is not likely to be insufficient to fulfil the conditions set out in Article 45c; and
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 376 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45d – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) to an extent that the amount of required own funds and eligible liabilities does not exceed a level that is necessary to fulfil the conditions of Article 45c.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 377 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
3. Where more than one G-SII entityof the entities referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 belonging to the same EU G- SII O-SIIs and institutions subject to direct supervision by the SSM are resolution entities, the relevant resolution authorities shall calculate the amount referred in paragraph 2,
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 379 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45d – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) for the Union parent entity as if it was the only resolution entity of the EU G- SII, O-SII and other relevant institutions.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 381 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45d – paragraph 4
4. The resolution authority's decision to impose an additional requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities under point (b) of paragraph 1, shall contain the reasons for that decision, including a full assessment of the elements referred to in paragraph 2.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 390 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
The resolution authority mayshall give guidance to an entity to have own funds and eligible liabilities that fulfil the conditions of Article 45b or 45g(3) in excess of the levels set out in Article 45c and Article 45d that provides for additional amounts for the following purposes:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 394 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
The amount of the guidance given in accordance with of paragraph 1 may be set only where the competent authority has already set its own guidance in accordance with Article 104b of Directive 2013/36/EU and shall not exceed the level of that guidance.deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 402 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
The amount of the guidance given in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1 shall not exceedbe equal to the amount of the combined buffer requirement referred to in point (6) of Article 128 of Directive 2013/36/EU, except for the requirement referred to in point (a) of that provision, unless a higher level is necessary to ensure that, following the event of resolution, the entity continues to meeto sustain market confidence and ensure both the continued provision of critical economic functions by the institution and the access to funding without recourse to extraordinary financial support othe conditions for its authorisation for an appropriate period of time that is not longer than one yearr than contributions from resolution financing arrangements, consistently with Article 101(2) and Article 44(5) and (8) of this Directive.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 408 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e – paragraph 3
3. Where an entity consistently failsthe failure of an entity to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph, the resolution authority may require that the alasts longer than six mount ofhs, the requirement referred to in Article 45c(2) be increased to cover the amount of the guidance given pursuant to thislevant authorities shall exercise their powers under Article 45k.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 410 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e – paragraph 4
4. An entity that fails failure by an entity to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph , shall not be subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU. with the shortfall relative to the guidance amount multiplied by a factor G being treated as a shortfall relative to requirements in Article 45c and Article 45d . The factor G shall be calculated as m /6 where m is the number of days that have elapsed since the guidance was provided divided by 30.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 489 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45i – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the levels of available items that meet the conditions of Article 45b or Article 45g(3) and the amounts of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed in accordance with Article 45(2) following the application of deductions in accordance with Articles 72e to 72j of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as well as the levels of liabilities that are not excluded from the scope of the Article 44 pursuant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of this Article;
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 492 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45i – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Competent and resolution authorities may request from entities referred to in Article 1(1) data referred to in points (a) and (b) of this paragraph at any time on an ad- hoc basis.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 497 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45i – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. When an institution meets a leverage or at least 3,3 times the requirement in accordance with Article 92(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 it shall be exempted from the requirements of this Article.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 500 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45k – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Any breach of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities by an entity shall be addressed by the relevant authoritiessubject to the restrictions referred to in Article 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU. In addition to the first subparagraph, the relevant authorities shall address any breach of the above requirement within a specified timeframe that cannot extend three months, on the basis of at least one of the following:
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 501 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45k – paragraph 1– point c
(c) early intervention measures in accordance with Article 27 to 29;
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 503 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45k – paragraph 1 a (new)
The resolution authorities shall monitor on a monthly basis the fulfilment of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities and shall inform the competent authority of any breaches or other relevant events that may affect the fulfilment of the minimum requirement.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 504 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45k – paragraph 1 b (new)
Failure to meet the requirement set by Articles 45c to 45f by an entity shall be presumed to be a significant impediment to resolvability for the purpose of Article 17 and 18.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 506 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45l a (new)
Article 45l a Transitional period Resolution authorities, after consulting the competent authorities, shall provide for a transitional period for entities to comply with the MREL requirements defined in Articles 45f and 45g. The transitional period referred to in paragraph 1 shall end on 1 January 2021.
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 530 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 24
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
The liabilities referred to in points (b) and (c) shall not include debt instruments which are unsecured liabilities, Additional Tier 1 instruments, and Tier 2 instruments. Moreover, they shall be senior to the liabilities which count towards the minimum requirement for own funds and permissible liabilities. The sum of liabilities subject to exemptions shall not exceed 3 per cent of total liabilities.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 547 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 24 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 56
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN)24 a. Article 56 is deleted Or. en
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 550 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 24 b (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 57
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN)24 b. Article 57 is deleted Or. en
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 551 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 24 c (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 58
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN)24 c. Article 58 is deleted. Or. en
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 559 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 26
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 63 – paragraph 1a
1a. The period of the suspension pursuant to paragraph 1(n) shall not exceed the minimum period of time that the resolution authority considers necessary for the effective application of one or more resolution tools or for the purposes of the valuation pursuant to Article 36 and in any event shall not exceed 56 working days.
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 578 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 43 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 129
By 1 June 201843 a. Article 129 is replaced by the following: Article 129 "Article 129 Review Review By 1 June 2018 and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall review the implementation of this Directive and shall submit a report there on to the European Parliament and to the Council. It shall assess in particular the following: (a) on the basis of the report from EBA referred to in Article 4(7), the need for any amendments with regard to minimising divergences at national level; (b) on the basis of the report from EBA referred to in Article 45(19), the need for any amendments with regard to minimising divergences at national level; (c) the functioning and efficiency of the role conferred on EBA in this Directive, including carrying out of mediation. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal. Notwithstanding the review provided for in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall, by 3July 2017, specifically review the application of Articles 13, 18 and 45 as regards EBA’s powers to conduct binding mediation to take account of future developments in financial services law. That report and any accompanying proposals, as appropriate, shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=EN); (ca) the opportunity of establishing a European Asset Management Body for fostering the EU markets of non- performing assets and loans; (cb) the need to review the Commission’s 2013 Banking Communication to adapt its standards to the provisions of this Directive and to eliminate existing inconsistencies." Or. en
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON