27 Amendments of Diogo FEIO related to 2013/2277(INI)
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is responsible for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘'in liaison with the ECB’' and ’'wherever possible together with the IMF’', the financial assistance hereinafter referred to as ‘'EU-IMF assistance’'; whereas the financial disbursements made available by the European Commission and the ECB, on the one side, and the IMF, on the other, were of a different amount and that the IMF´s participation in the Troika was especially due to its particular know-how and experience in similar situations and operations;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the Troika together with the Member State concerned is also responsible forconsulted during the preparation of formal decisions of the Eurogroup;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of precise actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM has also to address a request for assistance to the IMF;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets; whereas the timing of the adjustments was due to the amount of funding available;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have compromised the quality ofreated serious problems to employment, and social protection and health and safety standards;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suitdesigned to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades and need to be consistently and persistently tackled by national governments and by the EU even after the end of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Portuguese economy had suffered from low GDP and productivity growth for a number of years, and that this lack of growth, combined with an acceleration of expenditure, particularly discretionary spending, consistently above GDP growth, and the impact of the global financial crisis, had resulted in a large fiscal deficit and a high debt level, driving up Portugal’'s refinancing costs in capital markets to unsustainable levels; notes in this context that in 2007stresses that in 2010, before financial assistance was belatedly sought in 7 April 2011, Portugal’'s growth rate reached 2.4had declined to 1.9%, its fiscal deficit 3.1reached 9.8%, its debt level 62.794% and its current account deficit 10.26% of GDP, with the unemployment rate standing at 8.112.3%;
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Greece on 23 April 2010 and that the agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing , the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that, following five reviews and the insufficient success of the first programme, a second programme had to be adopted in March 2012, which has been reviewed three times since;
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Portugal on 7 April 2011 and that the agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to the combined eighth and ninth quarterlysuccessful tenth reviews of Portugal’'s economic adjustment programme;
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Ireland on 21 November 2010 and that the agreement between the Irish authorities and the EU and IMF was adopted on 7 December 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF assistance; further notes that the Irish programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to a twelfth and final review on 9 December 2013 marking the imminent completion of the Irish programme;
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude and its differentiated origins and consequences inside a monetary union;
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. RegretsTakes note that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; regrets that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties, including Art. 168(7) TFEU;
Amendment 380 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels;
Amendment 401 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal and also in other EU countries;
Amendment 431 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Acknowledges the very demanding efforts that have been requested to individuals, families, enterprises and other institutions of the civil societies of the countries under adjustment programmes;
Amendment 452 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that in some situations adequate statistics and information were not always available in the short time given; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up of the programme;
Amendment 469 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplorelaments the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place;
Amendment 483 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of polit deriving mostly from an insufficient and superficial resistance to change in some Member Statesknowledge of the countries under financial adjustment; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’'s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that as a result fiscal targets could not be fulfilled notwithstanding serious efforts and relevant reforms conducted by national governments in that sense;
Amendment 507 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Regrets that the significant reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes which is in itself a positive sign of financial stabilization has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; stresses that in some of these countries a large part of the growth in debt and GDP derives from the recognition of pre-existing liabilities and the mandatory recognition of debt of various state owned enterprises that were not correctly considered in the initial design of the adjustment programmes;
Amendment 535 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Points out that while the IMF’'s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation; recognizes these priority differences between the IMF and the European Commission, takes note of this preliminary inconsistency of goals between both institutions and considers it had a negative impact in the measures, fiscal targets, conditionality, and size of the financial envelopes attributed to each country under financial adjustment;
Amendment 544 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that too little attention has been given by the Troika to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; regrets this lack of discernment, patent in its rejection of several governmental suggestions aiming to lessen such impact, and its harmful effect in the lives of citizens, families, enterprises and other institutions of these countries; takes note of several political declarations of Troika high officials subscribing to this need of alleviation, thus recognizing the need to moderate the rhythm and rigor of the measures, fiscal targets and conditionality of the adjustment programmes, and their prediction and judgement failures; and deplores that these were not duly and timely followed by the Troika´s technical teams that denoted unnecessary degrees of rigidity and intransigence which had negative social consequences;
Amendment 636 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution;nd warns that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such as competition and state aid;
Amendment 689 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance, thus putting governments, including those of the Member States directly concerned, at the centre of any decisions taken;
Amendment 795 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)
Paragraph 40 a (new)
40a. Urges the EU to closely monitor the financial, fiscal and economic evolution in the Member States and to create an institutionalized system of positive incentives to duly reward those who meet best practices in this regard and those who utterly comply with their adjustment programmes;
Amendment 880 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
Paragraph 45
45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored ; similarly, takes the view that the option of a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF should also be explored and encouraged; further considers that other issues to be evaluated include the current institutional framework of the Troika, the involvement of the ECB in the review of the programmes and the mandatory involvement of the IMF in euro area financial assistance programmes as enshrined in the ESM treaty;
Amendment 884 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Paragraph 45 a (new)
45a. After these years of experience in designing and implementing financial programs, the European institutions have acquired the necessary know-how to design and implement them by themselves without resorting to the IMF in the future;