BETA

Activities of Diogo FEIO related to 2010/2302(INI)

Plenary speeches (13)

Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)
Explanations of vote
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2010/2302(INI)

Amendments (11)

Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
E a. Whereas the absence of regulatory certainty in this sector is putting at risk the proper functioning of EU financial markets and therefore requires the EU Commission, before coming forward with further amendments to Regulation 1060/2009, to properly identify the gaps in the new framework and provide an impact assessment on the range of alternatives available to fill such gap including the possibility of further legislative proposals.
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Is aware of the inherent conflict of interest if market participants devise internal credit risk assessments for their own regulatory capital requirements, and hence sees the need to increase supervisors‘ responsibilities, capacity and resources for monitoring, assessing and overseeing the adequacy of the internal models and of the risk management of such market participants;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Highlights the global nature of the credit rating industry and urges the Commission and Member States to work on a global approach, based on the highest standards, in order to preserve a level playing field and prevent regulatory arbitrage while keeping markets open;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Believes that the start-up financing costs to cover the first three years of the ECRaF's work need to be carefully calculated; that these initial costs should take the form of a lump-sum capital payment and should be provided by the financial services industry with the involvement of both users and issuers; asks the Commission to produce a detailed impact assessment, viability analysis, and cost estimate for the necessary financing in this respect; considers that the new ECRaF should be fully self-sufficient after the three-year start-up period;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Considers that, to ensure its credibility, the management, staff and governance structure of the new ECRaF need to be fully autonomous vis-à-vis the Member States, the Commission and all other public bodies and operates in accordance with amended Regulation (EC) no 1060/2009;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Points out that, in order to enable investors to adequately to assess risk and to fulfil their due-diligence and fiduciary duties, increased disclosure of information is necessary in the field of structured finance instruments to allow investors to make informed judgments; considers that sophisticated investors should be able to rate the underlying credits from which they can then derive the risk of a securitised product;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Asks the Commission to propose a revision of Directive 2003/71/EC and Directive 2004/109/EC in order to ensure that sufficient accurate and complete information on structured finance instruments is more widely available;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17 a. Alongside with increased transparency of the rating process and its internal auditing, calls for stronger supervision of CRAs by EU supervisory authorities and of more intrusive supervision by national supervisory authorities of the use /dependency on ratings by financial institutions;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Considers that the costs of both ratings should be borne by the issuer and that the first rating should be by a hired CRA, at the choice of the issuer, while the second CRA should be assigned by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to a different CRA on the base of merit, taking historic performance into accountnominated by an independent authority;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Considers that, as almost all information on sovereigns is available in the public domain, l and more will be available as a result of the reinforced economic governance, market players should make better use of it in making their investment decisions. Larger and more sophisticated market players should use internal models to assess sovereign credit risk;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Points out that the ultimate responsibility for an investment decisions lies with the financial market participant, i.e. the asset manager, financial institution or sophisticated investor; these should have effective risk management capabilities subject to adequate oversight by the administration;
2011/01/20
Committee: ECON