BETA

24 Amendments of Liem HOANG NGOC related to 2010/0280(COD)

Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
(3) The Stability and Growth Pact is based on the objective of sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability and conducive to employment creation and should, therefore, be measured against its ability to meet objectives laid down in article 3 TFEU and enhance long term investments for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) There is a need to build upon the experience gained and learn from mistakes made during the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union. Accordingly, the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact must be measured against its ability to meet objectives laid down in Article 3 TFUE and enhance long-term investments for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)
(4a) The preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact that is meant to ensure that Member States follow efficient and sustainable fiscal policy would benefit from more stringent and symmetric forms of coordination in order to ensure minimum quality and consistency with the economic and monetary union budgetary coordination framework.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) Strengthening economic governance should go hand in hand with reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of economic governance in the Union, which should be achieved through a closer and a more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments throughout the economic policy coordination procedures, with full use of the tools provided for by the TFEU, in particular the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union and the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) AdherencBudgetary positions net of public investment undertaken in pursuit of the Union’s objectives as laid down in Article 3 TFEU which adhere to the medium-term budgetary objective of budgetary positions should allow Member States to have a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP reference value in order to ensure rapid progress towards sustainability and to have room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking into account the needs of public investmentadjust their policies in accordance with the normal development of the economic cycle while maintaining a reasonable position with respect to the 3% of GDP reference value.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) PrudentEfficient and sustainable fiscal policy- making implies that the growth rate of government expenditure does normally not exceed a prudentpublic finances; over the medium term, adhere to a set of expenditure and revenue indicative guidelines. Growth in tax revenue (with temporary sources of revenue being excluded) should normally not fall behind the medium- term growth rate o f GDP, increases in excess of that norm are matched by d. Growth in government expenditure (with those social benefits and expenditure components being related to the business cycle) should normally not exceed a prudent medium term growth rate of GDP. Discretionary increases in government revenues andexpenditure or discretionary revenue reductions are compensated by reductions in expenditure.in tax revenue are to be offset by accompanying other discretionary measures, either on the side of expenditure or/and on the side of tax revenues
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 217 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 c (new) – point a (new)
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 2a – paragraph 1
[Current text of the first paragraph of Article 2a of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97:1c. Article 2a is amended as follows: (a) the first paragraph is replaced by the following "Each Member State shall have a differentiated medium-term objective for its budgetary position. These country- Member-State-specific medium-term budgetary objectives may diverge from the requirement of a close to balance or in surplus position. They shall, while provideing a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP government deficit ratio; they shall ensure, net of public investments pursuing the fulfillment of the objectives of the Union defined in article 3(TFUE). Each medium-term budgetary objective shall ensure the sustainability of public finances or a rapid progress towards such sustainability and, taking this into account, they shallwhile allowing room for budgetary manoeuvre, considering in particular the needs for to ensure the proper implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy and the objective of the Union as defined under article 3 of the TFUE, and adequate levels of public investment."]
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – subpoint b – subpoint i
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the medium-term budgetary objective and the adjustment path towards this objective for the general government balance as a percentage of GDP, the expected path of the general government netto debt ratio, the planned growth path of government expenditure, the planned growth path of government revenue at unchanged policy and a quantification of the planned discretionary revenue measures;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – subpoint c
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 3 – paragraph 3
3. The information about the paths for the general government balance and net debt ratio, the growth of government expenditure and its contribution to the implementation of the Union’s growth and employment objectives, the planned growth path of government revenue at unchanged policy, the planned discretionary revenue measures , government investment expenditure, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, employment and inflation the paths for growth and indicators of the competitiveness of the economy, including the production capacity utilisation rate, taxation rates on companies, progressivity of income taxes, aggregated demand and the main economic assumptions referred to in paragraph 2(a), and (b) shall be on an annual basis and shall cover, the preceding year, the current year and at least the following three years. '
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Council and the Parliament, when assessing the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective, shall examine if the Member State concerned pursues an appropriate annual improvement of its cyclically-adjusted budget balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, required to meet its medium-term budgetary objective, with 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark. For Member States with a high level of netto debt or excessive macroeconomic and social imbalances or both, the Council and the Parliament shall examine whether the annual improvement of the cyclically- adjusted budget balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures is higher thanreasonably close to 0.5% of GDP. The Council and the Parliament shall take into account whether a higher adjustment effort is made in economic good times, whereas the effort may be more limitsuspended in economic bad times.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 295 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4
Fiscal policy-making shall be considered prudent and thereby conducive to the achievement of the medium-term budgetary objective and its maintenance over time if the following conditions are satisfied: (a) for Member States that have achieved the medium-term budgetary objective, annual expenditure growth does not exceed a prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures; (b) for Member States that have not yet reached their medium-term budgetary objective, annual expenditure growth does not exceed a rate below a prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures. The size of the shortfall of the growth rate of government expenditure compared to a prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth is set in such a way as to ensure an appropriate adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objective; (c) discretionary reductions of government revenue items are matched either by expenditure reductions or by discretionary increases in other government revenue items or both.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 301 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point a
(a) for Member States that have achieved the medium-term budgetary objective, annual expenditure growth does not exceed a prudentthe estimate of medium-term rate of GDP growth, whereas growth in tax revenue does not stay behind the growth in government revenue unless the excess ises or gaps are matched by discretionary revenue measmeasures in revenue or/and expenditures;.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 – point b
(b) for Member States that have not yet reached their medium-term budgetary objective, annual growth in tax revenue should exceed the medium term rate of growth of GDP, whereas annual medium term expenditure growth doesshould not exceed a rate below a prudent medium- term rate of GDP growth, unless the excess is matched by discretionary revenue measures. The impact of unemployment benefits and other social expenditure related to the business cycle is not to be taken into account when in the calculation and assessment of the growth path of government expenditure. Deviations from these indicative expenditure and growth paths shall not be seen as a problem in case these deviations are matched by discretionary measures, either on the expenditure side or the revenue side or both. The size of the shortfall of the growth rate of government expenditure compared to a prudent medium-term rate of GDP growth is, and the size of the excess of growth rate of tax revenue compared to medium term GDP growth are both set in such a way as to ensure an appropriate adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objective; .
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 353 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 9
In periods of severe economic downturn of a general nature Member States may be allowed to temporarily depart from the adjustment path implied by prudent fiscal- policy making referred to in the fourth subparagraphset in its medium-term budgetary objectives.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 364 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. The Council shall carry out the examination of the stability programme within at most three months of the submission of the programme. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission and after consulting the Parliament and the Economic and Financial Committee, shall, if necessary, deliver an opinion on the programme. Where the Council, in accordance with Article 121 of the Treaty, considers that the objectives and the content of the programme should be strengthened with particular reference to prudsustainable and efficient fiscal policy-making, the Council shall, in its opinion, invite the Member State concerned to adjust its programme.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 370 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 1
1. As part of multilateral surveillance in accordance with Article 121(3) of the Treaty, the Council shall monitor the implementation of stability programmes, on the basis of information provided by participating Member States and of assessments by the Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee, in particular with a view to identifying actual or expected significant divergences of the budgetary position from the medium-term budgetary objective, or from the appropriate adjustment path towards it ensuing from deviations from prudent fiscal-policy making.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 374 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
2. In the event of a significant deviation from prudent fiscal-policy making referred in the fourth subparagraph of Article 5(1) of this regulation, and in order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit, the Commission, in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty may address a warning to the Member State concerned. A deviation from prudent fiscal policy making shall be considered significant if the following conditions occur: an excess over the expenditure growth consistent with prudent fiscal policy-making, not offset by discretionary revenue-increasing measures; or discretionary revenue- decreasing measures not offset by reductions in expenditure; and the deviation has a total impact on the government balance of at least 0.5 % of GDP in one single year or of at least 0.25 % of GDP on average per year in two consecutive years. The deviation shall not be considered if the Member State concerned has significantly overachieved the medium- term budgetary objective, taking into account the presence of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, and the budgetary plans laid out in the stability programme do not jeopardise this objective over the programme period. The deviation may be equally not considered in case of severe economic downturn of a general nature.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 380 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – first subparagraph
In the event of a significant deviation from prudent fiscal-policy making referred in the fourth subparagraph of Article 5(1) of this regulationMedium term budgetary objectives, and in order to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit or surplus, the Commission, in accordance with Article 121(4) of the Treaty may address a warning to the Member State concerned.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 384 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
A deviation from prudent fiscal policy making shall be considered significant if the following conditions occur: an excess over the expenditure growth consistent with prudent fiscal policy-making, not offset by discretionary revenue-increasing measures; or discretionary revenue- decreasing measures not offset by reductions in expenditure; and the deviation has a total impact on the government balance of at least 0.5 % of GDP in one single year or of at least 0.25 % of GDP on average per year in two consecutive years.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 406 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. In the event that the significant deviation from prudent fiscal-policy makingthe Medium term budgetary objectives persists or is particularly serious, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, shall address a recommendation to the Member State concerned to take the necessary adjustment measures. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall make the recommendation public.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 420 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 6 – subpoint b – subpoint i
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the medium-term budgetary objective and the adjustment path towards this objective for the general government balance as a percentage of GDP, the expected path of the general government netto debt ratio, the planned growth path of government expenditure, the planned growth path of government revenue at unchanged policy and a quantification of the planned discretionary revenue measures, the medium-term monetary policy objectives, the relationship of those objectives to price and exchange rate stability and to the achievement of sustained convergence;
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 452 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The Council, when assessing the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective, shall take into account whether a higher adjustment effort is made in economic good times, whereas the effort may be more limited or suspended in economic bad times. For Member States with a high level of netto debt or excessive macroeconomic imbalances or both, the Council shall examine whether the annual improvement of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures is higher thanreasonably close to 0.5% of GDP. For ERM2 Member States, the Council shall examine if the Member State concerned pursues an appropriate annual improvement of its cyclically adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, required to meet its medium- term budgetary objective, with 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 496 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 8
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 7
Special attention shall be paid to pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar. Member States implementing such reforms shall be allowed to deviate from the adjustment path to their medium-term budgetary objective or from the objective itself, with the deviation reflecting the net cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar, under the condition that the deviation remains temporary and that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the deficit reference value is preserved.deleted
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 536 #
Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 9
A deviation from prudsustainable and efficient fiscal policy making shall be considered significant if the following conditions occur: an excess over the expenditure growth consistent with prudefficient fiscal policy-making, not offset by discretionary revenue-increasing measures; or discretionary revenue- decreasing measures not offset by reductions in expenditure; and the deviation has a total impact on the government balance of at least 0.5% of GDP in one single year or of at least 0.25% of GDP on average per year in two consecutive years, and the off-balance increases faster than the annual growth rate for the year considered.
2011/02/15
Committee: ECON