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Activities of Dennis de JONG related to 2017/0226(COD)

Shadow reports (1)

2016/11/22
Committee: LIBE
Dossiers: 2017/0226(COD)
Documents: PDF(705 KB) DOC(111 KB)

Amendments (24)

Proposal for a directive
Title 0

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, including fraudulent payment requests, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA (This amendment applies throughout the text.)

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Recital 6 a (new)

(6a) There is a widespread practice of fraudulent payment requests. These fraudulent requests can take many forms, such as payment forms, trademark protection scams, misleading ‘business opportunities’ and ‘get-rich-quick’- schemes. The perpetrators of these fraudulent payment requests are very difficult to trace and prosecute, as they often send invoices from one country to another, while their bank account is in yet another country, adding a cross-border dimension to this type of fraud. This Directive should therefore cover fraudulent payment requests1a _________________ 1a (2013/2122(INI)) European Parliament resolution on misleading advertisement practices

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7

(7) Common definitions in this area are important to ensure a consistent approach in Member States’ application of this Directive. The definitions need to cover new types of payment instruments, such as electronic money and virtual currencies, as well as fraudulent payment requests.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9

(9) Effective and efficient criminal law measures are essential to protect non-cash means of payment against fraud and counterfeiting. In particular, a common criminal law approach is needed to the constituent elements of criminal conduct that contribute to or prepare the way for the actual fraudulent use of means of payment. Behaviour such as the collection and possession of payment instruments with the intention to commit fraud, through, for instance, phishing or skimming, and their distribution, for example by selling credit card information on the internet, should thus be made a criminal offence in its own right without being directly linked to the actual fraudulent use of means of payment. So such criminal conduct should also cover circumstances where possession, procurement or distribution does not necessarily lead to fraudulent use of such payment instruments, if the offender is aware of such a possibility (dolus eventualis). This Directive does not sanction the legitimate use of a payment instrument, including and in relation to the provision of innovative payment services, such as services commonly developed by fintech companies.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Recital 18

(18) A number of instruments and mechanisms exist at Union level to enable the exchange of information among national law enforcement authorities to investigate and prosecute crimes. To facilitate and speed up cooperation among national law enforcement authorities and make sure that those instruments and mechanisms are used to their fullest extent, this Directive should strengthen the importance of the operational points of contact introduced by Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA. Member States may decide to make use of the existing network of operational points of contact, such as that set up in Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council48 . They should provide effective assistance, for example facilitating the exchange of relevant information and the provision of technical advice or legal information. To ensure the network runs smoothly, each point of contact should be able to communicate quickly with the point of contact of another Member State. Given the significant trans-border dimension of this area of crime and in particular the volatile nature of the electronic evidence, Member States should be able to promptly deal with urgent requests from this network of points of contact and provide feedback within eight hours. In addition, the operational national points of contact should be used to report and exchange information regarding fraudulent payment requests. The Commission should facilitate the setting-up of a rapid alert system identifying new fraudulent practices. _________________ 48 Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA (OJ L 218, 14.8.2013, p. 8).

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Recital 20

(20) Fraud and counterfeiting of non- cash means of payment can result in serious economic and non-economic consequences for its victims. Where such fraud, for example, involves identity theft, its consequences are often aggravated because of reputational damage and serious emotional harm. Member States should adopt measures of assistance, support and protection aimed at mitigating these consequences.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Recital 23

(23) Member States should establish or strengthen policies to prevent fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, and measures to reduce the risk of becoming victims of such offences, for example, by means of information and awareness- raising campaigns and research and education programmes.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Recital 24

(24) There is a need to collect comparable data on the offences laid down in this Directive. Relevant data should be made available to the competent specialised Union agencies and bodies, such as Europol, and the Commission in line with their tasks and information needs. The aim would be to gain a more complete picture of the problem of fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment and issues relating to payment security at Union level, and so contribute to formulating a more effective response. Member States should make full use of Europol's mandate and capacity to provide assistance and support to relevant investigations, by submitting information on the offenders’ modus operandi to Europol for the purpose of conducting strategic analyses and threat assessments of fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council52 . . Providing information can help better understand present and future threats and assist the Council and the Commission in laying down strategic and operational priorities of the Union for fighting crime and in the ways of implementing those priorities. _________________ 52 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53).

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 a (new)

Article 2 a Fraudulent payment requests For the purpose of this Directive ‘fraudulent payment requests’ means: 1. misleading payment forms disguised as invoices for services the victim has purportedly already ordered, where in fact the victim has not; 2. payment requests purporting to come from public authorities or companies, where in fact they are not; 3. advertising which intentionally deceives or is likely to deceive victims whom it reaches in order for the perpetrator to economically benefit from the victim.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – title

Fraudulent use of payment requests and instruments

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(ba) fraudulent payment requests

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – title

Offences preparatory to the fraudulent use of payment instruments and requests

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)

(ca) preparing or executing fraudulent payment requests.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(ba) (re)directing payment service users to imitation websites.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point a

~~(a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid;~~deleted

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities;, including barring the legal person from public procurement in Member States and by the Union

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. If multiple Member States have established jurisdiction over an offence, Member States shall consult each other in order to determine which of the Member States has final jurisdiction over the offence, bearing in mind the principle of ne bis in idem.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The operational national points of contact shall play an active role in sharing information between citizens, companies and public authorities about fraudulent practices as referred to in Articles 3 to 7. In addition, the operational national contact points shall regularly inform the public about the general findings in examples that are easy to understand.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 2

2. Member States shall inform the Commission, Europol and Eurojust of their appointed point of contact referred to in paragraph 1 and update this information as necessary. The Commission shall forward that information to the other Member States.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. When dealing with data as referred to in this Article, competent authorities shall comply with applicable Union data protection rules.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 14 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Operational national contact points shall inform the Commission of new fraudulent practices. The Commission shall set-up a rapid alert system to identify new fraudulent practices and to inform the operational national contact points and Europol as soon as possible about such new fraudulent practices.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 2

2. Member States shall ensure that a system is in place for the recording, production and provision of statistical data measuring the reporting, investigative and judicial phases concerning the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 7. The operational national point of contacts shall be responsible, given that their knowledge on fraudulent practices is most up to date.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 17 – paragraph 3

3. The statistical data referred to in paragraph 2 shall, as a minimum, cover the number of offences referred to in Articles 3 to 7 reported to the Member States, the number of cases investigated, the number of persons prosecuted for and convicted of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 7, the number of requests that are made through the operational national points of contact and data on the functioning of the reporting, investigative and judicial phases concerning these offences.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE

Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [24 months after entry into force]. They shall ~~immediat~~without undue delay inform the Commission thereof.

2018/04/12
Committee: LIBE