BETA

23 Amendments of Danuta Maria HÜBNER related to 2013/2047(INI)

Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
I. whereas the value clients derive from the clearing member may lies in their provision of a firewall against counterparty risk in relation to both the CCP and other clearing members;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Non-bank financial institutions themselves should develop comprehensive and substantive recovery plans that identify critical operations and services and develop strategies and measures necessary to ensure continued provision of critical operations and services;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – – subparagraph 1 b (new)
The recovery plans should be reviewed by the relevant supervisory authority. The supervisory authority should be able to request changes to the recovery plan and should lead and consult with the resolution authority, which, if different, could make recommendations to the supervisor;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 c (new)
Supervisory authorities should have the power to intervene for financial stability reasons. They may require the implementation of parts of recovery plans, which have not yet been activated or take other actions if necessary. The authorities should however also be aware of the risk of creating market uncertainty in already stressed circumstances;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 d (new)
Resolution and supervisory authorities in each country should strive to cooperate and keep each other informed;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 e (new)
Resolution plans should be owned and developed by the resolution authorities, on the basis of information provided by the financial institution in question;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 f (new)
For groups with entities in different jurisdictions, a group resolution plan should be agreed between different resolution authorities. The group resolution plans should be based on the presumption of cooperation between authorities in different jurisdictions;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 g (new)
To retain a consistency with Article 80 of the bank recovery and resolution directive (BRR), one could avoid creating new resolution colleges if existing groups or colleges perform similar functions and carry out similar tasks already. Existing groups may be adapted. While remaining consistent with the BRR, one should not disregard the specificities of the different non-bank financial institutions. If required, in situations in which urgent action is required, the resolution authority for a financial institution could take decisions and act without consulting the college first;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 h (new)
Resolution measures should differentiate between different services and activities which the financial market infrastructure institution in question is authorised to provide or perform;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 i (new)
Conflicts with the recovery and resolution plans and existing legislation, in particular the Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive (FCAD) and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which could constrain or prevent recovery and resolution powers for CCPs and CSDs from being effective, should be avoided;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Calls upon the Commission to ensure that CCPs have a default management strategy for all products that are mandated for central clearingcleared by a CCP as part of a wider recovery plan approved by the supervisor;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the Commission to recognise that while the aim of ring-fencing asset classes within a default fund of a CCP is to limit contagion, it is unclear whether this will be sufficient to prevent such contagion in practice. However, one should remember that a CCP with a separate default waterfall in respect of specified product lines is more likely to retain its financial stability following a default event and that ring-fencing asset classes represents one important tool in limiting contagion;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Calls on the Commission to ensure that sound principles are established governing contractual arrangements between a CCP and its clearing members and how clearing members pass on losses to their clients, in such a way that the clearing member's default fund contribution will have to be exhausted before any losses from a defaulting clearing member can be passed on to the client, and that any contractual arrangements between a CCP and its clearing members should distinguish between losses arising from a member default and those arising from other reasons and the approach to be adopted in each case, which may be different; Underlines that the rights of both direct as well as indirect clients (the clients of a client of a clearing member) should be protected;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
All CCPs should have in place comprehensive recovery arrangements which provide protection over and above the funds and resources required by EMIR. These recovery plans should provide protection against all foreseeable circumstances, and should be included and published as part of the CCP's rules. It is important that there is no ambiguity between the recovery phase (when the CCP takes emergency action in close discussion with its regulators) and the resolution phase (when the regulators take over).
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1 b (new)
In order to allow the recovery arrangements maximum chance of success, the resolution arrangements should be triggered once the recovery arrangements have failed or are considered likely to fail.
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Stresses the need to treat "continuity of service" as a key resolution objective.
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Underlines that any voluntary participation of clearing members in loss allocation before removal of the CCP's management should not involve client money, while the resolution authority, once responsible, may employ loss allocation tools such as variation margin cutting or refilling of the default fund by the non-defaulting clearing membersIn being required to provide robust defence against all foreseeable circumstances, recovery arrangements will inevitably include measures which impact their clearing members, and this should not be ruled out as part of a CCP's recovery arrangements. A CCP's supervisor should ensure that a CCP's recovery plans are appropriate and equitable as well as robust;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Central counterparties with a banking licence should be subject to a central counterparty-specific regime and not to the proposed bank recovery and resolution regime of the bank recovery and resolution directive (BRR). Of particular concern in this sense is the fact that the proposed regime for banks would require them to hold an aggregate amount of debt that can be bailed-in. Such a power would be inappropriate for central counterparties holding a banking licence because they do not tend to issue such debt instruments;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Establishes that it is the responsibility of a CSD to ensure that its recovery plan clearly provides for operational continuity in reasonable crisis scenarios so that, even if other parts of its business can be disposed of, its pcrimary settlementtical functions can continue;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Calls, if no separate legislative proposal is imminent, for inclusion in the CSDR of a requirement for national competent authorities to ensure the establishment of appropriate recovery and resolution plans in line with international standards for all CSDs, including references to the articles of the BRRD that should apply to those CSDs operating under a banking licence;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Recovery and resolution plans in the insurance sector will need to take into account developments in Solvency II. The latter should also be swiftly adopted.
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 – subparagraph 1 b (new)
The long term nature of insurance liabilities, along with the tools available to regulators, provide for efficient resolution practices. Accelerated resolution measures are not needed for insurers and would also not be in the interest of consumers. Ensuring the fulfilment of insurance obligation for them is more important in the long run than a one-time compensation. The focus should therefore be on recovery.
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Since payment systems are at the heart of all cash transfers, it is clear that a market perturbation in such a system would have significant spillovers on other financial market actors. The 1998 Settlement Finality Directive already aims to mitigate potential risks in payment systems. The directive however does not go sufficiently into recovery and resolution, and specific provisions need to be made in order to allow payments systems to adequately react to adverse circumstances.
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON