BETA

Activities of Kay SWINBURNE related to 2013/2047(INI)

Plenary speeches (1)

Recovery and resolution framework for non-bank institutions (short presentation)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2013/2047(INI)

Reports (1)

REPORT on recovery and resolution framework for non-bank institutions PDF (199 KB) DOC (102 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2013/2047(INI)
Documents: PDF(199 KB) DOC(102 KB)

Amendments (14)

Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
- having regard to the International Association of Insurance Supervisors report of July 2013 "Global Systemically Important Insurers: Initial Assessment Methodology",
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 b (new)
- having regard to the International Association of Insurance Supervisors report of July 2013 "Global Systemically Important Insurers: Policy Measures",
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 c (new)
- having regard to the CPSS-IOSCO consultative report of August 2013 on 'Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures',
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 d (new)
- having regard to the FSB consultative report of August 2013 on 'Application of the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes to Non-Bank Financial Institutions',
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas the risks of cross-margining of products (portfolio margining) withinusing ring fencing of assets within the default fund of a CCP are untested and so while reducing collateral demands in the short term may reduce costs, the use of cross- margining should not jeopardise the ability of a CCP to correctly manage risk and should recognise the limitations of VaR analytics;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Calls upon the Commission to ensure that CCPs have a default management strategy for all products that are mandated for central clearingcleared by the CCP as part of a wider recovery plan approved by the supervisor, with a particular focus on those products that are mandated for central clearing as there is a higher likelihood of risk concentration in these cases;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Underlines the importance of monitoring risks to CCPs arising from a concentration of clearing members, and calls on supervisors to inform EBA of the largest 10 clearing members of each CCP so that such riskrisks such as inter-linkages, contagion and the potential for failure of more than one CCP at a time can be centrally monitored and assessed;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the Commission to recognise that while the aim of ring-fencing asset classes within a default fund of a CCP is to limit contagion, it is unclear whether this will be sufficient to prevent such contagion in practice given that commercial incentives related to cross-margining could increase risk in the system;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Recognises that losses incurred as a result of poor investment choices by the CCP could also result in the activating of the CCP’s recovery plan; calls upon the Commission to ensure that the CCP’s risk committee is kept fully apprised of the CCP’s investments in order to maintain appropriate oversight; recovery tools such as suspension of dividends and payment of variable remuneration or voluntary restructuring of liabilities through debt- to-equity conversion should be considered the most appropriate tools to be used in these circumstances;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Asserts that the dividing-line between recovery and resolution in the case of CCPs is when the default waterfall is exhausted, necessitating the option for the supervisor toat this point the supervisor should actively consider the option of removeing the CCP's management board should no alternative recovery tools be agreed between the CCP and its clearing members directly;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Establishes that it is the responsibility of a CSD to ensure that its recovery plan clearly provides for operational continuity in reasonable crisis scenarios so that, even if other parts of its business can be disposed of, its primary settlement function can continueas well as the other core services of the CSD can continue to be performed by the CSD or an existing third party provider, as authorised under CSDR;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Calls on the Member States, in the absence of Securities Law Legislation, to develop and coordinate their existing special administration regimes for CSDs in order to improve certainty as to how operational continuity will be maintained in a crisis, in particular by ensuring access to the registries for the resolution authority so as, records or accounts of the CSD so the resolution authority or national competent authority is easily able to identify the owners of assets;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Calls upon the Commission to further develop the IAIS methodology for designating Systemically Important Insurers placing most weighting upon non-traditional insurance activities (NTNI) and interconnectedness within the EU, followed by size, European activity and substitutability;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls on the Commission to closely take into account the IAIS's work on recovery and resolution of insurers, and to consider what action is needed to implement itwork with international partners to follow the timetable established by the FSB to implement the policy recommendations surrounding recovery and resolution planning requirements, enhanced group supervision and higher loss absorbency requirements;
2013/09/03
Committee: ECON