Activities of Alexandra THEIN related to 2011/2037(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on audit policy: lessons from the crisis PDF (182 KB) DOC (117 KB)
Amendments (9)
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Takes the view that the auditor, where that role is a statutory one, should be appointed by the audit committee and not by the board of the company to be audited, in which connection at least half the members of the audit committee should have experience of accounting and auditing; considers that the audit committee should take steps to ensure that the auditor is independent, in particular in the light of any consultancy services which the auditor provides or offers to provide;
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Agrees with the Commission on the principle that an audit report’s conclusions should focus on substance over form; takes the view that those conclusions should therefore be clear and detailed and address all the aspects of the auditor’s statutory remit;
Amendment 23 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the Commission to look into how the role of the auditor might be extended to include audits of risk reports provided by the entity being audited, in addition to verification of the information supplied in the main financial statements; takes the view that if that role is expanded the implications for the auditor’s liability should be taken into account;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Takes the view that audit reports should be brief, with clear, concise conclusions, and that they should include an annex containing additional explanations on general issues such as the methodology used, and specific issues such as key indicators, materiality figures, assessments of the risk involved in the material accounting estimates or materiality judgements made, and any particular problems encountered whilst carrying out the audit; takes the view that the principle of differentiated reporting – depending on the addressees – should be observed;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that, in order to guarantee the independence of audits, auditing contracts should run for no longer than eight years; takes the view that an initial contract should be concluded for four years, renewable only once for a further period of four years, followed by a period of at least four years – eight years for public inteRegards external rotation as a means of strengthening the independence of auditors, but reiterates its view that it is not external rotation but rather regular changes in internal auditors which represt entities – during which the audit firm concerned cannot audit the same company again; considers that there would be a need, at the end of the initial four-year period, for a new team to be appointed from within the audit firms the best regulatory solution, as confirmed by Directive 2006/43/EC; at most, consideration should be given to the issue of whether rotation might be appropriate for systemically relevant financial institutions;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that there should be aany ban on services other than auditing being provided to the audited company, as this would pose a risk to the auditor’s independence; takes the view, furthermore, that under no circumstances should internal and external auditing ser should apply at most to systemically relevant financial institutions, as as the provision of such services can pose a risk to the auditor’s independence; takes the general view that there should be clear demarcation between the auditing services and services other than auditing that an audit firm provicdes be provided simultaneouslyto a customer, with a view to avoiding conflicts of interest and in accordance with codes of auditing practice; points out that this wcould restrict ‘lowballing’, the practice of offering cut- price auditing with a view to obtaining compensation by charging for additional services; therefore takes the view that the bademarcation must apply to all firms and their clients, particularly where major audit firms are concerned; ;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Takes the view that the fees an audit firm can charge a single client should not exceed a certain percentage of its total income so as to prevent a situation in which the audit firm loses its economic independence; considers that when that percentage is set a distinction should be drawn between companies which are and are not involved in the capital market;
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Considers that there is a need to create, or encourage the creation of, a voluntary code of ethics for the Big Four firms, encouraging them to resalls on the Commission to establish equal competitive conditions on the auditing market and to simplify the rules governing auditing at European level; takes the view that easier access to the market and the removal of obstacles for firms wishing to enter the market are vital if a larger number of participants, and in particular bigger participants, are to be attriact their own growth, thereby protecting the development of medium-sized audit firms, which would ultimately also be beneficial for the survival of the major firms themselveed on to the auditing market; considers that there is a need to create, or encourage the creation of, a voluntary code of ethics for the Big Four firms, in order to protect or foster the development of medium-sized firms;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Calls on the Commission to bring in a system of compulsory tendering on a periodic basis for public interest entities, underin which at least one non-Big Four company would have to be includedconnection the terms of the invitations to tender should not be so narrowly defined and restrictive as to guarantee that contracts are awarded only to large firms; takes the view that such procedures should be open to all auditing firms which meet the selection criteria; takes the view that the audit committee must be givenhas a key role in this process, in which shareholders must also take part; points out just how important the role of the audit committee is in monitoring the effectiveness of external auditors; calls on the Commission to review the tendering practices employed by audit committees, in particular as regards the bureaucratic obstacles created by a formal tendering process;