Activities of Frank ENGEL related to 2012/2130(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012) PDF (352 KB) DOC (221 KB)
Amendments (89)
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 37
Citation 37
– having regard to the ongoing infringement proceedings in Case C- 288/12 brought by the European Commission against Hungary over the independence of the dlegality of the termination of the mandate of the former Commissioner for Data pProtection authoritystill pending before the European Court of Justice,
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the obligations incumbent on candidate countries under the Copenhagen criteria continue to apply to the Member States after joining the EU by virtue of Article 2 TEU and the principle of sincere co-operation, and whereas all Member States should therefore be assessed on a regular basis in order to verify their continued compliance with the EU's common values;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas according to Article 7(1) TEU grants the EU institutions the power to assess whethermay determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the commonby a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2 by a Member State, and to engage politically with the country concerned in order to prevent and redress violations, while the ultimate purpose of the means laid down in Article 7(2) and (3) TEU is to penalise and remedy any serious and persistent breach of common values; whereas before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital P
Recital P
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital T a (new)
Recital T a (new)
Ta. whereas there is not a "best model" throughout the rich and diverse European constitutional heritage, yet in all Member States special constitutional procedures render constitutional amendment more difficult compared to procedures governing ordinary legislation, namely through the use of a qualified majority, additional decisional processes, time delays and referenda, according to national procedures;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital V
Recital V
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital X
Recital X
X. whereas the adoption of the Fundamental Law of Hungary – which was passed on 18 April 2011, exclusively with the votes of the members of the governing coalition and on the basis of a draft text prepared by the representatives of the governing coalition – was conducted in the exceptionally short time frame of one month, thus restricting the possibilities for a thorough and substantial debate with the opposition parties and civil society on the draft text;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Y
Recital Y
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Z
Recital Z
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AA
Recital AA
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Heading I - Subheading 5
Heading I - Subheading 5
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AE
Recital AE
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AF
Recital AF
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG
Recital AG
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AG
Recital AG
AG. whereas, under the Fundamental Law, the powers of the Constitutional Court to review budget-related law1989 constitutional regime the newly established Hungarian Constitutional Court received the broadest possible powers thave been substantially limited to violations of an exhaustive list of rights, thus obstructing the review of constitutionality in cases of breaches of other fundamental rights, such as the right to propet can be delegated to a court of its kind, and whereas after twenty years of jurisprudence there was a broad consensus – even by members of the Court – that the powers of the Constitutional Court should be revised; and whereas in several Member States does not even exist the institute of a separate constitutional court at all (e.g. among others in Finland or in Greece, or the Danish system of courtys, the right to a fair trial and the right not to be discriminated against; which are based on a unified structure, or in Ireland, where Supreme Court can deal with constitutional issues);
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AH
Recital AH
AH. whereas the Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental Law left untouched the already existing right ofintroduces for the first time an explicit reference enabling the Constitutional Court to review amendments to the Fundamental Law on procedural grounds, and whereas it excludes in the future the Court being able to review constitutional amendments on substantive grounds; ; whereas the Constitutional Court never had competence to review constitutional amendments on substantive grounds stated by the Constitutional Court in its interpretation several times; and whereas the assessment of the Venice Commission on the review of constitutional amendments by constitutional courts concludes that this is a rare feature of constitutional jurisdiction, and that "such a control cannot therefore be considered as a requirement of the rule of law" (paragraph 49 of Opinion No. 679/2012 on the Revision of the Constitution of Belgium); and whereas in several Member States the competences of the constitutional court is limited or restricted to a certain type of procedures, furthermore, there is no legal regulation for the competences of the constitutional court regarding the supervision of the constitution or any amendments thereof among others in Austria, Lithuania, Slovenia, France or Portugal;
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AM
Recital AM
AM. whereas the Commission initiated an infringement procedure against Hungary on 8 June 2012, declaring that Hungary had failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 95/46/EC by removing the data protection supervisor from office before the end of the mandate, thus putting at risk the independence of the off; whereas the case is currently pending before the European Court of Justice;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AN
Recital AN
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BO
Recital BO
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BQ
Recital BQ
BQ. whereas the Hungarian Authorities are in the process of reviewing the Fourth Amendment that imposes press restrictions as it bans all political advertising during electoral campaigns except for advertising in the public media;
Amendment 169 #
Motion for a resolution
Heading I - Subheading 11
Heading I - Subheading 11
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BX
Recital BX
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BY
Recital BY
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital BZ
Recital BZ
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CA
Recital CA
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CB
Recital CB
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CC
Recital CC
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital CD
Recital CD
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Cconsiders that the extensive use of cardinal laws to regulate areas that are covered by ordinary laws in most Member States or to set forth very specific and detailed rules undermines the principles of democracy and the rule of law as it has enabled the current government, which enjoys the support of a qualifiedwhile having been a feature of the Hungarian constitutional and legal order since 1989, the extensive use of cardinal laws, the adoption of which requires a majority, of two set in stone political choices with the consequence of making it more difficult for any new future government having only a simple majority in the parliament to respond to social changes and thus of potentially diminishing the importance of new electionsthirds, in areas where European constitutional tradition does not warrant such an approach, should be re-evaluated, in order to ensure that future governments and parliamentary majorities be allowed to legislate in a meaningful and comprehensive manner;
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. SharUnderlines the opinion of the Venice Commission (No CDL-AD(2012)01)016), according to which the adoption of a large amount of legislation in a very short time frame could explain why some of the new provisions do not comply with European standards; which "welcomes the fact that this new Constitution establishes a constitutional order based on democracy, the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights as underlying principles. It notes that constitutions of other European States, such as Poland, Finland, Switzerland or Austria, have been used as a source of inspiration. A particular effort has been made to follow closely the technique and the contents of the ECHR and to some extent the EU Charter.";
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Considers that the limitation of constitutional jurisdiction relating to the laws on the central budget and taxes is in contradiction with the requirements of democracy, the rule of law and the principle of judicial review, as it weakens the institutional and procedural guarantees for the protection of a number of constitutional rights and for controlling the parliament's and the government's powers in the budgetary fielcontrol of central budget by constitutional courts is not a common European standard;
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Is deeply concerned about this shift of powers in constitutional matters to the advantage of the parliament and to the detriment of the Constitutional Court, which severely undermineUnderlines that according to rule of law a democratically elected Parliament has the right and duty to adopt the Constitution and Laws, and the Constitutional Court has the principle of separation of powers and a correctly functioning systemght and duty to safeguard the compatibility of cthecks and balances, which are key corollaries of the rule of law laws with the Constitution;
Amendment 247 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
Amendment 251 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 256 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Welcomes the factTakes note that the Commission has launched an infringement procedure against Hungary over the independence of the dlegality of the termination of the mandate of the former Commissioner for Data pProtection supervisor, which case is currently pending at the European Court of Justice;
Amendment 258 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 265 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
Amendment 268 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Regrets, however, that not all the recommendations of the Venice Commission have been implemented, in particular as regards the need to limit discretionary powers of the President of the National Judicial Office in the context of the transfer of cases, which potentially affect the right to a fair trial and the principle of a lawful judge, while taking note that the Hungarian government is still in the process of reviewing the matter;
Amendment 285 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Expresses concern at the effectsWelcomes the ongoing review of the provision of the Fourth Amendment banning political advertising in the commercial media, as although the announced aim of this provision is to reduce political campaign costs and create equal opportunities for the parties, it jeopardises the provision of balanced information;
Amendment 312 #
Motion for a resolution
Heading II - Subheading 6
Heading II - Subheading 6
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
Amendment 317 #
Motion for a resolution
Heading II - Subheading 7
Heading II - Subheading 7
Amendment 319 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
Paragraph 47
Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 51
Paragraph 51
Amendment 340 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 55
Paragraph 55
55. Expects all Member States to take the necessary steps, particularly within the Council of the European Union, to contribute loyally to the promotion of the Union's values and to cooperate with Parliament and the Commission in monitoring their observance, especially in the framework of the ‘Article 2 Trilogue’ referred to in paragraph 76;
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution
Heading III - Subheading 3
Heading III - Subheading 3
Amendment 343 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56
Paragraph 56
Amendment 345 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
Paragraph 57
Amendment 348 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
Paragraph 58
Amendment 351 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 59
Paragraph 59
Amendment 355 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 – indent 1
Paragraph 60 – indent 1
– to inform Parliament of its assessment of the Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental Law and its impact on cooperation within the EU;
Amendment 357 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 – indent 3
Paragraph 60 – indent 3
Amendment 360 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60 – indent 3
Paragraph 60 – indent 3
– to focus not only on specific infringements of EU law to be remedied notably through Article 258 TFEU, but to draw the consequences of a systemic change of the constitutional and legal system of a Member State where multiple and recurrent infringements unfortunately result in a state of legal uncertainty which not longer meets the requirements of Article 2 TEUas this is what is in its mandate under the Treaty;
Amendment 383 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – introductory part
Paragraph 61 – introductory part
61. Urges the Hungarian authorities to implement the following recommendations without any further delay, with a view to fully restoring the rule of law and its key requirements on the constitutional setting, the system of checks and balances and the independence of the judiciary, as well as strong safeguards for fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, media and religion and the right to propeall the measures the European Commission as the guardian of the treaties deems necessary in order to fully comply with EU law, to implement, as swiftly as possible, the recommendations of the Venice Commission and to ultimately enact the still pending judgments of the Hungarian Constitutional Courty:
Amendment 390 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 1
Paragraph 61 – indent 1
Amendment 399 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 2 a (new)
Paragraph 61 – indent 2 a (new)
- to reduce the recurrent use of cardinal laws in order to leave policy areas such as family, social, fiscal and budget to ordinary legislation and majorities;
Amendment 402 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 3
Paragraph 61 – indent 3
Amendment 404 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 3 a (new)
Paragraph 61 – indent 3 a (new)
- to insure the widest possible participation of all parliamentary parties in the constitutional process, even though the relevant special majority is held by the governing coalition alone;
Amendment 408 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 4
Paragraph 61 – indent 4
Amendment 416 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 5
Paragraph 61 – indent 5
Amendment 421 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 6
Paragraph 61 – indent 6
Amendment 437 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 9
Paragraph 61 – indent 9
– to fully restore and guarantee the independence of the judiciary by ensuring that the principles of irremovability and guaranteed term of office of judges, the rules governing the structure and composition of the governing bodies of the judiciary, as well as the safeguards on the independence of the Constitutional Court, are enshrined in the Fundamental Law;
Amendment 464 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 16
Paragraph 61 – indent 16
Amendment 477 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – subheading 5
Paragraph 61 – subheading 5
Amendment 482 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 20
Paragraph 61 – indent 20
Amendment 493 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – subheading 6
Paragraph 61 – subheading 6
Amendment 497 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 – indent 21
Paragraph 61 – indent 21
Amendment 502 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 63
Paragraph 63
63. Firmly requestsDeems appropriate that Member States be regularly assessed on their continued compliance with the fundamental values of the Union and the requirements of democracy and the rule of law bearing in mind that such an assessment must be founded on a commonly accepted European understanding of constitutional and legal dynamic;
Amendment 507 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 68
Paragraph 68
Amendment 510 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 69
Paragraph 69
Amendment 512 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 70
Paragraph 70
Amendment 514 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 71 - introductory part
Paragraph 71 - introductory part
Amendment 515 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 71 – indent 1
Paragraph 71 – indent 1
Amendment 516 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 71 – indent 2
Paragraph 71 – indent 2
Amendment 517 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 71 – indent 3
Paragraph 71 – indent 3
Amendment 518 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 71 – indent 4
Paragraph 71 – indent 4
Amendment 520 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 72
Paragraph 72
Amendment 524 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 73
Paragraph 73
Amendment 526 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 74
Paragraph 74
Amendment 532 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 75
Paragraph 75
75. Calls on the Hungarian authorities to inform Parliament, the Commission, the Council Presidency and the Council of Europe of the procedure and the calendar they intend to follow for the implementation of the recommendations contained in paragraph 61n the implementation of the requested measures;
Amendment 540 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 76
Paragraph 76
76. Invites the Commission and the Council to each designate a representative who, together with the Parliament's rapporteur (‘Article 2 Trilogue’), willto carry out an assessment of the information sent by the Hungarian authorities on the implementation of the recommendations contained in paragraph 61quested measures;
Amendment 542 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 77
Paragraph 77