12 Amendments of Cornelia ERNST related to 2023/2501(RSP)
Amendment 20 #
Recital J a (new)
J a. whereas the Charter does not discriminate by citizenship or residence when it comes to the rights to privacy and data protection;
Amendment 23 #
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that privacy and data protection are legally enforceable fundamental rights enshrined in the Treaties, the Charter and the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as in laws and case-law; emphasises that they must be applied in a manner that does not unnecessarily hamper trade or international relations, butadequacy decisions under the GDPR are legal decisions, not political choices and that the rights to privacy and data protection can be balanced only against other fundamental rights and not against commercial or political interests;
Amendment 29 #
Paragraph 2
2. Acknowledges the effortTakes note of the changes made in the EO to lay down limits on US Signals Intelligence Activities, by referring to the principles of proportionality and necessity, and providing a list of 12 legitimate objectives for such activities; points out, however, that these principles are long- standing key elements of the EU data protection regime and that their substantive definitions in the EO are not in line with their definition under EU law and their interpretation by the CJEU; further points out that the US President can, in secret, add new ‘legitimate objectives’ to this list; points out, furthermore, that for the purposes of the EU-US Data Privacy Framework, these principles will be interpreted solely in the light of US law and legal traditions; points out that the EO requires that signals intelligence must be conducted in a manner proportionate to the ‘validated intelligence priority’, which appears to be a very broad interpretation of proportionality;
Amendment 34 #
Paragraph 3
3. RDeeply regrets the fact that the EO does not prohibit the bulk collection of data by signals intelligence, including the content of communications; notes with concern that the list of legitimate national security objectives can be expanded by the US President, who can determine not to make the relevant updates public; Notes therefore that the executive order does allow for disproportionate bulk collection of data, including the content of communications, leading to serious discrepancies in the understanding of the requirement of necessity and proportionality;
Amendment 49 #
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Points out that the EO as a result fails to create actual equivalence in the level of protection, but merely paints over the differences;
Amendment 62 #
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Points out that the underlying problem is the surveillance of non-US persons under US law, and the inability for European citizens to seek redress in this regard;
Amendment 64 #
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that European businesses need and deserve legal certainty; stresses that successive data transfer mechanisms, which were subsequently repealed by the CJEU, created additional costs for European businesses; notes that continuing uncertainty and the need to adapt to new legal solutions is particularly burdensome for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;
Amendment 72 #
Paragraph 8
8. Points out that, unlike all other third countries that have received an adequacy decision under the GDPR, the US still does not have a federal data protection law; points out that the EO is not clear, precise or foreseeable in its application, as it can be amended or withdrawn at any time by the US President; is therefore concerned about the absence of a sunset clause which could provide that the decision would automatically expire four years after its entry into force;
Amendment 73 #
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. Underlines the fact that the possibility for the US President to modify the effect of the EO through acts that are not public, and not even made available to the Commission and the CJEU, put into question whether the EO meets the requirements of “law” as understood by European courts and a prerequisite for limitations to fundamental rights;
Amendment 76 #
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8 b. Reminds that the Commission when assessing the adequacy of a third country based on legislation and practices in place not only in substance but also in practice as established under Schrems I, Schrems II and the GDPR;
Amendment 78 #
Paragraph 9
9. Emphasises that adequacy decisions must include clear and strict mechanisms for monitoring and review in order to ensure that decisions are future proof or repealed or amended as necessary, and that EU citizens’ fundamental right to data protection is guaranteed at all times;
Amendment 85 #
Paragraph 11
11. Concludes that the EU-US Data Privacy Framework fails to create actual equivalence in the level of protection; believes that the adequacy finding is unlikely to satisfy the CJEU, should it be brought before them; calls on the Commission to continue negotiations with its US counterparts with the aim of creating a mechanism that would ensure such equivalence and which would provide the adequate level of protection required by Union data protection law and the Charter as interpreted by the CJEU; urges the Commission not to adopt the adequacy finding;