BETA

Activities of Diogo FEIO related to 2013/0253(COD)

Plenary speeches (1)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2013/0253(COD)

Amendments (89)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)

(10a) In the establishment of the SRM, and in parallel with what has been done in the SSM, the Board should be in charge of preparing a memorandum of understanding regarding the rules and procedure to be taken by national resolution authorities and the Board; The Board should be in charge of drafting the resolution plans of the credit institutions that are under the direct supervision of the ECB under the SSM framework, as well as all the cross-border institutions and groups, whereas the national resolution authorities should be in charge of drafting the resolution plans of the credit institutions that are exclusively located in their Member State and are not cross border entities, though always subject to a final approval by the Board; The same principle should be applied regarding the adoption of resolution schemes and actions on the basis of a strong and close cooperation;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 b (new)

(10b) The creation of a Banking Union is a project that should not be underestimated, neither in its goals, nor in its unattended consequences. Although a single financial framework is needed, European Institutions and Member States should be aligned in their views regarding this project in order to achieve a complete and robust successful framework;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 c (new)

(10c) A balance approach must be reached between predictability and flexibility in order not to jeopardize the future of our banking system; a balanced approach between the role of the central authorities and the national authorities should be safeguarded and the important role of the national authorities should never be underestimated; the impact that the entire project will have on senior unsecured creditors should be carefully assessed, including lower loss expectations in resolution than would be expected in insolvency;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 d (new)

(10d) Before the entry into force of the Single Supervision Mechanism, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism should be aligned as much as possible, mostly to avoid negative unintended consequences in the framework of possible resolutions of credit institutions that may occur in the transitional period, namely in Member States with higher sovereign credit risk;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) The ECB, as the supervisor within the SSM, is the best placed to assess whether a credit institution is failing or likely to fail and whether there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe. The Board, in its executive session, upon notification of the ECB, should provide a recommendation to the Commission. Given the need to balance the different interests at stake the Commission should decide whether or not to place an institution under resolution and should also decide on a clear and detailed resolution framework establishing the resolution actions to be taken by the Board. Within this framework, the Board, in its executive session, should decide on a resolution scheme and instruct the national resolution authorities on the resolution tools and powers to be executed at national level.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) It is instrumental for the good functioning of the internal market that the same rules apply to all resolution measures, regardless of whether they are taken by national resolution authorities under Directive [ ] or within the framework of the single resolution mechanism The Commission will assess those measures under Article 107 of the TFEU. Where the use of resolution financing arrangements does not involve State aid pursuant to Article 107 (1) of the TFEU, the Commission should, in order to ensure a level playing field within the internal market, assess those measures by analogy to Art 107 of the TFEU. If a notification under Article 108 of the TFEU is not necessary as no state aid pursuant to Article 107 of the TFEU is entailed in the proposed use of the Fund by the Board, as envisaged in its executive session, in order to ensure the integrity of the internal market between participating and non- participating Member States, the Commission should apply the relevant State aid rules under Article 107 of the TFEU by way of analogy when assessing the proposed use of the Fund. The Board should not decide on a resolution scheme until the Commission has ensured, by way of analogy with State aid rules, that the use of the Fund follows the same rules as interventions by national financing arrangements.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) In order to ensure a swift and effective decision making process in resolution, the Board should be a specific Union agency with a specific structure, corresponding to its specific tasks, and which departs from the model of all other agencies of the Union. Its composition should ensure that due account is taken of all relevant interests at stake in resolution procedures. The Board should operate in executive and plenary sessions. The plenary session should take place on a quarterly basis. In its executive session, it should be composed of an Executive Director, a Deputy Executive Director, and representatives of the Commission and the ECB. Considering the missions of the Board, the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director should be appointed by the Council on a proposal from the Commission and after hearing the European Parliament. When deliberating on the resolution of a bank or group established within a single participating Member State, the executive session of the Board should also convene and involve in the decision-making process the member appointed by the Member State concerned representing its national resolution authority. When deliberating on a cross- border group, the members appointed by the home and all host Member States concerned representing the relevant national resolution authorities should also be convened and involved in the decision- making process of the executive session of the Board. However, home authorities and host authorities should have a balanced influence on the decision, so host authorities should have jointly one single vote. ~~Observers, including a representative of the ESM and of the Euro Group, may also be invited to attend the meetings of the Board~~In this context, the Board should also establish an Administrative Board of Review for the purposes of carrying out an internal administrative review of the decisions taken in its executive sessions concerning resolution schemes and/or measures, following a request for review, submitted by the national resolution authority. Observers, including a representative of the ESM and of the Euro Group, may also be invited to attend the meetings of the Board and are subject to the same professional secrecy requirements as Members of the Board, staff of the Board and staff exchanged with or seconded by participating Member States carrying out resolution duties.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19 a (new)

(19a) The Board should establish internal resolution teams composed of its own staff and staff of the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States, that should act as resolution colleges and should be headed by Coordinators appointed from the Board's senior staff. Coordinators should participate in the executive sessions of the Board, but would not be attributed any voting rights, when deliberations and decisions are at stake. In case of an unresolved dispute at the resolution team's level, the Coordinator and/or any of the national resolution authorities might appeal to the Board that will address and resolve the dispute in its executive sessions. National resolution authorities might appeal from the Board's decision taken in their executive sessions to the Administrative Board of Review.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) In the light of the Board's missions and the resolution objectives which include the protection of public funds, the functioning of the Board should be financed from contributions paid by the institutions in the participating Member States. These institutions should not, under any circumstances, provide extraordinary annual contributions to cover administrative expenditure and should not be called to contribute to the budget of their national resolution authorities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) The Board and the Commission, where relevant, should replace the national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] in respect of all aspects related to the resolution decision-making process. The national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] should continue to carry out activities related to the implementation of resolution schemes adopted by the Board. In order to ensure transparency and democratic control, as well as to safeguard the rights of the Union institutions, the Board should be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for any decisions taken on the basis of this proposal to the extent that it has not planned and/or acted in accordance with specific instructions from the Commission. For the same reasons of transparency and democratic control, national parliaments should have certain rights to obtain information about the activities of the Board and to engage in a dialogue with it.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) To ensure a uniform approach for institutions and groups the Board, in its executive session, should be empowered to draw up resolution plans for such institutions and groups. The Board should assess the resolvability of institutions and groups, and take measures aimed at removing impediments to resolvability, if any. The Board should require national resolution authorities to apply such appropriate measures designed to remove impediments to resolvability in order to ensure consistency and the resolvability of the institutions concerned.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25

(25) The single resolution mechanism should be constructed on the frameworks of Directive [ ] and the SSM. Therefore, the Board should be empowered to intervene at an early stage where the financial situation or the solvency of an institution is deteriorating. The information that the Board receives from the ~~national resolution authorities or the~~ ECB at this stage is instrumental in making a determination on the action it might take in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution concerned.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

(27) In order to minimise disruption to the financial market and to the economy, the resolution process should be accomplished in a short time. The Commission should, throughout the resolution procedure, have access to any information which it deems necessary to take an informed decision in the resolution process. Where the Commission, following a recommendation of the Board, decides to put an institution under resolution, the Board should immediately adopt a resolution scheme, as proposed in the recommendation, establishing the details of the resolution tools and powers to be applied, and the use of any financing arrangements.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) The Commission should provide, following a recommendation by the Board, the framework for the resolution action to be taken depending on the circumstances of the case and should be able to designate for use all necessary resolution tools. Within that clear and precise framework, the Board should decide on the detailed resolution scheme. The relevant resolution tools should include the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool, the bail-in tool and the asset separation tool, which are also provided for by Directive [ ]. The framework should also make it possible to assess whether the conditions for the write- down and conversion of capital instruments are met.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44

(44) In order to implement the burden- sharing by shareholders and junior creditors, as required under State aid rules, the single resolution mechanism would be able to apply, by way of analogy, as of the entry into application of this Regulation, the bail-in tool to those stakeholders.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45

(45) To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool, the Board should be able to establish that the institutions hold an aggregate amount of own funds, subordinated debt and senior liabilities subject to the bail-in tool expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution, that do not qualify as own funds for the purposes of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 and of Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council17 , which institutions should have at all times. __________________ 16 European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1. 17 Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338.including own- funds, which institutions should have at all times. Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 48

(48) The efficiency and uniformity of resolution action should be ensured in all the participating Member States. For this purpose, the Board should be empowered, in exceptional cases and where a national resolution authority has not or not sufficiently applied the decision of the Board to transfer to another person specified rights, assets or liabilities of an institution under resolution or to require the conversion of debt instruments which contain a contractual term for conversion in certain circumstancesoverride it in order to ensure that such decision is accomplished. Any action by national resolution authorities that would restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Board should be excluded.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 52

(52) In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the Board should have appropriate investigatory powers. It should be able to require all necessary information either directly or through national resolution authorities, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, where appropriate in cooperation with national competent authorities. In the context of resolution, on-site inspections would be available for the Board to effectively monitor implementation by national authorities and to ensure that the Commission and the Board take their decisions on the basis of fully accurate information. Where the national resolution authority has no means available to afford the necessary assistance, it should use its powers to request the necessary assistance of other national resolution authorities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 52 a (new)

(52a) The procedure regarding the exchange of information between the Board, competent authorities and national resolution authorities should be defined and implemented through a memorandum of understanding.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54

(54) In order to ensure that decisions adopted within the framework of the single resolution mechanism are respected, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions should be imposed in case of infringement. The Board should be entitled to ~~instruct national resolution authorities to~~ impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply with obligations under its decisions. In order to ensure consistent, efficient and effective enforcement practices the Board should be entitled to issue guidelines addressed to national resolution authorities concerning the application of fines and penalty paymentsThis fines or periodic penalty payments should be determined by the Board, together with the competent authorities, and the Commission.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54 a (new)

(54a) To ensure that decisions are fully respected across the Union, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions should be imposed in case of infringement and equally applied across all Member States; For this reason the framework for the adoption of administrative sanctions and legal sanctions should be harmonized at the Union level in order to ensure effective compliance; Therefore common minimum rules should be laid down in order to have a fully European mechanism;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54 b (new)

(54b) Member States and the Board should ensure that any penalties imposed pursuant to Regulation (EC) No (...) are publicly disclosed only where such public disclosure would be proportionate.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 55

(55) Where a national resolution authority infringes the rules of the single resolution mechanism by not using the powers conferred on it under national law to implement an instruction by the Board, the Member State concerned may be liable to make good any damage caused to individuals, including where applicable to the entity or group under resolution, or any creditor of any part of that entity or group in any Member State, in accordance with that case law.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 56

(56) Appropriate rules should be laid down governing ~~the budget of the Board, the preparation of the budget,~~ the adoption of internal rules specifying the procedure for the establishment and implementation of ~~its~~the budget of the Board, its preparation, monitoring and control on a quarterly basis by the Board's plenary session, and the internal and external audit of the accounts.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 56 a (new)

(56a) The Board's plenary session should also adopt its annual work programme, monitor and control it on a quarterly basis, and issue opinions and/or recommendations on the quarterly draft report by the Executive-Director which should include a section on the resolution activities and the ongoing resolution cases of the Board, and a section on financial and administrative matters.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 59 a (new)

(59a) A credit facility for the Resolution Fund should be envisaged guaranteeing a full European backstop that can at any given moment effectively stop a contagious effect in the financial system. This credit facility will allow the economic agents to base their decisions according to the soundness of each financial institution rather than on the perceived sovereign risk of the Member States where the different institutions are based; With this credit facility the link between sovereign credit risk and the banking system will finally cease to exist;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 62

(62) Where participating Member States have already established national resolution financing arrangements, they should be able to provide that the national resolution financing arrangements use their available financial means, collected from institutions in the past by way of ex- ante contributions, to compensate institutions for the ex-ante contributions which those institutions should pay into the Fund. Such restitution should be without prejudice to the obligations of Member States under Directive 94/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council18. __________________ 18 Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 amending Directive 80/390/EEC coordinating the requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the admission of securities to official stock-exchange listing, with regard to the obligation to publish listing particulars. OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 1.funds already collected under these arrangements should be transferable to the Single Resolution Fund. Directive 94/18/EC of the European

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 63

(63) In order to ensure a fair calculation of contributions and provide incentives to operate under a model which presents less risk, contributions to the Fund which are to be determined by the Board, following a proposal by the competent authority, should take account of the degree of risk incurred by credit institutions.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 66

(66) The Commission, after a proposal from the Board, should be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU in order to determine the type of contributions to the Fund and the matters for which contributions are due, the manner in which the amount of the contributions is calculated and the way in which they are to be paid; specify registration, accounting, reporting and other rules necessary to ensure that the contributions are fully and timely paid; determine the contribution system for institutions that have been authorized to operate after the Fund has reached its target level; determine the criteria for the spreading out in time of the contributions; determine the circumstances under which the payment of contributions may be advanced or delayed; determine the criteria for establishing the amount of annual contributions; determine the measures to specify the circumstances and modalities under which an institution may be partially or entirely exempted from ex post ~~contributions, and the measures to specify the circumstances and modalities under which an institution may be partially or entirely exempted from ex-post~~ contributions.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 67

(67) To preserve the confidentiality of the work of the Board, its members, staff of the Board, including the staff exchanged with or seconded by participating Member States for the purpose of carrying out resolution duties should be subject to requirements of professional secrecy, even after their duties have ceased. These requirements should also apply to other persons authorised by the Board and persons authorised or appointed by the national resolution authorities of the Member States to conduct on-site inspections, and to observers invited to attend the plenary and executive sessions of the Board. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it, the Board should be authorized, subject to conditions, to exchange information with national or Union authorities and bodies.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 69

(69) Until the Board is fully operational, the Commission should be responsible for the initial operations including collecting the first contributions necessary to cover administrative expenses and the designation of an interim executive director to authorise all necessary payments on behalf of the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. When making decisions or taking action, which may have an impact in more than one participating Member State, and in particular when taking decisions concerning groups established in two or more participating Member States, the Commission and the Board shall give due consideration to all of the following factors:

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3

3. The Commission and the Board shall balance the factors referred to in paragraph 2 with the resolution objectives referred to in Article 12 as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. In order to respect the right to conduct business laid down by Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Board's discretion shall be limited to what is necessary to simplify the structure and operations of the institution solely to improve its resolvability. In addition, any measure imposed for such purposes shall be consistent with Union law. Measures shall neither directly nor indirectly be discriminatory on ground of nationality, and shall be justified by the overriding reason of the public interest in financial stability. To determine whether an action was taken in the general public interest, the Board, acting in the general public interest, shall be able to achieve the resolution objectives without encountering impediments to the application of resolution tools or its ability to exercise the powers conferred on it. Furthermore, an action shall not go beyond the minimum necessary to attain the objectives.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1

1. The Board shall draw up resolution plans for the entities ~~referred to in Article 2 and for group~~that are under direct supervision of the European Central Bank under the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation nº [ ] and for all cross border entities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The national resolution authorities shall draw up the resolution plans for the credit institutions that are exclusively located in their Member State and are not cross border entities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. All resolution plans shall be submitted to final approval by the Board in its executive session.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4

4. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the ~~Commiss~~Board or the national resolutions a~~nd the Board~~uthorities may take where an entity referred to in ~~Article 2 or a group~~paragraph 1 and 1a meet the conditions for resolution. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or of system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with this Regulation.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2

2. When drafting a resolution plan for entities referred to in Article 27 paragraph 1 or giving the final approval to resolution plans for entities referred in Article 7 paragraph 1a, the Board shall assess the extent to which such an entity is resolvable in accordance with this Regulation. An entity shall be deemed resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying to it the different resolution tools and powers without giving rise to significant adverse consequences for financial systems, including circumstances of broader financial instability or system wide events, of the Member State in which the entity is situated, or other Member States, or the Union and with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by the entity.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1

1. Where the ECB ~~or a national resolution authority~~ assesses that the conditions referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 are met in relation to an entity referred to in Article 2, it shall communicate that assessment without delay to the Commission and the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. On receiving a communication pursuant to paragraph 1, ~~or on its own initiative, the Board~~the Board in its executive session shall conduct an assessment of whether the following conditions are met:

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 8

8. Within the framework set by the Commission decision, the Board in its executive session shall decide on the resolution scheme referred to in Article 20 and shall ensure that the necessary resolution action is taken to carry out the resolution scheme by the relevant national resolution authorities. The decision of the Board shall be addressed to the relevant national resolution authorities and shall instruct those authorities, which shall take all necessary measures to implement the decision of the Board in accordance with Article 26, by exercising any of the resolution powers provided for in Directive [ ], in particular those in Articles 56 to 64 of that Directive [ ]. ~~Where State aid is present, the Board may only decide after the Commission has taken a decision on that State aid.~~

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 9

9. ~~On receiving a communication pursuant to paragraph 1, or on its own initiative, if the Board considers that~~If the Board considers that the resolution scheme includes resolution measures that could constitute State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, it shall invite the participating Member State or Member States concerned to immediately notify the envisaged measures to the Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 10

10. To the extent that the resolution action as proposed by the Board in its executive session involves the use of the Fund and does not entail the grant of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) of the TFEU, the Commission shall apply in parallel, by way of analogy, the criteria established for the application of Article 107 TFEU.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 3

3. Where this is necessary in order to achieve the resolution objectives, the Commission, following a recommendation of the Board ~~or on its own initiative~~, may review its decision on the resolution framework and adopt the appropriate amendments.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. Where a national resolution authority has not applied a decision referred to in Article 16, or has applied it in a way which fails to achieve the resolution objectives under this Regulation, the Board shall ~~have the power to order an institution under resolut~~override the national resolution authority in order to ensure the correct application of that decision:.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point a

~~(a) to transfer to another person specified rights, assets or liabilities of an institution under resolution;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point b

~~(b) to require the conversion of debt instruments which contain a contractual term for conversion in the circumstances provided for in Article 18.~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 5

5. The procedure regarding the exchange of information between the Board, ~~the~~ competent authorities and ~~the~~ national resolution authorities ~~may draw up memorandum of understanding with a procedure concerning the exchange of information~~shall be defined and implemented through a memorandum of understanding.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 5

5. Where the officials of and other accompanying persons authorised or appointed by the Board find that a person opposes an inspection ordered pursuant to paragraph 1, the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States concerned shall afford them the necessary assistance in accordance with national law. To the extent necessary for the inspection, this assistance shall include the sealing of any business premises and books or records. Where that power is not available to the national resolution authorities concerned, it shall use its powers to request the necessary assistance of other ~~the~~ national ~~resolution~~ authorities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. The officials and other persons referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 shall be subject to the professional secrecy requirement laid down in Article 79.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 41 – paragraph 1

1. The Board shall be accountable to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for the implementation of this Regulation, in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 8 to the extent that it has not planned and/or acted in accordance with specific instructions from the Commission.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 43 – paragraph 2

2. The members of the Board referred to in Article ~~40(2~~39 (1) shall act independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the Union's institutions or bodies, from any Government of a Member State or from any other public or private body.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) adopt, by 30 November of each year, the Board's annual work programme for the coming year in accordance with Article 49(1), based on a draft put forward by the Executive Director and shall transmit it for information to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the European Central Bank; the implementation of the Board's annual work programme should be monitored and controlled on a quarterly basis by the Board’s plenary.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) adopt, monitor and control, the annual budget of the Board in accordance with Article 598 (2);, and 58 (2a). The monitoring and control should be done on a quarterly basis.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(ba) issue opinions and/or recommendations on the quarterly draft report of the Executive-Director mentioned in Article 52 (2)(g)

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) decide on the voluntary borrowing between financing arrangements in accordance with Article 68, the mutualisation of national financing arrangements in accordance with Article 72 and on the lending to deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with Article 73 (4);

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) adopt anthe annual activity report on the Board's activities referred to in Article 421. This report shall present detailed explanations on the implementation of the budget;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 2

2. The Board in its plenary session shall hold at least ~~two~~four ordinary meetings a year. In addition, it shall meet on the initiative of the Executive Director, at the request of the Commission, or at the request of at least one-third of its members.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. The Coordinators of internal resolution teams, mentioned in Article 77, will also participate in the executive sessions of the Board, but without any voting rights, when deliberations and decisions will be taken with regard to entities referred to in Article 2.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. The Board shall establish an Administrative Board of Review for the purposes of carrying out an internal administrative review of the decisions taken in its executive sessions, in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by this Regulation, and concerning resolution schemes and/or measures, following a request for review, submitted by the national resolution authorities whose members have participated in the deliberations and the decision making in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3, in case of a major dissent from the decisions of the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 4

~~4. The Board, in its executive session, shall meet on the initiative of the Executive Director or at the request of its members.~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 2 – point g

(g) ~~each year the Executive Director shall prepare a~~the preparation of a quarterly draft report with a section on the resolution activities and the ongoing resolution cases of the Board, and a section on financial and administrative matters.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 7

7. A~~n Executive Director or~~ Deputy Executive Director whose term of office has been extended shall not participate in another selection procedure for the same post at the end of the overall period.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 56 – paragraph 1

1. The revenues of Part I of the budget shall consist of the annual contributions necessary to cover the annual estimated administrative expenditure in accordance with Article 62(1) (a).

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 2

2. The budget of the Board shall be adopted by the plenary session of the Board on the basis of the statement of estimates. ~~Where necessary, it shall be adjusted accordingly.~~

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Where necessary, the budget of the Board might be adjusted accordingly, in plenary session, following its quarterly review by the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 3

3. ~~The Board shall determine~~Following a proposal by the competent authority, including the ECB, in accordance with the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 5, the Board shall determine the contributions due by each entity referred to in Article 2 in a decision addressed to the entity concerned. The Board shall apply procedural, reporting and other rules ensuring that contributions are fully and timely paid.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Entities referred to in Article 2 shall not be called, under any circumstances, to provide extraordinary annual contributions for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1(a);

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Entities referred to in Article 2 shall not be called to contribute to the budget of the national resolution authorities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 4 c (new)

4c. Funds already collected under existing national resolution financing arrangements shall be transferred to the Single Resolution Fund.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 5 – point d

(d) determine the amount of the first annual contributions necessary to cover the administrative expenditure of the Board before it becomes fully operational.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 1

1. In a period no longer than 105 years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the available financial means of the Fund shall reach at least 10,8 % of the amount of ~~deposits~~covered deposits, according to Directive 94/19/EC, of all credit institutions authorised in the participating Member States ~~which are guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC~~.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. A credit facility shall be envisaged, in the 12 month period after the entry into force of this Regulation, guaranteeing a full European backstop.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 2

2. During the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1, contributions to the Fund calculated in accordance with Article 66, and raised in accordance with Article 62 shall be spread out in time as evenly as possible until the target level is reached unless, depending on the circumstances, they can be advanced or delayed in consideration of the ~~favourable~~ market conditions or the funding needs.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 5 – point b

(b) circumstances under which the payment of contributions may be advanced or delayed under paragraph 2;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 2

2. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target funding level specified in Article 65 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of ~~low risk assets~~assets eligible by the Central Banks of Member States, and unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 71(1). The share of these irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 350% of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with paragraph 1.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 3 – point b

~~(b) the quality of the collateral backing the payment commitments in paragraph 2;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point f

(f) to make a contribution to the institution under resolution in lieu of the contribution which would have been achieved by the write down and/or equity conversion of certain creditors, when the bail-in tool is applied and the resolution authority decides to exclude certain creditors from the scope of bail-in in accordance with Article 24(35);

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 – paragraph 1

1. Participating Member States shall ensure that, when the Board takes resolution actions, ~~and provided that these actions ensure that depositors continue having access to their deposits,~~ the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated shall be liable for the amounts specified in Article 99(1) and (4) of Directive [ ].

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 77 – paragraph 3

3. The Board ~~may~~shall establish internal resolution teams composed of its own staff and staff of the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 77 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. The Board will appoint from its own senior level staff Coordinators of the internal resolution teams.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 77 – paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. In case of an unresolved dispute at the level of the internal resolution team, the Coordinator and/or any of the national resolution authorities may appeal to the Board that will address and resolve the dispute in its executive session.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 77 – paragraph 3 c (new)

3c. National resolution authorities may still appeal against the Board's decision taken in its executive session to the Administrative Board of Review, according to paragraph 3 b new of Article 49.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 79 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. The professional secrecy requirements referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall also apply to observers who attend the Board's meetings on an ad hoc basis.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 83 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the functioning of the SRM and the impact of ~~the~~ its resolution activities on the interests of the Union as a whole and on the coherence and integrity of the internal market in financial services, including its possible impact on the structures of the national banking systems within the Union, on their competitiveness in comparison with other banking systems outside the SRM and outside the Union, and regarding the effectiveness of cooperation and information sharing arrangements within the SRM, between the SRM and the SSM, and between the SRM and national resolution authorities and national competent authorities of non- participating Member States;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 83 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) the interaction between the Board and the national resolution authorities of non- participating Member States and the effects of the SRM on these Member States, and the interaction between the Board and national resolution authorities of third countries.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 85 – paragraph 1

From the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 88, the Fund shall be considered the only resolution financing arrangement of the participating Member States under Title VII of Directive [ ].

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 88 – paragraph 2

Articles 7 to 23 and Articles 25 to 387 shall apply from 1 January 2015.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON