30 Amendments of Sven GIEGOLD related to 2010/2078(INI)
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas overall real GDP in the euro area shrank by 4.0% in 2009 after the financial turmoil deepened following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, whereas behind such an aggregated figure there are strong disparities between euro-area Member States,
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the ECB adjusted interest rates down to 1% and continued substantial and unprecedented non- standard measures to support credit; whereas the ECB balancesheet size has significantly increased throughout the year 2009,
Amendment 6 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas the credit growth rate in the euro area has been negative all along the year 2009 despite a substantial increase of the monetary base,
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
Eb. whereas the ECB has officially conducted lender-of-last-resort actions and has participated in currency swaps with other governments on its own account and, through the provision of repo facilities, to non-euro area countries such as Hungary during 2009,
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas there have been signs of economic stabilisation in the euro area over the second half of 2009 and quarterly growth rates, though still weak, have turned positive, whereas behind these aggregated figure some euro-area Member States remained in recession during the same period,
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that substantial imbalances between the euro zone economies have occurredIs deeply concerned about the persistence of substantial macroeconomic imbalances between the euro zone economies as well as deflationary pressures in many euro-area Member States;
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Condemns the fact that the principles of the Stability and Growth Pact were not always fully respected in the past; calls for unrestricted application of the Stability and Growth Pactreminds that if the objective to regain a balance of public finances and reduce indebtedness is a necessity for over-indebted states it will not solve alone the problem of economic imbalances between countries of the euro-area and more broadly of the EU; calls therefore for an ambitious reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in order to enhance surveillance and strengthen economic policy coordination beyond the budgetary dimension to address other macroeconomic imbalances and strengthen enforcement procedures;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that a monetary union needs strong and enhanced coordination of economic policies to be robust; regrets that in the Economic and Monetary Union the emphasis has largely been on the "‘monetary"’ side;
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Calls therefore on the Commission to put forward ambitious legislative proposals to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact and for a permanent crisis management scenarioframework;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. SharesIs deeply concernsed about possible speculation against the eurospeculative threats against the euro and other EU currencies;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Takes the view that credit growth and assets prices developments in the EU and in Member States are crucial indicators for an effective monitoring of financial stability within the EMU and more broadly the EU;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Is concerned about continuous strains on the euro area sovereign bonds markets reflected on widening spreads; deems that flight to safety provoked by waves of panic experienced during the current financial crisis have had massive distorting effects and have created costly negative externalities;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the proposal to establish a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which will close the current gap in macro- prudential supervision; calls on the ECB to establish clear models and definitions to ensure the effective functioning and accountability of the ESRB; adds that any new tasks conferred upon the ECB with regard to the ESRB should not compromise the independence of the ECB in any way;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Notes that since the crisis, the role of the ECB has been crucial, deems that such a role should involve reinforced transparency and accountability;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15b. Recalls its concerns over ECB’s procedural transparency; recalls its repeated demands related to the publication of the minutes of the ECB Governing Council;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Notes that the financial crisis in the euro-area is a solvency crisis that initially manifested itself as a liquidity crisis; deems that such a situation cannot be resolved in the long term by simply pouring new debt and liquidity into highly indebted economies in combination with accelerated plans for fiscal consolidation;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Believes that the crisis has revealed a trend in the economic policies of recent years which left many countries both within and outside the euro area with an alarming rate of public and private debt;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Recalls that before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the ratio of public debt to GDP of the euro-area and EU as a whole, as well as the ratio for the majority of member states has declined in between 1999 and 2007 and that in contrast, debt levels of households, firms and the leverage of the financial sector experienced a significant increase over the same period; acknowledges that some Member States such as Greece and Italy were important exceptions to these general trend;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17b. Reminds that the huge increase of public debt since 2008 in several member States has been triggered by the fact these countries had to face excesses previously caused by an unsustainable growth of private debt and huge financial bubbles; believes therefore that the current crisis made it evident that the fiscal position is unsustainable if the financing of the private sector is unsustainable;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Notes that this has lead to far reaching austerity measures which are necessary and often overdue, but which at the same time heavily constrain the capacity of governments to act;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that the lack of credit reaching the real economy stemmed more from lower demand due to diminished activity in the real economy thanas well as from the reluctance of banks to grant credit;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Underlines that several Member States' banks have been excessively reliant on liquidity provided by the ECB; notes that the Eurosystem performed several non standard liquidity injections into the Euro Area banking system, including a €442bn open-ended injection of one-year liquidity into 1121 banks in June 2009 (its largest one day operation ever) against euro-denominated collateral rated at least BBB-;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 b (new)
Paragraph 20 b (new)
20b. Stresses that the Eurosystem has refused to disclose the method used to determine the 'theoretical price' of impaired assets eligible for its liquidity operations in the framework of the Enhanced Credit Support during the whole year 2009, underlines that it is therefore impossible to verify whether the ECB has played a quasi-fiscal role; demands in this perspective to the ECB to disclose its valuation methods used all along the crisis;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that the non-standard measures which the ECB has introduced since October 2008 to support credit have been successful in avoiding a deeper recession and additional financial turmoil; reiterates that the exit from these measures needs to be well timed and well coordinated with national governments and their activities;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Is concerned however with the potential asymmetric impact of ECB's exit strategy given the substantial differences between euro-area Member States regarding the business cycle;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Asks therefore the ECB to carefully assess if monetary tightening should occur while the liquidity policies are still in place as well as to explore whether compulsory reserves requirements could be an additional instrument to the interest rate in order to preserve financial stability without hampering the recovery;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Shares concerns about the pro-cyclical aspects of the current regulatory, prudential, accounting and taxation rules which amplify the fluctuations that are inherent in the functioning of a market economy;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Considers that the global financial system needs to be made less fragile and that lessons from the crisis must be drawn on a global level to reduce systemic risk, tackle financial bubbles, improve the quality of risk management and the transparency of financial markets;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Acknowledges that the strength of the euro was partly due to weak economic activity in the US, where the account deficit narrowed sharply to about 2.9% of GDP and the federal budget deficit widened to about 10% of GDP; shares concerns about the expansion of the volume of money in the US and to a lesser extent in the EU;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. Is concerned about exchange rates volatility and carry trade operations experienced during the crisis and its consequences for both global financial stability and the real economy;