6 Amendments of Morten MESSERSCHMIDT related to 2017/2010(INI)
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Regrets that the absence of a binding effect of these reasoned opinions finally reduces the control of subsidiarity by national parliament to a simple right to protest ("yellow card") or in the best case to ask the European legislator for a second deliberation ("orange card") ;reminds in that regard that since the Lisbon treaty entered into force, only 3 "yellow cards" could be issued by national chambers for which the Commission has refused to withdraw its proposals in the two last cases (Revision of the directive on the posting of workers and establishment of the European public Prosecutor's Office), and went back in the first one only due to a lack of majority in the Council while denying in a press release any non compliance with the subsidiarity principle ("Monti II" revision) ;
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Regrets that Delegated acts and Implementing acts that are much abused to complete the EU legislative acts are however still not transmitted to the national Parliaments under the subsidiarity control ;
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Reminds that the real and ultimate judge of the subsidiarity is the Court of Justice of the European Union which has until now never annulled any community or EU Act on such a basis of an infringement of the subsidiarity principle, perhaps because to comply with the specific definition of subsidiarity as laid down in article 5 TEU one can always find a transnational dimension to any issue justifying the EU competence and, last but not least, because the EU Court is itself both judge and defendant ;
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Calls for the introduction, through an interinstitutional agreement, of an interparliamentary pillar to organise the network of the national parliaments, allowing them to : – truly scrutinise subsidiarity henceforth to be understood as allowing the Union to act under two cumulative conditions : (1) if the objectives of the envisaged action cannot be satisfactorily realised at the national level ;and (2) if democratic control is not thereby diminished ; – intervene should they so wish in EU decision-making, by exercising a collective right of veto ("red card") and an individual right of non-participation to an EU legislation or Policy, allowing the development of differentiated integration and cooperation ; – exercise both prior and follow-up monitoring of all Council of Ministers meetings at EU level through specialised interparliamentary groupings of their members ; – take decisions of a European nature that are immediately applicable in their respective Member States ;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Reiterates the need to enhance the flexibility of the early warning system, and notably of the eighttwelve-week period for submitting reasoned opinions, and to continue to reflect on the introduction of a green card mechanism with legally binding effect ;
Amendment 40 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes the reference to subsidiarity in the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017; takes the view that subsidiarity and national parliaments should have a prominent place in reflection on the EU’s future. in order to address the "structural democratic deficit" especially mentioned by the German Constitutional Court which, in its judgement of 30 June 2009 "Treaty of Lisbon", reminds that the national parliaments are sovereign assemblies conferring the main source of democratic legitimacy to the EU and should therefore exert, on behalf of their respective sovereign peoples, a genuine intervention and control over the EU decision making and process, in order to remain in compliance with our Constitutions and democratic principles ;