Activities of Peter SIMON related to 2013/0253(COD)
Plenary speeches (2)
Resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (debate)
Resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (debate)
Amendments (23)
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)
Recital 4 a (new)
(4a) The link between states and the banking sector, which has had devastating effects on the economy throughout the Union during the crisis, should be eliminated in order to reduce the current fragmentation of financial markets. Although the banking union will have a stable foundation only once all three pillars have been established, i.e. once a common European mechanism for deposit guarantee schemes has been set up, the creation of a single resolution mechanism already represents a significant step in that direction.
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) In the banking union liability and supervision should apply at the same level, i.e. banks which are subject to direct supervision at European level should also be resolved at European level. Accordingly, the relevant national supervisory authority should be responsible for credit institutions which are supervised primarily at national level in the context of the common supervisory mechanism.
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) A single bank resolution fund (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Fund’) is an essential element without which a single resolution mechanism could not work properly. Different systems of national funding would distort the application of uniform bank resolution rules in the internal market. The Fund should help to ensure a uniform administrative practice in the financing of resolution and to avoid the creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to divergent national practices. The Fund should be financed directly by banks and should be pooled at Union level so that the resolution resources can be objectively allocated across Member States thus increasing financial stability and limiting the link between the perceived fiscal position of individual Member States and the funding costs of large, systemically relevant banks and undertakings operating in those Member States. Credit institutions which pay into the Fund should be exempted from the requirement to contribute to national resolution funds, in order to rule out double payment.
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) Mirroring the scope of the Council Regulation (EU) No …/…, a single resolution mechanism should cover all credit institutions established in the participating Member States. However, within the framework of aIn a banking union liability and supervision should apply at the same level. Banks which are subject to direct supervision at European level should also be resolved at European level. The single resolution mechanism, it should be possible to resolve directly any credit institution of a participating Member State in order to avoid asymmetries within the internal market in the treatment of failing institutions and creditors during a resolution processtherefore cover all credit institutions which are subject to direct supervision by the ECB. To the extent that parent undertakings, investment firms and financial institutions are included in the consolidated supervision by the ECB, they should be included in the scope of the single resolution mechanism. Although the ECB will not supervise those institutions on a solo basis, it will be the only supervisor that will have a global perception of the risk to which a group, and indirectly the individual members, is exposed to. To exclude entities which form part of the consolidated supervision within the scope of the ECB from the scope of the single resolution mechanism would make it impossible to plan for the resolution of banking groups and to adopt a group resolution strategy, and would make any resolution decisions much less effective.
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) The Board and the Commission, where relevant, should replace the national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] in respect of all aspects related to the resolution decision-making process concerning the resolution of entities covered by this Regulation. The national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] should continue to carry out activities related to the implementation of resolution schemes adopted by the Board. In order to ensure transparency and democratic control, as well as to safeguard the rights of the Union institutions, the Board should be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for any decisions taken on the basis of this proposal. For the same reasons of transparency and democratic control, national parliaments should have certain rights to obtain information about the activities of the Board and to engage in a dialogue with it.
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) The single resolution mechanism should be constructbased on the frameworks of Directive [ ] and the SSM. Therefore, the Board should be empowered to intervene at an early stage where the financial situation or the solvency of an institution is deteriorating. The information that the Board receives from the national resolution authorities or the ECB at this stage is instrumental in making a determination on the action it might take in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution concerned.
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) In order to minimise disruption to the financial market and to the economy, the resolution process should be accomplished in a short time. Depositors should be granted access at least to the guaranteed deposits at the earliest possible juncture, and at the latest within a time frame shorter than that in which depositors are afforded access to guaranteed deposits in the context of a normal insolvency procedure, in accordance with Directive [...] of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit guarantee schemes. The Commission should, throughout the resolution procedure, have access to any information which it deems necessary to take an informed decision in the resolution process. Where the Commission decides to put an institution under resolution, the Board should immediately adopt a resolution scheme establishing the details of the resolution tools and powers to be applied, and the use of any financing arrangements. In that connection, the Board should work closely with the competent national authorities and resolution authorities and the deposit guarantee schemes.
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32
Recital 32
(32) Interference with property rights should not be disproportionate. As a consequence, affected shareholders and creditors should not incur greater losses than those which they would have incurred had the institution been wound up at the time that the resolution decision is taken. In the event of partial transfer of assets of an institution under resolution to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, the residual part of the institution under resolution should be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. In order to protect existing shareholders and creditors of the institution during the winding up proceedings, they should be entitled to receive in payment of their claims not less than what it is estimated they would have recovered if the whole institution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings. When powers to effect a conversion to equity under the bail-in tool are exercised, attention should be paid to the legal form of the institution concerned, on the grounds that the conversion of claims or debt instruments to equity may not be appropriate, as for example in the case of shares in cooperatives.
Amendment 234 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) credit institutions established in participating Member Statedirectly supervised by the European Central Bank in accordance with Article 6 paragraph 4 of Council Regulation (EU)No[ ] conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions;
Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Development banks shall be excluded from the scope of this Regulation.
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3
Article 5 – paragraph 3
3. Subject to the provisions of this Regulation, as referred to in Art. 2, the national resolution authorities of the participating Member State shall act on the basis of and in conformity with the relevant provisions of national law, as harmonized by Directive [ ].
Amendment 528 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector, including measures taken in the context of deposit or institutional guarantee schemes, or supervisory action (including early intervention measures or the write down or conversion of capital instruments in accordance with Article 14), taken in respect of the entity, or a measure to wind up the institution taken by the national resolution authorities, would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe;
Amendment 535 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point d – point iii
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point d – point iii
Amendment 563 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 7
Article 16 – paragraph 7
7. The decision of the Commission shall be addressed to the Board. If the Commission decides not to place the entity under resolution, because the condition laid down in paragraph 2(c) is not met, the entity concerned shall be wound up by means of measures taken in the context of national resolution mechanisms or national deposit guarantee schemes or in accordance with national insolvency law.
Amendment 612 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any action, including alternative private sector, including measures taken in the context of deposit or institutional guarantee schemes, or supervisory action (including early intervention measures), other than the write down or conversion of capital instruments, either singly or in combination with resolution action, would prevent the failure of that entity or group within a reasonable timeframe.
Amendment 719 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2
Article 27 – paragraph 2
2. In the exercise of their respective responsibilities under this Regulation, the Board, the Commission, the ECB and, the national competent authorities and resolution authorities and, where appropriate, deposit guarantee schemes shall cooperate closely. The ECB and the national competent authorities shall provide the Board and the Commission with all information necessary for the exercise of their tasks.
Amendment 721 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3
Article 27 – paragraph 3
3. In the exercise of their respective responsibilities under this Regulation, the Board, the Commission, the ECB and, the national competent authorities and resolution authorities and, where appropriate, deposit guarantee schemes shall cooperate closely. in the resolution planning, early intervention and resolution phases pursuant to Articles 7 to 26. The ECB and the national competent authorities shall provide the Board and the Commission with all information necessary for the exercise of their tasks.
Amendment 727 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1
Article 28 – paragraph 1
1. Both the Board and the national resolution authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information. Where procedures are implemented pursuant to Article 2, letters a to c, to wind up entities which are not subject to direct supervision by the European Central Bank in accordance with Article 6(4) of Council Regulation [...] conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, the national resolution authorities and the Board shall be required to exchange information.
Amendment 924 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 1
Article 65 – paragraph 1
1. In a period no longer than 10 years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the available financial means of the Fund shall reach at least 1.5% of the amount of deposits of all credit institutions authoriscovered inby the participating Member Statesis Regulation which are guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC.
Amendment 943 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 66 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The individual contribution of each institution shall be raised at least annually and shall be calculated pro-rata to the amount of its liabilities excluding own funds and covered deposits, with respect to the total liabilities, excluding own funds and covered deposits, of all the institutions authorisedsubject to this Regulation as referred to in Article 2 in the territories of the participating Member States.
Amendment 947 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 66 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Liabilities of a credit institution are excluded from the calculation of contributions where the credit institution has been set up by a Member State's central or regional government or local authority and that government or authority has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the institution and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime or the liabilities are explicitly guaranteed by that government or authority or at least 90% of the loans granted by the institution are directly or indirectly guaranteed by that government or authority and the predominant purpose is to fund promotional loans granted on a non-competitive, not-for-profit basis in order to promote that government's public policy objectives;
Amendment 965 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 67 – paragraph 1
Article 67 – paragraph 1
1. Where the available financial means are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the Fund, the Board shall raise in accordance with Article 62 extraordinary ex post contributions from the institutions authorisedsubject to this Regulation as referred to in Art. 2 in the territories of participating Member States, in order to cover the additional amounts. These extraordinary contributions shall be allocated between institutions in accordance with the rules set out in Article 66.
Amendment 1002 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 – paragraph 3
Article 73 – paragraph 3
3. Before deciding, in accordance with paragraph 1 of this ArticlIn order to enable it carry out its depositor protection role properly, the deposit guarantee scheme which is liable pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be involved from an early stage in the preparation and implementation of the resolution measures. The Board shall determine in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, and in consultation with the deposit guarantee scheme, the amount by which the deposit guarantee scheme is liable in compliance with the conditions established in Article 39(3)(d) of Directive [ ], the Board shall consult the deposit guarantee scheme concerned, having full regard to the urgency of the matter.