Activities of Morten MESSERSCHMIDT related to 2018/2112(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning enhanced cooperation PDF (224 KB) DOC (74 KB)
Amendments (18)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Union has a particular interest in implementing enhanced cooperation in certain areas of non- exclusive EU competences in order to move forward the European projects and to facilitate the life of citizens;
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas enhanced cooperation should not be seen as an instrument of exclusion or division of the Member States, but as a pragmatic solution to advance European integrationthe achievement of objectives, the preservation of common interests and even supranational integration itself, but in the latter case only if the peoples concerned clearly express their desire for it by referendum;
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the sensitive nature of certain policy areas makes it difficult to follow the ordinary legislative procedure, not only because of the unanimity requirement but also due to the established practice in the Council of always seeking consensus among the Member States, even when a qualified majority would be sufficient to take a decision; whereas the search for a consensus between the democracies that make up our Union is infinitely preferable and more in keeping with the very nature of Europe than any decision or standard devised circuitously by expert groups or comitology, pushed forward by a technocratic body and imposed on countries that reject it;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the European Union cannot legitimately turn itself into a state federation by stealth, i.e. without the issue being solemnly put to the peoples directly concerned; whereas also the constitutional case-law in particular of the German Constitutional Court in its 'Lisbon' judgment of 30 June 2009 is totally clear in this respect and that many of its legal grounds have clear European ramifications: 'Integration requires the willingness to joint action and the acceptance of autonomous common opinion-forming. However, integration into a free community neither requires submission removed from constitutional limitation and control nor the forgoing (of) one’s own identity. The Basic Law does not grant powers to bodies acting on behalf of Germany to abandon the right to self-determination of the German people in the form of Germany’s sovereignty under international law by joining a federal state. Due to the irrevocable transfer of sovereignty to a new subject of legitimation that goes with it, this step is reserved to the directly declared will of the German people alone.' (Section 228); whereas the European Union is not, so far, a federal state, and that the comparison with federal states in the rest of the world, which are all first and foremost nations, even composite ones, is therefore completely irrelevant here;
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas it seems likely in the future that the Member States would need to resort more and more often to the provisions on enhanced cooperation in order to address common problems and to attain common goals provided that the provisions of the Treaty are interpreted in such a way that cooperation is based on freedom of choice of partners, freedom of commitments and freedom of structures;
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Points out that even though enhanced cooperation has not been used extensively since its inception in the Treaty of Amsterdam, it seems to be gaining importance and delivers tangible results, provided that it is free, flexible, sectoral and open;
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Believes that even though enhanced cooperation is considered as a second-best scenario, it is still a viable tool for problem-solving on the Union level and a tool to overcome some of the institutional deadlockthe supranationalist dead-end by finally facilitating the differentiated forms of cooperation that form the basis of the best European achievements, which exclude any forced unification from above, are in keeping with a modern Europe organised according to the principle of networks and would make it possible to launch joint European scientific, energy, industrial and even cultural projects;
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Points out that the political impetus for enhanced cooperation should come from the Member States, but discussions on its contents should be based on a Commission proposal;
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Believes that in order to promote the freedom, flexibility and thus multiplicity of differentiated forms of cooperation needed to face the common challenges facing us, the very broad objectives of cooperation, as set out in Article 20 TEU, must be understood as so many different possible objectives, i.e. they are not cumulative but alternatives;
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that the period covering two consecutive Council presidencies should be the maximum time period to conclude that the alternative objectives of cooperation cannot be attained by the Union as a whole, as required by the wording of Article 20 TEU;
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Affirms that the unity of EU institutions should be maintained andbut that enhanced cooperation should notmay lead to the creation of parallelad hoc, case-by-case institutional arrangements, but could allow specific bodies to be established where appropriate, without prejudice to the competences and role of the Union institutions and bodies;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Believes that enhanced cooperation shouldmay be under the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice unless the establishment of a special court required for the functioning of a particular case of enhanced cooperation is necessary, in which case this should be specified in the legal act establishing the enhanced cooperation;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Believes that clear rules should be laid down in all cases of enhanced cooperation on the withdrawal of a Member State that no longer wishes to participate and on the expulthe voluntary suspension ofby a Member State that no longer fulfils the conditions of the enhanced cooperof its participation; advises that the terms and conditions of the possible withdrawal or expulvoluntary suspension of a Member State should be specified in the act establishing the enhanced cooperation;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
Paragraph 28 a (new)
28 a. Recalls that the Economic and Monetary Union of the countries sharing the single currency is, de facto, the very first instance of enhanced co-operation; that countries that have joined the euro have accepted equitably shared sacrifices to maintain the parities that have been fixed; recalls also, therefore, that where a euro Member State is no longer able to assume the burden, it must be able to suspend its participation and return when its economy has recovered; that the rights of voluntary suspension or non- participation should be generalised in order to avoid making unilateral withdrawal as provided for in Article 50 TEU the only ultimate course of action;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Urges Member States participating in enhanced cooperation to work towards integrating enhanced cooperation into the acquis communautairethe generalisation of differentiated, free, flexible, sectoral, open and democratically controlled cooperation so that the Union no longer develops on the basis of the 'limited' sovereignty principle formerly postulated by Leonid Brezhnev, but according to the principle of sovereignty based on partnership;