BETA

Activities of Danuta Maria HÜBNER related to 2020/2122(INI)

Plenary speeches (1)

Banking Union - annual report 2020 (debate)
2021/10/06
Dossiers: 2020/2122(INI)

Reports (1)

REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2020
2021/07/26
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2020/2122(INI)
Documents: PDF(227 KB) DOC(85 KB)
Authors: [{'name': 'Danuta Maria HÜBNER', 'mepid': 96779}]

Amendments (67)

Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 29
— having regard to the Memoranda of Understanding on supervisory cooperation between the UK supervisory authorities and the EU and its Member States’ supervisory authorities,deleted
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 32 a (new)
— having regard to the paper entitled ‘Liquidity in resolution: comparing frameworks for liquidity provision across jurisdictions’ of the ECB’s Occasional Paper Series1a, _________________ 1aGrund, Sebastian, Nomm, Nele and Walch, Florian, ‘Liquidity in resolution: comparing frameworks for liquidity provision across jurisdictions’, Occasional Paper Series, No 251, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, December 2020, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops /ecb.op251~65a080c5b3.en.pdf
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas overall, the banking sector has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with resilience, mostly founded on the regulatory reformsoverhaul enacted since the global financial crisis and further, facilitated by the single European Rulebook and Single Supervision in the Banking Union, and supported by extraordinary public policy relief measures and capital conservation practices;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas the Banking Union is open to all EU Member States; whereas Bulgaria and Croatia have joined ERM II and entered the Banking Union;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
A b. whereas a more stable, competitive and convergent Economic and Monetary Union requires a solid Banking Union and a more developed and safe Capital Markets Union; whereas the completion of the Banking Union would be a vital contributor to the international perception of the euro and its increased role in global markets;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
A c. whereas the Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), ensures full alignment between supervision and management of banking crisis;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the completion of the Banking Union beyond its two pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Singlexisting pillars remains a priority; whereas targeted reforms in the Rresolution Mechanism (SRM), is pendingand deposit insurance area to complete the Banking Union should further enhance the robustness of banks and safeguard overall financial stability;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will be introduced by 2022, two years earlier than previously foreseen, providing a common system-wide safety net for banks in resolution;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas the EU banking sector was characterised by structural inefficiencies before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, expressed in low profitability, low cost efficiency, low interest rates, overcapacity and uncertainty of sustainability of business models;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
B c. whereas the shortcomings identified during the pandemic provide renewed impetus to move forward on improving crisis management, further integrating the banking sector, addressing the home-host balance and the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures, as well as on the introduction of a European deposit insurance scheme; whereas embracing the lessons learned during the pandemic could pave the way for improved cost efficiency and more sustainable business models;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the lack of a solution to the treatment of sovereign debt exposures and national options and discretionsbanks have been developing concentrated exposures toward certain sovereigns but a solution to the treatment of sovereign debt exposures is still to be addressed; whereas a number of national discretions within legislative framework persists, undermining the European dimension of the Banking Union;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy bring new risks to banks’ balance sheets; , potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas the urge for technological transformation has accelerated, increasing the efficiency of banks and their ambition for innovation, while exposing them at the same time to the new risks and challenges of the digital finance world, cybersecurity, reputational risks, data privacy, AML risks and consumer protection;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas, despite strong EU consumer protection varies across the Banking Unrules, national rules implementing European consumer protection requirements vary across the Banking Union, pointing to the need for harmonisation;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas stronger EU prudential and anti-money laundering (AML) supervision is necessary;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas the standards of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision can serve as a global harmonising platform for banks, they should be enacted into European law in a timely fashion and with due regard for their goals, taking proper account of the specific characteristics of the European banking system, where appropriate, and the proportionality principle;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas the withdrawal of the UK from the EU has resulted in the relocation of banking services to the EU; whereas the SSM played a crucial steering and monitoring role through its systematic “preparedness” guidance and coordination with significant banks on their operating models; whereas the full assessment of effectiveness of banking sector’s preparedness to the new reality will be tested in the mid and long term perspective;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
I. whereas the crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework (CMDI) should be proportional, moreensure consistent and efficient hand more coherent, and shouldling of all banks, regardless of size or business model, as well as, contribute to preserving financial stability, minimising the use of taxpayers’ money and ensuring a level playing field across the EU;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
I a. whereas the current crisis management framework does not ensure a consistent approach in handling distressed banks across Member States, due to, inter alia, different interpretation of the Public Interest Assessment (PIA) by the SRB and National Resolution authorities outside the Banking Union, availability under national insolvency proceedings of tools that are similar to the resolution tools under BRRD and SRMR and the misalignment of incentives when choosing the solution for addressing a bank’s failure as a result of the different conditions for accessing the funding sources available in resolution and in insolvency;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
J. whereas supervision and resolution rules, as well as the resolution fund have been centralized, deposit guarantees schemes remain national and differ across Member States; whereas depositors across the Banking Union should enjoy the same level of protection;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the entry of Bulgaria and Croatia into the Banking Union; and the inclusion of the Bulgarian lev and the Croatian kuna in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II); takes note of the decisions of the European Central Bank (ECB) to establish close cooperation with Bulgarian National Banks and Croatian National Banks, whereby Bulgaria and Croatia joined, as of 1 October 2020, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); highlights that the National Banks of Bulgaria and Croatia are duly represented in the ECB and the SRB’s Plenary Session and Extended Executive Sessions with the same rights and obligations as all other members, including voting rights;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that the Banking Union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration, through the SSM and the SRM, while a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) is still lacking; welcomes the possible revision of the resolution framework and supports the current reflection for further harmonisation of insolvency laws, with a view to increase the efficiency and coherence of crisis management of banks in the EU, as well as for the creation of a deposit insurance mechanism in the Banking Union aiming to enhance the level of deposit protection;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that banks were able to responsed to the current crisis demonstrates thatwith resilience as they were being better-capitalized and less-leveraged than a decade ago, demonstrating positive effects of the institutional set-up that has been put in place and the regulatory reforms following the past decade, as well as the institutional set-up, have resulted in better-capitalised and less- leveraged banks2008 financial crisis; contemplates, nevertheless, that the banking sector is characterised by certain structural inefficiencies, which can be further exacerbated by the current crisis; believes that the deteriorating asset quality of banks and persisting low interest rate environment may increase the level of NPLs in the banks’ balance sheet and impact the already subdued profitability, potentially leading to insolvency cases particularly for the most affected sectors; considers urgent and immediate action is required;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Finds that the RRF may provide impetus for the completion of the Banking Union; highlights the crucial role of the banking sector in providing access to credit and channelling available funding into the real economy, in particular into sustainable and socially responsible investments;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3 b. Observes that a fully-fledged Banking Union, together with fully integrated Capital Markets Union would support the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and a strengthened international role of the euro;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 111 #
4. Considers that while the good relationship between the SSM and the SRB has been fundamental from the inception of the system, a strengthened approach to cooperation between the two pillars is particularly important in the current context to ensure appropriate and timely action;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes, moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty, the central banks’ liquidity programmes and, the ECB’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP); further highlights the significance of the flexibility extended by regulators for banks to operate below Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G) and with reduced capital requirements;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. NotWelcomes the ‘CRR quick fix’ with targeted changes to the Capital Requirements Regulation31 extending transitional arrangements in order to support banks’ lending capacity32 ; _________________ 31Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 32Regulation (EU) 2020/873 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 as regards certain adjustments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 204, 26.6.2020, p. 4). to households and businesses mitigating the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuring that the regulatory framework interacts smoothly with other measures addressing the crisis;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the ESAs’ recommendation of 31 March 2021 to prepare for an expected deterioration of asset quality; first joint risk assessment report of 20211a, advising banks to prepare for an expected deterioration of asset quality by adjusting provisioning models to ensure timely recognition of adequate levels of provision, to ensure sound lending practices and adequate pricing of risks, including after public support measures such as loan moratoria and public guarantee schemes will expire and to follow conservative policies on dividends and share buy-backs; further takes note of the ESA’s warning to financial institutions to continue to develop further actions to accommodate a “low-for-long” interest rate environment; _________________ 1a jc_2021_27_jc_spring_2021_report_on_ri sks_and_vulnerabilities.pdf(europa.eu)
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Calls for a well-orchestrated shift from pandemic relief to recovery support tools, as a nearly or uncoordinated withdrawal of the temporary measures could bring back pre-crisis deficiencies and vulnerabilities of the banking sector, including increasing banks’ exposures to credit risk, potentially affecting their capital position, and undermine recovery and growth;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. NotWelcomes the accelerated pace of digitalisation in the banking sector, while pointing to the insufficient level ofallowing banks to better serve clients remotely and with new products and providing opportunities for increased cost-efficiency; underlines that digitalisation requires considerable resources for investments in this areaIT systems, R&D and new operating models, which may expose banks to weak profitability in the short term, particularly for banks with lower capital levels and riskier exposures; considers that bank consolidation of small and medium-sized banks could facilitate their IT investment;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Underlines the importance to secure technological neutrality in regulatory and supervisory approaches; highlights the need to address challenges posed by the use of new innovative technologies related to banking supervision and the oversight of payment systems; strongly supports the European Commission’s new Digital Finance Strategy, which will facilitate the scaling of innovative technology cross-border whilst ensuring high standards of consumer protection and financial sector resilience;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the ECB’s repwortk on the digital euro and, its report as well as the outcome of its public consultation and expects further analysis of the implications of digital currency for the banking sector, in terms of financial intermediation, lending capacity and profitability; takes note of the objective for the digital euro to function alongside cash, as a means of secure and competitive digital payment; supports the ECB’s efforts in ensuring a high level of privacy protection, confidentiality of payments data, cyber resilience, and security;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Notes the postponement of the implementation of the Basel III reforms andat in March 2020, the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) revised the implementation timeline of the final elements of the Basel III framework; underlines the importance of sound global banking standards and their consistent implementation; awaits the Commission’s upcoming proposal on the implementation of the finalised standards, takingBasel III standards; recalls that the implementation should take into account the specificities and diversity of the EU banking sector; and business models and respect the principle of not significantly increasing overall capital requirements, while at the same time strengthening the overall financial position of European banks;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Notes the interdependencies between banks and central counterparties (CCPs), pointing the ambiguous questions arising in connection to the responsibilities of banks and CCPs for potential end-of waterfall losses and the interaction of their prudential requirements;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14 a. Appreciates the role of European banking supervision in ensuring temporary capital and operational relief to banks, so they can continue to provide financial support to businesses and households and absorb losses, while maintaining high quality of the supervision;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. NTakes notes that the SSM, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, temporarily allowed banks to use extra capital buffers and provided flexibility for rebuilding them, which could allow banks to process quickly expected increase of NPLs; calls for guidance on the expected period and approach to rebuilding the buffers;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15 a. Highlights the importance of enhancing transparency and predictability of EU banking supervision and commends in this regard the recent practice of publishing bank specific Pillar 2 requirements; believes that individual requirements make SSM expectations more reliable and facilitate more informed investors’ decisions;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15 b. Expects that recent changes to the SSM organisational structure, while simplifying the system and incorporating technological innovation, will facilitate more risk focused supervision and internal institutional collaboration;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15 c. Finds merit in the November 2020 SSM analysis of potential vulnerabilities of banking sector under different scenarios, regarding effects of the shock on asset quality and capital;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that sound management of credit risk should remain the key priority for the SSM; shares SSM’s concerns that banks might change their models for credit risk and takes note, in this regard, of the SSM supervisory expectations for appropriate operational preparations in anticipation of NPLs increase and for robust credit risk management, as outlined in its letters to CEOs of significant institutions and its COVID-19 credit risk strategy1a; supports the SSM’s intensified oversight of high leveraged markets; notes that not all banks have been able to meet SSM's expectations on credit management, requiring further efforts; _________________ 1aIdentification and measurement of credit risk in the contextof the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic (europa.eu)
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. SAcknowledges that Covid-19 induced crisis increases the risk of further build-up of NPLs; stresses that ensuring proper and timely management of deteriorated exposureasset quality in banks’ balance sheets will be key to preventing a build-up of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the short term; calls for the monitoring of any potential cliff edge effects particularly when temporary relief measures are withdrawn;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17 a. Underlines that banks should comply with applicable prudential rules and supervisory guidance on NPLs and maintain operational capacity to proactively manage distress debtors and control their balance sheets, accelerating early identification of bad loans in order to reduce the risk of weakening lending capacity in the time of great demand for recovery related investment; highlights existing flexibility in implementing ECB guidance on NPLs, including granting more time for banks with particularly high NPL levels for the submission of their NPLs reduction strategies;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)
17 b. Reminds that risk reduction in the banking sector would contribute a more stable, strong and economic growth oriented Banking Union; in this regard asks co-legislators to finalise the agreement on the Commission proposal for the Directive on credit servicers and credit purchasers, which will encourage the development of secondary markets for NPLs in the EU and aims to help banks to reduce the stocks of NPLs on their balance sheets; calls on the co-legislators to subsequently work on an agreement on the Commission proposal regarding accelerated extrajudicial collateral enforcement (AECE), which intends to provide banks, under certain conditions, with a mechanism to accelerate the value recovery from secured loans via an extrajudicial enforcement of procedures;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Stresses that banks should diligently assess the financial soundness and viability of businesses, proactively engage with distressed debtors to manage their exposures, and offer financing and viable restructuring, or alternative suitable options to viable companies, in order to ensure that defaults are prevented where possible, and that businesses and consumers don’t risk over-indebtedness; urges banks to contemplate, as last resort, the exit of unviable companies from the market in a structured way; considers that the prudential framework should allow and encourage such options; calls upon EBA to give banks enough room to provide forbearance measures, and avoid counterproductive capital absorptions;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Notes that the expected credit losses, together with the current low interest environment, might further negatively affect the already subdued profitability of banks; points to the need for banks to readjust their business models towards more sustainable, cost-saving and technologically advanced strategies, and to perform strategic steering and prudent oversight of business functions; emphasises the importance to ensure that banks’ provisioning decisions to support the lending capacity of banks are not unduly postponed, particularly when the demand for credit picks up;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 248 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Stresses the benefits of banking consolidation in addressing the overcapacities and fragmentation of the banking sector; , both within the EU and cross border, in addressing low profitability, overcapacities and fragmentation of the banking sector; acknowledges the encouraging trend in the banking sector towards engagement in consolidation and points in this context to the ECB Guide on the supervisory approach to consolidation, supporting well-designed and well-executed business combinations;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Regrets that the home host issue remains a challenge; is concerned that if the level of NPLs rises as public support measures begin to recede, home and host countries may put in place measures to protect assets and proceed with renewed ring-fencing; stresses that banks need to be able to operate across borders while managing their capital and liquidity at a consolidated level, in order to diversify their risks and address any lack of profitability; considers that gradual harmonisation is required in areas where national options and discretions apply, including in the area of insolvency law with credible and enforceable safeguards for host countries concerning the availability of resources and impact on financial stability;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Is concerned that as Member States sell increasing amounts of sovereign bonds, their share of sovereign debt in banks’ balance sheets also grows, potentially aggravating the doom loopsovereign-bank nexus; considers that while the creation of Next Generation EU will provide high- quality low risk European assets, allowing for a rebalancing of sovereign bonds in banks’ balance sheets, the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures is still lacking;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22 a. Believes that resolving the home- host issues, breaking the sovereign bank nexus and supporting banking consolidation efforts, would require the introduction of pan-European safety nets to create trust and reduce the impulse for ring-fencing, the elaboration and implementation of intragroup financial support agreements as part of the banks’ recovery plans, the gradual harmonisation in areas where national options and discretions apply, including in the area of insolvency, while continuing risk reduction efforts;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 b (new)
22 b. Stresses the important role of robust internal governance structures within banks, and points to the weakness identified thereof in the SSM’s 2020 Supervisory and Evaluation Process (SREP) focused on how banks handled crisis-linked risk to capital and liquidity, taking into account exceptional circumstances affecting individual banks; commends the targeted approach to collecting information for capital and liquidity assessment; underlines the importance of enacting the highest standards and a level playing field in the “fit and proper” assessments of board members of banks, which are currently construed differently across Member States due to the highly diverse transposition of the Capital Requirements Directive; endorses the ECB’s plan to revise its current Guide to fit and proper assessment in 2021 to outline its supervisory expectations on the quality of the board members; anticipates the ECB’s proposals for a package of measures aimed at enhancing the fit and proper supervision; encourages in that regard the consideration for integration of the ‘fit and proper’ requirements into the Capital Requirements Regulation;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 271 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Notes that the EU-wide stress test launched on 29 January 2021 aims to test capital trajectories of banks in a situation of worsening asset quality under the scenario of protracted low interest rate environment; notes that this stress test is a continuity of the past framework;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 278 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Notes the efforts of the SSM to provide guidance and clarity to banks for self-assessing and appropriately reporting environmental and climate change-related risks; commends in this context the recommendation of the ECB Guide on climate related and environmental risks, enhancing strategic, comprehensive approach to tackling climate related risk; supports the idea of banks’ self- assessment and action plans to be prepared in 2021 followed by 2022 supervisory review of banks’ actions; considers the SSM climate risk stress test an important step in evaluating banks’ practices and identifying concrete areas of improvement;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Notes the EBA’s role in leading, coordinating and monitoring the EU financial sector’s fight against money laundering and terrorist financing; welcomes EBA's support on individual functioning of AML supervisory powers implementation across Member countries and calls for further actions to ensure AML/CFT supervision is risk based, proportionate and effective; points to the differences in approaches taken to AML/CFT supervision by national authorities and in the application of the EU regulation, which may result in regulatory arbitrage; takes note of EBA's second mandate to build a database on AML, expected to be developed in 2021, and enhance cooperation and exchange of information across European authorities; stresses the important role AML colleges for cross border groups, comprising of all AML authorities of the jurisdictions where the group operates, play in assessing how the group is performing under AML;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 295 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. NTakes note of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; acknowledges the progress that many significant banks have achieved on their post-Brexit target operating models as agreed with the SSM, and supports the SSM’s efforts to monitor progress towards these models in the areas of assets, staff and booking practices; reiterates that in the context of relocation of business in the EU, empty shell institutions are not acceptable in the euro area; considers that existing regulatory loopholes in the EU legal framework should be addressed in order to strengthen supervision and recalls that the SSM will assume direct responsibility for the prudential supervision of systemically relevant investment firms once the revised Investment Firms regulation comes into force in June 2021; notes the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; takes note of the progress that many significant banks have achieved on their post-Brexit target operating models as agreed with the SSM, and supports the SSM’s efforts to monitor progress towards these models in the areas of assets, staff and booking practices;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 296 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Notes the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the ECB and the UK authoritiStresses the importance to maintain a level playing field in the regulatory space and to prevent a regulatory race to the bottom; notes in this context that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the ECB and the UK authorities, based on the template negotiated by EBA and covering the prudential supervision outside insurance and pension schemes, which entered into force on 1 January 2021, providinges a solid foundation for supervisory cooperation between the SSM and the UK Prudential Regulation Authority, focusing on information exchange and reciprocal treatment of cross-border banking groups and with a view to sharing responsibilities related to branch supervision; underlines the importance of a level playing field in the regulatory space and of preventing a regulatory race to the bottom; welcomes the agreement reached on 26 March 2021 between the EU and the UK on the MoU establishing a framework for voluntary regulatory cooperation in the area of financial services;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 299 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Trusts that the introduction of a backstop into the SRF in 2022, two years earlier than originally envisaged, is positive for the strengthening of the crisis management framework; n the form of a revolving credit line from the ESM, providing a safety net for bank resolutions in the Banking Union, will strengthen the crisis management framework and is an important step towards completing the Banking Union; notes that the significant build-up of the Single Resolution Fund together with the common backstop, will provide the SRB with access to combined funds at the level of €100 billion;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 302 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
28 a. Calls for the consideration of some form of credible, public budget-backed guarantee mechanism to ensure that in resolution, banks with limited collateral can access liquidity, as observed in other jurisdictions, in order to ensure the smooth continuity of services and the stability of financial markets ; considers in this context that an example could be a SRB bond that is lent to the bank in resolution;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
29. Welcomes the fact that while the SRB was not required to take resolution action in 2020, it nevertheless meticulously collaborated with the SSM regarding close- to-crisis cases; takes note of the relief measures and flexibility granted by the SRB for meeting MREL interim targets without endangering resolvability; takes note of the 2020 MREL policy developed by the SRB and dedicated reporting for MREL under both the BRRD I and BRRD II frameworks, while engaging in dialogue and maintaining cooperation with the banks to discuss the progress made towards resolvability; appreciates the advancement of the current resolution planning cycle for 2021, and reiterates that MRELproportionate MREL setting represents one of the key elements in enhancing banks’ resolvability while ensuring broader financial stability;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29 a. Points out that the existing overlaps between the requirements for the use of early intervention measures and standard supervisory powers of the ECB create confusion and can prevent the implementation of early intervention measures; insists therefore that this overlap should be removed and the legal basis for each instrument should be clarified in order to ensure appropriate and gradual application of the measures;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 313 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
30. Considers it necessary to have in place an EUfacilitate liquidation regime forof banks for which the SRB or the national resolution authority assesses that there is no public interest in resolution; underlines in this context the need to prevent a situation where banks that are declared as failing or likely to fail and do not pass the PIA but where no action can be taken by the insolvency authorities ensuring the banks’ exit from the market because the insolvency criteria under national law are not met;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
31. Invites the Commission to reflect on the necessary improvements of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework to ensure its consistent and effective application to all banks irrespective of their size or business model, focusing in particular on the choice of resolution tools, on proportionality in the conditions for accessing the SRF or the national resolution funds and on the potential for further harmonisation of specific aspects of existing national insolvency laws in order to ensuresuch as consistent and effective application of the crisiditionality on the use of external funding, so as to ensure an alignment of incentives management frameworkd a level playing field;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 328 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
32. Finds merit, in particular, in adopting a targeted approach to the harmonisation of the creditor hierarchy in bank insolvency proceedings, including the treatment of covered and uncovered deposits, in order to increase the scope of the funding by the DGSs in resolution and in measures other than payouts, subject to the stringent application of a least-cost test; calls therefore on the Commission to bring more clarity to the least-cost principle and to the conditions for the use of DGS funds;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 330 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
33. Considers it necessary to review the public interest assessment in order to allow resolution tools to be applied to a broader group of banks;increase transparency and ex-ante predictability on its expected outcome, and thus allow resolution tools to be applied to a broader group of banks and provide the clarity needed to ensure more coherent and proportionate MREL levels; further in that regard underlines the need to coherently revisit the State Aid rules and the Commission’s 2013 Banking Communication 1a to reflect the progress in the implementation of the crisis management framework and to achieve consistency with respect to BRRD requirements; _________________ 1a OJ C 216, 30.7.2013, p. 1.
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
34. Supports the idea of considering the role of group recovery and resolution plans in the crisis management framework; With a view to ensuring a more efficient approach to managing difficulties in cross border banking, supports the idea of considering the role of group recovery and resolution plans, as well as their practical implementation, in the context of the review of the crisis management framework; welcomes the proposals to offer banking groups the option of having subsidiaries and parent companies enter into a formal agreement to provide each other with liquidity support, and to link this support to their group recovery plans, to facilitate the use of existing provisions in a home-host balanced manner;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 348 #
35. Notes the importance of depositors across the Banking Union enjoying the same level of protection of their savings; takes note of the Commission proposal to introduce a European Deposit Insurance Scheme in order to further strengthen citizens’ confidence in the protection of deposits by introducing an EDISand enhance financial stability; considers the importance of EDIS in helping reduce the link between sovereigns and banks;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 363 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
36. Notes the Commission’s launch of the review of the CMDI framework, including the option of a hybrid EDISTakes note of the option for a hybrid EDIS contemplated in the context of the review of the CMDI framework, built around the idea of a new central fund coexisting with funds remaining at national DGS level which in the short term would provide liquidity support in case of shortfall of DGS means and in the long term might evolve to mutualisation of losses, combined with a commensurate increase in the role of the Single Resolution Board; stresses the strong interlinkages between crisis management and EDIS and the need to address them jointly to avoid the re-nationalisation of the Banking Union and maintain a level playing field;
2021/05/27
Committee: ECON