BETA

Activities of Ashley FOX related to 2014/0121(COD)

Plenary speeches (1)

Long-term shareholder engagement and corporate governance statement (debate)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2014/0121(COD)

Shadow opinions (1)

OPINION on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2014/0121(COD)
Documents: PDF(287 KB) DOC(992 KB)

Amendments (13)

Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
(12) Institutional investors should annually disclose to the public how their equity investment strategy is aligned with the profile and duration of their liabilities and how it contributes to the medium to long- term performance of their assets. Where they make use of asset managers, either through discretionary mandates involving the management of assets on an individual basis or through pooled funds, they should disclose to the public the main elements of the arrangement with the asset manager with regard to a number of issues, such as whether it incentivises the asset manager to align its investment strategy and decisions with the profile and duration of the liabilities of the institutional investor, whether it incentivises the asset manager to make investment decisions based on medium to long-term company performance and to engage with companies, how it evaluates the asset managers performance, the structure of the consideration for the asset management services and the targeted portfolio turnovermake investment decisions based on medium to long-term company performance and to engage with companies. This would contribute to a proper alignment of interests between the final beneficiaries of institutional investors, the asset managers and the investee companies and potentially to the development of longer-term investment strategies and longer-term relationships with investee companies involving shareholder engagement.
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 16
(16) In order to ensure that shareholders have an effective say on the remuneration policy, they should be granted the right to approve the remuneration policy, on the basis of a clear, understandable and comprehensive overview of the company's remuneration policy, which should be aligned with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the company and should incorporate measures to avoid conflicts of interest. Any ratio addressing remuneration shall be based upon annual adjustments in remuneration which will provide a useful indicator of the development of remuneration across the company. Companies should only pay remuneration to their directors in accordance with a remuneration policy that has been approved by shareholders. The approved remuneration policy should be publicly disclosed without delay.
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
(19) Transactions with related parties may cause prejudice to companies and their shareholders, as they may give the related party the opportunity to appropriate value belonging to the company. Thus, adequate safeguards for the protection of shareholders’ interests are of importance. For this reason Member States should ensure that related party transactions representing more than 5 % of the companies’ assets or transactions which can have a significant impact on profits or turnover should be submitted to a vote by the shareholders in a general meeting. Where the related party transaction involves a shareholder, this shareholder should be excluded from that vote. The company should not be allowed to conclude the transaction before the shareholders’ approval of the transaction. For transactions with related parties that represent more than 1% of their assets companies should publicly announce such transactions at the time of the conclusion of the transaction, and accompany the announcement by a report from an independent third party assessing whether the transaction is on market terms and confirming that the transaction is fair and reasonable from the perspective of the shareholders, including minority shareholders. Member States should be allowed to exclude transactions entered into between the company and its wholly owned subsidiaries, as well as transactions conducted on standard terms in the ordinary course of business. Member States should also be able to allow companies to request the advance approval by shareholders for certain clearly defined types of recurrent transactions above 5 percent of the assets, and to request from shareholders an advance exemption from the obligation to produce an independent third party report for recurrent transactions above 1 percent of the assets, under certain conditions, in order to facilitate the conclusion of such transactions by companies.
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2007/36/EC
Article 2 – point h
(h) ”shareholder engagement’ meanincludes the monitoring by a shareholder alone or together with other shareholders, of companies on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure and corporate governance, having a dialogue with companies on these matters and voting at the general meeting.
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2007/36/EC
Chapter IB – article 3g – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Where an asset manager invests on behalf of an institutional investor, either on a discretionary client-by-client basis or through a collective investment undertaking, the institutional investor shall annually disclose to the public the main elements of the arrangement with the asset manager with regard to the following issues:
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2007/36/EC
Chapter IB – article 3g – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) whether and to what extent it incentivises the asset manager to align its investment strategy and decisions with the profile and duration of its liabilities;deleted
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2007/36/EC
Chapter IB – article 3g – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the method and time horizon of the evaluation of the asset manager’s performance, and in particular whether, and how this evaluation takes long-term absolute performance into account as opposed to performance relative to a benchmark index or other asset managers pursuing similar investment strategies;deleted
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2007/36/EC
Chapter IB – article 3g – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) how the structure of the consideration for the asset management services contributes to the alignment of the investment decisions of the asset manager with the profile and duration of the liabilities of the institutional investor;deleted
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2007/36/EC
Chapter IB – article 3g – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) the targeted portfolio turnover or turnover range, the method used for the turnover calculation, and whether any procedure is established when this is exceeded by the asset manager;deleted
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2007/36/EC
Chapter IB – article 3h – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that asset managers disclose on a half-yearly basisannually and where necessary to the institutional investor with which they have entered into the arrangement referred to in Article 3g(2) in individual mandates how their investment strategy and implementation thereof complies with that arrangement and how the investment strategy and implementation thereof contributes to medium to long-term performance of the assets of the institutional investor.
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2007/36/EC
Article 9a – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
The policy shall indicate the maximum amounts of total remuneration that can be awarded, and the corresponding relative proportion of the different components of fixed and variable remuneration. It shall explain how the pay and employment conditions of employees of the company were taken into account when setting the policy or directors' remuneration by explaining the ratio between the average annual adjustment of remuneration of directors and the average annual adjustment of remuneration of full time employees of the company other than directors and why this ratio is considered appropriate. The policy may exceptionally be without a ratio in case of exceptional circumstances. In that case, it shall explain why there is no ratio and which measures with the same effect have been taken.
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2007/36/EC
Article 9c – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that companies, in case of transactions with related parties that represent more than 1% of their assets, publicly announce such transactions at the time of the conclusion of the transaction, and accompany the announcement by a report from an independent third party assessing whether or not it is on market terms and confirming that the transaction is fair and reasonable from the perspective of the shareholders, including minority shareholders. The announcement shall contain information on the nature of the related party relationship, the name of the related party, the amount of the transaction and any other information necessary to assess the transaction.
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Directive 2007/36/EC
Article 9c – paragraph 4
4. Member States may exclude transactions entered into between the company and one or more members of its group from the requirements in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, provided that those members of the group are wholly owned by the company. Member States may also exclude transactions conducted on standard terms in the ordinary course of business.
2015/01/07
Committee: ECON