BETA

51 Amendments of Carl HAGLUND related to 2010/2038(INI)

Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the Commission communication voices concerns about the adverse impact on growth potential and government deficlong-term sustainabilitsy of population ageing and the long-term trend towards rising welfare spending as aublic finances with regard to high deficit and debt levels, especially in the light of proporulation of GDPageing,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas fiscal policy is not sustainable if it implies an excessive accumulation of government debt over time,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the projections underpinning the communication are based on assumptions that will inevitablmay change between now and 2060, which is a long way off,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas the debt and deficit increases of the Member States during the crisis and the projected demographic development will make fiscal sustainability an acute challenge,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the Member States have not taken enough steps to reduce their administrative expenditure, bring their healthcare spending under control and reform their health and retirement systems,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas all the Member States saw their deficits and debt ratios increase in 2009 as a result of the cyclical slowdown in tax revenuefinancial crisis and the implementation of the special recovery measures recommended by the Commission,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas increasing government debt is rated by the very credit-ratings agencies that underestimated the risks associated with private securities before the financial crisiputs a high burden on future generations,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas it agrees with the Commission that ‘there is no one clear-cut definition of a sustainable fiscal position’, but nevertheless attempts to suggest a criterion for sustainability,deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas the long-term growth rate is affected by short-term business investment,deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas those economies that account for the largest propore threat of deflation ofin the EU’s GDP are in fact beset by excess saving, and whereas the threat of deflation is consequently stilluropean Union has been successfully presvent ined by the European UnionCB,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
I. whereas tax incentives that advantage economic agents with a strong propensity to save are liable to fuel excess saving leading to financial bubbles,deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
J. whereas population trends are shaped by changes in the fertility rate and migration flows,deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
K. whereas the health and macroeconomic benefits of reducing the compulsory component of social protection are dubious,deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
L. whereas there is still considerable demand for a welfare state in some Member States,s and whereas themany welfare states has not necessarily sapped those countries’ economic dynamism in the pastve proved their functionality and economic dynamism even in times of decreased economic growth,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
La. whereas the current debt and deficit levels threaten the very existence of the welfare state,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L b (new)
Lb. whereas the lack of implementing structural reforms and of consolidating public finances will have an adverse effect on expenditure with regard to health care, pensions and employment,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L c (new)
Lc. whereas many Member States are in breach of the Stability and Growth Pact and whereas proper compliance to it would have mitigated the negative effects of the crisis,
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Title before first paragraph
What kind of exit strategy?deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1. Expresses its deep concern about the long-term sustainability of public finances in the aftermath of the financial and economic crises; reminds that the efforts made within the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact prior to the crises were to a very high degree geared towards meeting the growing demographic challenge; acknowledges that much of this effort has been wiped out by the necessity to dramatically increase government expenditure mainly in order to prevent the world-wide melt- down of the financial system, but also to alleviate the worst of the social consequences of the economic crises;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 a (new)
-1a. Regrets that even before the crises started a number of Member States' performance in consolidating their public finances were not impressive despite the fact that the economic conditions were favourable; which was a breach of the preventive arm of the SGP, especially after its re-drafting in 2005, and which seriously diminished the capacity to act in a counter-cyclical way as the crises unfolded, leading to more uncertainty, higher unemployment and increased social problems;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 b (new)
-1b. Is aware that the current levels of public expenditure cannot be maintained indefinitely; welcomes the European Councils' decision to refrain from deciding on a follow-up package of help measures until the present one's results have been thoroughly analysed and the need for further action is clearly demonstrated;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 c (new)
-1c. Acknowledges that the operations destined to prevent a melt-down of the financial sector were successful, although vigilance is still highly necessary; expects the financial burden in relation to the saving of the banking sector to decrease; lauds the central banks' coordinated approach to achieve this goal; is proud of the ECB's leading role in saving the banking sector; puts its full weight behind the reform of the system of prudential supervision and the re-drawing of the framework of the financial architecture;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 d (new)
-1d. Underlines that the SGP must aim for balance or surplus over time, requiring surplus in economic good times and pension schemes transparently financed in the framework of public budgets or by funded private schemes;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 e (new)
-1e. Points out that the long-term sustainability of public finances is essential for stability and growth, and for maintaining appropriate levels of public expenditure; stresses that high debt and deficit levels are a threat to sustainability and will have adverse effects on public health care, pensions and employment;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 f (new)
-1f. Expresses its deep concern with the high deficit and debt levels in the Member States; warns against using the crisis not to consolidate public finances, not to decrease public spending and not to implement structural reforms, all of which are essential for a return to growth and employment;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 g (new)
-1g. Reminds that the consolidation of public finances, the reduction of deficit and debt levels is essential to maintain a modern welfare state and a system of redistribution which caters for society as a whole but especially supports the less privileged parts of it;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 h (new)
-1h. Stresses that, if public debt continues to increase, the costs in the form of interest rate payments cannot be borne anymore by future generations without endangering welfare state models;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 i (new)
-1i. Is deeply concerned that many Member States are in breach with the Stability and Growth Pact; regrets that Member States have not consolidated their public finances in economic beneficial times before the crisis; agrees with the Commission statement that debt sustainability should get a very prominent and explicit role in surveillance procedures; urges the Commission to rigorously ensure compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. DWarns against an abrupt end of support to the real economy in order to avoid a double dip; draws attention to the undesirable effects – in terms of deteriorating employment, human capital and purchasing power – of prematurely withdrawing support measures; reminds that these measures were explicitly meant to be timely, targeted and temporary; welcomes the Commission's work on the exit strategy from the present contingency measures; supports the Commission's approach of exit strategies that are differentiated between countries in time and scope; understands that the withdrawals from the measures will start in 2011 for the first batch of countries; encourages the Member States to do their utmost to implement the exit strategies as soon and as firmly as possible;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Considers that the fiscal exit strategy should start before the monetary exit strategy in order to allow the latter to be correctly implemented, thus ensuring that the ECB, which successfully avoided a slip into deflation, can equally well insure that inflation does not ruin the recovery; understands that the ECB has hinted that in the absence of timely fiscal reining-in, its monetary tightening would regrettably have to be stronger than anticipated;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Points to the fact that the anti-cyclical effects of the SGP can only work if the Member States effectively achieve a budgetary surplus in good times; calls in this respect for a better implementation also of the preventive arm or the SGP; urges to move from the 'spend first, reimburse later' attitude to a 'save for a possible future emergency' principle; reminds that the SGP requires the Member States to achieve a budget that is balanced or in surplus over the medium term, meaning that a deficit of three percent is not an aim, but the extreme limit allowed for, even under the revised Pact; warns decision-makers as well as businesses to get used to non- conventional fiscal and monetary measures to expect these to become the norm;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Urges to carry out structural reforms in parallel to the unwinding of the help packages in order to prevent future crises as well as to increase the competitiveness of the European businesses, achieve more growth and boost employment;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Takes the view that the Commission should define indicators of a ‘recovering economy’ in order to determine the point at which exit strategies should be deployed, for example where an economy has reached its normal production capacity utilisation rate;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Suggests that the Commission apply aAcknowledges that fiscal stimple rule enabling each Member State to let its automatic stabilisers work: allow ‘non-conventional’ measures for as long as the production capacity utilisation rate is lower than normal, andulus and unfettered automatic stabilisers have proved to be successful and suggests that the Commission ask the Member States to strive towards a balanced budget by allocating primary budget surpluses to debt repayment once the economy is on the way to full employmentsustained recovery;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Title before paragraph 5
How can the long-term sustainability of public finances be determindeleted?
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Agrees with the Commission that ‘successful fiscal expansion to counter recession and longer-term fiscal sustainability are not incompatible’; stresses, however, that fiscal expansion has to be temporary and targeted;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Takes the view that, where there is an imbalance between savings and investment, budgetary policy must, by means of borrowing, be able to budgetary policy must, predominantly by means of reallocation, convert available savings into growth-boosting investment expenditure (such as investment in developing a zero-carbonresearch and development, modernising the industrial base, developing a smarter and greener economy in the European Union);
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Emphasises that public-sector and welfare spending is more than just unproductive expenditure, since it also has a beneficial impact on the accumulation of physical and human capital and on effective demand; stresses that due to more scarce resources the quality of public sector spending has to be improved;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Emphasises that the resulting increase in the potential growth rate would in turn be likely to relax constraints on financing such expenditure, thanks to the ensuing tax revenue;deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls that the long-term balance of compulsory penssustainability of social protection schystemes depends not only on population trends, but also on the productivity of assets (which affects the potential growth rate)consolidation of public finances and the proporreduction of GDP allocated to the financing of such schemedebt and deficit levels;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Recalls that the debt burden increases when real interest rates are higher than the GDP growth rate, and that deficits are sustainable as long as they do not entail a transfer of burdens so large that they cannot be borne by the relevant economic agents;deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Title before paragraph 14
How can public debt be assessdeleted?
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Asks the Commission to carry out studies that will afford a basis for assessing the quality of thessess Member States’ debts – which determines interest rates on government borrowing – in order to improve the information available to credit-rating agencies;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Suggests, in particular, that the Commission assess the effects of the fiscal spending deployed by the Member States in order to kick-start their economies, in terms of its impact on production and, on government accounts and the long-term sustainability of public finances;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Suggests that the term ‘excessive deficit’ be used where spending or poorly calibrated tax incentives increase the debt by depriving the government of significant resources without producing the effect on growth and tax revenue forecast in the budget legislation;deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls that the Stability and Growth Pact was revised in 2005 in order to allow the de facto adoption of the principles underpinning a counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy, which have come into their own in the faand that a counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy can only work if Member States strive for a balanced of the crisir surplus budget in economic upswings;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Asks the Commission to ensure that any recommendations on deficit reduction are compatible with this principle of counter-cyclical management of public finances;deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Calls for the structural deficit to be used as anone of the indicators used for determining the long-term sustainability of public finances;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for an indicator of the level of structural debt – such as the ‘government debt-to-assets’ ratio or the ‘net debt-to- GDP’ ratio – to be used in order to determine the Member States’ solvency;deleted
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Considers a renewed growth and jobs strategy as key contributor to sustainable public finances in the European Union; believes that the European Union needs to modernise its economy and particularly its industrial base; calls for a re-allocation in the EU and the Member States' budgets towards greater investment into research and innovation; points out that the new EU 2020 strategy needs binding instruments to succeed;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
20b. Reminds that the interest rates' spreads on the capital markets are the main indicators of the Member States' solvency;
2010/03/09
Committee: ECON