27 Amendments of Pascal CANFIN related to 2010/2303(INI)
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes the shortcomings of the prescriptive US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which failed to protect US institutions during the financial crisis, whilst at the same time increasing compliance costs for all listed companies, in particular SMEs, reducing competitiveness and hampering the creation of new listed companieat the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act turned out to be inappropriate to protect US institutions during the financial crisis;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Recognises that while the area of corporate governance is constantly evolving and is therefore ill-suited to a prescriptive approach and that a, flexible ‘'comply or explain’' approaches in the form of codes of best practice is more appropriate; believes that ‘comply or explain’ is proportionate and can be applied across a wide range of financial institutions operating in various sectors and markets, but that it mustguidelines have failed as a useful instrument to avoid the financial crisis and proven to be ineffective; believes that binding rules need to be at the core of corporate governance regulation, to be complemented by soft regular external evaluation and appropriate regulatory oversighttion such as codes of best practices;
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls onRequests that the Commission to submitsubjects every proposal it considers to improve corporate governance to a cost-benefit impact assessment which focuses on the need to keep financial institutions competitive so that the, taking into account the impact of not regulating on financial stability can help deliver economic growthd the real economy;
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Stresses that risk is intrinsic and necessary in the financial sector in order to foster competitiveness,limited and controlled risk taking can contribute to increaseing liquidity, provideing loans, and delivering economic growth on a long-term basis;
Amendment 22 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls upon the Commission to propose measures concerning mandatory board risk committees and rules on their composition and function; considers that members of the risk committees should devote enough time to their duty to be in a position to really assess the risks of complex financial instruments
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Calls for the establishment of mandatory risk committees at board level for all economically significantcross border financial institutions; members of the risk committee shall devote enough time to their duty to be in a position to really assess the risks of complex financial institutions;
Amendment 25 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Encourages institutional shareholders to engage in a dialogue with financial institutions on improving corporate governance and risk management with a view to the long-term viability of the financial institution; encourages in this respect institutional investors to adhere tobelieves that "comply or explain" approaches in the form of guidelines have failed as a useful instrument to avoid the financial crisis and proven to be ineffective, and that binding rules need to be at the core of corporate governance regulation, to be complemented by soft regulation such as an international code of best practice;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Calls for a rationalisation of currentthe revision of the relevant existing EU legislation with the aim of requiring every institution to publish in its annual report a risk report and a business model setting out the board's approach to overall risk strategy, including its risk tolerance and appetite, risk policy, risk management and internal control systems, including compliance policy, thereby enabling investors and supervisors to assess whether the institution has identified key risks and whether the risk management and internal control systems relating to those risks are adequate;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. insists that extra-financial risks such as climate change must be part of any risk assessment;
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Calls on national and EU supervisors, the latter with regard to cross boarder institutions, to develop objective criteria for a ‘"fit and proper person’" test by which to assess the suitability of individuals to be added to an ‘"approved persons’" list for supervised functions; supervisors must perform their assessments and approvals procedure in a timely and efficient manner;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Believes that all non-executive members of unitary or supervisory boards should be of high calibre, that every board should have non-executive members who possess recent and relevant financial industry expertisknowledge, whose role should be complemented by other non-executives with other areas of expertise and experience relevant to the work of the board, that every financial institution should have a board with a diversity of experience, expertise and character and that appointments should be made on merit;
Amendment 68 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that directors must devote sufficient time to the performance of their duties, which should be monitored by national and EU supervisory bodies;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Believes that there should be a basic assumption that no person shouldany person shall not be serveing on more than threone boards of directors of financial institutions;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Stresses that properly disclosed share- options with vesting periods of at least three years10 years (and at least three years after leaving the institution) for directors are a useful tool to brin aligning the interests of directors into line with those of the shareholders;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Suggests banning severance pay in case of non-performance or voluntary departure and that directors' pay on severance pay ('golden parachutes') in case of early termination should not exceed 6 months non variable remuneration;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 b (new)
Paragraph 22 b (new)
22b. Is of the opinion, for ethical, social and economic reasons, that the difference between the highest and the lowest remuneration in a company should be reasonable; proposes that the directors’ remunerations should not be higher than five times the average remuneration of the 1000 best paid employees of the company;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 c (new)
Paragraph 22 c (new)
22c. Is of the opinion, that the pay rise of directors should be consistent with the pay rise of employees of the company; proposes that the percentage increase in remuneration of directors should not be higher than the average pay raise of the employees of the company;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Notes that the issueWelcomes as a first significant step in the right direction the rules ofn remuneration in financial institutions has been dealt withstipulated in CRD III;
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. stresses that the overall annual remuneration of directors of financial institutions benefiting from state aid should not exceed 500.000 Euros;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)
Paragraph 23 b (new)
23b. Considers that for financial institutions, the competent supervision authority should have the right to limit the overall amount of variable remuneration in order to strengthen equity capital;
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 c (new)
Paragraph 23 c (new)
23c. Stresses that financial institutions should have a remuneration committee which should determine the remuneration policy, which must be independent and accountable to shareholders and supervisors and should work closely with the firm's risk committee in the evaluation of the incentives created by the compensation system as well as with the trade unions' representatives;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 d (new)
Paragraph 23 d (new)
23d. Believes that the chair and the members of the remuneration committee must be members of the management body who do not perform any executive functions in the financial institution or the listed company concerned and who are not directors of other companies as their own remunerations are based on benchmark which give them an interest to encourage remuneration inflation;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 e (new)
Paragraph 23 e (new)
23e. Is of the opinion that shareholders should contribute towards the determination of sustainable remuneration policies and should be given the opportunity to express their views on the remuneration policies with the right to reject the remuneration policy defined by the remuneration committee at the general meeting;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 f (new)
Paragraph 23 f (new)
23f. Stresses that non-executive board members' compensation should only comprise fixed pay and should not include performance or share-based pay;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 g (new)
Paragraph 23 g (new)
23g. Is of the opinion that quality-linked performance criteria should be taken into consideration in order to determine the level of the variable compensation; proposes therefore that the 'social added value of companies' performance' should be taken into consideration as one essential criterion, as well as 'sustainability' criteria when applicable; considers therefore that variable remuneration of directors should not be mainly based on financial results but also on operational, safety, social and environmental results;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Considers that internal audit departments of systemic institutions shall be supervised both by the financial institutions' directors and supervisors ; in particular, supervisors shall have at any time the possibility to dismiss the director of the internal audit in case of inappropriate performance of its tasks;
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Stresses that an auditor's primary role should not be compromised by the burden of extra duties, such as an examination and assessment of non-audit information, which falls outside his or her area of expertiserules for auditing firms need to be developed to tackle conflict of interests as being discussed in the field of credit rating agencies;