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4 Amendments of Cătălin Sorin IVAN related to 2016/0360A(COD)

Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)
(13a) To prevent an institution from paying out own funds, even though its capital position is weak, a buffer on top of the prescribed leverage ratio should be met. Should the institution fail to meet this buffer, the institution is prohibited from distributing its own capital to shareholders and management, until the capital position meets the minimum leverage ratio plus the leverage ratio buffer requirement (LRBR).
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 56 a (new)
(56a) Provisions with respect to the inclusion of risk factors in the bank’s internal models for regulatory capital require consideration of continuously available ‘real’ prices. Individually, banks are unlikely to be able to view real prices for all representative transactions in the market since they are directly involved in only a subset of these transactions. The prices available from only a subset of transactions are less likely to be a reliable reflection of market reality and may not satisfy the required threshold for a risk factor to be considered to have continuously available ‘real’ prices or, in other words, modellable. The intention of this regulation is to allow banks the possibility to use all real prices available in the market. Therefore, banks should have the flexibility of using data aggregators, which may be third party utilities, to allow them to obtain prices that offer a broad view market reality and satisfy the risk factor modellability threshold by pooling or sourcing real prices from across markets
2018/02/02
Committee: ECON
Amendment 486 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 -a (new)
(40) The following Article 92 -a is inserted: Article 92 -a 1. An institution that fails to keep a leverage ratio of at least 5%, the leverage ratio buffer requirement (LRBR), shall be prohibited from making a distribution in connection with its own funds to an extent that would decrease its leverage ratio. 2. Institutions that fail to meet the leverage ratio buffer requirement (LRBR) shall notify the competent authority and any such institution is prohibited from undertaking any of the following actions before it has fulfilled the requirement of paragraph 1: (a) make a distribution of its own funds that would decrease its leverage ratio; (b) pay variable remuneration or discretionary pension benefits; (c) make payments on own funds instruments. 3. The restrictions imposed by this Article shall only apply to payments that result in a reduction of own funds or in a reduction of profits, and where a suspension of payment or failure to pay does not constitute an event of default or a condition for the commencement of proceedings under the insolvency regime applicable to the institution. 4. Where an institution fails to meet the leverage ratio buffer requirement (LRBR) and still intends to distribute any of its distributable profits or undertake an action referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2, it shall first obtain permission from the competent authority and provide the following information: (a) the amount of capital maintained by the institution, subdivided as follows: (i) Common Equity Tier 1 capital, (ii) Additional Tier 1 capital, (iii) Tier 2 capital; (b) the amount of its interim and year- end profits; (c) the amount of distributable profits it intends to allocate between the following: (i) dividend payments, (ii) share buy backs, (iii) payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments, (iv) the payment of variable remuneration or discretionary pension benefits. 5. Institutions shall maintain arrangements to ensure that the leverage ratio buffer is calculated accurately, and shall be able to demonstrate that accuracy to the competent authority on request. 6. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, a distribution in connection with its own funds shall include the following: (a) a payment of cash dividends; (b) a distribution of fully or partly paid bonus shares or other capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of this Regulation; (c) a redemption or purchase by an institution of its own shares or other capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of this Regulation; (d) a repayment of amounts paid up in connection with capital instruments referred to in Article26(1)(a) of this Regulation; (e) a distribution of items referred to in points (b) to (e) of Article 26(1) of this Regulation.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 654 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b f – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Evidence of a transaction does not mean that, when using third party sources, full specific details of the transaction would be required by affected firms for all transactions as this would be a cause for concern for the specific counterparties and be disproportionate. However, submitted data should go beyond the bear minimum attributes required to demonstrate that a risk factor meets the thresholds for modellability and should include transaction amount to meet the need to measure a ‘non- negligible amount’ and also the transaction’s price to be able to verify the trade is real.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON