[ParlTrack]

Motion for a resolution
Citation 21 a (new)

- having regard to the European Parliament position of 5 July 2011 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor-compensation schemes (COM(2010)0371 – C7-0174/2010 – 2010/0199(COD))- Schmidt report),

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q

Q. whereas ~~time is running out and~~ restoring confidence is the main task in order to convince European citizens and enterprises to start investing again in the economy and to create conditions for financial institutions to provide the real economy, once again, with credit on a broad but sound basis;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital W

W. whereas it is beyond doubt that the European integration is an irreversible and progressive process ~~if Member States meticulously honour their European engagements~~;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital AH

AH. whereas the precarious situation of the banking sector in several Member States threatens the public finances and the cost of management of the banking crisis falls ~~too~~ heavily on taxpayers; whereas the existing mechanisms and structures are insufficient to prevent mutual contagion;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital AM

AM. whereas the Union would benefit from ~~proposals that introduce~~ a single European supervisory mechanism for financial institutions, a ~~single~~ European regime for deposit guarantee schemes and a ~~single~~ European regime for recovery and resolution schemes;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital AN

~~AN. whereas the scope of the deposit guarantee and crisis management framework should mirror that of the single supervisory mechanism in terms of the banks covered (symmetry);~~deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital AN a (new)

ANa. whereas in order to ensure the necessary confidence in the financial market and stability in a common internal market for financial services, with free movement of capital, well endowed and functioning schemes for deposit guarantees and for crisis management in banking throughout the EU are essential;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BC

BC. whereas deposit guarantee schemes are only one type of instrument which should guarantee financial stability; whereas they are part of a larger financial safety net consisting of regulation, prudential supervision, crisis management, deposit protection and a lender of last resort;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BD

BD. whereas deposit guarantee schemes ~~have~~ played an important role ~~during the financial crisis~~ to protect the assets of depositors, maintain financial stability, avoid bank runs and ~~re-g~~maintain depositor confidence;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BF a (new)

BFa. whereas in order to implement the new financial architecture it is essential to urgently unblock the negotiations on the Deposit Guarantee Schemes and the Investor Compensation Scheme Directive, on which negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council are suspended, despite their crucial importance in providing common mechanisms to resolve banks and guarantee customer deposits;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Olle SCHMIDT, Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BF b (new)

BFb. whereas for the achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, which will include concrete proposals on preserving the unity and integrity of the internal market for financial services, progress on these two key pieces of European legislation is urgently needed;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BG

BG. whereas ~~the introduction of~~ a single European deposit guarantee ~~fund should be the ultimate goal, further increasing the credibility of the scheme; the development of a similar scheme is justified considering the introduction of a European structu~~regime with functioning deposit guarantee schemes backed by appropriate levels of funding, which there for ~~prudential supervision and a European recovery and resolution framework~~e enhance credibility and investor confidence, should be the ultimate goal;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BH

BH. whereas a single European deposit guarantee ~~scheme should cover all banks within the countries included in the system in order to guarantee a level playing field and avoid depo~~regime necessitates uniform, common, stringent requirements applicable to all deposit guarantee schemes in the Union in order to achieve the same comprehensive protection and the same stability of deposit guarantee schemes and guarantee a level playing field; whereas only in this way can the preconditions for the requisite fl~~ight from uncovered to covered financial institutions~~exibility be created so as take sufficient account of specific national circumstances in the financial sector;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5

Single recovery and resolution ~~sche~~regime

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BJ

BJ. whereas a single European recovery and resolution ~~authority (ERRA)~~regime should be established, preferably in parallel with the single supervisory mechanism, for restoring the viability of banks in difficulties and resolving non-viable financial institutions;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BK

BK. whereas the ERRA will be able to work more efficiently, more promptly and more consistently than a network of national recovery and resolution authorities, avoiding the negative consequences of purely national decisions, breaking the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns and eliminating the need for ad hoc intergovernmental crisis solutions;deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BL

BL. whereas the ERRA, whenever the situation requires, needs to explain and justify and should be accountable to the European Parliament for the actions and decisions taken in the field of European recovery and resolution of financial institutions;deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BM

~~BM. whereas the head of the ERRA should be appointed after a hearing in and confirmation by the European Parliament;~~deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BO

BO. whereas progress also must be made to create a single European recovery and resolution ~~fund~~regime which is essential to guarantee at all times the stability of the financial system and to manage the resolution of financial institutions, whatever their size or nature, while safeguarding public finances;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Recital BP

BP. whereas, in the Union, it is necessary for the protection of private savings either to keep separate ~~European~~ funds for deposit guarantee and recovery and resolution or, if the funds are merged, to ensure the same stability and resilience as with separate funds;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2

Recommendation 1.2 relating to a European deposit guarantee scheme The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows: The legislative act to be adopted should update and supplement the Commission's proposal of 12 July 2010 for a directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes in order to introduce a stronger European dimension to deposit protection. The proposal should create a single European deposit guarantee fund (EDGF) and ensure that the level of funds available at Union level are adequate to provide a high level of protection to eligible deposits. The EDGF should cover all banks in order to guarantee a level playing field and avoid deposit flight from uncovered to covered financial institutions. In order to maximise the protection of private savings, the EDGF should be kept separate from the single recovery and resolution fund (see recommendation 1.3 below). The EDGF should have a strong financial structure built on contributions from industry, with European public money only serving as an ultimate backstop. All deposits denominated in euro should be subject to a particular regime. Under that particular regime, the obligation on Member States to ensure that the EDGF has adequate funding should be a collective one in the case of Member States whose currency is the euro. A vehicle should be established or designated to provide reassurance that that the collective obligation will be met. That vehicle could be the ESM.deleted

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – title

Recommendation 1.2 relating to ~~a European~~ deposit guarantee schemes

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – introductory part

The European Parliament c~~onsiders that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:~~alls on the Commission to do everything possible to ensure that the legislative procedure relating to the Directive on deposit guarantee schemes [recast] can be completed as soon as possible on the basis of the European Parliament’s position of 16 February 2012.

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

Peter SIMON

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.3

Recommendation 1.3 relating to a European recovery and resolution scheme The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows: The legislative act to be adopted should update and supplement the current proposal for a directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms in order to create a European scheme for the application of resolution measures to institutions subject to direct supervision under the single supervisory mechanism. A body at European level should be established or designated to exercise the required resolution tools in respect of those institutions (ERRA). This body should enjoy a wide independence. Its head should be appointed after confirmation by the European Parliament. In order to ensure adequate resources are available for resolution actions to be taken, a fund should be created aimed at preserving stability and limiting contagion from failing banks. The fund should be pan-European, funded ex-ante by the institutions concerned, and separate from deposit- guarantee schemes. The resolution scheme should have a strong financial structure built on contributions from industry with public money only serving as an ultimate backstop. However, Member States should have an obligation to ensure that the fund is of an adequate size. That obligation should be a collective one in the case of Member States whose currency is the euro. A vehicle should be established or designated to provide reassurance that that the collective obligation will be met. (Sentence appears in German which is missing from the English version.) That vehicle could be the ESM. The proposal should also accord with other aspects of the European Parliament's resolution of 7 July 2010 with recommendations to the Commission on Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, such as harmonisation of insolvency laws and common risk assessments.deleted

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

24 Amendments of Peter SIMON related to 2012/2151(INI)

ParlTrack - 2011-2024