BETA

Activities of Kay SWINBURNE related to 2010/0250(COD)

Plenary speeches (11)

Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (debate)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories PDF (888 KB) DOC (996 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2010/0250(COD)
Documents: PDF(888 KB) DOC(996 KB)

Amendments (61)

Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation
Title
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories(Text with EEA relevance)
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) This Regulation sets out the criteria for determining the eligibility to the clearing obligation. IOn view of its pivotal role, ESMAthe basis of draft technical standards developed by ESA (ESMA), and in consultation with the ESRB established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and Council, the Commission should decide whether a class of derivatives meets the eligibility criteria and from when the clearing obligation takes effect, including, where appropriate, any 'phase in' implementation standards. A gradual implementation of the clearing obligation could be either in terms of proportion of the eligible classes that must be cleared, or in terms of the types of market participants that must comply with the clearing obligation. Bilateral clearing should continue to be authorised if the legal requirements for clearing are not met for certain categories of derivatives.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12 a (new)
(12 a) In determining whether a class of derivatives is eligible for central clearing, it is essential that the level and type of systemic risk be taken into account. For certain classes of derivatives, involving exchange of principal, such as foreign exchange, settlement risk may be the predominant risk, which is already addressed through existing market infrastructure. This should be taken into account when considering which classes of derivatives should be mandated for central clearing.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 a (new)
(14 a) It is important that necessarily different treatment of non-financial counterparties extends from this Regulation to Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. Counterparties who are not mandated to centrally clear should not face higher capital charges on continued bilateral arrangements.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
(15) Rules on clearing and reporting obligations and rules on risk mitigation techniques for OTC derivative contracts not cleared by a CCP should apply to financial counterparties, namely investment firms as set out inuthorised under Directive 2004/39/EC, credit institutions as defined inuthorised under Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast)22 , insurance undertakings as defined inuthorised under Directive 73/239/EEC [NB: to be repealed by Solvency II in 2012], assurance undertakings as defined inuthorised under Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance23 , reinsurance undertakings as defined inuthorised under Directive 2005/68/EC, undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) as defined inuthorised under Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS)24 , institutions for occupational retirement provision as defined in Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision25 andand alternative investment funds managed by alternative investment funds managers as defined inuthorised or registered under Directive 2010/.../EU.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) The introduction of a clearing obligation along with a process to establish which CCPs can be used for the purpose of this obligation may lead to unintended competitive distortions of the OTC derivatives market. For example, a CCP could refuse to clear transactions executed on certain trading venues because the CCP is owned by a competing trading venue. In order to avoid such discriminatory practices, CCPs should accept to clear transactions executed in different venues, to the extent that those venues comply with the operational and technical requirements established by the CCP. Generally, the Commission should continue to closely monitor the evolution of the OTC derivatives market and should, where necessary, intervene in order to prevent such competitive distortions from occurring in the Internal Market.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) In order to identify the relevant classes of OTC derivatives that should be subject to the clearing obligation, the thresholds and systemically relevant non-financial counterparties, reliable data is needed. Therefore, for regulatory purposes, it is important that a uniform OTC derivatives data reporting requirement is established at Union level.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 226 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1
1. This Regulation lays down uniform requirements for derivative contracts set out in Annex I Section C numbers (4) to (10) of Directive 2004/39/EC that are traded over-the-counter and lays down uniform requirements for the performance of activities of central counterparties and trade repositories.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 247 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)
(3 a) "derivative contracts" or "derivatives" means financial instruments as set out in Annex I Section C numbers 4 to 10 of Directive 2004/39/EC, that are not otherwise included within or excluded from the application of MiFID, including by virtue of Article 38 and 39 of Regulation no. 1287/2006. This Regulation shall not apply to financial instruments whose characteristics are predominantly those of financial instruments within the meaning of Annex I Section C (1) - (3) notwithstanding that they include incidental derivative features, which could otherwise be viewed as falling within the scope of this Regulation. This Regulation shall also not apply to the foreign exchange spot market, which could otherwise be viewed as falling within the scope of this Regulation.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 251 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4
(4) ’class of derivatives' means a number of OTCsubset of derivative contracts that share common, essential characteristics; including, but not limited to; maturity, underlying and currency of notional;
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5
(5) ’over the counter (OTC) derivatives' means derivative contracts whose execution does not take place on a regulated market as defined by Article 4 (1) point 14 of Directive 2004/39/EC;deleted
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6
(6) ’financial counterparty' means an undertaking established in the Union which is an authorised investment firms as set out in Directive 2004/39/EC, an authorised credit institutions as defined in Directive 2006/48/EC, an authorised insurance undertakings as defined in Directive 73/239/EEC, an authorised assurance undertakings as defined in Directive 2002/83/EC, an authorised reinsurance undertakings as defined in Directive 2005/68/EC, an authorised undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC, institutions for occupational retirement provision as defined in Directive 2003/41/EC and alternative investment funds managers as defined in Directive 2010/.../EU;or an authorised or registered alternative investment funds as defined in Directive 2010/.../EU excluding those businesses whose sole or main strategy or investment policy is to develop or invest in (directly or through its subsidiary entities, co-ownership or joint venture participations) physical real estate.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 22 a (new)
(22 a) 'segregation' shall mean at least that the assets and positions of one person shall not be used to discharge the liabilities of or claims against any other person from whom it is intended that he is segregated, and shall not be available for such purposes, especially in the event of a clearing member’s insolvency.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 288 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
A financial counterparty shall clear all OTC derivative contracts which are considered eligible pursuant to Article 4 and are concluded with other financial counterparties in the relevant CCPs listed in the register as referred to in Article 4(4).
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 297 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
That clearing obligation shall also apply to financial counterparties and to the non- financial counterparties referred to in Article 7(2) which enter into eligible OTC derivative contracts with third country enticlearing counterparties.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. There shall be no clearing obligation in the case of derivative contracts between subsidiary undertakings of the same parent company or between a parent company and a subsidiary undertaking. Instead such trades, where they would be subject to the clearing obligation were the counterparties not subsidiary undertakings of the same parent company or a parent company and a subsidiary undertaking, shall be subject to the risk mitigation techniques under Article 8 and financial counterparties shall be subject to the reporting requirements under Article 6.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 335 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the date(s) from which the clearing obligation takes effect for different counterparties or categories of counterparties where differentiation is appropriate. This date shall be no earlier than the date on which the clearing obligation is imposed.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 345 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a a (new)
(a a) the level of counterparty credit risk involved;
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 347 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) the impact of settlement risk
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 350 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point b b (new)
(b b) the level of standardisation of the contractual terms and operational processes;
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 356 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) ability of the CCPs, to handle the volume of contracts;
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 366 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new)
(e a) the range, type and operational capacity of counterparties using the derivative contract and their risk management techniques;
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 404 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1
A CCP that has been authorised to clear eligible OTC derivative contracts shall accept clearing such contracts on a non- discriminatory, transparent and objective basis, regardless of the venue of execution.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 405 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. The CCP shall establish policies and procedures sufficient to ensure compliance with these obligations under paragraph 1, including: a) Offering trading venues consistent communication protocols based on open international standards; b) Accounting separately for the costs and revenues relating to individual services and disclosing such information to their Competent Authorities on the basis of accounting standards adopted under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 406 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 b (new)
1 b. When a request for access has been formally submitted to a CCP by a trading venue, the venue shall only be denied access on non-competitive grounds or in the case of a threat to the orderly functioning of markets. The venue receive a fully reasoned and explained response to that request within three months. Following a rejected application the trading venue may put in a new request for access following a minimum of one month waiting period.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 407 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 c (new)
1 c. Within six months of the submission, access must be completed, subject to the approval by the competent authorities of the trading venue and the CCP.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 408 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 d (new)
1 d. The home competent authorities of the requesting trade venue and CCP may only deny access to a CCP where such access could threaten the smooth and orderly functioning of markets. In case of disagreement, ESMA shall settle any disputes between competent authorities in accordance with article 19 of Regulation EU 1095/2010.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 418 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
FinanciaAll counterparties shall report to a trade repository registered in accordance with Article 51 the details of any OTC derivative contract they have entered into and any modification or termination. The details shall be reported no later than the working day following the execution, clearing, or modification of the contract.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 433 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Where a trade repository is not able to record the details of an OTC derivative contract, financial counterparties shall report the details of their positions in those contracts to the competent authority designated in accordance with Article 48 of Directive 2004/39/EC.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 474 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Where a non-financial counterparty takes positions in OTC derivative contracts exceeding the clearing threshold to be determined pursuant to paragraph 3(b) on 90 consecutive days, it shall be subject to the clearing obligation set out in Article 3 with regard to all its eligible OTC derivative contracts. When the aforementioned non-financial counterparty's positions in derivative contracts falls below the clearing threshold for 90 consecutive days the clearing obligation shall no longer apply.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 488 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) Criteria for establishing which derivatives contracts are objectively measurable as directly linked to commercial or treasury financing activity based upon whether: i) a transaction qualifies for hedge accounting treatment under IFRS, or equivalent accounting rules; or ii) contributes to the reduction of economic risks in the conduct and management of a non-financial end user, where the risks arise from a potential change in value or cash flow - of assets that it owns, produces, manufactures, processes or merchandises; - of liabilities that it incurs; - of services that it provides or purchases; - of revenues received (including receivables); or - are related to fluctuations in interest, commodity or foreign exchange rates including planned exposures arising from any of the foregoing.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 675 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
A CCP shall have a board of which at least one third, but no less than two, of its members are independent. These independent members may be representatives of the clients of the Clearing Members. The compensation of the independent and other non-executive members of the board shall not be linked to the business performance of the CCP.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 694 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 3
3. The risk committee shall advise the board on any arrangements that may impact the risk management of the CCP, such as, but not limited to, a significant change in its risk model, the default procedures, the criteria for accepting clearing members or the clearing of new classes of instruments. The advice of the risk committee is not required for the daily operations of the CCP or, but in emergency situations could play a consultative role.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 723 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 2
2. Where the organisational or administrative arrangements of a CCP to manage conflicts of interest are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that risks of damage to the interests of a clearing member or client will be prevented, it shall clearly disclose the general nature or sources of conflicts of interest to the clearing member before accepting new transactions from that clearing member. Where the client is not known to the CCP, the CCP shall inform the clearing member whose client is concerned.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 735 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point h
(h) the service provider cooperates with the competent authority in connection with the outsourced activities;deleted
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 744 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 1
1. A CCP shall establish the categories of admissible clearing members and the admission criteria. Such criteria shall be non-discriminatory, transparent and objective so as to ensure fair and open access to the CCP and shall ensure that clearing members have sufficient financial resources and operational capacity to meet the obligations arising from participation in a CCP. Criteria that restrict access shall only be permitted to the extent that their objective is to control the risk for the CCP. Financial institutions should not be restricted from becoming clearing members in an uncompetitive or unreasonable way.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 746 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 3
3. Clearing members that clear transactions on behalf of their clients shall have the necessary additional financial resources and operational capacity to perform this activity. The CCP's rules for clearing members should allow it to gather basic information to identify, monitor and manage relevant concentrations of risk related to the provision of services to clients. Clearing members shall, upon request, inform the CCP about the criteria and arrangements they adopt to allow their clients to access the services of the CCP.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 748 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 6
6. A CCP may impose specific additional obligations on clearing members, such as, but not limited to, the participation in auctions of a defaulting clearing member's position. Such additional obligations shall be proportional to the risk brought by the clearing member and shall not restrict participation to certain categories of clearing members in an uncompetitive way.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 749 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 1
1. A CCP shall publicly disclose the prices and fees associated with services provided. It shall disclose the prices and fees of singleeach services and functions provided separately, including discounts and rebates and the conditions to benefit from those reductions. It shall allow its clearing members and, where relevant, their clients, separate access to specific services.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 750 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 3
3. ATo the maximum extent possible, consistent with its legal and contractual obligations, a CCP shall publicly disclose the price information used to calculate its end of day exposures with its clearing members and the volumes of the cleared transactions for each class of instruments.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 752 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. A CCP shall publicly disclose the operational and technical requirements related to the communication protocols covering content and message formats it uses to interact with third-parties, including those referred to in Article 5.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 757 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 1
1. A CCP shall keep records and accounts that shall enable it, at any time and without delay, to identify and segregate the assets and positions of one clearing member from the assets and positions of any other clearing member and from its own assets. Where a CCP deposits assets and funds with a third party, it shall ensure that assets and funds belonging to a clearing member are kept separately from the assets and funds belonging to the CCP, other clearing members and from assets and funds belonging to that third party.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 765 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 2
2. A CCP shall require each clearing member to distinguish and segregate in accounts with the CCP the assets and positions of that clearing member from those of its clients. A CCP shall allow clients to have a more detailed segregation ofkeep records and accounts enabling each clearing member to identify clearly in accounts with the CCP, their assets, funds and positions. The CCP shall publicly discl of that clearing member from those of the risks and costs associated with the different levels of segregationclearing member’s clients. This can also be offered via segregated accounts maintained by an independent third party.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 775 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 3
3. Depending on the level of segregation chosen by a client, the CCP shall ensure that it is able to transfer on request at a pre-defined trigger event, without the consent of the clearing member and within a pre-defined transfer period its assets and positions to another clearing member. That other clearing member shall only be obliged where it has previously entered into a contractual relationship for that purposeA CCP shall offer to keep records and accounts enabling each clearing member to identify clearly in accounts held by the CCP the assets, funds and positions held for the account of a client from those held for the account of other clients.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 782 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. A clearing member shall, depending on the level of service agreed with the client, offer to ensure that assets and funds belonging to a client are either legally segregated from the assets and funds belonging to other clients of the clearing member and from the clearing member (“full segregation”), or provide client omnibus accounts that provide legal protection for client assets (“legally segregated omnibus accounts”). Clearing members shall offer both full segregation and legally segregated omnibus accounts to their clients under commercially reasonable terms.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 783 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 3 b (new)
3 b. The CCP and clearing member shall publicly disclose the levels of protection and the costs associated with the different levels of segregation they provide. Details of the different levels of segregation shall include a description of the main legal implications of the respective levels of segregation offered including information on the relevant jurisdictions’ applicable insolvency law.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 784 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 3 c (new)
3 c. A CCP shall offer clearing members and, where relevant, clients the possibility to provide, at their discretion, their initial margin either via a title transfer collateral arrangement or via a security interest collateral arrangement. Clearing Members shall offer corresponding possibilities to their clients, except to the extent that national or EU laws restrict the use of title transfer financial collateral arrangements by retail customers.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 788 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 4
4. Provided that the client is not exposed to the default of the clearing member through which it has access to the CCP or of any other clients, Annex III, Part 2, point 6 of Directive 2006/48/EC shall applyA CCP should structure its arrangements to ensure, that when full segregation has been chosen, it can facilitate the transfer of the positions and collateral of clients of a defaulting member to one or more other participants.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 797 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 38 – paragraph 1
A CCP shall measure and assess its liquidity and credit exposures to each clearing member and, where relevant, to another CCP with whom it has concluded an interoperable arrangement, on a near to real time basis. A CCP should, where practicable, identify, monitor and manage the potential risks arising from clearing members clearing transactions on behalf of clients. A CCP shall have access in a timely manner and on a non discriminatory basis to the relevant pricing sources to effectively measure its exposures. Such pricing sources should include as a minimum, those related to indices used to price derivatives or other financial instruments.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 799 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 38 – paragraph 1 a (new)
CCPs should be granted non- discriminatory access to information on the composition, methodology and prices of any indices that are required to calculate the value of a derivative product. This should be done on a reasonable cost basis.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 802 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 1
1. A CCP shall impose, call and collect, or in specific cases, secure margins to limit its credit exposures from its clearing members, and where relevant, from CCPs which have interoperable arrangements. Such margins shall be sufficient to cover potential exposures that the CCP estimates will occur until the liquidation of the relevant positions. They shall be sufficient to cover losses that result from at least 99 per cent of the exposures movements over an appropriate time horizon and they shall ensure that a CCP fully collateralises its exposures with all its clearing members, and where relevant with CCPs which have interoperable arrangements, at least on a daily basis.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 822 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
Powers are delegated to the Commission to adopt regulatory technical standards specifying the appropriate percentage and time horizon, as well as the appropriate mechanisms for securing margin as referred to in paragraph 1, to be considered for the different classes of financial instruments.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 828 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 1
1. A CCP shall maintain a default fund to cover lossesTo further limit its credit exposures to its clearing members, a CCP shall maintain a default fund to cover losses that exceed the losses to be covered by margin requirements as referred to in Article 39, arising from the default, including the opening of an insolvency procedure of one or more clearing members.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 836 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 41 – paragraph 1
1. In addition to the capital required in Article 12, a CCP shall maintain sufficient available financial resources to cover potential losses that exceed the losses to be covered by margin requirements and the default fund. Such resources may include any other clearing fund provided by clearing members or other parties, loss sharing arrangements, insurance arrangements, the own funds of a CCP, parental guarantees or similar provisions. Such resources, and should be proportionate to the risks shared by the CCP and the others underwriting risk in the CCP. These resources shall include the dedicated resources of the CCP and shall be freely available to the CCP and shall not be used to cover the operating losses.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 846 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 3
3. A CCP shall use contributions to the default fund and other contributions of non-defaulting clearing members only after having exhausted the contributions of the defaulting clearing member and, where relevant, having utilised the CCP's own funds referred to in Article 41(1).
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 849 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. In cases where a client has chosen full segregation or a legally segregated omnibus account, a CCP may not use that client's margins to cover the losses resulting from any clearing member's default, except in the case of the client's own default.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 851 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 43 – paragraph 1
1. A CCP shall only accept highly liquidcash, cash equivalents such as gold, and highly liquid financial instruments as collateral with minimal credit and market risk to cover its exposure to its clearing members. It shall apply adequate haircuts to asset values that reflect the potential for their value to decline over the interval between their last revaluation and the time by which they can reasonably be assumed to be liquidated. It shall take into account the liquidity risk following the default of a market participant and the concentration risk on certain assets that may result in establishing the acceptable collateral and the relevant haircuts.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 875 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1
1. A CCP shall regularly review the models and parameters adopted to calculate its margin requirements, default fund contributions, collateral requirements and other risk control mechanisms. It shall subject the models to rigorous and frequent stress tests to assess their resilience in extreme but plausible market conditions and shall perform back tests to assess the reliability of the methodology adopted. The CCP shall inform the competent authority of the results of the tests performed and. It shall obtain its validation before adopting an independent validation and subject any significanyt change to the models and parameters to review by the competent authority before adopting the change.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 882 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 1
1. A CCP shall, where practicable and available, use central bank money to settle its transactions. Where central bank money is not accessibleused, steps shall be taken to strictly limit credit and liquidity risks.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 945 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 67 – paragraph 1
1. A trade repository shall publish aggregate positions by class of derivatives on the contracts reported to it, such reporting utilising international open industry standards where possible.
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 972 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 70 – paragraph 1
"Where a system operator has provided collateral security to another system operator in connection with an interoperable system, the rights of the providing system operator to that collateral security shall not be affected by insolvency proceedings against the receiving system operator." Where a client in the meaning of the Regulation …./… has provided collateral security to the participant with whom the client has a contractual relationship in connection with the system executing client’s transfer orders, the rights of the providing client to that collateral security shall not be affected by insolvency proceedings against the receiving participant."
2011/03/30
Committee: ECON