BETA

38 Amendments of Sari ESSAYAH related to 2013/2277(INI)

Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion
Recital A
A. whereas the economic crisis and the economic adjustment programme measures adopted in response to it in Greece (May 2010 and March 2012), Ireland (December 2010), Portugal (May 2011) and Cyprus (June 2013) have had a direct and indirect impact on employment levels and dire consequences for the social situation; whereas, although all the programmes were formally signed by the Commission, they were designed, and their conditionality determined, jointly by the IMF, the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Member State concerned and the Commission;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that, quite clearly, without the economic adjustment programmes the social impact of the crisis would have been far worse than it is at present and that the EU institutions (the ECB, the Commission and the Eurogroup) are fully co-responsible for the conditions imposed under the economic adjustment programmes, and therefore for their social consequences in comparison with the consequences without economic adjustment programmes;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 42 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Regrets the fact that those programmes were designed without anysufficient assessment of the consequences by means of impact studies or coordination with the Employment Committee, the Social Protection Committee, the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) or the Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs; regrets, too, the fact that, despite the important social implications, the consultative bodies established by Treaty, in particular the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR), were not consulted;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 61 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that the economic crisis and the adjustment policies and structural reforms deemed necessary to remedy it in the four countries have led to dramatic unemployment rates, historically high rates of job losses and worsening working conditions; points out that the consequences for activity rates, in particular as regards the sustainability of social protection and pension systems, are even more serious because the gap between the Europe 2020 targets and reality is rapidly growing ever wider;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas it has been necessary to provide financial assistance because the Member States in question were obtaining loans from the market only at extremely high interest rates and whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
7. Warns that, if not remediedunless the economic situation is remedied by means of the economic adjustment programmes, these huge divergences, especially in the case of the younger generation, will result in structural damage to the labour market of the four countries, limit their capacity for recovery, provoke massive forced migration with tremendous brain-drain effects and increase the persistent divergences between Member States supplying employment and those supplying a low-cost workforce;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 108 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
8. Recalls that the Europe 2020 strategy accurately states that the figure to watch is the employment rate, which indicates the availability of human and financial resources to ensure the sustainability of our economic and social model; regrets that the slowdown in the unemployment rate is confused with the recovery of jobs lost; observes that the decline in industrial employment was already a problem long before the economic crisis and recalls that in the last four years job losses have reached 2 million in the four countries, which is 15% of existing jobs;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 120 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
9. Is concerned that, among the conditions for financial assistance, the programmes include recommendations for specific cuts in fundamental areas of the fight against poverty, such as pensions, basic services, health care and pharmaceutical products for the basic protection of the most vulnerable; highlights the factfears that the main impact of these measure economic crisis is on the fight against child poverty;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
La. having regard to those exceptional measures to provide assistance to programme countries which the European Central Bank has taken and also the assistance provided through the Target system to the banks of programme countries and the ECB’s role as a technical adviser in the Troika;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 18
18. Regrets the fact that the programmes imposed on the four countries allow firms to opt out of collective bargaining agreements and to review sectoral wage agreements directly affecting the structure and values of collective bargaining arrangements set out in the respective national constitutions; notes that this resulted in a request by the ILO Expert Committee, in the case of Greece, to re- establish social dialogue, and, in the case of Portugal, for the Constitutional Court to annul certain legislative measures; stresses that this despicable situation is the consequence of having limited structural reforms involving only the deregulation of labour relations and wage cuts at any cost, which is in clear contradiction with the EU’s general objectives and the policies of the Europe 2020 strategy at times of normal economic development;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Observes that in many countries general causes of the debt problems of the public and private sectors were the large disparities in surpluses and deficits between countries and the granting of loans by banks in countries in surplus to banks in deficit countries and to Member States and hence to citizens and businesses primarily for purposes of consumption rather than productive investment and rapid wage rises in deficit countries;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Considers that sooner or later living on credit always hits a wall, after which it is difficult to obtain further credit if lenders lose confidence in the creditor’s ability to repay the debt;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Observes that an attempt has been made to solve structural problems of the euro area by tightening up the Stability and Growth Pact, because it had not been complied with strictly enough before the economic crisis; observes that, according to the so-called six-pack and two-pack legislative packages, Member States are required to reduce their debt burdens each year by 1/20th of the amount by which they exceed 60% of GDP and considers that the legislation should be complied with, but that it will be difficult if economic growth is slow and debt exceeds 100% of GDP, and notes that programme countries in particular will encounter major difficulties with this stipulation;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 188 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 19
19. Calls on the Commission to carry out a detailed study of the social and economic consequences of the adjustment programmeseconomic crisis and the adjustment programmes carried out in response to it in the four countries in order to provide a precise understanding of both the short-term and long-term damage to the social protection systems, with particular regard to the fight against poverty, the maintaining of good social dialogue and the balance between flexibility and security in labour relations; calls on the Commission to use its consultative bodies when drafting this study, as well as the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee; suggests that the EESC be asked to draft a specific report;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 198 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 20
20. Calls on the Commission to ask the ILO and the Council of Europe to draft reports on possible corrective measures and incentives, their funding and the sustainability of public finances, to ensure full compliance with the European Social Charter and the Protocol thereto and with the ILO Core Conventions, since the obligations deriving from them have been affected by the economic crisis and the budgetary adjustment measures and the structural reforms requested by the Troika in order to remedy it;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 209 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 21
21. Calls on the EU to provide support, after the assessment, including through financial resources where appropriate, for order to restore the economies of the countries concerned to such a condition that they can themselves fund the recovery of social protection standards and of, the fight against poverty reduction and the renewal of social dialogue through a social recovery plan; calls on the Commission, the ECB and the Eurogroup to phase out the exceptional measures that have been put in place once the economy of the programme country has been placed on a sound footing;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 219 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 23
23. Calls on the EU not to apply such institutional and financial solutions in future, and to put in place mechanismto take responsibility for implementing measures enabling the EU institutionMember States to achieve the social goals and policies set out in the Treaties, in particular those relating to the individual and collective rights of those at greatest risk of social exclusion;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 223 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 24
24. Calls on the Commission and the Council to give the same attention to social imbalances, and to correcting them, as it does to macroeconomic imbalances, and to that end to put EPSCO and its priorities on an equal footing with ECOFIN and the Eurogroup so as to place the public finances of the Member States on a sustainable footing and put an end to their living on credit;
2014/01/17
Committee: EMPL
Amendment 312 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. RegretConsiders the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations to be understandable; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices which involve keeping information behind closed doors on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 332 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact by the fact that the economic recession eliminated opportunities to attain the objectives of these strategies and that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure in a difficult political environment;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 347 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Regrets that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal are not balanced in that they comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; regrets that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties, including Art. 168(7) TFEU but not to the same extent or sufficiently, for example, concerning defence expenditure; considers that in an emergency it must be possible for all problems in national systems to be examined and remedied;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 375 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Deplores the fact that the measures implemented in those four countries have not distributed the burden sufficiently, in such a way as to require the rich to pay relatively more while the poor are more protected, but on the contrary many rich people have removed their property from the reach of the measures, and that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 425 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack ofinadequate progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken in some respects;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 443 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes and that no such adequate economic model with adequate country- specific indicators, designed to calculate the impact of major changes, was available; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up of the programme;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 472 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the economic crisis arose and the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections in response to it were put into place;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 487 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to change in some Member States, which admittedly is difficult to assess in advance; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that, as a result of political opposition and the poor implementation of the measures, fiscal targets could not be fulfilled;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 534 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Points out that while the IMF’s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, which indeed was the correct objective given that external devaluation was not possible, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation, which naturally entails the objective of internal devaluation;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 551 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries in the sense that the distribution of burdens between the poor and the rich has not been balanced;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 561 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results, and notes that in many of the programme countries there was no national consensus and ownership of the corrective measures, which is of course difficult to achieve initially but which should come about under the pressure of the situation, and that serious dissension and unrest hampered the stabilisation of the economic situation;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 571 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
28a. Observes that, pursuant to Article 125(1) TFEU, the Union or a Member State thereof is not liable for the Member States’ commitments, and that the original purpose of this provision was to compel the Member States to adhere to a strict economic policy, because they cannot expect anyone to come to their rescue; observes that rescue measures have nonetheless been taken, as a consequence of which citizens’ confidence in the legality of measures has been shaken, and that the mandates of the Commission and the ECB have been difficult to understand;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 670 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level and the fact that national decision-makers in the programme countries acted in response to the threat that their economy might collapse and were in practice compelled to approve many conditions imposed by those providing assistance, although they indeed bear democratic responsibility for approving them, and that elected representatives were likewise accountable to their electorates in the parliaments of the countries providing the funding; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 723 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
38. Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union; takes the view that any departure from the Community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements would divide and weaken the Union, including the euro area;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 775 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
39. StresseConsiders that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grreport on its activity to the European Parliament more frequently, so that Members of the European Parliament cant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESMollow and comment on its decisions;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 791 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
40. Urges that in the short run consideration should be given to amendESM Treaty be adhered to strictly, so that the public ing the ESM Treaty in order to allow standard decisions to be taken by a qualified majority rather than by unanimity, and to allow for precautionary assistance to be givenMember States providing assistance do not become uncertain about the validity of agreements entered into;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 803 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
41. Calls for the involvement of social partners as discussion partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 816 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
42. Demands that the Troika constantly take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and consider the revision of MoUs on theimplementation of MoUs and the success of the economic policies basised ofn the latest empirical resultm, as well as possible needs for changes;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 862 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
44. Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup, amending MoUs with the Member States receiving EU-IMF financial assistance to include appropriate democratic accountability at both national and European levels; calls for European guidelines to be established in order to ensure appropriate democratic control on the implementation of measures at national level;
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 873 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored ; similarly, takes the view that the option of a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF should also be explored; further considers that other issues to be evaluated include the current institutional framework of the Troika, the involvement of the ECB in the review of the programmes and the mandatory involvement of the IMF in euro area financial assistance programmes as enshrined in the ESM treaty;deleted
2014/02/03
Committee: ECON