16 Amendments of Marta ANDREASEN related to 2011/2037(INI)
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Takes the view that statutory auditing has a social function and is in the public interest, as it is an absolutely fundamental component of the democratica free, open and transparent economic and political system;
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Takes the view that auditors should be subject to an obligation to alert supervisors or the relevant authorities when they spot problems that might jeopardise the futurebring it to the immediate attention of the directors of an entity, and to the regulatory authorities as appropriate, if they discover problems or irregularities which pose an imminent threat to the future as a going concern of the entity being audited;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Takes the view that the main body of the audit reports should be brief, with clear, concise conclusions, and that they should include an annex containing additional explanations on general issues such as the methodology used, and specific issues such as key indicators, materiality figures, assessments of the risk involved in the material accounting estimates or materiality judgements made, and any particular problems encountered whilst carrying out the audit should form annexes;
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Takes the view that professional scepticism is vital in auditing and has an impact on each and every stage of an audit; points out that this scepticism comes about as a result of the objectivity and independence of the auditor;, combined with professional judgement developed by experience for which box-ticking procedures cannot be a substitute.
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Agrees that there is an inevitable conflicmplicit conflict of interest in the auditor being appointed and paid by the audited entity; nevertheless, does not currently see any justification for this appointment to be made by a third party; with this in mind, calls for the audit committee's role to be stre and calls for investigation into possible ways of eliminating thenedis;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that, in order to guarantee the independence of audits, auditing contracts should run for no longer than eightxxx years; takes the view that an initial contract should be concluded for fourxxx/2 years, renewable only once for a further period of fourxxx/2 years, followed by a period of at least fourxxx/2 years – eightxxx years for public interest entities – during which the audit firm concerned cannot audit the same company again; considers that there would be a need, at the end of the initial four-xxx/2- year period, for a new team to be appointed from within the audit firm;
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Considers it vital that steps be taken to prevent attempts to get roundcircumvent the mandatory rotation rule by appointing another audit firm from within the same group or by using; similarly, staff from the saformer auditors working for a different company should be barred from auditing the same client on behalf of their new auditor for the same period (s) that the former auditor is debarred;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that there should be a ban on services other than auditing being provided to the audited company, as this would pose a risk to the auditor's independence; takes the view, furthermore, that under no circumstances should internal and exthe provision by the auditor of services other than auditing to the client, as this presents a clear conflict of interest; takes the view, furthermore, this ban should include the provision of internal auditing services be provided simultaneously; points out that this would restrict ‘lowballing’, the practice of offering cut-price auditing with a view to obtaining compensation by charging for additional services; therefore takes the view that the ban must apply to all firms and their clients, particularly where major audit firms are concerned;
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Takes the view that the feesproportion of an audit firm can charge a singl's fee income from any one client should not exceed a certain percentage of its total income so as to prevent a situation in which the audit firm loses its economic independence;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Believes that firms that audit public interest entities ought toshould publish their own accounts and that these accounts, as well as the methods used, should be checked to ensure they are in orderwhilst it recognises issues of commercial confidentiality believes that these accounts should themselves be subject to an independent external audit;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. In view of the current configuration of the audit market, believes that the collapse of one of the Big Four firms wcould undermindamage the credibility of the auditing profession as a whole;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Takes the view that firms that are deemed ‘too big to fail’ could create the risk of moral hazard and that the contingency plans relating to the major auditing firms should be reinforced; believes, furthermore, that these plansteps should be taken to extend the audit of large entities to a wider market than currently exists; and these steps should be designed to minimise the risk of an audit firm leaving the market without good reason and to reduce the uncertainty and disruption that would cause, whilst ensuring that the market does not end up being dominated by an even tighter oligopoly;.
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. States that it is vital to introduce a ban on restrictive clauses in contracts that favour the Big Four firms; calls for mergers between small and medium-sized audit firms to be encouraged; urges the Commission to look into creating a quality certificate and register for audit companies so that small and medium- sized audit firms can show that their work is of a satisfactory standardoutlaw clauses in commercial contracts which restrict the choice of auditor;
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. Considers that there is a need to create, or encourage the creation of, a code of ethics for the major audit firms, encouraging them to restrict their own growth, thereby protecting the development of medium-sized audit firms, which would ultimately also be beneficial for the survival of the major firms themselves;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Calls on the Commission to bring inWishes to encourage a system of compulsory tendering on a periodic basis for public interest entities, underin which at least one non-Big Four company would have to be includedthe number of tenders invited must be such as to secure offers from companies other than the usual suppliers to large entities; takes the view that the audit committee must be given a key role in this process, in which shareholders must also take part;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22 a. Takes the view that all financial institutions considered too big to fail, or considered systemically relevant, nationally, regionally and/or internationally, being a contingent liability on national balance sheets, should be audited under the direct supervision of the National Court of Auditors or other supreme audit bodies of the Member States;