Activities of Liem HOANG NGOC related to 2013/2277(INI)
Reports (1)
REPORT on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries PDF (350 KB) DOC (175 KB)
Amendments (70)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
Citation 1
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 7, Article 9, Article 136 in combination with Article 121 , Article 151, Article 152, Article 153, Article 168 and Article 174 thereof,
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
- having regard to the European Social Charter,
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3
Citation 3
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 3 and Article 13(2) thereof,
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas bail outs of the financial sector have directly contributed to increasing the level of public debts; whereas private households have born an unduly share of the cost of the crisis;
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member Statfinancial crisis has led to an economic and social crisis; whereas this economic situation and measures taken under troika programmes have compromised the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standards;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim waaim of programme conditionality is to ensure that the money that was lent wouldill be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this alsofirst and foremost requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas debt reduction cannot be achieved in a depressed economic environment; whereas the programmes were not suitdesigned to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that Greek sovereign bonds rates started increasing at the end of November 2009; notes that the start of this speculative pressure followed closely the legislative elections held on 4th October 2009, the subsequent change of majority in the Greek legislature, and the announcement by the newly formed government of an upward revision of public deficit figures, the real statistics having been concealed by the previous government;
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Notes that the Central Bank of Greece in November 2010 significantly contributed to intensifying market turmoil by publicly warning investors that ECB liquidity operations could no longer be taken for granted in the case of Greek sovereign debt.
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Notes that tensions on the Portuguese sovereign bonds market only started in mid April 2010, that is five months after Greek sovereign bonds rates had started increasing; notes that this timing coincides with the Greek government request for financial assistance on 23rd April 2010; deplores the lack of immediate reaction from the European Council and the ECB to the situation developing on financial markets in the first months of 2010; Is of the opinion that this inaction up to May 2010 contributed to the speculative pressure on Greek bonds spilling over to Portuguese bonds.
Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking crisis of unprecedented dimensions that resulted largely from the exposure of the Irish financial sector to the US "subprime crisis", irresponsible risk taking by Irish banks and the widespread use of asset backed securities, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6.3% in 2009 (1.1% in 2010) from a positive growth level of 5% of GDP in 2007, unemployment to increase from 4.7% in 2007 to 13.7% in 2010 and - its most detrimental impact - the government balance of payments to experience a deficit in 2010 of 30.6%, down from a surplus in 2007 (0.2%); notes further notes in the decade prior to the assistance programme that the Irish economy experienced a prolonged period of negative real interest rates;
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Notes that the Irish government's decision to provide a blanket guarantee to the banking sector largely explains the sharp increase of the public deficit in 2010, which directly contributed to the increase of public debt;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Points to the inexistence of fiscal imbalances prior to the crisis in Ireland and to the extremely low level of public debt; points to the extended level of flexibility of the labour market prior to the crisis and the unecessity of further reforms in that respect; notes the development of asset bubbles in Ireland prior to the crisis, largely driven by the existence of large inflation differential between Ireland and the rest of the eurozone and the inadequacy of monetary policy for Ireland that resulted from it; points to the extreme financialization of the Irish economy in the years leading to the crisis, the financial sector representing close to 40% of Irish GDP;
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Welcomes the pro-active stance taken by the ECB to restore stability on financial markets, in particular with respect to the use of non-conventional instruments; regrets however that the OMT programme was only launched in August 2012, as well as the general lack of transparency on the SMP programme; Is of the opinion that an earlier announcement of the OMT could have prevented the contagion of speculation from the Greek sovereign bonds market to other member states;
Amendment 241 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Regrets that the first agreement of May 2010 did not contain provisions for a restructuring of the Greek debt, despite it being proposed by the IMF; points to the ECB's refusal to consider any form of debt restructuring in 2010 and 2011, and its refusal to participate to the restructuring agreed in February 2012; believes that an early restructuring was absolutely necessary in order to restore the sustainability of the Greek public debt; believes that an early restructuring could have reduce the intensity of fiscal austerity in Greece;
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Deplores that the Irish government's demand, supported by the IMF, to include a contribution from senior bond-holders of the banking sector in the financing of the programme was rejected by the Commission, the ECB and the Eurogroup; regrets that this decision led to Irish citizens supporting the bulk of the cost of the bail-out, and severely deteriorated public finances; Is of the opinion that banks' bond holders should have been made liable for their own risk taking;
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Deplores that a first agreement between the troika and Cypriot authorities announced on 16 march 2013 contained provisions that conflicted with the Directive 2009/14/EC on deposit- guarantee schemes with regard to the imposition of a levy on deposits below 100,000 euros; notes that this agreement was not opposed by the Commission at the Eurogroup meeting where it was endorsed; condemn the Commission for failing to act as the guardian of the "acquis communautaire" in that instance;
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Notes that the programmes provided to the 4 countries establish conditions for companies to opt-out collective bargaining agreements and to review sectorial wage agreements;
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances in both creditor countries and member states receiving financial assistance, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the coin a monetary union, while the euro area does not benefit from instraiuments of monetary uniongenerally associated with a transfer union, such as a sufficient federal budget, financed by own resources and the ability to borrow on financial markets; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear of a melt- down of the euro area was palpable, political agreements had to be reached, the world economy was in a downturn, and a number of countries which were intended to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways;
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. RegretsCondemn the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negdramativec impact of such practices on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;
Amendment 325 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. DeploresCondemn the fact that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure in a difficult political environment aiming at creating in Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion ;
Amendment 336 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Strongly defends that fundamental principles and key objectives of European Treaties need to be respected, regardless of time or market pressure.
Amendment 337 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15b. insist that the consequences of policies contained in the memorandums clearly contradict the objectives of the European Union, that are the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion, as stated in Article 151 of the TFEU;
Amendment 338 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15c. Deplores the lack of consideration being given in the drafting of policy recommendations to necessary political debates at national and European level and the respect of normal democratic procedures;
Amendment 354 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. RegDeplorets that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; regrets that the programmes are not bound by which are in violation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties, including Art. 168(7) TFEU;
Amendment 385 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Condemns measures such as cutting minimum wages and weakening collective bargaining systems, since these impact heavily on domestic demand and as such on economic and employment performance; point to the contradiction between the objective of debt reduction and policies negatively impacting demand and thus economic growth
Amendment 404 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Expresses deep concerns about the fact that the lack of positive future perspective in program countries has led to an upsurge in emigration of young educated workers, thereby structurally undermining economic capacity.
Amendment 405 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18b. Stresses that similar negative longer term effects on economic potential can unfortunately also be expected from austerity driven cuts in education spending and from rising child poverty.
Amendment 406 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)
Paragraph 18 c (new)
18c. Notes that the sharp decrease of wages in all four member states has led to a sizeable increase in profit margins, along with rising inequalities and rising poverty; notes that this decrease in unit labour cost has not however, translated into increased investment levels;
Amendment 407 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 d (new)
Paragraph 18 d (new)
18d. Notes that EC data and diverse studies show that between 2008 and 2012, the income distribution inequality has grown in the 4 countries and that the cuts in the social benefits and unemployment resulting from austerity measures as well as lowered wages due to structural reforms are raising poverty levels. Furthermore Commission Report found relatively high levels of in work poverty due to low minimum wages cut or frozen by the austerity measures;
Amendment 419 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms and fiscal austerity having been undertaken; is of the opinion that this lack of results serious challenges the relevance of policies contained in MoUs
Amendment 435 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Welcomes the fact that both Ireland and Portugal achieved their first debt issues in January 2014 since the beginning of their adjustment programme; believes that sustainable growth and job creation are necessary in order to secure a lasting return to market financing for these countries;
Amendment 465 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place; stresses that draconian austerity plans were unable to restore market confidence and that high interest rate spreads on sovereign debt only started to come down slowly after the ECB finally announced its OMT program in August 2012
Amendment 485 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Deplores however the sometimesconstantly over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to changethe economic and social impact of policies recommended in somthe Member States; deplores the fact that this alsodirectly affected the Troika’s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that as a result fiscal targets have been largely unrealistic and as such could not be fulfilled;
Amendment 492 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Notes that from the onset the Troika published comprehensive documents on the diagnosis, the strategy to overcome the problems, a set of policy measures elaborated together with the national government concerned, and economic forecasts, all of which are updated on a regular basis; Notes that this does not constitute sufficient means of accountability;
Amendment 506 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Regrets that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP, since policies implemented have led to prolonged recession, which negatively affected tax receipts and led to a predictable increase in social transfers ; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; thus points to the inadequacy of the programmes to effectively reduce debt levels;
Amendment 520 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respectUnderlines that an adequate valuation of the fiscal multiplier is necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; recalls that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; notes that this period encompasses the conclusions of all but one memorandum of understanding under enquiry in this report; recalls that the European Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points however that the Commission admitted in its reply to the questionnaire that "fiscal multipliers tend to be larger at the current juncture than in normal times"; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the European Commission and the IMF was not followed up;on the size of the fiscal multiplier was not followed up with a joint stance being taken by the troika; thus is of the opinion that the troika is yet to take stock of this debate and should consider the revision of memoranda on the basis of the latest empirical results on fiscal multipliers.
Amendment 532 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Points out that while the IMF’s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation; notes that due to the absence of democratic deliberations on which strategy to favour, the two strategies were pursued simultaneously in all countries under assistance programmes; notes that the combination of fiscal austerity and restrictive wage policy depressed both public and private demand, thus leading to dramatic cumulative economic and social consequences.
Amendment 557 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that too littleclose to no attention has been given to alleviating the negative economic and social impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries;
Amendment 564 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Stresses that national-level ownership is important, and that failure to implement agreed measures has consequences in terms of the expected results; stresses however that national-level ownership cannot be achieved without proper democratic legitimacy and accountability at both national and EU level;
Amendment 590 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. NotDeplores that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as beingis unclear and lackingnot transparencyt;
Amendment 611 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30a. Points to the central role of the Eurogroup with respect to both the decision to grant financial assistance and the determination of the conditions on which support has been granted, despite the Eurogroup not being an official institution of the European Union; deplores the absence of EU level democratic legitimity and accountability of the Eurogroup when it assumes EU level executive powers;
Amendment 612 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 b (new)
Paragraph 30 b (new)
30b. Takes note of the Eurogroup President statement that the Eurogroup gives a mandate to the European Commission to negotiate on its behalf the details of the conditions attached to the assistance, while taking into account Member States' views on key elements of the conditionality and, in view of their own financial constraints, on the size of financial assistance;
Amendment 613 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 c (new)
Paragraph 30 c (new)
30c. Notes that the above mentioned procedure whereby the Eurogroup confers a mandate to the European Commission is not specified in the Treaties; notes that Article 13(2) TEU explicitly prohibits EU institutions, such as the European Commission, to act beyond the attributions they are granted by the Treaties; therefore deems that the Commission's mandates for negotiation to act within the troika have been violating the EU primary law and are thus to be considered illegal;
Amendment 614 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 d (new)
Paragraph 30 d (new)
30d. Notes that the President of the Eurogroup, in his reply to the European Parliament questionnaire, failed to comment on means of democratic legitimacy and accountability of the troika at EU level;
Amendment 623 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Notes that the actual powers of the troïka go far beyond that of reviewing the implementation of memoranda in programme countries and proposing decisions to final decision makers (Eurogroup, IMF board, ECB board); Notes in that respect the admission by the President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without considering their specific policy implications; concludes that an effective decision making power has de facto been delegated to the troïka;
Amendment 637 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Takes note ofQuestions the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution; warns that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such as competition, wage and social policies, and state aid;
Amendment 643 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)
Paragraph 32 a (new)
32a. Insists in this regards that the European Commission does not have any competence in wage policy;
Amendment 650 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Points equally to a possiblthe conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States as well as its mandate under the Treaty;
Amendment 658 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is not permitted by the Treaties; therefore con uncertain legal grounddemn the ECB association with the troika in its current form;
Amendment 674 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generally weakEmphasises the lack of democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; points to the fact that the MoU was not ratified by Parliament in one of the member states (Portugal); notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives;
Amendment 690 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance, thus putting governments, including those of the Mnational executive from member Sstates directly concernedof the euro area, at the centre of any decisions taken;
Amendment 695 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)
Paragraph 36 a (new)
36a. Is of the opinion that national level legitimacy and accountability is insufficient with regard to decisions taken collectively by euro area member states within the frame of the ESM; believes that in a multi-level polity such as the European Union, democratic legitimacy and accountability ought to be granted and carried out at the level at which decisions are taken;
Amendment 698 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points to the fact that the ESM is an intergovernmental by nature, is bound by the unanimity rule, andody which is not part of the European Union legal structure; deplores that the Commission, as an EU institution, accepts to being tasked with specific attributions in the ESM treaty, in clear contradiction with the Treaty on the European Union; points that the ESM is bound by the unanimity rule in the regular procedure, and that three member states (Germany, France and Italy) benefit from a veto power in the emergency procedure; points that the ESM is subject to political influence exerted by finance ministers, heads of state and government as well as national parliaments of some creditor member states;
Amendment 706 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)
Paragraph 37 a (new)
37a. Notes that the ESM Treaty has introduced the principle of loan conditionaly under the form of a macroeconomic adjustment programme; points out that the ESM treaty does not define further the content of conditionality or adjustment programme, thus giving a great deal of leeway to the troika in recommending such conditionality
Amendment 707 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 b (new)
Paragraph 37 b (new)
37b. Calls for the current troïka setting to be discontinued;
Amendment 724 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union; takes the view thatstrongly rejects any departure from the Community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements would divide and weaken the Union, including the euro area;
Amendment 774 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty andDemands the ESM to be immediately integrated in the European Union's legal framework; demands that the ESM beis made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESM; calls for the decision to disburse loan tranches to member state under assistance to be subject to co- decision rules; calls for the ESM to be accountable to both the European Parliament and the European Council; calls for the ESM to be further developed, with increased lending and borrowing capacities and joint and several guaranties from the euro area member states.
Amendment 798 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Calls for thea real involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of adjustment programmes, current and future; Deplores the troika's refusal to accept the agreement reached by social partners in Portugal on the minimum wage; Calls for any assistance mechanism of the European Union to actively seek the conclusion of social agreements by social partners, and to respect them once concluded ;
Amendment 810 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 a (new)
Paragraph 41 a (new)
41a. Calls for the ESM board to step into a structural dialogue with European social partners
Amendment 811 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 b (new)
Paragraph 41 b (new)
41b. Calls for any future involvement of the IMF in the Euro area to be optional and limited; calls for the consultation of the European Parliament on the involvement of the IMF in the Euro area on an ad-hoc basis;
Amendment 824 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and consider the revision ofrevises MoUs on the basis of the latest empirical results;
Amendment 826 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 a (new)
Paragraph 42 a (new)
42a. Calls for memoranda to be revised within the frame of the community legislation so as to promote credible and sustainable consolidation strategy, and serve the objectives of the Union growth strategy and stated social cohesion and employment objectives; demands in particular that fiscal adjustment timeframes are prolonged; calls for revised memoranda to restore the principles of upward convergence and cohesion on which the EU was founded, as well as the principles contained in the Charter of fundamental right of the European Union;
Amendment 827 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42 b (new)
Paragraph 42 b (new)
42b. Strongly reject the Commission proposal for bilateral contractual arrangements, which represents the extension of the troika system to all member states of the euro area;
Amendment 843 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve theRequests full accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the TroikaEuropean Union assistance mechanism; requests that the Commission representative(s)s in the Troika should be European Union assistance mechanism are heard inby the European Parliament before taking up their duties and should b; demands that they are subjected to regular reporting to the European Parliament;
Amendment 854 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 a (new)
Paragraph 43 a (new)
43a. Notes that the ECB's mandate is, according to the Treaty, primarily limited to monetary stability; points out that the ECB has no mandate, no competence and no expertise on labour market policy; thus call for the ECB to be no longer involved in the preparation of structural reforms in the member states; calls for the association of the ECB in the Union's assistance programme to be discontinued;
Amendment 876 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
Paragraph 45
45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non- euro Member States, should be explored ; similarly, takes the view that the option of a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF should also be explored; further considers that other issues to be evaluated include the current institutional framework of the Troika, the involvement of the ECB in the review of the programmes and the mandatory involvement of the IMF in euro area financial assistance programmes as enshrined in the ESM treatystrongly considered;
Amendment 885 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Paragraph 45 a (new)
45a. Calls for a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF and the ESM in its current form; believes that this European Monetary Fund should be based on joint and several guarantees from the member states; believes that it should take over the attributions of the ESM, and that it should be subjected to the highest democratic standards of accountability and legitimacy;
Amendment 886 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 b (new)
Paragraph 45 b (new)
45b. Calls for a convention to be convened for the preparation of any change to the Treaties;
Amendment 887 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 c (new)
Paragraph 45 c (new)
45c. Supports the Irish authorities' demand for a transfer of a share of public debt corresponding to the cost of the bail out of the financial sector to the ESM, on the basis that bail in instruments that have been made available to other member states under a programme were not granted to Ireland when it requested assistance; Is of the opinion that this transfer would strongly benefit the Irish economy and financial stability in the eurozone overall
Amendment 888 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 d (new)
Paragraph 45 d (new)
45d. Calls for an immediate restructuring of the Greek public debt, in particular that owned by the ECB, the EFSF and the IMF; believes that the existence of the OMT provides sufficient guarantees to alleviate negative market reactions to a restructuring; recalls that a number of possibilities exist for such a restructuring, besides a haircut on bonds principals, including bond swapping, extending bonds maturities and reducing coupons;