17 Amendments of Sven GIEGOLD related to 2009/2090(INI)
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas growing global trade imbalances and an increasing disconnect between the movements of nominal exchange rates and the inflation differential between countries have been the main causes of the current financial and economic crisis,
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas the Treaty confers responsibility for exchange rate policy on the Council in order to address global imbalances,
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the ECB does not have a redistributive mandate,
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas since October 2008 the ECB has accepted as collateral in repos and at the discount window a wide range of private securities in the framework of its "Enhanced Credit Support", including most asset-backed securities, as long as they have at least a BBB- rating and the ECB therefore takes credit risk on these outright purchases; whereas none of such ECB loans to private entities and collateralised against private securities are guaranteed by Member States' Treasuries,
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
Recital H b (new)
Hb. whereas certain banks which borrowed from the Eurosystem, such as Kaupthing’s Luxembourg subsidiary and Lehman Europe, have become insolvent; whereas the ECB had to write off its risky exposures; whereas other banks (such as the German Landesbanken and the Spanish Cajas) have serious solvency concerns,
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Underlines that the risk of a growing asset price bubble cannot yet be excluded; therefore, reiterates its call for quick progress as regards the consolidation of the regulatory and supervisory framework to address that challenge; likewise, calls on the ECB to develop a plan on how to avoid new asset price bubbles while bearing in mind that restricting the general offer of credit to enterprises and consumers has high costs for employment and economic development;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Is concerned by the unwillingness of the ECB to reveal how it values illiquid collateral makes it impossible for external assessors to determine whether an ex-ante subsidy was involved in the terms and conditions of the loans;
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)
Paragraph 8 c (new)
8c. Request the ECB to make public either the pricing models or the actual valuations of all illiquid private securities offered as collateral;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 d (new)
Paragraph 8 d (new)
8d. Demands that the Commission assess the potential quasi-fiscal role of the ECB and therefore analyse the conformity of its "Enhanced Credit Support" with EU competition law;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Concurs with the ECB about the need to learn lessons from the crisis; in particular that management of risk and liquidity in the financial system, and the transparency of financial markets and institutions must be improved if a similar crisis is not to be repeated; recalls that global imbalances related to exchange rate fluctuations between the euro and third-country currencies such as the US dollar and the renminbi-yuan, must also be addressed to avoid financial crises in the future;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Recommends that any moves to increase interest ratesa more restrictive monetary policy should be taken with the utmost caution so as not to endanger future economic growthrecovery;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. SExpresses its concerns about the rise of public debt in the euro area; points out, however, that if fiscal support is withdrawn too quickly, the economy could tip back into recession; states that Member States should continue, for the time being, with their current coordinated fiscal stimulus measures to protect jobs, encourage investment and stimulate growth; calls on the Member States to begin the process of reducing their public debt as soon as the economy is strong enough to withstand such reduction; recalls in this respect that Member States' specific circumstances should be taken into account and that Member States should be permitted to tighten their fiscal policy accordingly at times when the recovery is secure;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Acknowledges that monetary policy is limited in its scope and cannot resolve macro-economic heterogeneity between Member States in the euro area; underlines, in this context, that the budget of the European Union is not sufficiently large to limit the imbalances between Member States effectively; notes that because of the lack of a sufficient solidarity mechanism and the limited EU budget, labour market flexibility and structural reforms have become the main tools by which to counteract asymmetrical development;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14b. Regrets that Member States have engaged in wage deflation as way of restoring competitiveness; points out that such a strategy hampers social rights and solidarity among countries; takes the view that the setting-up of cooperative institutional setting is still needed to combat effectively unemployment and to achieve social and territorial cohesion; suggests, in this context, that the size of the budget of the European union be re- examined; considers it also to be of utmost importance to ensure better coordination of national wage developments as a way to mitigate imbalances across the European Union; in particular, reiterates its call for the introduction or maintenance of a minimum wage in every Member State;
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Calls on all Member States in the euro area to take note that, for genuine monetary union to exist, participation in the euro area cannot be regarded as an end in itself, and stresses the need for structural reforms that aim, inter alia, to reduce non-renewable energy consumption and resource use; adds that failure to make such reforms would jeopardise the credibility of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact; points out that the facilities granted by the revised Stability and Growth Pact must be geared towards the financing of high- quality public investments that are needed to meet the climate-energy package and, more broadly, to reduce the ecological debt; in particular, stresses the need to direct government expenditure towards policies such as education, research and development and innovation; reiterates also its conviction that green taxation has a key role to play for triggering structural changes necessary for sound public finances;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new) (after subheading "The external dimension of the euro")
Paragraph 19 a (new) (after subheading "The external dimension of the euro")
19a. Invites the Council, the Eurogroup, and the ECB to enhance the coordination of their activities in the sphere of exchange rate policy;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Recalls that exchange rate fluctuations constitute an impediment to global economic recovery; in particular, considers that the appreciation of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis key currencies is a growing concern; deems it essential, therefore, to promote under the leadership of the IMF exchange rate arrangements with the US dollar or the renminbi-yen along the lines of the Louvre Accord of 1987 as a way of guarding against currency speculation, limiting global imbalances and providing enough policy space for all countries to pursue appropriate counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies in the face of a recession or financial crisis;