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18 Amendments of Bas EICKHOUT related to 2013/0265(COD)

Amendment 37 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) The currently existing wide variety of interchange fees and their level prevent the emergence of ‘new’ pan Union players on the basis of business models with lower or no interchange fees, to the detriment of potential economies of scale and scope and their resulting efficiencies. This has a negative impact on retailers and consumers and prevents innovation. As Pan-Union players would have to offer issuing banks as a minimum the highest level of interchange fee prevailing in the market they want to enter it also results in persisting market fragmentation. Existing domestic schemes with lower or no interchange fees may also be forced to exit the market because of the pressure from banks to obtain higher interchange fees revenues. As a result, consumers and merchants face restricted choice, higher prices and lower quality of payment services while their ability to use pan- Union payment solutions is restricted. In addition, retailers cannot overcome the fee differences by making use of card acceptance services offered by banks in other Member States. Specific rules applied by the payment schemes require the application of the interchange fee of the ‘Point of Sale’ (country of the retailer) for each payment transaction. This prevents acquiring banks from successfully offering their services on a cross border basis. It also prevents retailers from reducing their payment costs to the benefit of consumers.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) For domestic transactions, a short transition period is necessary to provide payment services providers and schemes with time to adapt to the new requirements. Therefore, after a two yearsix months period following the entry into force of this Regulation and in order to provide for a completion of an internal market for card- based payments, the caps on interchange fees for consumer card transactions should be extended to cover all, cross-border and domestic payments.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) In order to facilitate cross border acquiring all (cross-border and domestic) 'consumer' debit card transactions and card based payment transaction should have a maximumno interchange fee of 0,20%in line with the impact assessment and all (cross-border and domestic) consumer credit card transactions and card based payment transactions based on those should have a maximum interchange fee of 0.30%.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18 a (new)
(18a) The impact assessment shows that a prohibition of interchange fees for debit card transactions would be beneficial for card acceptance, card usage, development of the single market and generate more benefits to merchants and consumers than a cap set at any higher level. Moreover it would avoid that national systems with very low or zero interchange fees for debit transaction would be negatively affected by a higher cap due to cross border expansion or new market entrants increasing fee levels to the level of the cap. A ban on interchange fees for debit card transactions also addresses the threat of exporting the interchange fee model to new, innovative payment services such as mobile and online systems.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
(19) Those caps are for consumer credit card transactions is based on the so-called 'Merchant Indifference Test' developed in economic literature, which identifies the fee level a merchant would be willing to pay if he were to compare the cost of the customer's use of a payment card with those of non-card (cash) payments (taking into account the fee for service paid to acquiring banks, i.e. the merchant service charge coming on top of the interchange fee). It thereby stimulates the use of efficient payment instruments through a promotion of those cards that provide higher transactional benefits, while at the same time preventing disproportionate merchant fees, which would impose hidden costs on other consumers. Excessive merchant fees might otherwise arise due to the collective interchange fee arrangements, as merchants are reluctant to turn down costly payment instruments for fear of losing business. Experience has shown that those levels are proportionate, as they do not call into question the operation of international card schemes and payment service providers. They also provide benefits for retailers and consumers and provide legal certainty.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28
(28) In accordance with Article 55of the proposal COM (2013)547 the payee can steer Surcharging has neither payer towards the use of a specific payment instrument. However, no charges should be requested by the payee for the use of payment instruments of which interchange fees are regulated within the scope of this Regulation, as in such situations the advantages of surcharging become limited while creating complexity in the marketroved to be an efficient steering mechanism for merchants to negotiate lower fees, nor has it generated downward pressure on interchange fees. Overall, surcharging has been detrimental to consumers and should therefore be prohibited.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) transactions with commercial cards,deleted
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4
(4) 'debit card transaction' means an card payment transaction included with prepaid cards linked to a current or deposit access account to which aeach transaction is individually debited in less than or 48 hour2 business days after the transaction has been authorised/initiated.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5
(5) 'credit card transaction' means an card payment transaction where the transaction is settled more than 48 hour2 business days after the transaction has been authorised/initiated and to which a number of payment transactions is pooled to one amount and debited from a current or deposit account;
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1
1. With effect from two months after the entry into force of this Regulation, payment services providers shall not offer or request for cross-border debit card transactions a per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or effect of more than 0,2 % of the value of the transaction.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2
2. With effect from two months after the entry into force of this Regulation, payment services providers shall not offer or request for cross-border credit card transactions a per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or effect of more than 0,3 % of the value of the transaction. Member States may introduce a lower cap.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. With effect from two yearsix months after the entry into force of this Regulation, payment service providers shall not offer or request a per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or effect of more than 0,2 % of the value of the transaction for any debit card based transactions.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2
2. With effect from twosix months years after the entry into force of this Regulation, payment service providers shall not offer or request a per transaction interchange fee or other agreed remuneration with an equivalent object or effect of more than 0,3 % of the value of the transaction for any credit card based transactions. Member States may introduce a lower cap.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Every year after the entry into force of this Regulation, the European Banking Authority shall provide a report on the profits derived from interchange fees disaggregated by Member State and distinguishing between cross border and domestic transactions.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The issuer shall provide consumers with clear and balanced information on available brands and their key features. Issuers shall be prohibited from requiring consumers to accept more than one brand of payment instruments on a card, telecommunication, digital or IT device.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 304 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. EBA shall be empowered to issue guidelines to ensure sanctions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Member States shall ensure that payment service providers participate in complaint procedures pursuant to paragraph 1.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1
FourThree years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the application of this Regulation. The Commission's report shall look in particular at the appropriateness of the levels of interchange fees and at steering mechanisms such as charges, taking into account the use and cost of the various means of payments and the level of entry of new players and new technology on the market, as well as appropriateness of the levels of interchange fees and assess the gains for consumers of the caps and compare them to potential gains for consumers of an all-encompassing ban on interchange fees. If appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal.
2014/01/28
Committee: ECON