[ParlTrack]

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)

(2a) CCPs established within the Union differ in terms of the nature of their business, legal and organisational structure as well as their risk profile, size and legal status. Regulation should reflect this diversity.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) The number of CCPs currently established in the Union and authorised under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 remains relatively limited, standing at 17 in June 2017. 28 third-country CCPs have been recognised under the equivalence provisions of that Regulation, a~~llow~~uthorising them ~~also~~ to offer their services to clearing members and trading venues established in the Union48 . Clearing markets are well integrated across the Union ~~but~~, often highly concentrated in certain asset classes and highly interconnected. The concentration of risk makes the failure of a CCP a low- probability but a potentially extremely high-impact event. In line with the G20 consensus, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation on CCP Recovery and Resolution49 in November 2016 to ensure that authorities are appropriately prepared to address a failing CCP, safeguarding financial stability and limiting taxpayer costs. __________________ 48 In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, ESMA provides a list of the third-country CCPs that have been recognised to offer services and activities in the Union. The third-country CCPs are established in 15 countries covered by CCP equivalence decisions adopted by the Commission, including Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, South Korea, Mexico, South Africa and the US CFTC, Brazil, UAE, Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), India and New Zealand. 49 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365. COM(2016) 856 final.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)

(3a) In line with the adoption of the forthcoming Regulation on CCP Recovery and Resolution, an appropriate mechanism needs to be developed in order to ensure that the supervisor taking the decision to put a CCP into resolution has access to ‘the lender of last resort’ resource.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) The supervisory arrangements under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 are~~ly mainly on~~ primarily the responsibility of the home- country authority. CCPs established in the Union are currently authorised and supervised by colleges of national supervisors, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), relevant members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), and other relevant authorities. The colleges ~~rely on~~benefit from coordination and information-sharing by the national competent authority which bears the responsibility to enforce the provisions laid out in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. Diverging supervisory practice~~s for CCPs~~ across the Union ~~can create risks of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage, jeopardising financial stability and allowing for unhealthy competition~~, when not a reflection of the diverse nature of CCPs, could create risks of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage. The Commission has drawn attention to these emerging risks and the need for greater supervisory convergence in its Communication on CMU of September 201651 and in the public consultation on the operations of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)52 . __________________ 51 Communication on the “State of the Union 2016: Completing the Capital Market Union – Commission accelerates reform”; 14 September 2016. 52 Public consultation on the operations of the European Supervisory Authorities”; 21/03/2017 – 16/05/2017.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)

(6a) This regulation should seek to support enhanced global supervisory cooperation, therefore once equivalence has been granted to a third country jurisdiction, the relevant authorities should seek to avoid duplication and allow supervisors to rely on and/or defer to each other’s regulatory and supervisory frameworks.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) The ~~basic~~ tasks to be carried out through the ESCB ~~includ~~are the definition and implementation of the monetary policy of the Union and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. Safe and efficient financial market infrastructures, in particular clearing systems, are essential for the fulfilment of these ~~basic tasks, and the pursuit of the ESCB’s primary objective of maintaining price stability~~tasks. The relevant members of the ESCB, as central banks of issue of the currencies of the financial instruments cleared by CCPs, should be involved in CCP supervision, due to the potential risks that the malfunctioning of a CCP could pose to the pursuit of those basic tasks and the primary objective, affecting the instruments and counterparties which are used to transmit monetary policy. As a result, the central banks of issue should be involved in the assessment of a CCP’s risk management. In addition, while the mandates of central banks and supervisors may overlap, there is a potential for misalignment when supervisory actions impact on key responsibilities of central banks in areas such as price stability, monetary policy and the payment systems. In crisis situations, such misalignments can amplify the risks to financial stability if the assignment of responsibilities between authorities remains unclear.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) The Treaties have established an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro, and the European Central Bank (ECB) as an Institution of the Union for this purpose. The Treaties also provide that the ESCB shall be governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB, and the ECB alone may authorise the issue of the euro. ~~The specific role of the ECB within the ESCB as the central bank of issue of the single currency of the Union should thus be acknowledged~~Attention should also be given to the Euro system, meaning those Union currencies that are not the Euro and their respective central banks of issue.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) In view of the global nature of financial markets and of the need to address inconsistencies in the supervision of Union and third-country CCPs, ESMA’s ability to promote convergence in the supervision of CCPs that are similar in nature should be enhanced. In order to confer new roles and responsibilities on ESMA, Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA)53 should be amended. __________________ 53 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p.84

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) A specific ~~Executive Session (“CCP Executive Session~~committee (“CCP Supervisory Committee”) should be created within ~~the Board of S~~ESMA for the purposes of preparing decisions and carrying out the tasks relating to the supervis~~ors~~ion of ~~ESMA to~~CCPs, handleing tasks related to CCPs in general, and superviseing Union and the EU facing activity of third- country CCPs in particular. In order to guarantee a smooth establishment of the CCP Executive Session, it is necessary to clarify its interactions with the Board of Supervisors of ESMA, its organisation and the tasks it should perform. The CCP Supervisory Committee should be composed of authorities experienced in the supervision of CCPs. In order to ensure the smooth integration of the CCP Supervisory Committee within the structure of ESMA, while taking due account of the specific needs of CCP supervision, as well as to preserve a swift decision-making process, the CCP Supervisory Committee should be chaired by an independent chairperson with the help of two independent Vice Chairs, and its decisions should be subject to the non- objection of the Board of Supervisors of ESMA. The appointment of the independent Chair and the two independent Vice Chairs should be based on merit, expertise and experience and should not be restricted to those of EU nationality given the highly specialised nature of those senior roles.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) In order to ensure a coherent supervisory approach and to reflect the mandates relevant authorities involved in the supervision of CCPs, the CCP ~~Executive Session~~Supervisory Committee should be composed of a permanent and ~~CCP-specific members. Permanent members should include the Head of the CCP Executive Session and two independent Directors, who~~independent Chair, two permanent and independent Vice Chairs and CCP-specific members. The Chairs of the CCP Supervisory Committee should act independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole. ~~The Commission and the ECB should also appoint permanent members.~~ Members specific to each CCP should include a representative of the competent national authorities of the Member States where the CCP is established, designated in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, representatives from the competent national authorities of the three largest clearing members of the CCP, representatives from the competent national authority of any relevant interoperable CCPs and a representative of the relevant central bank(s) of issue. The ~~Head~~Chair of the CCP ~~Executive Session~~Supervisory Committee should be able to invite members of the supervisory college, a~~s well as~~nd should invite representatives of authorities of third- country CCPs recognised by ESMA as observers to ensure that the views of the other relevant authorities are taken into account by the CCP ~~Executive Session~~Supervisory Committee. While the permanent members should participate in all meetings of the CCP ~~Executive Session~~Supervisory Committee, CCP specific members and observers should participate only where necessary and appropriate for CCPs under their supervision. The presence of an independent ~~permanent members~~Chair and CCP-specific members should ensure that decisions made in the CCP ~~Executive Session~~Supervisory Committee are consistent, appropriate and proportionate across the Union and that the relevant national competent authorities, central banks of issue and observers are involved in the decision-making on issues concerning a CCP established in a Member State.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11 a (new)

(11a) In order to ensure a coherent supervisory approach, ESMA shall, in addition to the stress tests as set out in this regulation, take note of the stress tests carried out by CCPs as part of their recovery and resolution arrangements. These stress tests, during which a CCP should consider its arrangements across the Union in terms of their aggregate effect on Union financial stability, should be included in crisis simulation exercises with respect to potential system-wide stress events.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) In order to ensure effective supervision, ~~the CCP Executive Session should have a dedicated staff and~~it is necessary for the CCP Supervisory Committee to have a dedicated staff possessing sufficient knowledge, skills and experience and should not be restricted to those of EU nationality given the highly specialised expertise required. It is also necessary for the CCP Supervisory Committee to have adequate resources to guarantee its autonomy, independence and adequate functioning in relation to its tasks. The budgetary impact of the supervisory powers over CCPs needs to be considered in the statement made by ESMA in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) ~~While n~~National competent authorities should continue to exercise their current supervisory responsibilities under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, ~~the prior consent of~~agreement with ESMA should be ~~required~~sought for certain decisions in order to promote consistency in the supervision of CCPs throughout the Union. A specific mechanism is introduced for cases of disagreement between ESMA and the national competent authorities. Since some decisions will require both the consent of the national competent authority and of ESMA, disagreements and deadlocks between those two entities should be avoided to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, the national competent authority and ESMA should coordinate their analysis and endeavour to reach a common position. Where inconsistencies or disagreements nevertheless arise, the national competent authority and ESMA should attempt to reconcile their views and reach a compromise position within the shortest possible timeframe. Similarly, there is a need to better reflect the mandates of the central banks of issue concerning their monetary policy responsibilities, due to the potential risks that the malfunctioning of a CCP could pose to the implementation of the monetary policy of the Union and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. Therefore, ~~the prior consent of~~an agreement with the relevant central banks of issue should be required on certain decisions envisaged by national competent authorities, in particular when it relates to a CCP’s payment and settlement arrangements and related liquidity risk management procedures for the transactions denominated in that central bank of issue’s currensought on decisions relating to monetary policy.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) In order to enable ESMA to conduct its tasks with regards to CCPs effectively, both Union and third-country CCPs should pay supervisory fees for ESMA’s supervisory and administrative tasks. These fees should be proportionate to the turnover of the services the CCP provides in a Union currency to EU clearing members. These fees should cove~~r fo~~r the applications for authorisation of Union CCPs, the applications for recognition of third-country CCPs, and the annual fees associated with the tasks under ESMA’s responsibility. The Commission should specify further in a delegated act the types of fees, the matters for which fees are due, the amount of the fees and the manner in which they are to be paid by authorised and applicant Union CCPs recognised third- country CCPs.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) The supervisory arrangements in this Regulation for third-country CCPs offering clearing services ~~within the Union also require revision. Access to~~in a Union currency to EU clearing members, should ensure access to relevant information, provide the ability to conduct appropriate on-site inspections ~~and the possibility to share~~where necessary and allow the sharing of information on third- country CCPs between relevant Union and Member State authorities needs to be improved to avoid important financial stability implications for Union entities. There is also a risk that changes to a third-country CCP rules or to a third-country regulatory framework cannot be taken into account and could negatively affect the regulatory or supervisory outcomes, leading to an unlevel playing field between Union and third-country CCPs.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25

(25) As part of its commitment to integrated financial markets, the Commission should continue to determine by way of equivalence decisions that the legal and supervisory frameworks of third countries fulfil the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. In order to enhance the implementation of the current equivalence regime in relation to CCPs, the Commission ~~should be able to, if necessary, specify further the criteria for assessing the equivalence of third-country CCP regimes. It is also necessary to empower ESMA with the supervision of~~may empower ESMA to monitor regulatory and supervisory developments in those third-country CCP regimes that have been deemed equivalent by the Commission. This is in order to ensure that the equivalence criteria and any specific conditions set for their use continue to be satisfied by third countries. ESMA should report its findings to the Commission and the relevant third country supervisor on a confidential basis.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26

(26) The Commission is currently able to amend, suspend, review or revoke an equivalence decision at any time, in particular where developments occur in a third country which materially affect the elements assessed in accordance with the equivalence requirements under this Regulation. Where a third country’s relevant authorities no longer cooperate with ESMA or other Union supervisors in good faith or fail to comply on a continuous basis with the applicable equivalence requirements, the Commission is also able to, inter alia, put an authority of the third country on notice or publish a specific recommendation. Where the Commission decides at any time to revoke a third country’s equivalence, it is able to delay the date of application of that decision in order to address the risks to financial stability or of market disruptions. In addition to those powers currently available, the Commission should also be able to set specific conditions to ensure that the equivalence criteria continue to be fulfilled on an ongoing basis by the third country to which an equivalence decision relates. The Commission should ~~also~~ be able to set conditions ensuring that ESMA is able to effectively exercise its responsibilities in relation to third-country CCPs recognised under this Regulation or in relation to monitoring of regulatory and supervisory developments in third countries that are of relevance for adopted equivalence decisions.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

(27) In view of the ~~growing~~often cross-border ~~dimension of~~nature of systemically relevant CCPs and of the interlinkages in the Union financial system, it is necessary to improve the ability of the Union to identify, monitor and mitigate the potential risks related to th~~ird-country CCP~~ose systemically relevant third-country CCPs offering a clearing service in a Union currency to EU clearing members. The role of ESMA should therefore be enhanced to effectively supervise how third- country CCPs that apply for recognition to provide clearing ~~services in the Union~~in a Union currency to EU clearing members provide that service. This supervision must be done in conjuncture with the relevant third country authority. The involvement of the Union central banks of issue in the recognition and supervision of third- country CCPs ~~that are active~~offering clearing services to EU clearing members and in the currency they issue, should also be improved. Therefore, Union central banks of issue should be consulted on ~~certain~~those aspects affecting their monetary policy responsibilities ~~in relation to financial instruments denominated in Union currencies which are cleared to a significant extent in CCPs located outside the Union~~.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

(28) Once the Commission has determined the legal and supervisory framework of a third country as equivalent to the Union framework, the process to recognise CCPs and related services from that third country should take into account the risks those CCPs present for the financial stability of the Union or for the Member State.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29

(29) When considering the application of a third-country CCP for recognition, ESMA should assess the degree of systemic risk that the CCP or CCP’s clearing service offered in a Union currency and provided to EU clearing members, presents to the financial stability of the Union on the basis of objective and transparent criteria set out in this Regulation. A Commission delegated act should further specify these criteria.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29 a (new)

(29a) When determining whether or not a CCP or one or more clearing service offered by the CCP is systemically important for the financial stability of the Union, ESMA should only take into account the nature, size and complexity of a CCP’s business in the EU. A non- EU CCP should not be considered to be systemically important if its EU business is not significant, regardless of the size of its global business.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30

(30) CCPs that are not systemically important to the financial stability of the Union or one of its Member States should be considered as ‘Tier 1’ CCPs. CCPs offering a clearing service in a Union currency to EU clearing members that are systemically important, or likely to become systemically important, to the financial stability of the Union or one of its Member States should be considered as ‘Tier 2’ CCPs, or ‘Tier 2’ service lines. Where ESMA determines that a third-country CCP, or clearing service offered in a Union currency to EU clearing members is not systemically important to the financial stability of the Union, the existing recognition conditions under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 should apply to that CCP or clearing service. Where ESMA determines that a third-country CCP, or a CCP’s clearing service offered in a Union currency to EU clearing members, is systemically important, additional requirements proportionate to the degree of risk presented by that CCP, or clearing service thereof, should be established. ESMA should only recognise such a CCP, or one or more of the clearing service lines provided, where that CCP complies with these requirements.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31

(31) The additional requirements should include certain prudential requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 that aim to increase the safety and efficiency of how a CCP’s clearing service in a Union currency is provided to EU clearing members. ESMA should be directly responsible for ~~ensuring that~~assessing whether a systemically-important third-country CCP complies with those requirements. Related requirements should also enable ESMA to carry full and effective supervision of ~~that CCP.~~ how clearing services in a Union currency are offered by the CCP to EU clearing members.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32

(32) In order to ensure the proper involvement of the central bank(s) of issue, the systemically important third-country CCP should also fulfil any additional requirements that the central bank(s) of issue c~~onsider necessary~~an justify as required to support their monetary policy responsibilities. The central bank(s) of issue should provide ESMA with confirmation whether or not the CCP complies with any additional requirements as quickly as possible and in any case 180 days from the CCP’s application to ESMA.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

(33) The degree of risk posed by a systemically-important CCP to the financial system and stability of the Union varies. The requirements for systemically- important CCPs should therefore be applied in a manner proportionate to the risks that the CCP may present to the Union. Where ESMA ~~and the relevant central bank(s) of issue~~ concludes that a third-country CCP is of such systemic importance that additional requirements will not ensure the financial stability of the Union, ESMA should be able to recommend to the Commission that that CCP should not be recognised. ~~The Commission should be able to adopt an implementing act declaring that the third- country CCP should be established in the Union and authorised as such to provide clearing services in the Union.~~

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34

(34) ESMA should regularly review the recognition of third-country CCPs as well as their classification as Tier 1 or Tier 2 CCPs. In this regard, ESMA should consider amongst others, the changes in the nature, size and complexity of ~~the~~how third- country CCP’s ~~busines~~clearing services are offered in a Union currency to EU clearing members. Such reviews should take place at least every two years and more frequently where necessary. Further to such reviews, ESMA should be able to reclassify a CCP, or clearing service offered in a Union currency to EU clearing members, from Tier 1 to Tier 2 or vice versa. An adaptation period should be allowed if reclassification occurs.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) ESMA should have all the powers necessary to supervise the clearing services provided in a Union currency to EU clearing members of recognised third- country CCPs, so as to ensure their ongoing compliance with the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. In ~~certain areas~~areas relating to monetary policy, ESMA’s decisions should be subject to the ~~prior cons~~agreement of the relevant central bank(s) of issue.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37

(37) ESMA should be able to impose fines on third-country CCPs where it finds that they have committed, intentionally or negligently, an infringement of this Regulation by providing incorrect or misleading information to ESMA. In addition, ESMA should be able to impose fines on systemically-important CCPs where it finds that they have committed, intentionally or negligently, an infringement of the additional requirements applicable to them in this Regulation.deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 39

(39) ESMA should be able to impose fines on both Tier 1 and Tier 2 CCPs where it finds that they have committed, intentionally or negligently, an infringement of this Regulation by providing incorrect or misleading information to ESMA. In addition, ESMA should be able to impose fines on Tier 2 CCPs where it finds that they have committed, intentionally or negligently, an infringement of the additional requirements applicable to them in this Regulation.deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 40

(40) Fines should be imposed according to the level of seriousness of the infringement. Infringements should be divided into different groups for which specific fines should be allocated. In order to calculate the fine relating to a particular infringement, ESMA should apply a two-step methodology consisting of setting a basic amount and adjusting that basic amount, if necessary, by certain coefficients. The basic amount should be established by taking into account the annual turnover of the third-country CCPs concerned and the adjustments should be made by increasing or decreasing the basic amount through the application of the relevant coefficients in accordance with this Regulation.deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41

(41) This Regulation should establish coefficients linked to aggravating and mitigating circumstances in order to give the necessary tools to ESMA to decide on a fine which is proportionate to the seriousness of the infringement committed by a third country CCP, taking into account the circumstances under which that infringement has been committed.deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 42

(42) The decision to impose ~~fines or~~ periodic penalty payments should be based on an independent investigation.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 43

(43) Before deciding whether to impose ~~fines or~~ periodic penalty payments, ESMA should give the persons subject to the proceedings the opportunity to be heard in order to respect their rights of defence.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44

(44) ESMA should refrain from imposing ~~fines or~~ periodic penalty payments where a prior acquittal or conviction arising from identical facts, or from facts which are substantially the same, has acquired the force of res judicata as a result of criminal proceedings under national law.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45

(45) ESMA’s decisions imposing ~~fines and~~ periodic penalty payments should be enforceable and their enforcement should be subject to the rules of civil procedure which are in force in the State in the territory of which it is carried out. Rules of civil procedure should not include criminal procedural rules but could include administrative procedural rules.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 47

(47) The validation of significant changes to models and parameters adopted to calculate a CCP’s margin requirements, default fund contributions, collateral requirements, and other risk-control mechanisms should be aligned with ~~the new~~a requirement ~~of a prior consent of ESMA with certain decisions of~~to reach agreement with ESMA and the national competent authority with regard to CCPs established in the Union. To simplify the model validation proceedings, one validation by the national competent authority that is subject to ESMA’s prior consent should replace the two validations that national competent authority and ESMA were required to conduct independently. In addition, the interplay of that validation and the college decision should be clarified. The preliminary adoption of a significant change to that models or parameters should be possible where needed, especially where their swift change is necessary to ensure the soundness of the CCP’s risk management.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 50

(50) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to increase the safety and efficiency of CCPs by laying down uniform requirements for their activities, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of their scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 6 – point 1 a

~~2. In Article 6, the following point (1a) is inserted: ‘ (1a) a Board of Supervisors in Executive Session for CCPs (CCP Executive Session), which shall exercise the tasks set out in Article 44b; ‘~~deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 40 – paragraph 1 – point f

~~4. In Article 40(1), the following point (f) is added: ‘ (f) the permanent members of the CCP Executive Session, referred to in point (i) of Article 44a(1)(a), who shall be non-voting. ‘~~deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 42 – subparagraph 1

5. In Article 42, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: ‘When carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the Chairperson, the voting permanent members and the voting members specific to each CCP of the CCP Executive Session referred to in point (i) of Article 44a(1)(a) and the voting members of the Board of Supervisors shall act independently and objectively in the sole interest of the Union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. ‘deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 43 – paragraphs 1 and 8

6. Article 43 is amended as follows: (a) following: ‘1. give guidance to the work of the Authority. It shall be responsible for the tasks referred to in Chapter II, except for those tasks for which the CCP Executive Session is responsible pursuant to Article 44b(1). ‘ (b) following: ‘8. exercise disciplinary authority over the Chairperson and may remove him or her from office in accordance with Article 48(5). The Board of Supervisors, in agreement with the CCP Executive Session, shall exercise disciplinary authority over the Executive Director and may remove him or her from office in accordance with Article 51(5). ‘deleted paragraph 1 is replaced by the The Board of Supervisors shall paragraph 8 is replaced by the The Board of Supervisors shall

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Chapter III – section 1A

~~[...]~~deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Chapter III – Section 3 – title

~~8. The title of Section 3 of Chapter III is replaced by the following: ‘Chairperson, Head and Directors’~~deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 48 a

~~[...]~~deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 49

10. Article 49 is replaced by the following: ‘Without prejudice to the role of the Board of Supervisors, in relation to the tasks of the Head of the CCP Executive Session and the Directors referred to in point (i) of Article 44a(1)(a) and Chairperson, shall neither seek or take instructions from the Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body. Neither Member States, the Union institutions or bodies, nor any other public or private body shall seek to influence the Head of the CCP Executive Session and the Directors referred to in point (i) of Article 44a(1)(a) or the Chairperson in the performance of his or her tasks. In accordance with the Staff Regulations referred to in Article 68, the Chairperson, the Head of the CCP Executive Session and the Directors referred to in point (i) of 44a(1)(a) shall, after leaving service, continue to be bound by the duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. ‘deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11

11. Article 50 is replaced by the following: ‘1. Council may invite the Chairperson or his alternate, or the Head of the CCP Executive Session, to make a statement while fully respecting their independence. The Chairperson or the Head shall make a statement before the European Parliament and answer any questions put by its members, whenever so requested. 2. the CCP Executive Session shall report in writing on the main activities of Board of Supervisors and of the CCP Executive Session, respectively, to the European Parliament where requested and at least 15 days before making the statement referred to in paragraph 1. 3. referred to in Articles 11 to 18 and Articles 20 and 33, the Chairperson shall report any relevant information requested by the European Parliament on an ad-hoc basis. In addition to the information referred to in Article 33, the Head of the CCP Executive Session shall report any relevant information requested by the European Parliament on an ad-hoc basis.’deleted The European Parliament or the The Chairperson or the Head of In addition to the information

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

12. Article 53 is amended as follows: (a) Paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: ‘2. The Executive Director shall be responsible for implementing the annual work programme of the Authority under the guidance of the Board of Supervisors and the CCP Executive Session and under the control of the Management Board. ‘ (b) Paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: ‘4. prepare a multi-annual work programme, as referred to in Article 47(2). For the tasks and powers referred to in Article 44b(1), the Executive Director shall obtain the consent of the CCP Executive Session prior to submitting it to the Management Board. ‘ (c) Paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: ‘7. shall prepare a draft report with a section on the regulatory and supervisory activities of the Authority and a section on financial and administrative matters. For the tasks and powers referred to in Article 44b(1), the Executive Director shall obtain the consent of the CCP Executive Session prior to submitting it to the Management Board. ‘deleted The Executive Director shall Each year the Executive Director

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 63 – paragraph 1 a

13. In Article 63, the following paragraph 1a is inserted: ‘1a. ESMA’s expenditure and fees relating to the tasks and powers referred to in Article 44b (1) shall be separately identifiable within the statement of estimates referred to in paragraph 1. Prior to the adoption of that statement of estimates, the draft prepared by the Executive Director relating to such expenditure and fees shall be approved by the CCP Executive Session. The annual accounts of ESMA drawn up and published in accordance with Article 64(6) shall include the income and expenses related to the tasks referred to in Article 44b(1). ‘deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 14

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 70 – paragraph 1

14. In Article 70, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘1. Supervisors, the CCP Executive Session and the Management Board, the Executive Director, and members of the staff of the Authority, including officials seconded by Member States on a temporary basis and all other persons carrying out tasks for the Authority on a contractual basis, shall be subject to the requirements of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 339 TFEU and the relevant provisions in Union legislation, even after their duties have ceased. ‘deleted Members of the Board of

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15

Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 76 – paragraph 2 a

15. In Article 76, the following paragraph 2a is inserted: ‘2a. Until such time as the Head of the CCP Executive Session and the Directors of the CCP Executive Session referred to in Article 44a(1) take up their duties following their appointment in accordance with Article 48a, the functions of the CCP Executive Session shall be carried out by the Board of Supervisors. ‘deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

The ~~Head~~Chair of the CCP ~~Executive Session~~Supervisory Committee referred to in Article ~~48a of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010~~22a shall chair and manage the college.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – point a

~~(b) in paragraph 2, point (a) is replaced by the following: ‘ (a) the permanent members of the CCP Executive Session referred to in Article 44a of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010; ‘~~deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)

(ca) in paragraph 2, point (ca) is inserted: (ca) the central banks of issue of the most relevant currencies of the financial instruments cleared.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 19 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 4

The representative of the Commission shall be non-voting member. ~~The other permanent members of the CCP Executive Session shall have one vote each.~~

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

ESMA shall establish the frequency and depth of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 hagiving particular regard to the size, systemic importance, nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the CCPs concerned. The review and evaluation shall be updated at least on an annual basis.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

The CCPs ~~shall~~may be subject to appropriate on-site inspections~~. ESMA staff shall be invited to participate in these on-site inspections~~ where necessary.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Competent authorities shall prepare and submit draft decisions to ESMA for cons~~ent~~ideration prior to adoption of any of the following decisions:

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) decisions adopted pursuant to Articles ~~7, 8, 14, 15, 16,~~ 20, 21, 30, 31, 35, 49 and 54 of this Regulation and Articles 35(4) and 36(4) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014;

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 2 –subparagraph 1

Competent authorities shall prepare and submit draft decisions to the central banks of issue referred to in Article 18(2)(h) before adopting any decision pursuant to Articles 14, 15, 20, 44, 46, 50 and 54.deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Where ESMA proposes amendments, the competent authority m~~ay only adopt the decision as amended by ESMA~~ust give due consideration to their suggestions.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2

Where ESMA objects to a final draft decision, the competent authority ~~shall~~may not adopt that decision.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 646/2012
Article 21 a – paragraph 7

7. Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission under Article 258 TFEU, ESMA may adopt a decision addressed to a financial market participant requiring the necessary action to comply with its obligations under Union law, including the cessation of any practice in the following cases: (a) not comply with paragraph 5 in case of ESMAs objection or amendments to a final draft decision; (b) where a competent authority, following a request from ESMA in accordance with paragraph 3, fails to take the requested action within a reasonable time where that failure results in a financial market participant breaching the applicable requirements in Titles IV and V of this Regulation. Decisions adopted pursuant to the first subparagraph shall prevail over any previous decision adopted by the competent authorities on the same matter.deleted where a competent authority does

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 b – Title

Co~~nsent of~~operation with the Central Bank of Issue

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 b – paragraph 1

1. The consent referred to in Article 21a(2) shall be deemed to be given unless the central bank of issue proposes amendments or objects to the draft decision within a maximum period of 15 calendar days after its submission. Where the central bank of issue proposes amendments or objects to a draft decision, it shall provide full and detailed reasons, in writing. Where ESMA has proposed amendments pursuant to Article 21a(4) to the draft decisions to be adopted pursuant to Articles 14, 15, 20 and 54, it shall also submit them also to the central bank of issue. In that case, the deadline referred to in the first subparagraph shall be extended by 5 days.deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 b – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Cooperation should be ensured between the central bank of issue and the relevant supervisory authorities. This should include information sharing, analysis of stress tests carried out by the CCP and constructive dialogue in decision making. Where a decision relates to an issue of monetary policy, the relevant authority should consult with the relevant central bank of issue.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 b – paragraph 2

2. Where the central bank of issue proposes amendments, the competent authority may only adopt the decision as amended by that central bank of issue. Where the central bank of issue objects to a draft decision, the competent authority shall not adopt that decision.deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 21 c – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. The Commission shall adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 82 to further specify the types of fees, the matters for which fees are due, the amount of the fees - which should be proportionate to the level of activity of the CCP within the EU- and the manner in which they are to be paid by the following entities:

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 22 a (new)

7a. The following Article 22a is inserted: Article 22a ESMA CCP Supervisory Committee 1. ESMA shall establish a permanent internal committee pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 for the purposes of preparing decisions and carrying out the tasks relating to the supervision of Union and third country CCPs. The CCP Supervisory Committee established pursuant to the first subparagraph shall submit to the Board of Supervisors complete draft decisions for adoption in accordance with Article 22c.2. The CCP Supervisory Committee shall be composed of: (a) the following permanent members: (i) a Chair, appointed in accordance with Article 22b, who shall be voting; (ii) two Vice Chairs, appointed in accordance with Article 22b, who shall be voting; (iii) a representative of the Commission, who shall be non-voting; and (iv) a representative of the ESCB, who shall be non-voting; (b) the following non-permanent members specific to each CCP in relation to which the CCP Supervisory Committee is convened: (i) a representative of the national competent authority for each CCP established in the Union in relation to which the CCP is convened, who shall be voting; and (ii) a representative of each of the relevant central banks of issue referred to in point (h) of Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 for each CCP established in the Union in relation to which the CCP Supervisory Committee is convened, who shall be non-voting. (iii) a representative of the national competent authority of the three largest clearing members of the CCP who shall be non-voting. (iv) a representative of the national competent authority for each interoperable CCP for which the CCP Supervisory Committee is convened, who shall be non-voting. The Chair may invite as observers to the meetings of the CCP Supervisory Committee, where and as appropriate and necessary, other members referred to in Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the college of the relevant CCP to the meetings of the CCP Supervisory Committee. Where the CCP Supervisory Committee is exercising any of the tasks referred to in point (b) of paragraph 3, authorities of third country CCPs recognised by ESMA pursuant to Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 shall be invited, where and as appropriate and necessary, as observers. Meetings of the CCP Supervisory Committee shall be convened by its Chair at its own initiative or at the request of any of its members. The CCP Supervisory Committee shall meet at least five times a year. Where a task of the CCP Supervisory Committee does not relate to a specific CCP established in the Union, the Committee shall be composed only of the permanent members referred in point (a) of this paragraph and, where relevant, the central banks of issue referred to in point(b)(ii) of this paragraph. 3. The CCP Supervisory Committee shall be responsible for all of the following: (a) providing the consent referred to in Article 21a(1) of Regulation(EU) No 648/2012; (b) recognising and supervising the clearing services offered in Union currencies to EU clearing members of third-country CCPs in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, the monitoring of regulatory and supervisory developments in third countries under Chapter 2 of Title II of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012; and (c) the tasks referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 5(1),the first subparagraph of Article 9(3), Articles 9(4), 13(1) and (4), 17(2) and(3), 18(1), 20(2) and (6), Articles 21c, 23 and 24, Articles 29(3), 38(5),48(3), 49(1) and 54(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 4. The Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee shall be a full-time, independent professional. The Chair shall be appointed on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge of clearing, post-trading and financial matters, and of experience relevant to CCP supervision and regulation. The Chair shall be chosen on the basis of an open selection procedure organised by the Commission, which shall respect the principles of gender balance, experience, qualification and not be restricted to those of EU nationality given the highly specialized nature of this role. The Chair shall not hold any other office at national, Union, or international level. The Chair shall be subject to an appropriate intermediary period before taking up this position and after completing this role. The Commission shall provide to the European Parliament a shortlist of candidates for the position of Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee and shall inform the Council of the shortlist. The Commission shall submit a proposal for the appointment of the Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee to the European Parliament for approval. Following the approval of that proposal, the Council shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee. The Council shall act by qualified majority. The Chair shall be appointed for a fixed term. The Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee should be accountable to the European Parliament and should appear before them on a regular basis so as to inform the Parliament of ongoing activity and maintain an open and constructive dialogue. Where the Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties or has been found guilty of serious misconduct, the Council may, on a proposal from the Commission which has been approved by the European Parliament, adopt an implementing decision to remove him or her from office. The Council shall act by qualified majority. The European Parliament or the Council may inform the Commission that they consider the conditions for the removal of the Chair of the CCP Supervisory Committee to be fulfilled, to which the Commission shall respond. The appointment and treatment of the two independent Vice-Chairs does not need to follow this process, however the same level of independence and transparency should be ensured. 5. The CCP Supervisory Committee shall be supported by a dedicated staff of not necessarily EU nationals, possessing sufficient knowledge, skills and experience and shall be granted adequate resources by ESMA to carry out its tasks. 6. Following consultation with the relevant supervisory college, the CCP Supervisory Committee shall submit draft decisions to the Board of Supervisors pursuant to paragraph 1. 7. The CCP Supervisory Committee shall ensure that members of the college referred to in Article 18(2), the authorities referred to in Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 and the ESRB, in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, have access to all information necessary for the purpose of carrying out their tasks. 8. For the purposes of this Regulation, ESMA shall ensure structural separation between the CCP Supervisory Committee and other functions referred to in Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 b (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 22 b (new)

7b. The following Article 22b is inserted: Article 22b Decision-making within the CCP Supervisory Committee The CCP Supervisory Committee shall take its decisions by a simple majority of its members, In the event of a tie, the Chair shall have the casting vote.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 c (new)

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 22 c (new)

7c. The following Article22c is inserted: Article 22c Decision making within the Board of Supervisors Where the CCP Supervisory Committee submits draft decisions to the Board of Supervisors, those draft decisions shall be deemed adopted by ESMA unless the Board of Supervisors decides on the basis of a simplified majority, as defined in Article 16(4) of the Treaty on European Union and in Article 238(2) TFEU, to reject the draft decision within five working days of its transmission. In cases of particular urgency, the aforementioned period shall not exceed 24 hours. Where the Board of Supervisors rejects a draft decision, it shall state the reasons for doing so in writing.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 25 – paragraph 2 a – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

ESMA shall determine whether ~~a CPP~~one or more of the clearing services provided by a third country CCP in a Union currency to EU clearing members, is systemically important or likely to become systemically important for the financial stability of the Union or for one or more of its Member States (Tier 2 CCP) by taking into account all of the following criteria:

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 25 – paragraph 2 b – introductory part

2b. Where ESMA determines ~~a CCP~~one or more of the services provided by a third country CCP in a Union currency to EU clearing members to be systemically important or likely to become systemically important (Tier 2 CCP) in accordance with paragraph 2a, it may only recognise that CCP where, in addition to the conditions referred to in Article 25(2)(a), (b), (c) and (d), the following conditions are fulfilled in respect of those clearing services:

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 25 – paragraph 2 c

2c. ESMA, in agreement with the relevant central banks of issue and commensurate with the degree of systemic importance of the CCP in accordance with paragraph 2a, may conclude that a CCP is of such substantial systemic importance that compliance with the conditions set out in paragraph 2b does not sufficiently ensure the financial stability of the Union or of one or more of its Member States and should not therefore be recognised. In such a case, ESMA shall recommend that the Commission adopt an implementing act confirming that that CCP should not be recognised in accordance with paragraph 2b. After submission of the recommendation referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission may adopt an implementing act declaring that that CCP shall not be recognised pursuant to paragraph 2b and that it may only provide clearing services in the Union after it has been granted authorisation in accordance with Article 14.deleted

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point e

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 25 – paragraph 6 b – subparagraph 1

Without prejudice to paragraph 7 of this Article, ESMA shall monitor the regulatory and supervisory developments in third countries for which implementing acts have been adopted pursuant to paragraph 6.

2018/04/13
Committee: ECON

Kay SWINBURNE