16 Amendments of Paulo RANGEL related to 2013/2077(INI)
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Points out that, while the economic and financial crises call for better coordination of policies and strengthening of the Union’s powers in a range of domains, it is also essential to maintain a clear understanding of the division of competences in the European Union system of multi-level governance, and to take decisions at the most appropriate level and as close as possible to the citizens;
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Reiterates thaStresses that the European institutions must respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol No 2, are of a general and fundamental nature, binding the institutions in their entire activity with the sole exception that; Notes that, according to Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union the principle of subsidiarity does notonly applyies in those rare areas which fall withinareas outside the exclusive competence of the Union;
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Suggests assessing whether appropriate criteria should be laid down, at EU level, for evaluating compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Notes the crucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process and stresses the need, in this context, for proper consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality;
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes the fact that the Member States’ parliamentscloser participation of national parliaments in the framework of the European legislative process and the fact that they are showing an ever greater interest in the proper application of these principles by the institutions of the Union. This is illustrated by the fact that in 2011 the European Parliament received 77523 contributions, of which only 77 were reasoned opinions claiming that a draft legislative act did not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, and 523 other contributions criticising inter alia non- respect of the principle of proportionality, whereas the respective figures for 2010 were 41299 and 29941;
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Highlights that the principle of subsidiarity constitutes a political guideline on the exercise of powers at Union level; regrets that there is thus no possibility for the principle to be enforced by a court within that systemCourt of Justice, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, is competent to review the legality of legislative acts, as regards compliance with the principle of subsidiarity;
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Points out, on the other hand, that the Court of Justice of the European Union, by virtue of the Treaties, has jurisdiction in actions brought on grounds of ‘infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application’, and that pursuant to the Treaty on European Union the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality belong to these rules; notes that the judicial review of the validity of Union acts does therefore extend to compliance with these principles;
Amendment 21 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Emphasises, however, that wthen it comes to scrutinising this compliance with regard to complex economic situations, the Court of Justice limits its review of the reasons given for the action to those set out Court of Justice, in its judgment of 12 May 2011 in case C- 176/09 Luxembourg v European Parliament and Council, states that the principle of proportionality ‘requires that measures implemented through provisions of European Union law be appropriate for attaining the recitals and the explanatory statement of the act concerned, considering that the lawfulness of a measure adopted in this context can only be affected if the measure is manifestly inappropriate with respect to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to pursuelegitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them’ and that ‘in the fields in which the European Union legislature has a broad legislative power’ the lawfulness of a measure adopted in this context can only be affected if the measure is manifestly inappropriate with respect to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue, although the European legislator must nonetheless ‘base its choice on objective criteria’ and, when assessing the burdens associated with various possible measures, ‘examine whether objectives pursued by the measure chosen are such as to justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators’;
Amendment 23 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the subsidiarity principle as formulated in the Treaties permits Union action in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence only ‘if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’, which means that the ‘subsidiarity check’ to a certain degree also implies a ‘proportionality check’ highlighting the functional complementarity of the two principles; takes the view that subsidiarity, as an objective legal principle associated with the concept of optimum level of action, may lead both to an extension of the activities of the Union within the framework of its powers, when circumstances so require, and, conversely, to the action concerned being restricted or curtailed where it is no longer justified;
Amendment 26 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. RegretNotes that the Commission received only a small number of parliamentary questions (32 out of more than 12 000) in 2011 on issues relating to compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and encourages its Members to make more use of this tool of parliamentary scrutiny;
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Highlights the fact that in 2011 the Commission received 64 reasoned opinions within the meaning of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which represents a considerable increase in comparison to 2010; notes, however, that these 64 reasoned opinions represented barely 10 % of the total 622 opinions forwarded to the Commission by national parliaments in 2011 within the terms of the political dialogue in question; also draws attention however to the fact that no Commission proposal received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow or orange card procedures’ under the Protocol;
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Notes with concern that some reasoned opinions from national parliaments highlight the fact that, in a number of Commission legislative proposals, the subsidiarity justification is insufficient or non-existent;
Amendment 35 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Highlights the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
Amendment 36 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 c (new)
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9c. Notes further in this regard that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity and proportionality checks has often been considered insufficient;
Amendment 37 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 d (new)
Paragraph 9 d (new)
Amendment 38 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10