BETA

867 Amendments of Diogo FEIO

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is responsible for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘'in liaison with the ECB’' and ’'wherever possible together with the IMF’', the financial assistance hereinafter referred to as ‘'EU-IMF assistance’'; whereas the financial disbursements made available by the European Commission and the ECB, on the one side, and the IMF, on the other, were of a different amount and that the IMF´s participation in the Troika was especially due to its particular know-how and experience in similar situations and operations;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the Troika together with the Member State concerned is also ~~responsible for~~consulted during the preparation of formal decisions of the Eurogroup;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G

G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of precise actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM has also to address a request for assistance to the IMF;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets; whereas the timing of the adjustments was due to the amount of funding available;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have c~~ompromised the quality of~~reated serious problems to employment, and social protection ~~and health and safety standards~~;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital L

L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not ~~suit~~designed to comprehensively correct~~ing~~ macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades and need to be consistently and persistently tackled by national governments and by the EU even after the end of the adjustment programmes;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Portuguese economy had suffered from low GDP and productivity growth for a number of years, and that this lack of growth, combined with an acceleration of expenditure, particularly discretionary spending, consistently above GDP growth, and the impact of the global financial crisis, had resulted in a large fiscal deficit and a high debt level, driving up Portugal’'s refinancing costs in capital markets to unsustainable levels; ~~notes in this context that in 2007~~stresses that in 2010, before financial assistance was belatedly sought in 7 April 2011, Portugal’'s growth rate ~~reached 2.4~~had declined to 1.9%, its fiscal deficit ~~3.1~~reached 9.8%, its debt level ~~62.7~~94% and its current account deficit 10.26% of GDP, with the unemployment rate standing at ~~8.1~~12.3%;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Greece on 23 April 2010 and that the agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing , the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that, following five reviews and the insufficient success of the first programme, a second programme had to be adopted in March 2012, which has been reviewed three times since;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Portugal on 7 April 2011 and that the agreement between the Portuguese authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 17 May 2011 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that the Portuguese programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to the ~~combined eighth and ninth quarterly~~successful tenth reviews of Portugal’'s economic adjustment programme;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Notes that the initial request for financial assistance was made by Ireland on 21 November 2010 and that the agreement between the Irish authorities and the EU and IMF was adopted on 7 December 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing the policy conditionality for EU-IMF assistance; further notes that the Irish programme has since been reviewed regularly, leading to a twelfth and final review on 9 December 2013 marking the imminent completion of the Irish programme;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude and its differentiated origins and consequences inside a monetary union;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; ~~further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concerned;~~

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. ~~Regrets~~Takes note that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; regrets that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties, including Art. 168(7) TFEU;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Deplores that ~~since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that~~ cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes~~; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal~~ and also in other EU countries;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Acknowledges the very demanding efforts that have been requested to individuals, families, enterprises and other institutions of the civil societies of the countries under adjustment programmes;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Underlines that adequate economic models are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that in some situations adequate statistics and information were not always available in the short time given; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up of the programme;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; ~~further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run;~~ also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; ~~deplore~~laments the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned~~, but also the insufficient recognition of polit~~ deriving mostly from an insufficient and superficial ~~resistance to change in some Member States~~knowledge of the countries under financial adjustment; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’'s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that as a result fiscal targets could not be fulfilled notwithstanding serious efforts and relevant reforms conducted by national governments in that sense;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Regrets that the significant reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes which is in itself a positive sign of financial stabilization has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries; stresses that in some of these countries a large part of the growth in debt and GDP derives from the recognition of pre-existing liabilities and the mandatory recognition of debt of various state owned enterprises that were not correctly considered in the initial design of the adjustment programmes;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Points out that while the IMF’'s stated objective in its assistance operations within the frame of the Troika is internal devaluation, the Commission has never clearly endorsed this objective; notes that the objective emphasised by the Commission in all four programme countries under enquiry has rather been fiscal consolidation; recognizes these priority differences between the IMF and the European Commission, takes note of this preliminary inconsistency of goals between both institutions and considers it had a negative impact in the measures, fiscal targets, conditionality, and size of the financial envelopes attributed to each country under financial adjustment;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Considers that too little attention has been given by the Troika to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; regrets this lack of discernment, patent in its rejection of several governmental suggestions aiming to lessen such impact, and its harmful effect in the lives of citizens, families, enterprises and other institutions of these countries; takes note of several political declarations of Troika high officials subscribing to this need of alleviation, thus recognizing the need to moderate the rhythm and rigor of the measures, fiscal targets and conditionality of the adjustment programmes, and their prediction and judgement failures; and deplores that these were not duly and timely followed by the Troika´s technical teams that denoted unnecessary degrees of rigidity and intransigence which had negative social consequences;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika a~~s both an agent of Member States and an EU institution;~~nd warns that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such as competition and state aid;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both the Eurogroup and the IMF, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance~~, thus putting governments, including those of the Member States directly concerned, at the centre of any decisions taken~~;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40 a (new)

40a. Urges the EU to closely monitor the financial, fiscal and economic evolution in the Member States and to create an institutionalized system of positive incentives to duly reward those who meet best practices in this regard and those who utterly comply with their adjustment programmes;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45

45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored ; similarly, takes the view that the option of a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF should also be explored and encouraged; further considers that other issues to be evaluated include the current institutional framework of the Troika, the involvement of the ECB in the review of the programmes and the mandatory involvement of the IMF in euro area financial assistance programmes as enshrined in the ESM treaty;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/2277(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)

45a. After these years of experience in designing and implementing financial programs, the European institutions have acquired the necessary know-how to design and implement them by themselves without resorting to the IMF in the future;

2014/02/03
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) ~~the issuer of~~ the money market instrument has been awarded one of the two highest internal rating grades according to the rules laid down in Articles 16 to 19 of this Regulation.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1

1. Each ~~issuer of a~~ money market instrument in which a MMF intends to invest shall be assigned an internal rating pursuant to the internal assessment procedure.

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0306(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the internal rating system shall be based on a single rating scale which ~~exclusively~~ reflects quantification of the credit risk of the issuer. The rating scale shall have six grades for non-defaulted issuers and one for defaulted issuers;

2013/12/12
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 5 a (new)

(5a) The Single Euro Payments Area (‘SEPA’) will reach a major milestone in 2014 with the migration of national credit transfers and direct debits in euro to SEPA-compliant credit transfers and direct debits. The construction of an integrated, competitive, innovative and level-playing field market for euro retail payments in the Euro area should be continued to achieve a true Single Market for payment services in Europe. This ongoing construction should be sustained by strengthened governance under the chairmanship of the European Central Bank. The announcement by the ECB of the creation of the Euro Retail Payments Board (ERPB), successor of the SEPA Council, should contribute to and facilitate reaching this objective. The composition of the ERPB, taking into account a better balance of interest of the supply and the demand side of the payment market should ensure effective advice as regards the orientation of the SEPA project in the future and potential obstacles towards its achievement, ways to address them and ways to foster innovation, competition and integration in retail payments in euro in the EU. The Commission participation as an observer should be envisaged in order to ensure that the tasks, composition and functioning of the ERPB contribute to the promotion of the SEPA project.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7 a (new)

(7a) For consumers to understand their rights and obligations under this Directive, they need to be informed in a clear and accessible way. Within two years after the entering into force of the Directive, the European Commission should therefore produce a consumer friendly electronic leaflet listing in a clear and easy to understand manner the rights and obligations of consumers under this Directive and related Union law on payment services. The information will be made available on the websites of the Commission, EBA and national banking regulators. The Member States shall ensure that payment services providers will make the leaflet in its original format available, free of charge, to all their existing and new clients electronically on their websites and on paper at their branches, their agents and the entities to which their activities are outsourced.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12

(12) Feedback from the market shows that the payment activities covered by the limited network exception often comprise massive payment volumes and values and offer to consumers hundreds or thousands of different products and services, which does not fit the purpose of the limited network exemption as provided for in Directive 2007/64/EC. That implies greater risks and no legal protection for payment service users, in particular for consumers and clear disadvantages for regulated market actors. A more precise description of a limited network, in line with Directive 2009/110/EC, is necessary in order to limit those risks. A payment instrument should thus be considered to be used within such a limited network if it can be used only either for the purchase of goods and services inwith a specific ~~store or chain of stores~~retailer or retail chain, or for a limited range of goods or services, regardless of the geographical location of the point of sale. Such instruments could include store cards, petrol cards, membership cards, public transport cards, meal vouchers or vouchers for specific services, which are sometimes subject to a specific tax or labour legal framework designed to promote the use of such instruments to meet the objectives laid down in social legislation. Where such a specific-purpose instrument develops into a general purpose instrument, the exemption from the scope of this Directive should no longer apply. Instruments which can be used for purchases in stores of listed merchants should not be exempted from the scope of this Directive as such instruments are typically designed for a network of service providers which is continuously growing. The exemption should apply in combination with the obligation of potential payment service providers to notify activities falling within the scope of the definition of a limited network.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 19 a (new)

(19a) To complete the internal market in payments and to ensure that it is conducive to a striving electronic commerce and to economic growth, it is important to allow potential new entrants and current payment service providers alternatives to card payments in order to develop and enhance their services to consumers and retailers. Therefore, EBA in close cooperation with the ECB, shall provide a comprehensive assessment regarding the access to the international bank account number (IBAN), as defined in Article 2(15) of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council26a stored on the electronic chip of debit cards, or to their equivalent for mobile or online payments based thereon, including the electronic chip of the smartphone, the payment application deriving from the debit card or any equivalent embedded technology, with a view to allow those payment service providers to initiate automatically, with the cardholder’s consent, a payment transaction (e.g. a direct debit or a credit transfer) using the IBAN stored on the electronic chip of debit cards or any other equivalent embedded technology. The assessment shall take into consideration the rules concerning fraud prevention and data protection. _________ 26a Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 (OJ L 94, 30.3.2012).

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 80

(80) In order to ensure consistent application of this Directive, the Commission should be able to rely on the expertise and support of EBA, which should have the task to elaborate guidelines and prepare regulatory technical standards on security aspects regarding payment services, and on the cooperation between Member States in the context of the provision of services and establishment of authorised payment institutions in other Member States. Where the guidelines and standards concern security aspects of payments, the EBA shall also take account of the recommendations adopted by the European Forum on the Security of Retail Payments (SecurePay Forum) regarding security of internet payments and payment account access services. The Commission should be empowered to adopt those regulatory technical standards. These specific tasks are fully in line with the role and responsibilities of EBA defined in Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, under which the EBA has been set up.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) payment transactions consisting of ~~the~~ non- prof~~essional~~it cash collection and delivery within the framework of a non- profit or charitable activity;

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point k

(k) services based on specific instruments that are designed to address precise needs that can be used only in a limited way, because they allow the specific instrument holder to acquire goods or services of only ~~in in the premises of th~~one issuer or within a limited network of service providers under direct commercial agreement with a professional issuer or because they can be used only to acquire a limited range of goods or services;

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point n a (new)

(na) ‘personalised security credentials’ means information used for the validation of the identity of a natural or legal person

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 32

32. ‘payment initiation service’ means a payment service enabling access to a payment account provided by a third party payment service provider, where the payer can be actively involved in the payment initiation or the third party payment service provider’s software, or where payment instruments can be used by the payer or the payee to transmit the payer’s credentials to the account servicingservice provided by a third party payment service provider to initiate a payment order, upon request by the payer, with respect to a payment account held at another payment service provider;.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 33

33. ‘account information service’ means a ~~payment service where consolidated and user-friendly information is~~service provided by a third party payment service providedr to ~~a payment ser~~provicde ~~user~~consolidated information on one or several payment accounts held by the payment service user with one or several ~~account servicing~~other payment service providers;

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 38 a (new)

38a. ‘credit card transaction’ means a card payment transaction where the transaction is settled more than 2 working days after the transaction has been cleared;

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The Member States or competent authorities shall require a payment institution which provides any of the payment services ~~and, insofar as it at the same time is engaged in other business activities referred to~~listed in Annex I, including those listed in Article 17(1)(c) to safeguard all funds which have been received from the payment service users or through another payment service provider for the execution of payment transactions, in either of the following ways:

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)

(ba) payment systems where a sole payment service provider (whether as a single entity or as a group): - acts or can act as the payment service provider for both the payer and the payee and is exclusively responsible for the management of the system, and - licenses other payment service providers to participate in the system and the latter have no right to negotiate fees between or amongst themselves in relation to the system although they may establish their own pricing in relation to payers and payees.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 37 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Member States shall require that, where a payment order is initiated by a third party payment service provider, it makes available to the payment service user the information and conditions referred to in Article 38. The information and conditions shall be given in a clear and understandable form and in an official language of the Member State where the payment service is offered or in any other language agreed between the parties.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 39 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) where applicable, the amount of any charges ~~for the payment~~payable to the third party payment service provider for the transaction and, where applicable, a breakdown thereof.

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 41 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Immediately after receipt of the payment order, the ~~payer’s~~account servicing payment service provider shall provide or make available to the payer, in the same way as provided for in Article 37(1), the following data with regard to its own services:

2014/01/28
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 57 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

Consent to execute a payment transaction or a series of payment transactions (including direct debit) shall be given in the form agreed between the payer and the payment service provider. Consent may also be given directly or indirectly via the payee. Consent to execute a payment transaction shall also be considered given where the payer authorises a third party payment service provider to initiate the payment transaction with the account servicing payment service provider.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 57 – paragraph 3

3. Consent may be withdrawn by the payer at any time, but no later than the point in time of irrevocability under Article 71. Consent to execute a series of payment transactions (including direct debit) may also be withdrawn with the effect that any future payment transaction is to be considered as unauthorised.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 – title

Access to and use of payment account information by third party payment service provider and by third party payment instrument issuers

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that a payer, provided that he holds a payment account that can be accessed via online banking, has the right to make use of a third party payment service provider, to obtain payment services enabling access to payment accounts as referred to in point (7) of Annex I. Member States shall ensure that a payer has the right to make use of a third party payment instrument issuer to obtain payment card services.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The account servicing payment service provider shall not deny access as defined under this Article to the third party payment service provider or to the third party payment instrument issuer when it has been authorised to carry a specific payment on behalf of the payer provided that the payer gives its consent in accordance with Article 57 in an express manner.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 – paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Payees who offer to payers the option of making use of third party payment service providers or third party payment instrument issuers shall unambiguously provide to payers information about such third party payment service provider(s), including their registration number and the name of their responsible supervisory authority.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)

(aa) when communicating with the account servicing payment service provider, to authenticate itself in an unequivocal manner;

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 – paragraph 2 – point c

(c) not to store ~~sensitive payment data or~~ personalised security credentials of the payment service user and not use any such data for purposes other than those explicitly requested by the payer.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. If the payer has given consent to a third party payment instrument issuer which has provided the payer with a payment instrument to obtain information on the availability of sufficient funds for a specified payment transaction on a specified payment account held by the payer, the account servicing payment service provider of the specified payment account shall provide such information to the third party payment instrument issuer immediately upon receipt of the payer's payment order.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 – paragraph 4

4. Account servicing payment service providers shall treat payment orders transmitted through the services of a third party payment service provider or by a third party payment instrument issuer without any discrimination for other than objective reasons in particular in terms of timing and priority vis- à-vis payment orders transmitted directly by the payer himself.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 58 a (new)

Article 58a Access to and use of payment account information by third party payment service provider and by third party payment instrument issuers Member States shall ensure that a payment service user has the right to make use of a third party payment service provider to obtain payment services based on access to payment accounts as referred to in point (7) of Annex I. Where a third party payment service provider has been authorised by the payment service user to provide payment services under paragraph 1, it shall have the following obligations: a) to ensure strong customer authentication for the initiation of payments or access to account information by i. redirecting the payment service user in a secure manner to its account servicing payment service provider for such authentication or ii. issuing its own personalised security features for such authentication. The third party payment service provider shall not be allowed to obtain the payment service user's personalised security features issued by the account servicing payment service provider. b) to authenticate itself in an unequivocal manner towards the account servicing payment service provider(s) of the payment service user. c) not to store sensitive payment data of the payment service user obtained when accessing the payment service users payment account, apart from information for identifying a payment initiated by the third party payment service provider such as reference number, payer's and payee's IBAN as well as the transaction amount, reference information and the settlement system information, and not use any data for other purposes than explicitly requested by the payment service user. 3. Member States shall ensure that account servicing payment service providers provide facilities to receive payment orders from third party payment service providers and to accept a redirection as stated under 2. Where, for a payment initiation service, the payment order is transmitted through the services of a third party payment service provider, the account servicing payment service provider shall immediately notify the former of the delivery of the payment order and provide information on the availability of sufficient funds for the specified payment transaction. Account servicing payment service providers shall treat payment orders transmitted through the services of a third party payment service provider without any discrimination for other than objective reasons in terms of timing and priority vis-à-vis payment orders transmitted directly by the payer himself. 6. Member States shall ensure that payment service providers shall offer, once available, a secure standardised interface for third party payment service based on access to payment accounts. A European standard should be defined by the European Banking Authority within [...] of entry into force of this directive, in close cooperation with the European Central Bank, and include at least technical and functional specifications for transmitting a payment order between the account servicing payment service provider and the third party payment service provider under 2(a), and for the unequivocal authentication of the thirds party payment service provider as stated under 2(b).

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 59

Access to and use of payment account information by third party payment instrument issuers 1. Member States shall ensure that a payer has the right to make use of a third party payment instrument issuer to obtain payment card services. 2. If the payer has given consent to a third party payment instrument issuer which has provided the payer with a payment instrument to obtain information on the availability of sufficient funds for a specified payment transaction on a specified payment account held by the payer, the account servicing payment service provider of the specified payment account shall provide such information to the third party payment instrument issuer immediately upon receipt of the payer's payment order. 3. Account servicing payment service providers shall treat payment orders transmitted through the services of a third party payment instrument issuer without any discrimination for other than objective reasons in terms of timing and priority in respect of payment orders transmitted directly by the payer personally.rticle 59 deleted

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 63 – paragraph 2

2. Where the payment service user has chosen to make use of a third party payment service provider ~~is involved,~~ the payment service user shall ~~also obtain rectification from the account servicing payment service provider pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article~~inform the latter and notify the account servicing payment service provider. It is for the account servicing payment service provider to rectify, unless it can demonstrate that the responsibility lies with either the payment service user or the third party payment service provider, without prejudice to Article~~s 65(2) and~~ 80(1).

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 63 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. The payment service user shall report to its account servicing payment service provider any incident that affects the former in the context of its use of a third party payment service provider or third party payment instrument issuer. The account servicing payment service provider shall notify the national competent authorities of any incidents that occur. National competent authorities shall than follow the procedures set by EBA, in close cooperation with the ECB, as lay down in Article 85.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 65 – paragraph 2

2. Where a third party payment service provider is involved, the account servicing payment service provider shall refund the amount of the unauthorised payment transaction and, where applicable, restore the debited payment account to the state in which it would have been had the unauthorised payment transaction not taken place. ~~Financial compensation to the account servicing payment service provider by the third party payment service provider may be applicable~~Once it is established that the third party payment service provider is liable for the unauthorised payment transaction, the third party payment service provider shall, within one business day, compensate the account servicing payment service provider for reasonable costs incurred as a result of the refund to the payer, including the amount of the unauthorised payment transaction.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 67 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4

For direct debits the payer has an unconditional right for refund within the time limits set in Article 68, except where the payee has already fulfilled the contractual obligations and the services have already been received or the goods have already been consumed by the payer. At the payment service provider's request, the payee shall bear the burden to prove that the conditions referred to in the third subparagraph. Member States may limit the right for refund for fixed amount direct debits schemes for certain categories of goods or services. The EBA, in close cooperation with the European Retail Payments Board, shall develop guidelines on the types of goods and services that may be made subject to such fixed amount direct debit scheme with a limitation or exclusion of the refund right.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 85 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Upon the receipt of the notification, the competent authority in the home Member State shall, without undue delay, provide the relevant details of the incident with EBA.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 85 – paragraph 3

3. Upon receipt of the notification~~, and where relevant, EBA shall~~ EBA shall, in co-operation with the competent authority in the home Member State, assess the relevance of the incident, and, based on that assessment, notify ~~the~~ competent authorities in the other Member States.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 85 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. The national competent authority shall act preventively, if necessary, and in order to protect the immediate safety of the financial system.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 85 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. EBA shall in close cooperation with the ECB develop guidelines specifying the framework for the notification of NIS incidents referred in the above paragraphs. The guidelines shall specify the scope and treatment of information to be submitted, including the criteria of relevance of incidents and standard notification templates to ensure a consistent and efficient notification process.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 86 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. EBA shall co-ordinate the sharing of information in the area of operational and security risks associated with payment services with the competent authorities the ECB, the competent authorities under the [NIS] Directive, and, where relevant, with ENISA.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 94 a (new)

Article 94a Common and Secure Open Standards of Communication 1.. The Common and Secure Open Standards of Communication shall be defined by the EBA, in close cooperation with the ECB, within 12 months of entry into force of this Directive [OJ please insert date], and include technical and functional specifications for transmitting a payment order between the account servicing payment service provider and the third party payment service provider. 2. The EBA, in close cooperation with the ECB, shall ensure appropriate consultation of all stakeholders in the payment services market. 3. Member States shall ensure that payment service providers shall offer once available, Common and Secure Open Standards of Communication for third party payment service on access to payment accounts. 4. This Article shall not preclude the application of other obligations laid down in this Directive.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0264(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 100 a (new)

Article 100a In Article 4 of Regulation 1093/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, point 1 is replaced by the following: '(1) 'financial institutions' means 'credit institutions' as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC, 'investment firms' as defined in Article 3(1)(b) of Directive 2006/49/EC, and 'financial conglomerates' as defined in Article 2(14) of Directive 2002/87/EC, 'payment institutions' as defined in Article 4(4) of Directive 2007/64/EC, and 'electronic money institutions' as defined in Article 2(1) of Directive 2009/110/EC, save that, with regard to Directive 2005/60/EC, 'financial institutions' means credit institutions and financial institutions as defined in Article 3(1) and (2) of that Directive;'.

2014/01/20
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)

(10a) In the establishment of the SRM, and in parallel with what has been done in the SSM, the Board should be in charge of preparing a memorandum of understanding regarding the rules and procedure to be taken by national resolution authorities and the Board; The Board should be in charge of drafting the resolution plans of the credit institutions that are under the direct supervision of the ECB under the SSM framework, as well as all the cross-border institutions and groups, whereas the national resolution authorities should be in charge of drafting the resolution plans of the credit institutions that are exclusively located in their Member State and are not cross border entities, though always subject to a final approval by the Board; The same principle should be applied regarding the adoption of resolution schemes and actions on the basis of a strong and close cooperation;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 b (new)

(10b) The creation of a Banking Union is a project that should not be underestimated, neither in its goals, nor in its unattended consequences. Although a single financial framework is needed, European Institutions and Member States should be aligned in their views regarding this project in order to achieve a complete and robust successful framework;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 c (new)

(10c) A balance approach must be reached between predictability and flexibility in order not to jeopardize the future of our banking system; a balanced approach between the role of the central authorities and the national authorities should be safeguarded and the important role of the national authorities should never be underestimated; the impact that the entire project will have on senior unsecured creditors should be carefully assessed, including lower loss expectations in resolution than would be expected in insolvency;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 d (new)

(10d) Before the entry into force of the Single Supervision Mechanism, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism should be aligned as much as possible, mostly to avoid negative unintended consequences in the framework of possible resolutions of credit institutions that may occur in the transitional period, namely in Member States with higher sovereign credit risk;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) The ECB, as the supervisor within the SSM, is the best placed to assess whether a credit institution is failing or likely to fail and whether there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe. The Board, in its executive session, upon notification of the ECB, should provide a recommendation to the Commission. Given the need to balance the different interests at stake the Commission should decide whether or not to place an institution under resolution and should also decide on a clear and detailed resolution framework establishing the resolution actions to be taken by the Board. Within this framework, the Board, in its executive session, should decide on a resolution scheme and instruct the national resolution authorities on the resolution tools and powers to be executed at national level.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) It is instrumental for the good functioning of the internal market that the same rules apply to all resolution measures, regardless of whether they are taken by national resolution authorities under Directive [ ] or within the framework of the single resolution mechanism The Commission will assess those measures under Article 107 of the TFEU. Where the use of resolution financing arrangements does not involve State aid pursuant to Article 107 (1) of the TFEU, the Commission should, in order to ensure a level playing field within the internal market, assess those measures by analogy to Art 107 of the TFEU. If a notification under Article 108 of the TFEU is not necessary as no state aid pursuant to Article 107 of the TFEU is entailed in the proposed use of the Fund by the Board, as envisaged in its executive session, in order to ensure the integrity of the internal market between participating and non- participating Member States, the Commission should apply the relevant State aid rules under Article 107 of the TFEU by way of analogy when assessing the proposed use of the Fund. The Board should not decide on a resolution scheme until the Commission has ensured, by way of analogy with State aid rules, that the use of the Fund follows the same rules as interventions by national financing arrangements.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) In order to ensure a swift and effective decision making process in resolution, the Board should be a specific Union agency with a specific structure, corresponding to its specific tasks, and which departs from the model of all other agencies of the Union. Its composition should ensure that due account is taken of all relevant interests at stake in resolution procedures. The Board should operate in executive and plenary sessions. The plenary session should take place on a quarterly basis. In its executive session, it should be composed of an Executive Director, a Deputy Executive Director, and representatives of the Commission and the ECB. Considering the missions of the Board, the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director should be appointed by the Council on a proposal from the Commission and after hearing the European Parliament. When deliberating on the resolution of a bank or group established within a single participating Member State, the executive session of the Board should also convene and involve in the decision-making process the member appointed by the Member State concerned representing its national resolution authority. When deliberating on a cross- border group, the members appointed by the home and all host Member States concerned representing the relevant national resolution authorities should also be convened and involved in the decision- making process of the executive session of the Board. However, home authorities and host authorities should have a balanced influence on the decision, so host authorities should have jointly one single vote. ~~Observers, including a representative of the ESM and of the Euro Group, may also be invited to attend the meetings of the Board~~In this context, the Board should also establish an Administrative Board of Review for the purposes of carrying out an internal administrative review of the decisions taken in its executive sessions concerning resolution schemes and/or measures, following a request for review, submitted by the national resolution authority. Observers, including a representative of the ESM and of the Euro Group, may also be invited to attend the meetings of the Board and are subject to the same professional secrecy requirements as Members of the Board, staff of the Board and staff exchanged with or seconded by participating Member States carrying out resolution duties.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19 a (new)

(19a) The Board should establish internal resolution teams composed of its own staff and staff of the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States, that should act as resolution colleges and should be headed by Coordinators appointed from the Board's senior staff. Coordinators should participate in the executive sessions of the Board, but would not be attributed any voting rights, when deliberations and decisions are at stake. In case of an unresolved dispute at the resolution team's level, the Coordinator and/or any of the national resolution authorities might appeal to the Board that will address and resolve the dispute in its executive sessions. National resolution authorities might appeal from the Board's decision taken in their executive sessions to the Administrative Board of Review.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) In the light of the Board's missions and the resolution objectives which include the protection of public funds, the functioning of the Board should be financed from contributions paid by the institutions in the participating Member States. These institutions should not, under any circumstances, provide extraordinary annual contributions to cover administrative expenditure and should not be called to contribute to the budget of their national resolution authorities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) The Board and the Commission, where relevant, should replace the national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] in respect of all aspects related to the resolution decision-making process. The national resolution authorities designated under Directive [ ] should continue to carry out activities related to the implementation of resolution schemes adopted by the Board. In order to ensure transparency and democratic control, as well as to safeguard the rights of the Union institutions, the Board should be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for any decisions taken on the basis of this proposal to the extent that it has not planned and/or acted in accordance with specific instructions from the Commission. For the same reasons of transparency and democratic control, national parliaments should have certain rights to obtain information about the activities of the Board and to engage in a dialogue with it.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) To ensure a uniform approach for institutions and groups the Board, in its executive session, should be empowered to draw up resolution plans for such institutions and groups. The Board should assess the resolvability of institutions and groups, and take measures aimed at removing impediments to resolvability, if any. The Board should require national resolution authorities to apply such appropriate measures designed to remove impediments to resolvability in order to ensure consistency and the resolvability of the institutions concerned.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25

(25) The single resolution mechanism should be constructed on the frameworks of Directive [ ] and the SSM. Therefore, the Board should be empowered to intervene at an early stage where the financial situation or the solvency of an institution is deteriorating. The information that the Board receives from the ~~national resolution authorities or the~~ ECB at this stage is instrumental in making a determination on the action it might take in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution concerned.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

(27) In order to minimise disruption to the financial market and to the economy, the resolution process should be accomplished in a short time. The Commission should, throughout the resolution procedure, have access to any information which it deems necessary to take an informed decision in the resolution process. Where the Commission, following a recommendation of the Board, decides to put an institution under resolution, the Board should immediately adopt a resolution scheme, as proposed in the recommendation, establishing the details of the resolution tools and powers to be applied, and the use of any financing arrangements.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) The Commission should provide, following a recommendation by the Board, the framework for the resolution action to be taken depending on the circumstances of the case and should be able to designate for use all necessary resolution tools. Within that clear and precise framework, the Board should decide on the detailed resolution scheme. The relevant resolution tools should include the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool, the bail-in tool and the asset separation tool, which are also provided for by Directive [ ]. The framework should also make it possible to assess whether the conditions for the write- down and conversion of capital instruments are met.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44

(44) In order to implement the burden- sharing by shareholders and junior creditors, as required under State aid rules, the single resolution mechanism would be able to apply, by way of analogy, as of the entry into application of this Regulation, the bail-in tool to those stakeholders.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45

(45) To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool, the Board should be able to establish that the institutions hold an aggregate amount of own funds, subordinated debt and senior liabilities subject to the bail-in tool expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution, that do not qualify as own funds for the purposes of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 and of Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council17 , which institutions should have at all times. __________________ 16 European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1. 17 Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338.including own- funds, which institutions should have at all times. Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 48

(48) The efficiency and uniformity of resolution action should be ensured in all the participating Member States. For this purpose, the Board should be empowered, in exceptional cases and where a national resolution authority has not or not sufficiently applied the decision of the Board to transfer to another person specified rights, assets or liabilities of an institution under resolution or to require the conversion of debt instruments which contain a contractual term for conversion in certain circumstancesoverride it in order to ensure that such decision is accomplished. Any action by national resolution authorities that would restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Board should be excluded.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 52

(52) In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the Board should have appropriate investigatory powers. It should be able to require all necessary information either directly or through national resolution authorities, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections, where appropriate in cooperation with national competent authorities. In the context of resolution, on-site inspections would be available for the Board to effectively monitor implementation by national authorities and to ensure that the Commission and the Board take their decisions on the basis of fully accurate information. Where the national resolution authority has no means available to afford the necessary assistance, it should use its powers to request the necessary assistance of other national resolution authorities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 52 a (new)

(52a) The procedure regarding the exchange of information between the Board, competent authorities and national resolution authorities should be defined and implemented through a memorandum of understanding.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54

(54) In order to ensure that decisions adopted within the framework of the single resolution mechanism are respected, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions should be imposed in case of infringement. The Board should be entitled to ~~instruct national resolution authorities to~~ impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply with obligations under its decisions. In order to ensure consistent, efficient and effective enforcement practices the Board should be entitled to issue guidelines addressed to national resolution authorities concerning the application of fines and penalty paymentsThis fines or periodic penalty payments should be determined by the Board, together with the competent authorities, and the Commission.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54 a (new)

(54a) To ensure that decisions are fully respected across the Union, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions should be imposed in case of infringement and equally applied across all Member States; For this reason the framework for the adoption of administrative sanctions and legal sanctions should be harmonized at the Union level in order to ensure effective compliance; Therefore common minimum rules should be laid down in order to have a fully European mechanism;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54 b (new)

(54b) Member States and the Board should ensure that any penalties imposed pursuant to Regulation (EC) No (...) are publicly disclosed only where such public disclosure would be proportionate.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 55

(55) Where a national resolution authority infringes the rules of the single resolution mechanism by not using the powers conferred on it under national law to implement an instruction by the Board, the Member State concerned may be liable to make good any damage caused to individuals, including where applicable to the entity or group under resolution, or any creditor of any part of that entity or group in any Member State, in accordance with that case law.deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 56

(56) Appropriate rules should be laid down governing ~~the budget of the Board, the preparation of the budget,~~ the adoption of internal rules specifying the procedure for the establishment and implementation of ~~its~~the budget of the Board, its preparation, monitoring and control on a quarterly basis by the Board's plenary session, and the internal and external audit of the accounts.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 56 a (new)

(56a) The Board's plenary session should also adopt its annual work programme, monitor and control it on a quarterly basis, and issue opinions and/or recommendations on the quarterly draft report by the Executive-Director which should include a section on the resolution activities and the ongoing resolution cases of the Board, and a section on financial and administrative matters.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 59 a (new)

(59a) A credit facility for the Resolution Fund should be envisaged guaranteeing a full European backstop that can at any given moment effectively stop a contagious effect in the financial system. This credit facility will allow the economic agents to base their decisions according to the soundness of each financial institution rather than on the perceived sovereign risk of the Member States where the different institutions are based; With this credit facility the link between sovereign credit risk and the banking system will finally cease to exist;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 62

(62) Where participating Member States have already established national resolution financing arrangements, they should be able to provide that the national resolution financing arrangements use their available financial means, collected from institutions in the past by way of ex- ante contributions, to compensate institutions for the ex-ante contributions which those institutions should pay into the Fund. Such restitution should be without prejudice to the obligations of Member States under Directive 94/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council18. __________________ 18 Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 amending Directive 80/390/EEC coordinating the requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the admission of securities to official stock-exchange listing, with regard to the obligation to publish listing particulars. OJ L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 1.funds already collected under these arrangements should be transferable to the Single Resolution Fund. Directive 94/18/EC of the European

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 63

(63) In order to ensure a fair calculation of contributions and provide incentives to operate under a model which presents less risk, contributions to the Fund which are to be determined by the Board, following a proposal by the competent authority, should take account of the degree of risk incurred by credit institutions.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 66

(66) The Commission, after a proposal from the Board, should be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU in order to determine the type of contributions to the Fund and the matters for which contributions are due, the manner in which the amount of the contributions is calculated and the way in which they are to be paid; specify registration, accounting, reporting and other rules necessary to ensure that the contributions are fully and timely paid; determine the contribution system for institutions that have been authorized to operate after the Fund has reached its target level; determine the criteria for the spreading out in time of the contributions; determine the circumstances under which the payment of contributions may be advanced or delayed; determine the criteria for establishing the amount of annual contributions; determine the measures to specify the circumstances and modalities under which an institution may be partially or entirely exempted from ex post ~~contributions, and the measures to specify the circumstances and modalities under which an institution may be partially or entirely exempted from ex-post~~ contributions.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 67

(67) To preserve the confidentiality of the work of the Board, its members, staff of the Board, including the staff exchanged with or seconded by participating Member States for the purpose of carrying out resolution duties should be subject to requirements of professional secrecy, even after their duties have ceased. These requirements should also apply to other persons authorised by the Board and persons authorised or appointed by the national resolution authorities of the Member States to conduct on-site inspections, and to observers invited to attend the plenary and executive sessions of the Board. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it, the Board should be authorized, subject to conditions, to exchange information with national or Union authorities and bodies.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 69

(69) Until the Board is fully operational, the Commission should be responsible for the initial operations including collecting the first contributions necessary to cover administrative expenses and the designation of an interim executive director to authorise all necessary payments on behalf of the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. When making decisions or taking action, which may have an impact in more than one participating Member State, and in particular when taking decisions concerning groups established in two or more participating Member States, the Commission and the Board shall give due consideration to all of the following factors:

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3

3. The Commission and the Board shall balance the factors referred to in paragraph 2 with the resolution objectives referred to in Article 12 as appropriate to the nature and circumstances of each case.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. In order to respect the right to conduct business laid down by Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Board's discretion shall be limited to what is necessary to simplify the structure and operations of the institution solely to improve its resolvability. In addition, any measure imposed for such purposes shall be consistent with Union law. Measures shall neither directly nor indirectly be discriminatory on ground of nationality, and shall be justified by the overriding reason of the public interest in financial stability. To determine whether an action was taken in the general public interest, the Board, acting in the general public interest, shall be able to achieve the resolution objectives without encountering impediments to the application of resolution tools or its ability to exercise the powers conferred on it. Furthermore, an action shall not go beyond the minimum necessary to attain the objectives.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1

1. The Board shall draw up resolution plans for the entities ~~referred to in Article 2 and for group~~that are under direct supervision of the European Central Bank under the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation nº [ ] and for all cross border entities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The national resolution authorities shall draw up the resolution plans for the credit institutions that are exclusively located in their Member State and are not cross border entities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. All resolution plans shall be submitted to final approval by the Board in its executive session.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4

4. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the ~~Commiss~~Board or the national resolutions a~~nd the Board~~uthorities may take where an entity referred to in ~~Article 2 or a group~~paragraph 1 and 1a meet the conditions for resolution. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or of system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with this Regulation.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 2

2. When drafting a resolution plan for entities referred to in Article 27 paragraph 1 or giving the final approval to resolution plans for entities referred in Article 7 paragraph 1a, the Board shall assess the extent to which such an entity is resolvable in accordance with this Regulation. An entity shall be deemed resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authority to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it by applying to it the different resolution tools and powers without giving rise to significant adverse consequences for financial systems, including circumstances of broader financial instability or system wide events, of the Member State in which the entity is situated, or other Member States, or the Union and with a view to ensuring the continuity of critical functions carried out by the entity.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1

1. Where the ECB ~~or a national resolution authority~~ assesses that the conditions referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 are met in relation to an entity referred to in Article 2, it shall communicate that assessment without delay to the Commission and the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. On receiving a communication pursuant to paragraph 1, ~~or on its own initiative, the Board~~the Board in its executive session shall conduct an assessment of whether the following conditions are met:

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 8

8. Within the framework set by the Commission decision, the Board in its executive session shall decide on the resolution scheme referred to in Article 20 and shall ensure that the necessary resolution action is taken to carry out the resolution scheme by the relevant national resolution authorities. The decision of the Board shall be addressed to the relevant national resolution authorities and shall instruct those authorities, which shall take all necessary measures to implement the decision of the Board in accordance with Article 26, by exercising any of the resolution powers provided for in Directive [ ], in particular those in Articles 56 to 64 of that Directive [ ]. ~~Where State aid is present, the Board may only decide after the Commission has taken a decision on that State aid.~~

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 9

9. ~~On receiving a communication pursuant to paragraph 1, or on its own initiative, if the Board considers that~~If the Board considers that the resolution scheme includes resolution measures that could constitute State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, it shall invite the participating Member State or Member States concerned to immediately notify the envisaged measures to the Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 10

10. To the extent that the resolution action as proposed by the Board in its executive session involves the use of the Fund and does not entail the grant of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) of the TFEU, the Commission shall apply in parallel, by way of analogy, the criteria established for the application of Article 107 TFEU.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 3

3. Where this is necessary in order to achieve the resolution objectives, the Commission, following a recommendation of the Board ~~or on its own initiative~~, may review its decision on the resolution framework and adopt the appropriate amendments.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – introductory part

2. Where a national resolution authority has not applied a decision referred to in Article 16, or has applied it in a way which fails to achieve the resolution objectives under this Regulation, the Board shall ~~have the power to order an institution under resolut~~override the national resolution authority in order to ensure the correct application of that decision:.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point a

~~(a) to transfer to another person specified rights, assets or liabilities of an institution under resolution;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 2 – point b

~~(b) to require the conversion of debt instruments which contain a contractual term for conversion in the circumstances provided for in Article 18.~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 5

5. The procedure regarding the exchange of information between the Board, ~~the~~ competent authorities and ~~the~~ national resolution authorities ~~may draw up memorandum of understanding with a procedure concerning the exchange of information~~shall be defined and implemented through a memorandum of understanding.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 5

5. Where the officials of and other accompanying persons authorised or appointed by the Board find that a person opposes an inspection ordered pursuant to paragraph 1, the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States concerned shall afford them the necessary assistance in accordance with national law. To the extent necessary for the inspection, this assistance shall include the sealing of any business premises and books or records. Where that power is not available to the national resolution authorities concerned, it shall use its powers to request the necessary assistance of other ~~the~~ national ~~resolution~~ authorities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. The officials and other persons referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 shall be subject to the professional secrecy requirement laid down in Article 79.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 41 – paragraph 1

1. The Board shall be accountable to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission for the implementation of this Regulation, in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 8 to the extent that it has not planned and/or acted in accordance with specific instructions from the Commission.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 43 – paragraph 2

2. The members of the Board referred to in Article ~~40(2~~39 (1) shall act independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the Union's institutions or bodies, from any Government of a Member State or from any other public or private body.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) adopt, by 30 November of each year, the Board's annual work programme for the coming year in accordance with Article 49(1), based on a draft put forward by the Executive Director and shall transmit it for information to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the European Central Bank; the implementation of the Board's annual work programme should be monitored and controlled on a quarterly basis by the Board’s plenary.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) adopt, monitor and control, the annual budget of the Board in accordance with Article 598 (2);, and 58 (2a). The monitoring and control should be done on a quarterly basis.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(ba) issue opinions and/or recommendations on the quarterly draft report of the Executive-Director mentioned in Article 52 (2)(g)

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) decide on the voluntary borrowing between financing arrangements in accordance with Article 68, the mutualisation of national financing arrangements in accordance with Article 72 and on the lending to deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with Article 73 (4);

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) adopt anthe annual activity report on the Board's activities referred to in Article 421. This report shall present detailed explanations on the implementation of the budget;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 2

2. The Board in its plenary session shall hold at least ~~two~~four ordinary meetings a year. In addition, it shall meet on the initiative of the Executive Director, at the request of the Commission, or at the request of at least one-third of its members.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. The Coordinators of internal resolution teams, mentioned in Article 77, will also participate in the executive sessions of the Board, but without any voting rights, when deliberations and decisions will be taken with regard to entities referred to in Article 2.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. The Board shall establish an Administrative Board of Review for the purposes of carrying out an internal administrative review of the decisions taken in its executive sessions, in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by this Regulation, and concerning resolution schemes and/or measures, following a request for review, submitted by the national resolution authorities whose members have participated in the deliberations and the decision making in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3, in case of a major dissent from the decisions of the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 50 – paragraph 4

~~4. The Board, in its executive session, shall meet on the initiative of the Executive Director or at the request of its members.~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 2 – point g

(g) ~~each year the Executive Director shall prepare a~~the preparation of a quarterly draft report with a section on the resolution activities and the ongoing resolution cases of the Board, and a section on financial and administrative matters.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 7

7. A~~n Executive Director or~~ Deputy Executive Director whose term of office has been extended shall not participate in another selection procedure for the same post at the end of the overall period.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 56 – paragraph 1

1. The revenues of Part I of the budget shall consist of the annual contributions necessary to cover the annual estimated administrative expenditure in accordance with Article 62(1) (a).

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 2

2. The budget of the Board shall be adopted by the plenary session of the Board on the basis of the statement of estimates. ~~Where necessary, it shall be adjusted accordingly.~~

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 58 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Where necessary, the budget of the Board might be adjusted accordingly, in plenary session, following its quarterly review by the Board.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 3

3. ~~The Board shall determine~~Following a proposal by the competent authority, including the ECB, in accordance with the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 5, the Board shall determine the contributions due by each entity referred to in Article 2 in a decision addressed to the entity concerned. The Board shall apply procedural, reporting and other rules ensuring that contributions are fully and timely paid.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Entities referred to in Article 2 shall not be called, under any circumstances, to provide extraordinary annual contributions for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1(a);

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Entities referred to in Article 2 shall not be called to contribute to the budget of the national resolution authorities.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 4 c (new)

4c. Funds already collected under existing national resolution financing arrangements shall be transferred to the Single Resolution Fund.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 62 – paragraph 5 – point d

(d) determine the amount of the first annual contributions necessary to cover the administrative expenditure of the Board before it becomes fully operational.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 1

1. In a period no longer than 105 years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the available financial means of the Fund shall reach at least 10,8 % of the amount of ~~deposits~~covered deposits, according to Directive 94/19/EC, of all credit institutions authorised in the participating Member States ~~which are guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC~~.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. A credit facility shall be envisaged, in the 12 month period after the entry into force of this Regulation, guaranteeing a full European backstop.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 2

2. During the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1, contributions to the Fund calculated in accordance with Article 66, and raised in accordance with Article 62 shall be spread out in time as evenly as possible until the target level is reached unless, depending on the circumstances, they can be advanced or delayed in consideration of the ~~favourable~~ market conditions or the funding needs.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 5 – point b

(b) circumstances under which the payment of contributions may be advanced or delayed under paragraph 2;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 2

2. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target funding level specified in Article 65 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of ~~low risk assets~~assets eligible by the Central Banks of Member States, and unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the Board for the purposes specified in Article 71(1). The share of these irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 350% of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with paragraph 1.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 3 – point b

~~(b) the quality of the collateral backing the payment commitments in paragraph 2;~~deleted

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 71 – paragraph 1 – point f

(f) to make a contribution to the institution under resolution in lieu of the contribution which would have been achieved by the write down and/or equity conversion of certain creditors, when the bail-in tool is applied and the resolution authority decides to exclude certain creditors from the scope of bail-in in accordance with Article 24(35);

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 – paragraph 1

1. Participating Member States shall ensure that, when the Board takes resolution actions, ~~and provided that these actions ensure that depositors continue having access to their deposits,~~ the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated shall be liable for the amounts specified in Article 99(1) and (4) of Directive [ ].

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 77 – paragraph 3

3. The Board ~~may~~shall establish internal resolution teams composed of its own staff and staff of the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 77 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. The Board will appoint from its own senior level staff Coordinators of the internal resolution teams.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 77 – paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. In case of an unresolved dispute at the level of the internal resolution team, the Coordinator and/or any of the national resolution authorities may appeal to the Board that will address and resolve the dispute in its executive session.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 77 – paragraph 3 c (new)

3c. National resolution authorities may still appeal against the Board's decision taken in its executive session to the Administrative Board of Review, according to paragraph 3 b new of Article 49.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 79 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. The professional secrecy requirements referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall also apply to observers who attend the Board's meetings on an ad hoc basis.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 83 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the functioning of the SRM and the impact of ~~the~~ its resolution activities on the interests of the Union as a whole and on the coherence and integrity of the internal market in financial services, including its possible impact on the structures of the national banking systems within the Union, on their competitiveness in comparison with other banking systems outside the SRM and outside the Union, and regarding the effectiveness of cooperation and information sharing arrangements within the SRM, between the SRM and the SSM, and between the SRM and national resolution authorities and national competent authorities of non- participating Member States;

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Elisa FERREIRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 83 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) the interaction between the Board and the national resolution authorities of non- participating Member States and the effects of the SRM on these Member States, and the interaction between the Board and national resolution authorities of third countries.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 85 – paragraph 1

From the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 88, the Fund shall be considered the only resolution financing arrangement of the participating Member States under Title VII of Directive [ ].

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0253(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 88 – paragraph 2

Articles 7 to 23 and Articles 25 to 387 shall apply from 1 January 2015.

2013/10/22
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 2

2. Full compensation shall place anyone who has suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been had the infringement not been committed. It shall therefore include compensation for actual loss and for loss of profit, and payment of interest ~~from the time the harm occurred until the compensation~~ in respect of that harm has actually been paid.

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 9

9. ‘~~review~~competition court’ means a national court that is empowered to review decisions of a national competition authority, in which context it may also have the power to find an infringement of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty;

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 11

11. ‘final’ infringement decision means an infringement decision of a competition authority or ~~review~~competition court that can no longer be reviewed;

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 14

14. ‘leniency corporate statement’ means an oral or written presentation voluntarily provided by, or on behalf of, an ~~undertaking~~applicant to a competition authority, describing the ~~undertaking~~applicant's knowledge of a secret cartel and its role therein, which was drawn up specifically for submission to the authority with a view to obtaining immunity or a reduction of fines under a leniency programme concerning the application of Article 101 of the Treaty or the corresponding provision under national law; this does not include documents or information that exist irrespective of the proceedings of a competition authority (‘pre-existing information’);

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 4

4. Member States shall ensure that national courts have at their disposal effective measures to protect confidential information from improper use ~~to the greatest extent possible~~ whilst also ensuring that relevant evidence containing such information is available in the action for damages.

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 5

5. Member States shall ~~take the necessary measures to~~ give full effect to legal privileges and other rights not to be compelled to disclose evidence.

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) ~~leniency corporate stateme~~statements from leniency applicants; and

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) information that was drawn up by a competition authority in the course of its proceedings and was included in the file of a competition authority.

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that evidence falling into one of the categories listed in Article 6(1) which is obtained by a natural or legal person solely through access to the file of a competition authority in exercise of his rights ~~of defence~~ under Article 27 of Regulation No 1/2003 or corresponding provisions of national law is not admissible in actions for damages.

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 2

2. Member States shall ensure that evidence falling within one of the categories listed in Article 6, paragraph 2 which is obtained by a natural or legal person solely through access to the file of a competition authority in exercise of his rights ~~of defence~~ under Article 27 of Regulation No 1/2003 or corresponding provisions of national law is not admissible in actions for damages until that competition authority has closed its proceedings or taken a decision referred to in Article 5 of Regulation No 1/2003 or in Chapter III of Regulation No 1/2003.

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9

Member States shall ensure that, where national courts rule, in actions for damages under Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty or under national competition law, on agreements, decisions or practices which are already the subject of a final infringement decision by a national competition authority or by a ~~review~~competition court, those courts cannot take decisions running counter to such finding of an infringement. This obligation is without prejudice to the rights and obligations under Article 267 of the Treaty.

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 2

2. Member States shall ensure that an undertaking which has been granted immunity from fines by a competition authority under a leniency programme shall be liable to injured parties other than its direct or indirect purchasers or providers only when such injured parties show that they are unable to obtain full compensation from the other undertakings that were involved in the same infringement of competition law.deleted

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 3

3. Member States shall ensure that an infringing undertaking may recover a contribution from any other infringing undertaking, the amount of which shall be determined in the light of their relative responsibility for the harm caused by the infringement. The amount of contribution of an undertaking which has been granted immunity from fines by a competition authority under a leniency programme shall not exceed the amount of the harm it caused to its own direct or indirect purchasers or providers.

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0185(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 4

4. Member States shall ensure that, to the extent the infringement caused harm to injured parties other than the direct or indirect purchasers or providers of the infringing undertakings, the amount of contribution of the immunity recipient shall be determined in the light of its relative responsibility for that harm.deleted

2013/11/08
Committee: ECON

2013/0025(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 13

(13) TIn order to mitigate the risks related to the use of the gambling sector to launder the proceeds of criminal activity ~~is of concern. In order to mitigate the risks related to the sector~~ and to provide parity amongst the providers of gambling services, an obligation for all providers of gambling services to conduct customer due diligence for single transactions of EUR 2 000 or more should be laid down. Member States should consider applying this threshold to the collection of winnings as well as wagering a stake. Providers of gambling services with physical premises ~~(e.g. casinos and gaming houses) should ensure~~subject to State supervision will be deemed in any event to have satisfied thate customer due diligence~~, if it is taken at the point of entry to the premises, can be linked to the transactions conducted by the customer on those premises~~ requirements if they register, identify, and verify the identity of, their customers immediately on or before entry, whatever the value of the transactions to be carried out.

2013/12/09
Committee: ECON LIBE

2013/0025(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) for providers of gambling services, when carrying out occasional transactions ~~amounting to EUR 2 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked~~whose individual value amounts to EUR 2000 or more;

2013/12/09
Committee: ECON LIBE

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the economic and monetary union (EMU) is not an end in itself but rather an instrument to achieve the Union and the Member States objectives, in particular a balanced and sustainable growth ~~and a high level of~~, sound public finances and employment;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

D. whereas the Union is at a crossroads and a clear direction needs to be ~~chosen either to combine the forces within the Union an~~taken concerning its future; whereas forces need to be combined to build a future ~~for~~ a strong and value-driven Union in a globalised world~~, or to fold back on itself and be forced to submit passively to globalisation for lack of power and influence~~;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F

F. whereas ~~there i~~currently several Member States gare~~at concern about the difficult~~ facing a very demanding economic and financial situation ~~in which several Member States find themselves~~, aggravated by the continuous strains on the sovereign bond markets reflected in high interest borrowing rates ~~for some countries and considerable financial and economic~~and considerable instability;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. whereas recent events have made clear that the euro area is ~~not sufficient~~still not properly equipped to solve ~~the~~an economic and financial crisis and to react adequately to regional economic shocks within it; whilst the Union has made significant progress in order to overcome such barriers, room for improvement still exists;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas the important role played by the euro, both within the euro area and at the global level, as the second most important international reserve currency , ~~risks being increasingly undermined the longer the crisis persists~~demands a strong European response and a coordinated European action to bring back growth and stability to the economy;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas over the last decade, notwithstanding its conceptual and practical flaws, the euro has brought Union citizens many benefits, such as price stability, protection against currency fluctuations, the impossibility of non- cooperative competitive devaluations, lower interest rates, the encouragement of the integration of financial markets and easier cross-border capital movement;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital K

K. whereas the Union's single currency should ~~not become a symbol of division which threatens the whole European project, but should~~ remain a symbol of a Union that is decisive and capable of taking far-reaching decisions for a common and prosperous future; whereas the euro should be regarded as an essential step towards a more robust economic and fiscal union;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)

La. whereas the crisis has demonstrated not only the interdependence between Member States whose currency is the euro but also has made clear the need for a more robust fiscal union with effective mechanisms to correct unsustainable fiscal trajectories, macroecononomic imbalances, debt levels and the upper limits of budget balance of Member States;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital N

N. whereas Union and national policy makers should continu~~ously~~e to explain to their citizens all steps of the policy measures applied; whereas communication is a corner stone of every democracy and represents a necessary pillar to achieve social cohesion; whilst all the benefits of a single currency, including the costs and risks linked to a break up of the euro area;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q

Q. whereas ~~time is running out and restoring confidence is the main task in order to convince~~restoring confidence inside the Union is essential in order to create the conditions for European citizens and enterprises to start reinvesting ~~again~~ in the economy and to create conditions for financial institutions to provide the real economy, once again, with credit on a broad ~~but~~and sound basis;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital R

R. whereas the answer to successfully exit the euro crisis isproves to be complex and demands sustained, and multifaceted efforts at all institutional and policy levels;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital T

T. whereas in order to restor~~ing~~e confidence ~~also requires those~~in the Union, Heads of State and Government and their Ministers musto defend, loyally, in their Member States, the policy decisions they agreed upon at Union level ~~and to explain that~~; necessary explanation of they subscribed ~~to those~~ policies i~~n the belief that they~~s desired as wiell safeguard the future of their own citizens; whereas by imputing unpopular decisions to the Union, a particularly dangerous game of perception is being played which risks eroding the Union from below, undermining solidarity and ultimately damaging the European project as a wholeas sharing the common belief that those measures will safeguard the future of their own citizens;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital T a (new)

Ta. whereas socially the Union is fragile at the moment; whereas several Member States are under extremely demanding structural reform efforts and consolidation programmes; whereas ultimately political union is the key to overcome to overcome such times, encouraging solidarity and carry on with the European project;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital V

V. whereas the growing divide between core and peripheral countries in the Union should not become chronic in nature; whereas a permanent framework must be created in which Member States in difficulty should be able to rely on solidarity-based support from other Member States; whereas those Member States which desire solidarityMember States should be able to take up their responsibility for implementing the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union as well as their country-specific recommendations and their engagements under the European Semester, in particular those related to the stability and growth pact (SGP), the Euro- plus pact and the macro-economic imbalances procedure;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital W

W. whereas it is ~~beyond doubt~~clear that the European integration ~~is an irreversible and progressive~~can become a truly progressive and popular process if Member States meticulously honour their European engagements and if Union institutions strictly respect and thoroughly apply the principle of subsidiarity;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Z

Z. whereas the report drawn up by the four Presidents represents ~~the first~~a long-term plan which unambiguously ~~chooses the way forward and~~ seeks to break the cycle of distrust by means of structural measures;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital AD

AD. whereas the most probable need for future Treaty changes should not ~~be an obstacle to the swift implementation of what can already be achieved under the existing Treaties; whereas much can be achieved within the current institutional framework;~~prevent the Union and the Member States from continuing their path towards deeper and more efficient economic and fiscal coordination within the actual legal framework, using all available tools to the full implementation of the 'six pack', the 'two pack' and the Fiscal Compact.

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital AE

AE. whereas the ~~ambition~~goal should be that all Member States jointly take steps ~~for~~towards stronger towards greater European integration; whereas decisions that only apply to the euro area might be needed where required or justified on the basis of the specificity of the euro area, not excluding opt-ins for other Member States;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital AO

AO. whereas ~~supervisory authorities in general should det~~it is part of the role of a supervisory authority to detect and correct problems at an early stage to prevent crises from occurring and maintaining financial stability;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital AY

AY. whereas the ~~independence of the~~ European single supervisory mechanism from political and industry influence does not exempt it from explaining, justifying and being accountable to the European Parliament, on a regular basis and whenever the situation requires, for the actions and decisions taken in the field of European supervision, given the impact that supervisory measures may have on public financesneeds to be accountable given the impact and importance of its measures; whereas to achieve the proper and desired political accountability, regular reporting must take place in the European Parliament, ban~~ks, employees and customer~~d whenever the situation requires;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BI

BI. whereas ex-ante planning, early intervention, speed, access to quality information and credibility are essential in managing bank crises;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BW

~~BW. whereas the trilogue negotiations on the so-called ‘two-pack’ regulations should soon lead to concrete political results; the Council should abandon its reluctance on the dossier;~~deleted

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BY a (new)

BYa. whereas the creation of a "European Debt Authority" responsible to coordinate all issues related with the annual debt issuance plan of the Member States, the renewal of their outstanding debt and the assessment of the sustainability of all Member States governments debt, as well as a annual publication of data related to Member States public debt, deficit and other macroeconomic indicators and a creditworthiness assessment could be an effective pre-emptive mechanism to avoid future sovereign debt crises;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BZ

BZ. whereas the common issuance of debt is in the longer run a corollary of EMU within a completely functional economic and monetary union and should not be regarded as an immediate response to the present crisis nor an immediate crisis resolution mechanism;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital BZ a (new)

BZ a. whereas an enhanced fiscal integration and budgetary discipline are a necessary precondition for the common issuance of debt with joint and several liabilities;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CA a (new)

CAa. whereas the feasibility of moving towards a system of 'European Safe Bonds' as proposed by 'Euro-nomics' should be envisaged as an immediate tool to reduce pressure on debt markets, without the need for a treaty change; whereas this option does not require joint and several liabilities;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CC

CC. whereas the European Semester ~~offers a good framework to coordinate economic policies implemented at national level in line with the country-specific recom~~is the valid framework for the effective economic and governance of the euro area Member States that are linked by a joint and common responsibility, bringing together the multilateral surveillance of budgetary and macroeconomic policies and the implemendtation~~s adopted by the Council~~ of the European Strategy for Growth and Jobs as embodied in the 'Europe 2020' Strategy;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CC a (new)

CCa. whereas the European Semester allows for the necessary ex ante coordination in the euro area context, via the exchange of draft budget plans and the previous discussion of all major economic policy reform plans, allowing the reduction and/or elimination of any possible spill-over effects that may arise from national actions on other countries or on the euro area as a whole;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CE

CE. whereas national economic policies must reflect the reality of ~~membership of EMU within a social market economy~~the interlinkage that arises from EMU membership;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CG

CG. whereas it is up to the Member States to always deliver ~~without delay on~~ the agreed reforms in their national reform programmes;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CG a (new)

CGa. whereas the current demand for public sector investment programmes should imply the need for European scrutiny of all programmes with direct impact in the euro area as a whole, using the European Semester tool; whereas such programs should only be agreed upon if they truly represent quality investment; if they are sound and sustainable and if they do not represent any increase in the national debt ratios;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CH

CH. whereas the instrument of enhanced cooperation should be used more frequently ~~in the field of taxation; whereas reference can be made to the European Parliament's position on the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) and the financial transactions tax (FTT)~~as stated by Commission President Barroso in his State of the Union speech;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CJ

CJ. whereas binding coordination at Union level ~~might be considered for certain key economic policy issues particularly relevant for~~is crucial in all areas, in particular for those focusing in growth and employment;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 8

DFrom democratic legitimacy and accountability to political union

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CM a (new)

CMa. whereas the single currency as a strong economic pillar is indispensable, therefore it should rest on an enhanced governance and a broader fiscal union to foster fiscal discipline and deeper integration in the internal market;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CM b (new)

CMb. whereas the European Parliament should become a fully fledged Parliament, like its peers; whereas political leaders and representatives of the Institutions, the agencies and other European bodies should be political accountable before the European Parliament; whereas regular reporting and annually presentations of their work and forecasts should be made before the European Parliament; whereas the European Parliament and national parliaments should reinforce their working tools and fill in the existing gap that still prevails between the national parliaments important cooperation;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CN a (new)

CNa. whereas a Consultative Committee should be created to play an advisory role to the President of the Commission; whereas such Consultative Committee should be composed of past Commission presidents and should give advice over general political directions and priorities for the European Union; whereas its meetings should convene preferably before the European Council meetings and its recommendations could me made public with the agreement of the President of the Commission;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CP

CP. whereas measures taken at Union level ~~are often~~to deal with the current crisis are sometimes perceived as being ‘"too little, too late’" due to the procedures arising from the democratic legislative process, the lack of a European institutional substructure or own Union resources to intervene directly to tackle a crisis situation;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CP a (new)

CPa. whereas the path to create a fully fledged European budget, with its own resources, should be envisaged; whereas such budget should act as counter-cyclical instrument and as a vehicle for a transfer union;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital CT

CT. whereas wherever new competences are transferred to or created at Union level or new Union institutions established, corresponding democratic control by, and accountability to, the European Parliament and the national parliaments should be ensured;

2012/09/26
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Diogo FEIO

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.1 – paragraph 9 a (new)

The ESM should recapitalise banks directly as soon as legislation on the SSM has been approved. A precise and clear calendar for finalising the banking union should be drawn up.

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Diogo FEIO

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.2 – paragraph 6 a (new)

Specify that a clear calendar for finalising the banking union should be drawn.

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2151(INI)

Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Diogo FEIO

Motion for a resolution
Annex – part 1 – point 1.3 – paragraph 6

That obligation should be a collective one in the case of Member States whose currency is the euro. A vehicle should be established or designated to provide reassurance that that collective obligation will be met and if required that vehicle needs to be able to intervene directly in institutions under recovery or resolution. That vehicle could be the ESM, as long as recourse to public intervention is activated only in exceptional cases.

2012/10/02
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

A a. Whereas the current economic situation has demonstrated that stronger coordination between Member States macroeconomic and budgetary policies is needed in order to achieve a more integrated and balanced economic union;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas the European Semester ~~was~~framework was finally codified in Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of 16 November 2011 (the Wortmann-Kool report) and; presents one of the main cornerstone's of the economic and governance package, essential to lead the Union in the following steps of the completion of the EMU;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. Whereas this is the first time that the European Semester is being fully implemented and the necessary lessons must be drawn in order to reach its full potential.

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the Commission's country- specific recommendations for the euro area; recalls that these is the first time, due to the implementation of the new economic and governance package, that those recommendations have a macroeconomic scenario of all the euro area and gained a new level of detail; believes that the recommendations haven't yet reached their full potential; expects these recommendations to form the basis of the Spring Council's recommendations;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Recalls that the European Semester is the valid framework for the effective economic and governance of the euro area Member States that are linked by a joint and common responsibility, bringing together the multilateral surveillance of budgetary and macroeconomic policies and the implementation of the European Strategy for Growth and Jobs as embodied in the EU2020 Strategy.

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Recalls that the European Semester allows for the necessary ex ante coordination in the euro area context, both via the ~~transmission~~exchange of draft budget plans and the previous discussion of all major economic policy reform plans, ~~in order to take into account~~allowing the reduction and/or elimination of, an~~d reduce,~~y possible spill-over effects that may arise from national actions on other countries or on the euro area as a whole;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. ~~Is confident that the measures proposed are conducive to sustainable public finances, increased competitiveness,~~Welcomes the measures that have been proposed and believes that those are the necessary steps to be undertaken to achieve sound and sustainable public finances, to minimize the macroeconomic imbalances and to boost competitiveness that will lead to higher growth and ~~improved~~ employment;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. ~~Note~~Supports the Commission's ~~insistence o~~efforts in conducting growth-enhancing structural reforms to allow the EU to get to grips with the crisis and regain its preeminent role in the world economy; Strongly supports the Commission's efforts to correct the macroeconomic imbalances within the euro area;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. ~~Notes that most of the structural reforms are concentrating on a small number of areas~~Welcomes and supports the areas where most of the structural reforms are taking place, such as labour markets, the taxation system, restructuring the banking sector, removing unjustified restrictions on regulated trades and professions, liberalising certain industries, improving the efficiency and quality of public expenditure, avoiding unnecessary layers of government, combating tax evasion, and reforming mortgage and real estate markets; acknowledges that there is still a long way to go and believes that the right foundations have been set and that room for improvement still exits.

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Reiterates that the Commission is in a unique position to develop a truly detailed European macroeconomic plan that can boost growth and jobs and; Urges the Commission to pursuit it utmost; Believes that in order to pursue such plan the Commission shall propose to use the European funds in the most smart and friendly way and shall look for ways to adapt them to the needs that the EU currently faces;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Welcomes the end of excessive deficit procedures for several Member States; ~~hop~~Believes that ~~more procedure~~the remaining Member States still in the procedure will be able to meet the targets can ~~be brought to an end in the near future~~d time frames set out for them; Urges all political leaders to pursuit such efforts and maintain their commitments';

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Acknowledges the very demanding efforts that have been requested to all European citizens in the recent years;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Lauds the economic dialogue held so far between Parliament and national representatives, ~~and wishes~~Recalls its importance to achieve a fully operating European Semester framework and to reach the necessary democratic accountability for all the involved players; Reiterates its commitment to conduct further dialogues;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Reiterates its call to take action to improve the stability of the financial system in the euro area; Recalls that such action is needed to regain stability worldwide since the Union is one of its decisive players; Urges all political leaders to take the necessary measures conductive to reach this goal;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2150(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Recalls that any decision of the Council not to follow the European Commission recommendations shall be dully explained and go along with a fully fledged explanatory statement;

2012/09/13
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. Whereas it is crucial to create and develop the necessary tools and lay the right conditions that will able the Union to boost growth in the eurozone and in the Union as whole;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas SMEs constitute the dominant category of business organisation in all EU countries with more than 23 million enterprises, representing 99.8% of the market, and their contribution to the EU-GDP is up to 60%;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)

Bb. whereas 85 % of all new jobs in the EU between 2002 and 2010 were created by SMEs, in particular by new firms; whereas 32.5 million people in the EU are self-employed;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Recalls that in the current economic situation and due to the severe impact it is having in the European banking system, due to its link with sovereign, alternative ways to access finance to SMEs needs to be found; Stresses that the current situation can prove itself ideal to create permanent alternative ways that could help breaking the link between SMEs financing and bank credit;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Stresses that the Commission should emphasize the important role that the stock market can play as a way for SMEs to obtain their financing requirements at different stages;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Recalls that stock markets designed specifically for SMEs are already in place, such as NYSE Alternext, a market designed to response to specific market and financing requirements in the Eurozone; Whereas this self-regulated market, in operation since 2005, has already allowed SMEs to raise their capital between 2,5 millions € and 15 millions €, which clearly demonstrates the impact and added value that the stock market can have as tool for the financing of SMEs;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)

7c. Whereas the stock market offers access to liquidity both for companies and investors and should be used by SMEs as a way to step up growth, facilitate the withdrawal of an investor or prepare for an inheritance or buyout;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 d (new)

7d. Stresses that beside being an alternative way for SMEs to access finance, due to the requirements and conditionality's of the stock markets, they have the added value of improving substantially the organization, management and reporting skills of this companies and by that contributing significantly to strengthen this category of business organisation;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)

23a. Calls on the Commission to develop ways of making tailor made SMEs stock markets more attractive both to institutional investors (such as hedge funds, investment funds, pension funds, insurance companies among others) and private investors; Whereas this could be achieved by introducing more friendly tax regimes for investors that would channel part of their investments for SMEs, or by fostering the use of SMEs specialized investments funds, for example in partnership with the EIB, or by supporting mechanisms through which a small group of SMEs, that are already in the stock market and that share the same kind of risk weight, could issue common bonds with medium and long maturity, increasing the attractiveness of this markets to all investors;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2134(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 b (new)

23b. Stresses that due to the vital role that SMEs play in the Unions' economy, it makes them the more potent contributors to economic growth and job creation in the upcoming years and for this reason; Calls on the Commission and Member States to act fast in creating the necessary space that the SMEs need to be able to properly finance themselves and drive the Unions' economy;

2012/10/19
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)

- having regard to the presentation by Vice-President Rehn in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 23 November 2011 and of the exchange of views with the German Council of Economic Experts on the European redemption fund on 29 November 2011,

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)

- having regard to the report by President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union",

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 c (new)

- having regard to the decision of the European Council of 30 June 2012 to explore ways of improving the economic and financial architecture of the eurozone

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas Parliament requested that the Commission submit a report on the ~~pos~~feasibility of introducing ~~euro~~stability bonds, which was an integral part of the agreement between Parliament and the Council on the economic governance package (six pack); ~~whereas the Green Paper, however, proposes neither crisis resolution measures nor ways in which the options presented could be implemented;~~

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas no federal state (including the U.S.A. and Germany) issue the equivalent of eurobonds such as foreseen in options 1 and 2 of the Green Book, something which elevates eurobonds to the level of a totally new concept, which cannot be compared with the tried and trusted U.S. treasury bonds and Bundesanleihen;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)

Bb. whereas the crisis has demonstrated not only the interdependence between eurozone Member States but also has made clear the need for a more robust fiscal union with effective mechanisms to correct unsustainable fiscal trajectories, macroeconomic imbalances, debt levels and the upper limits of budget balance of Member States;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)

Bc. whereas it is now recognized that the common issuance of debt is not an immediate response to the present crisis nor an immediate crisis resolution mechanism but just an instrument within a completely functional economic and monetary union to the reinforcement of financial stability and prevention of future sovereign debt crisis;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)

Bd. whereas the common issuance of debt with joint and several liabilities and an enhanced fiscal integration and budgetary discipline and control are two faces of the same coin;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Recital B e (new)

Be. whereas a substantial part of the national budgetary sovereignty should be transferred to the EU, making the participation on the common debt issuance system conditional on the respect of SGP rules - and on the acceptance of EU powers to requires changes to national budgets when in violation of fiscal rules - so to ensure compliance and prevent moral hazard;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. ~~Takes note of~~Welcomes the various crisis mitigation and resolution efforts of the European institutions, particularly the establishment of the EFSM, the EFSF, the SMP and the LTRO, and the latest agreement ons reached regarding the ESM and the "fiscal compact"; lauds these steps as a clear sign for solidarity within the euro area; reminds that three Member states outside the euro area have also receive help to overcome their sovereign debt crisis;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Welcomes the presentation of the Green Book, which fulfils a long standing requests of the European Parliament; Considers that the possible introduction of stability bonds would be an operation at par in importance with the introduction of the single currency;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Welcomes the decision of the European Council of 30 June 2012 to explore ways of improving the economic and financial architecture of the euro area; notes that great emphasis is put by the Council on avoiding moral hazard and achieving sound and sustainable public finances;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. Notes that the EFSM, the EFSF and the ESM are the most important firewalls designed so far by the EU; stresses that as a common bond system does not prevent individual country default, the role of the ESM regarding solvency issues shall not be disregarded and reiterates its vital importance to help ring-fencing such system;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 d (new)

1d. Stresses that fiscal consolidation and structural reforms throughout all Member States are necessary to restore fiscal credibility and are essential to achieve a sustainable balance of payments and sound and sustainable public finances. Restoring sound state finances and carrying out structural reforms should be a prerequisite for introducing a common debt issuance system;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Welcomes the fiscal consolidation and structural reform efforts undertaken by a number of Member States; acknowledges the difficult and demanding efforts that are being requested to the European citizens but reinforces the need for fiscal consolidation; welcomes that two Member states saw their excessive deficit procedure ended this year;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Believes that growth is only possible with sound fiscal policies and therefore, and due to the deepen inter-dependence between Member States and the spill-over effects of macroeconomic policies, even those Member States out of assistance programmes should improve their consolidation efforts and structural reform programmes in order to foster competitiveness, growth and employment;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Is deeply concerned, however, that ~~despite Member States‘ reform and consolidation efforts euro area sovereign bond markets are in distr~~the markets have not acknowledged the considerable efforts towards reforms and consolidation in some Member statess, which is reflected in widening spreads and high interest rate volatility;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Believes that there is an urgent need to further discuss a longer-term vision for the euro area which ensures sound public finances, sustainable growth and high levels of employment, preventing moral hazard and supporting convergence which is only possible with a qualitative move towards a fiscal union;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Notes that an integrated budgetary framework is essential to ensure sound fiscal policy, encompassing coordination, joint decision-making, greater enforcement and commensurate steps towards common debt issuance (including short-term funding instruments on a limited and conditional basis, or gradual roll-over into a redemption fund);

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Stresses that all existing and future instruments or institutions which are sensu stricto or sensu lato part of the economic governance framework of the Union need to be democratically legitimised as well as rooted on a firm legal base and made accountable by involving the parliaments of the Member States and the European Parliament in the setting-up and running of these instruments or institutions;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Believes that the prospect of common bonds can foster stability in the euro area and be an additional element to incentivise compliance with the stability and growth pact~~Reiterates its position that as a necessary precondition for common issuance bonds, a sustainable fiscal framework needs to be in place, aimed at both enhanced economic governance, fiscal discipline and SGP compliance; reiterates its position that sequencing is a key issue involving a ~~binding roadmap, included in the annex,~~roadmap similar to the Maastricht criteria for introducing the single currency; asks for further clarification on the Commission's suggestion to make the common debt issuance conditional, e.g. on the respect of the Stability and Growth Pact;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Reminds that even under a common bond issuance scheme every Member state is obliged to pay back the entirety of its debt; reminds that common bond issuance are no guarantee against a Member state defaulting on its debt;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Urges to only consider commonly issued bonds that insure strict seniority status to the holders of these bonds in order to protect the EU taxpayers;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)

7c. Notes that most proposals for eurobonds include ways to reduce the access to the bonds for Member states whose budgetary positions spin out of control; urges therefore to maintain mechanisms that are able to help those Member states which are experiencing difficulties in form of a liquidity crisis (as opposed to a solvability crisis) and that are excluded from the common issuance of bonds; believes that the ESM should be maintained for that purpose; urges to make the ESM subject to the Community method;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 d (new)

7d. Is aware of the fact that eurobonds can lead to a transfer union in two ways: through the subsidizing of interest rates in normal times, and in the case a Member state defaults on its debt which demands the establishment of a full functional fiscal union;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 e (new)

7e. Asks the Commission to further elaborate on the criteria of allocation of the loans to the Member states, as the Green Book's only states that this would be done 'according to their needs'; insists that the capacity to service the debt should be one of the central allocation criteria;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 f (new)

7f. Understands that the Commission deems the upper limit of 60% in the blue bond proposals to be too high to insure the stability of the system and asks for further clarification concerning that limit;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 g (new)

7g. Believes that it is essential to establish a roadmap in a two-phase approach: in a short-run exit the current crisis and in a long-run to move towards a fiscal union by completing, strengthening and deepening the economic and monetary union;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Urges Member States to s~~eriously consider~~tudy the option of ~~immediately~~ establishing a temporary European Redemption Fund in order to allow participating countries to reduce excessive debt over a maximum period of 25 years ~~by using the interest rate savings for debt reduction~~;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Urges Member States to ~~seriously~~ consider the ~~immediate~~ issuance of common short-term debt in the form of eurobills to protect those Member States with fundamentally sustainable fiscal polices from illiquidity runs and the negative feedback loop between sovereign and banking crises;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Urges Member States to study the feasibility of moving towards a system of European Safe Bonds as proposed by Euro-nomics;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Calls on the Commission to ~~prepare contingency plans allowing a rapid implementation of these schemes~~engage in clarifying the legal restraints to the common issuance of bonds, especially Article 125 TFEU and its implication for three possible issuing modes, which are joint liability, several liability, as well as joint and several liability; Urges the Commission to analyse the possible use of article 352/1 of the TFEU or any other legal basis for the implementation of a partial common debt issuance solution without a necessary Treaty change;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that, in parallel, there is an urgent need to recapitalise the European banking sector and to further complete financial integration in the EU; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals for a Banking Union with a single financial supervisory authority to oversee systemic financial institutions with pre-emptive intervention powers, a banking resolution regime including a recapitalisation fund and an EU-wide common deposit guarantee scheme;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Believes that the ~~issuance of common bonds~~common debt issuance under separate liability, similar to the EFSF bond, risks not being sufficiently attractive for investors and that the roadmap should therefore include a system, which does not require any Treaty change, for the allocation of debt below 60 % of GDP to be issued under joint and several liabilities (blue-bond/red-bond proposal)if some Member states participating in the scheme still lack sustainable finances;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

12a. Notes that three scenarios might have to be chosen from: first, a single interest rate for all participating Member states, resulting in a transfer of wealth between countries, second, a differentiated interest rate, and third, a single rate associated to a compensation scheme such as floated by the Commission, where Member states with lower ratings financially compensate those with better ratings;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)

12b. Asks the Commission to elaborate more its option to establish a system of differentiation of the interest rates between Member states with divergent ratings, especially to clarify how and by whom these ratings are established once market mechanisms were neutralized by the introduction of common bonds;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 c (new)

12c. Shares the view expressed by the Commission in its Green Paper that the stability of a eurobond system cannot rely solely on the shoulders of a small number of Member states with sustainable finances, and that such system demands a strengthened fiscal union and stronger budgetary discipline and control to prevent moral hazard;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Believes that if ~~the blue-bond/red- bond system proves to be beneficial to the euro area as a whole, a further step, requiring~~a system of mutualisation of debt is deemed possible and well interwoven in a stability oriented framework, a Treaty change, should be envisaged, which iscould result in the issuance of bonds under joint and several liability;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

13a. Believes that a system of partial substitution of national issuance (such as the blue/red bonds) might reduce the cost of borrowing for those Member States that have sound and sustainable public finances on the one hand, and might create an incentive for those with excessive debt to reduce it on the other, as the risk associated with red bonds would be higher and interest rates would increase;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Advocates, following the implementation of short-term measures to exit the crisis, the setting-up of a committee inspired by the Delors Committee of 1988, including representatives from Member States, the ~~Commission and the ECB~~President of the Commission, the President of the European Council, the President of the ECB and the President of the Eurogroup; believes that this committee should evaluate progress and make recommendations for further steps with regard to post-crisis phases, to be discussed in Parliament; takes the view that this committee should also look at the longer term possibility of issuing genuine federal bonds destined to feed the European budget;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)

14a. Strengthens that the Commission should study the feasibility of each and all of the options presented in the Annex (both phase 1 and phase 2), which are not necessarily alternative but can be, under certain circumstances, cumulative and concurrent;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE, Marianne THYSSEN

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)

14b. Is aware that an ever increasing number of proposals for the mutualisation of debt are being made, especially in the academic field; notes that these proposals vary considerably; outlines a chosen number of possible options in the annex;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Title

~~The Roadmap~~Possible options for the mutualisation of debt

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Title

Phase 1 - ~~Immediate measures to exit the~~Short term measure in view of the present sovereign debt crisis

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 1 - Subtitle 1

Option 1. Setting up of a temporary European redemption fund to reduce debt to sustainable levels at affordable interest rates

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 1 - Paragraph 1

The Commission ~~makes a proposal for the immediate~~shall study and report its conclusions to the European Parliament on the possibility of setting up of a temporary European redemption fund along the following principles:

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 1 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 1

- transfer of debt amounts above the Maastricht reference value of 60 % of GDP to a common fund ~~subject to joint and several liabil~~through a roll-in phase of five years; such transference should be phased and start wityh th~~rough a roll-in phase of five years~~e transfer of only 10% of the debt above the Maastricht threshold of 60% of the GDP; subsequent transfers should be gradual;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 1 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 2

- limit participation to Member States without an adjustment programme; ~~provide for a phas~~Countries with adjustment program can joing i~~n of Member States that hav~~mmediately but their debts can only be transferred, following a phase-in plan after the successfully complet~~ed an~~ion of the adjustment programme;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 1 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 3

- oblige Member States to autonomously redeem the transferred debt over a period of maximum 25 years ~~by using the interest rate savings for debt redemption~~, which could be shorter if the growth rate is higher than foreseen;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 1 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 3 a (new)

- apply strict conditions such as (i) depositing collaterals; (ii) commit to fiscal consolidations plans and structural reforms;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 1 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 4

- implement the national debt brakes introduced in the fiscal compact to limit the debts that remain exclusively with the participating Member States at a maximum of 60 % of GDP starting in the year the redemption fund is established and oblige Member States to cover their liabilities by risk-free collateral;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 1 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 5 a (new)

- provide for transparent and predictable exit procedures for Member States. Staying should be incentivised and therefore exit should be costly; failure to honour commitments during the roll-in phase should immediately stop the roll-in phase and failure to honour commitments at any time should forfeit the collateral deposited with the Fund.

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Subtitle 2

2.Option 2: Introducing eurobills to protect Member States from illiquidity runs

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Paragraph 1

The Commission ~~makes a proposal for the immediate~~shall study and report its conclusions to the European Parliament on the possibility of setting up of a system for the issuance of common short-term debt along the following principles:

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 1

- establish an ~~agenc~~entity or use an already existing ~~entity~~one to issue eurobills ~~and limit~~with the participation ~~to Member States that comply with the rules as set-out in the Stability and Growth Pact~~of all eurozone Member States without an adjustment programme; provide for a phasing in of Member States that have successfully completed their adjustment programmes;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 1 a (new)

- those Member States that do not comply with the rules set-out in the Stability and Growth Pact might pay a penalty interest rate;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 1 b (new)

- Member States might be asked to pay a premium over eurobills rates related to their deficit and debt figures;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 1 c (new)

- total eurobill issuance can not exceed 10% of country GDP;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 2

- maximum maturity of eurobills ~~(amounting to maximum 10% of GDP)~~ of up to one year, which allows for continued monitoring and due to short term maturity frequent renewal of guarantees;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 3

- eurobills replace all short-term debt to be issued by Member States which consequently remain solely responsible for issuing their own debt for longer maturities which should be monitored and limited according to each country needs, fiscal situation and debt ratio;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 4

- provide for ~~dismissible participation by a decision of the national parliament~~transparent and predictable exit procedures for Member States. Staying should be incentivised and therefore exit should be costly;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2a - Subtitle 2 a (new)

Option 3. Introducing European Safe Bonds:

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2a - Paragraph 1 a (new)

The Commission shall study and report its conclusions to the European Parliament on the possibility of setting up of a system for the issuance of European Safe Bonds along the following principles:

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2a - Paragraph 1 b (new)

- establish an entity or use an already existing one ("Entity") to buy, on secondary markets, existing sovereign bonds of the eurozone Member States without an adjustment programme on a fixed weight and up to 60% of each country's GDP; provide for a phasing in of Member States that have successfully completed their adjustment programmes;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2a - Paragraph 1 c (new)

- sovereign bonds will then be used as collateral to the issuing of two securities: (i) European Safe Bonds that would grant the right to a senior claim to the payments from the bonds held in portfolio; (ii) European Junior Bonds, composed by the junior tranche on the portfolio of bonds, sold to investors in the market. The risks of losses on this junior bonds would be absorbed by holders of these securities and not by the Entity nor the EU or its Member States;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2a - Paragraph 1 d (new)

- the weight of each eurozone country should be fixed and should correspond to their % on the total eurozone GDP; such weights cannot be discretionarily changed to respond to any special and unforeseeable circumstances and cannot be permeable to political interference;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2a - Paragraph 1 e (new)

- European safe bonds would be issued by the Entity being composed of the senior tranche on a portfolio of sovereign bonds of different eurozone Member States and would be very close to a risk free security;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2a - Paragraph 1 f (new)

- potential further guarantees should be required;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 1 - Point 2a - Paragraph 1 g (new)

- the move to the European Safe Bonds should the gradual and the limits of target-issuing should start at lower levels than the maximum threshold of 60% of the eurozone GDP; Additional capital guarantees might be needed;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 2 - Title

Phase 2 ~~Blue bond proposal: yearly allocated debt ≤ 60 % of GDP to be issued in common without a Treaty change~~Long term solutions in order to complete the EMU

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 2 - Paragraph 1 a (new)

Progress to phase 2 shall be conditional to the establishment of an enhanced fiscal integration and budgetary discipline and control with effective mechanisms to prevent and correct unsustainable fiscal policies.

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 2 - Paragraph 1 b (new)

A substantial part of the national budgetary sovereignty should therefore be transferred to the EU, making the participation on the common debt issuance system conditional on the respect of SGP rules - and on the acceptance of EU powers to require changes to national budgets when in violation of fiscal rules - so to ensure compliance and prevent moral hazard. Such a progress would ultimately lead to the establishment of a euro area fiscal body equivalent to a treasury office.

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 2 - Paragraph 1 c (new)

Option 1 Common issuance of national debt involving a Treaty change

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 2 - Paragraph 2

The Commission ~~puts forward proposals for the~~shall study and report its conclusions to the European Parliament on the possibility of setting up of a system for the allocation of debt below 60 % of GDP to be issued in common, which is safeguarded by national debt brakes according to principles such as:

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 2 - Paragraph 2 - Subparagraph 2

- strictly limit the amount of debt to be issued ~~under joint and several liabilities to a part of less than 60 % of GDP by prohibiting participating Member States from issuing senior debt outside the common issuance~~to a part of less than 60 % of GDP, possibly even at an upper level that is lower than 60%;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 3 - Title

~~Phase 3 Common issuance of national debt involving a Treaty change~~deleted

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 3 - Paragraph 1

On the basis of the work of the committee, the Commission puts forward, if appropriate, proposals for a Treaty change (and where necessary, Member States’ constitutional changes) and the setting up of a system for the common issuance of bonds according to the following principles:deleted

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 3 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 1

~~- limit participation to Member States which comply with the conditions as set out in phase 2;~~deleted

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Mario MAURO, Alfredo PALLONE

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 3 - Paragraph 1 - Subparagraph 2

- establish a European debt agency for the issuance of bonds~~, or confer this task to the ESM~~;

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 4 - Title

~~Phase 4 -~~Option 2: Common issuance of a genuine European debt to feed the EU budget

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/2028(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex - Phase 4 - Paragraph 1

The Commission, after having prepared all eventual changes to the EU legal framework, puts forward proposals for possible issuance of bonds to finance EU investments for EU public goods (e.g. infrastructure, research and development, etc.) as well as serving as an instrument to facilitate fiscal adjustment in response to external shocks when cross-border effects are at playmake up for the difference between own resources and expenditures.

2012/07/12
Committee: ECON

2012/0309(COD)

Mário DAVID, Antonio CANCIAN, Timothy KIRKHOPE, Timothy Charles Ayrton TANNOCK, Krzysztof LISEK, Roberta METSOLA, Tunne KELAM, Georgios PAPANIKOLAOU, Paulo RANGEL, Niccolò RINALDI, Antonyia PARVANOVA, Ismail ERTUG, Nuno TEIXEIRA, Nirj DEVA, Salvador SEDÓ i ALABART, Arnaud DANJEAN, Adrian SEVERIN, Ivo VAJGL, Filip KACZMAREK, Elena Oana ANTONESCU, Monica MACOVEI, Dimitrios DROUTSAS, David CASA, Antonio LÓPEZ-ISTÚRIZ WHITE, Emilio MENÉNDEZ del VALLE, Anne DELVAUX, Paul RÜBIG, Inese VAIDERE, Agustín DÍAZ DE MERA GARCÍA CONSUEGRA, Andrey KOVATCHEV, Eduard KUKAN, Kristiina OJULAND, Paweł Robert KOWAL, Ioan Mircea PAŞCU, Cristian Dan PREDA, Seán KELLY, Antigoni PAPADOPOULOU, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU, Kinga GÁL, Alejo VIDAL-QUADRAS, Burkhard BALZ, Oldřich VLASÁK, Ramona Nicole MĂNESCU, Davor Ivo STIER, Norica NICOLAI, José Manuel FERNANDES, Hans-Peter MAYER, Anna IBRISAGIC, Petru Constantin LUHAN, Svetoslav Hristov MALINOV, Bogusław SONIK, Jacek PROTASIEWICZ, Tiziano MOTTI, Kyriacos TRIANTAPHYLLIDES, Bogusław LIBERADZKI, José Ignacio SALAFRANCA SÁNCHEZ-NEYRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) Exemption from the visa requirement for nationals of Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu should not come into force until bilateral agreements on visa waiver between the Union and the countries concerned have been concluded in order to ensure full reciprocity.

2013/07/12
Committee: LIBE

2012/0309(COD)

Mário DAVID, Antonio CANCIAN, Timothy KIRKHOPE, Timothy Charles Ayrton TANNOCK, Krzysztof LISEK, Roberta METSOLA, Tunne KELAM, Georgios PAPANIKOLAOU, Paulo RANGEL, Niccolò RINALDI, Antonyia PARVANOVA, Ismail ERTUG, Nuno TEIXEIRA, Nirj DEVA, Salvador SEDÓ i ALABART, Arnaud DANJEAN, Adrian SEVERIN, Ivo VAJGL, Filip KACZMAREK, Elena Oana ANTONESCU, Monica MACOVEI, Dimitrios DROUTSAS, David CASA, Antonio LÓPEZ-ISTÚRIZ WHITE, Emilio MENÉNDEZ del VALLE, Anne DELVAUX, Paul RÜBIG, Inese VAIDERE, Agustín DÍAZ DE MERA GARCÍA CONSUEGRA, Andrey KOVATCHEV, Eduard KUKAN, Kristiina OJULAND, Paweł Robert KOWAL, Ioan Mircea PAŞCU, Cristian Dan PREDA, Seán KELLY, Antigoni PAPADOPOULOU, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU, Kinga GÁL, Alejo VIDAL-QUADRAS, Burkhard BALZ, Oldřich VLASÁK, Ramona Nicole MĂNESCU, Davor Ivo STIER, Norica NICOLAI, José Manuel FERNANDES, Hans-Peter MAYER, Anna IBRISAGIC, Petru Constantin LUHAN, Svetoslav Hristov MALINOV, Jacek PROTASIEWICZ, Tiziano MOTTI, Kyriacos TRIANTAPHYLLIDES, Bogusław LIBERADZKI, José Ignacio SALAFRANCA SÁNCHEZ-NEYRA, Diogo FEIO, Bogusław SONIK

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 1 – point a

(a) in point 1, the references to Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu are deleted and a reference to South-Sudan is inserted;

2013/07/12
Committee: LIBE

2012/0309(COD)

Mário DAVID, Antonio CANCIAN, Timothy KIRKHOPE, Timothy Charles Ayrton TANNOCK, Krzysztof LISEK, Roberta METSOLA, Tunne KELAM, Georgios PAPANIKOLAOU, Paulo RANGEL, Niccolò RINALDI, Antonyia PARVANOVA, Ismail ERTUG, Nuno TEIXEIRA, Nirj DEVA, Salvador SEDÓ i ALABART, Arnaud DANJEAN, Adrian SEVERIN, Ivo VAJGL, Filip KACZMAREK, Elena Oana ANTONESCU, Monica MACOVEI, Dimitrios DROUTSAS, David CASA, Antonio LÓPEZ-ISTÚRIZ WHITE, Emilio MENÉNDEZ del VALLE, Anne DELVAUX, Paul RÜBIG, Inese VAIDERE, Agustín DÍAZ DE MERA GARCÍA CONSUEGRA, Andrey KOVATCHEV, Eduard KUKAN, Kristiina OJULAND, Paweł Robert KOWAL, Ioan Mircea PAŞCU, Cristian Dan PREDA, Seán KELLY, Antigoni PAPADOPOULOU, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU, Kinga GÁL, Alejo VIDAL-QUADRAS, Burkhard BALZ, Oldřich VLASÁK, Ramona Nicole MĂNESCU, Davor Ivo STIER, Norica NICOLAI, José Manuel FERNANDES, Hans-Peter MAYER, Anna IBRISAGIC, Petru Constantin LUHAN, Svetoslav Hristov MALINOV, Bogusław SONIK, Jacek PROTASIEWICZ, Tiziano MOTTI, Kyriacos TRIANTAPHYLLIDES, Bogusław LIBERADZKI, José Ignacio SALAFRANCA SÁNCHEZ-NEYRA, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 2 – point a – two last references

"Tuvalu*", "United Arab Emirates*" and "Vanuatu*"

2013/07/12
Committee: LIBE

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 13

(13) The current lack of transparency of the selection procedures and qualification criteria for board positions in most Member States represents a significant barrier to more gender diversity among board members and negatively affects both the board candidates' careers and freedom of movement, as well as investor decisions. Such lack of transparency prevents potential candidates for board positions from applying to boards where their qualifications would be most required and from challenging gender- biased appointment decisions, thus restricting their freedom of movement within the internal market. On the other hand, investors have different investment strategies that require information linked also to the expertise and competence of the board members. More transparency in the qualification criteria and the selection procedure for board members enables investors to better assess the company's business strategy and to take informed decisions.deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 15 a (new)

(15a) The EU institutions, agencies and in particular the ECB should lead by example concerning gender balance. Stringent rules on internal and external recruitment to all EU-institutions and agencies should be implemented in order to ensure fair treatment between women and men and to improve the gender balance among leading positions.

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 16

(16) The Union should therefore aim to increase the presence of women on company boards, in order both to boost economic growth and the competitiveness of European companies and to achieve effective gender equality on the labour market. This aim should be pursued through minimum requirements on positive action in the form of binding measures aiming at attaining a quantitative objective for the gender composition of boards of listed companies, in the view of the fact that Member States and other countries which have chosen this or a similar method have achieved the best results in reducing the under-representation of women in economic decision-making positions.deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 21 a (new)

(21a) Setting binding targets for gender balance in corporate boards of listed companies would seriously infringe on shareholders rights to freely choose their representatives. Consequently, companies' individual commitments and initiatives are preferable in the attempt to improve the gender balance among board positions.

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 21 b (new)

(21b) Keeping in mind that individual commitment of companies is the only way to change attitudes and practices toward women and men in a more comprehensive manner within companies. It also allows for companies to take action more broadly than merely among non-executive directors. Therefore it is necessary that all companies have a Gender policy in place.

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 29

(29) Where an unsuccessful candidate of the under-represented sex establishes the presumption they were equally qualified as the appointed candidate of the other sex, the listed company should be required to demonstrate the correctness of the choice.deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that listed companies in whose board's members of the under-represented sex hold less than 40 per cent of the non-executive director positions make the appointments to those positions on the basis of a comparative analysis of the qualifications of each candidate, by applying pre-established, clear, neutrally formulated and unambiguous criteria, in order to attain the said percentage at the latestundertake individual commitments in the form of individual targets or gender policies, in order to significantly improve the gender balance by 1 January 2020 ~~or at the latest by 1 January 2018 in c~~. The individual commitments shall be realistic but ambitious and based o~~f listed companies whi~~n company and branch ch ar~~e public undertaking~~acteristics.

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0299(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 2

~~2. The number of non-executive director positions necessary to meet the objective laid down in paragraph 1 shall be the number closest to the proportion of 40 per cent, but not exceeding 49 per cent.~~deleted

2013/05/13
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common understanding of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the Union. In order to preserve and increase the positive effects of market integration on growth and welfare, integration of supervisory responsibilities, through the definition of common principles and policies (methods, processes, practices and standards), should therefore be enhanced.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework. . In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the banking union should apply at least ~~to all Euro area Member State~~, in the setting up phase, to Euro area Member States only, in order to assure that the supervisory mechanism model is the most adequate and can be used by all the Union's Members. With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market, and ~~to the extent that this is~~following the set up of an institutionally ~~possible~~viable solution, the banking union should also be open later on to the participation of other Member States.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent, integrated, articulated and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that ~~those~~all its credit institutions are equally subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations. In particular, the single supervisory mechanism should be consistent with the functioning of the internal market for financial services and with the free movement of capital. A single supervisory mechanism is the basis for the next steps towards the banking union. This reflects the principle that any introduction of common intervention mechanisms in case of crises should be preceded by common controls to reduce the likelihood that intervention mechanisms will have to be used.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)

(10 a) The implementation of a single rule book for financial services should be concluded as soon as possible, while the common deposit insurance and resolution framework in the Euro area should follow soon after the setting up of the single supervisory mechanism, and with a specified deadline, as they respectively the second and third fundamental pillars, of a true European banking union.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 b (new)

(10 b) The single supervisory mechanism should provide for a single and indivisible common supervisory framework and rule book, applicable equally to all Credit Institutions, independently of their nature, dimension, complexity or interconnectedness. The single supervisory mechanism should be applied in a way that does not allow for any kind of segmentation, qualification or discrimination whatsoever among credit institutions in terms of quality and strictness of prudential supervision.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive and widely recognized expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerningwith access to multiple information resources and having maintained its credibility maintained through the recent crisis, the ECB is well placed to setting up the common supervisory framework and rule book with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Specific responsibilities should therefore be conferred on the ECB concerning the definition of principles and policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions within the Euro area.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11 a (new)

(11 a) Such definition of principles and policies (methods, processes, practices and standards) falls under the exclusive competence of the ECB and it could never be delegated since it confers on it the role of guardian of prudential supervision's quality, consistency and uniformity.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) The ECB should be conferred all those specific supervisory ~~task~~responsibilities which are crucial to ensure a coherent, integrated, articulated and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other ~~task~~responsibilities should remain with national authorities. The ECB's ~~task~~responsibilities should include ~~measures taken in~~the pursuance of macro-prudential stability.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise its supervisory ~~tasks in relation~~responsibilities in relation, and in an equal manner, to all banks of participating Member States.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)

(13 a) The ECB may, under its full discretion, delegate to national competent authorities the execution of some tasks concerning prudential supervision while, at the same time, maintaining full responsibility for coordination, monitoring and control of national competent authorities.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 b (new)

(13 b) In case of delegation of any tasks concerning prudential supervision, national competent authorities could be empowered to take decisions relating to the execution of those tasks although within the common supervisory framework and rule book established by the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 c (new)

(13 c) As a result of this delegation, national competent authorities should be accountable to the ECB. As part of their duties under the common supervisory framework and rule book, national competent authorities should submit regular reports to the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 d (new)

(13 d) The ECB should monitor and control national competent authorities under the common supervisory framework and rule book on an ongoing basis, making use of the powers referred to in this Regulation as well as of any powers arising out of the normal management process of delegation, such as the power to conduct audits and peer reviews of national competent authorities.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 e (new)

(13 e) In addition to ongoing reporting, national competent authorities should inform the ECB without delay of any serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution, where the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of that credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 f (new)

(13 f) The ECB may, at any moment, decide to take over the direct supervision of any credit institution in a participating Member State, in particular when the national competent authorities fail to perform their duties under this Regulation or when there is evidence that the credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, is about to pose a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or to the stability of the financial system, or to exacerbate a pre- existing threat.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 g (new)

(13 g) The Colleges of Supervision, under the exclusive guidance and control of the ECB, should continue to exist for credit institutions with cross-border activity, for purposes of regular supervision and most particularly for purposes of dealing with a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or stability of the financial system.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 h (new)

(13 h) Whenever a competent national authority believes that a major supervisory decision from the ECB might have been disproportionate in its impact and involves serious danger for the national economy and/or financial system of the corresponding Member State, the competent national authorities shall warn and have the right to appeal.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should ~~therefore have~~be responsible for the task tof authoriseing credit institutions and ~~should be responsible for the~~ withdraw~~al of~~ing authorisations.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) In addition to the conditions set out in Union l~~egislative acts~~aw for authorisation of credit institutions and the cases for withdrawal of such authorisations, Member States ~~may~~are currently able to provide for further conditions for authorisation and cases for withdrawal of authorisation. The ECB should therefore carry out its task to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw the authorisation in case of non- compliance with national law upon a proposal by the relevant national competent authority, which assesses compliance with the relevant conditions set out by national law.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) Supervisory ~~task~~responsibilities not conferred on the ECB should remain with national authorities. Those tasks should include the power to receive notifications from credit institutions in relation to the right of establishment and the free provision of services, to supervise bodies which are not covered by the definition of credit institutions under Union law but which are supervised as credit institutions under national law, to supervise credit institutions from third countries establishing a branch or providing cross- border services in the Union, to supervise payments services, to carry out day-to-day verifications of credit institutions, to carry out the function of competent authorities over credit institutions in relation to markets in financial instruments and the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) The ECB should carry out the ~~task~~responsibilities conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system of the Union and the unity and integrity of the Internal Market, thereby ensuring also the protection of depositors and improving the functioning of the Internal Market, in accordance with the single rulebook for financial services in the Union.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice-Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB should be able to delegate certain clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions to the supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council, which can give instructions and directions to that body. ~~The supervisory board may be supported by a steering committee with a more limited composition.~~

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44

(44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible~~. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate~~, accordingly to a phasing- in p~~eriod should be provided for. The number of banks subject to the supervision of the ECB should increase progressively,~~lan which tak~~ing~~es into account the relevance of the supervision of those banks to ensure financial stability. As a first step the ECB should be able to apply its supervisory tasks to any banks, in particular to banks which have received or requested public financial assistance. As a second step, banks of European systemic importance as reflected in their total exposures and their cross- jurisdictional activities should be covered. Total exposures should be calculated in light of the methodologies defined in the Basel III accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisors on the calculation of the leverage ratio and on the definition of common equity tier 1 capital. The phasing-in process should be completed within one year from the entry into force of this Regulation at the latestamount of preparation required to set up a common supervisory framework and rule book, as well as for the supervisory tasks.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1

This Regulation confers on the ECB specific ~~tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to~~responsibilities concerning the definition and implementation of supervisory principles and policies (methods, processes, practices and standards) relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to: - develop a single common supervisory framework and rule book applicable equally to all Credit Institutions, independently of their nature, dimension, complexity or interconnectedness; - promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market, allowing for no segmentation, qualification or discrimination among credit institutions in terms of quality and strictness of prudential supervision.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – title

Cooperation and responsibilities

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 a (new)

Article 3a Exclusive responsibilities conferred on the ECB The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively: - competent to develop a one and indivisible common supervisory framework and rule book, on the basis of principles and policies applicable to all credit institutions equally while ensuring a coherent, integrated, articulated and effective implementation of the Union's prudential supervision policy; - responsible for the coordination, monitoring and control of national competent authorities; - responsible to pursue macro-prudential stability; - responsible to coordinate and express a common position of representatives from competent authorities of the participating Member States when participating in the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board of the European Banking Authority, for issues relating to the responsibilities conferred on the ECB by this Regulation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – title

Tasks conferred ton the ECB

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law~~, be exclusively~~ and with its internal regulation, be competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States, in a equal manner:

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point j

(j) To participate in supplementary supervision of a financial conglomerate in relation to the credit institutions included in it and assume the ~~tasks~~responsibility of a coordinator where the ECB is appointed as the coordinator for a financial conglomerate in accordance with the criteria set out relevant Union law;

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 4

4. This regulation is without prejudice to the responsibilities and related powers of the competent authorities of the participating Member States to carry out supervisory ~~task~~responsibilities not referred to in this Regulation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. The ECB shall ~~carry out~~pursue its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB and national competent authorities.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The ECB may, under its internal regulation, delegate on national competent authorities some of the tasks set out in Article 4(1) concerning prudential supervision.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2

2. National competent authorities shall assist the ECB on its request with the preparation and implementation of any acts ~~relating to the tasks referred to~~falling under its competence, and execute at national level the delegated powers referred to by its internal regulation as mentioned in Article 4(1).

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3

3. The ECB shall organise, according to its internal regulation, the practical modalities of implementation of paragraph 2 by the national supervisory authorities in discharging its tasks~~. It shall clearly define the framework and conditions under which national competent authorities shall carry out those activities~~, while at the same time, maintaining full responsibility for coordination, monitoring and control of national competent authorities. National competent authorities shall carry out those tasks within the context of the common supervisory framework and rule book. The national competent authorities of all participating Member States shall be treated on an equal footing.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4

4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by and be accountable to the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 a (new)

Article 5 a Monitoring and right of intervention 1. The ECB shall monitor and control national competent authorities under the common supervisory framework and rule book on an ongoing basis, making use of the powers referred to in this Regulation as well as of any powers arising out of the normal management process of delegation, such as the power to conduct audits and peer reviews of national competent authorities. 2. National competent authorities shall inform the ECB without delay in the following cases: (a) where there are serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution, where the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of that credit institution; (b) where the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of that credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions. 3. The ECB may, at any moment, decide to take over the direct supervision of any credit institution in a participating Member State in the following cases: (a) where the national competent authorities fail to perform their duties under this Regulation; (b) where there is evidence that the credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, is about to pose a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or to the stability of the financial system, or to exacerbate a pre- existing threat; 4. The decision to which paragraph 3 refers shall be notified to the national competent authority and to the credit institution concerned. 5. When the ECB takes a major supervisory decision with a disproportionate impact and which may seriously endanger the national economy and/or financial stability of a Euro area Member State, the respective competent national authority shall warn and have the right to appeal against such decision.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph -1 (new)

-1. The existence of Colleges of Supervision, under the exclusive guidance and control of the ECB, shall continue to exist for credit institutions with cross- border activity, for the purposes of regular supervision and most particularly for the purposes of dealing with a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or stability of the financial system.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1

1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under Union law, the ECB may impose administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined, or up to 105% of the total annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business year. The sanctions shall be apply using the principle of proportionality and they shall guarantee that the institution is not placed in a scenario that might threaten its stability.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The upper limit of the administrative pecuniary sanctions applied to an institution, in a one year period, is of up to 5% of the annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business year.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 6

6. The ECB shall publish any sanction referred to paragraph 1 without undue delay including information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of persons responsible for it, unless such publication would seriously jeopardise the stability of the financial markets. ~~Where publication would cause a disproportionate damage to the parties involved, the ECB shall publish the sanction on an anonymous basis.~~

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. A credit institutions, financial holding company, or mixed financial holding company shall have the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice when it considers that the pecuniary sanction applied to it is disproportionate and likely to affect its sustainability.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1

1. The ~~planning and execution of the~~Governing Council is the ultimate responsible for the development and implementation of a common supervisory framework and rule book as well as for the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB~~, shall be undertaken by~~. The Governing Council may delegate the responsibilities and tasks under Article 4 and paragraph 1 of Article 4a, on an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State (hereinafter ‘"supervisory board’").

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3

3. The Governing Council of the ECB may delegate clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions regarding individual or a set of identifiable credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies to the supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council.deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4

~~4. The supervisory board may appoint from among its members a steering committee with a more limited composition which supports its activities, including preparing the meetings.~~deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7

7. The Governing Council, in accordance with its rules of procedure and voting mechanism shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board including rules on the term of office of the Chair and the Vice-Chair. Each Member of the Supervisory Board shall have one vote. The term of office shall not exceed five years and shall not be renewable.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1

1. The ECB shall levy fees on credit institutions which shall ~~cover expenditures relating to its tasks, and not exceed those expenditures~~be proportionate and which shall not amount to a duplication of fees paid to the national supervisor and to the ECB.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 1

1. From the 1st of Julanuary 2013, the ECB shall carry out the supervisory tasks conferred on it also in relation to the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, based on their size as reflected in, the sum of exposure values of all assets and off-balance sheet liabilities not deducted when determining the common equity tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes, and their cross- border activity as reflected in cross- jurisdictional claims such as deposits and other assets in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country and cross-jurisdictional liabilities such as loans and notes in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country, which together cover at least half of the banking sector in the Euro area as a whole, on 1 January 2013. The ECB shall adopt and make public the list of those institutions before 1 March 2013by this Regulation.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2

2. The ECB shall assume in full the tasks conferred on it by this regulation on the 1 January 2014 at ~~latest~~the earliest, in accordance with a phasing-in plan which takes into account the amount of preparation required to set up a common supervisory framework and rule book, as well as for the supervisory tasks.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3

3. Before 1 January 2014 the ECB may, by a decision addressed to the credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company and the national competent authority of the participating Member States concerned, start carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, in particular where a credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company has received or requested public financial assistance.deleted

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0242(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 4

4. From the entry into force of this Regulation, in view of the assumption of its tasks ~~in accordance with paragraph 1 to 3~~, the ECB may require the competent authorities of the participating Member States and the persons referred to in Article 9 to provide all relevant information for the ECB to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the credit institutions of the participating Member State. The credit institution and the competent authority shall supply the information requested.

2012/10/30
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 29

(29) When applying resolutions tools and exercising resolution powers, resolution authorities should make sure that shareholders and creditors bear an appropriate share of the losses, that the managers that have been involved in decisions leading to the imminent threat of failure of the credit institution or investment firm are replaced, that the costs of the resolution of the institution are minimised, and that all creditors of an insolvent institution that are of the same class are treated in a similar manner. When the use of the resolution tools involves the granting of State aid, interventions should have to be assessed in accordance with the relevant State aid provisions. State aid may be involved, inter alia, where resolution funds or deposit guarantee funds intervene to assist in the resolution of failing institutions.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46

(46) Where the bail-in tool is applied with the objective of restoring the capital of the failing institution to enable it to continue to operate as a going concern, the resolution through bail-in should always be accompanied by ~~replacement of management and a subsequent~~the application of other resolution tools in order to restructur~~ing of~~e the institution and its activities in a way that addresses the reasons for its failure. That restructuring should be achieved through the implementation of a business reorganisation plan. Where applicable, such plans should be compatible with the restructuring plan that the institutions is required to submit to the Commission under the Union State aid framework. In particular, in addition to measures aiming at restoring the long term viability of the institution, the plan should include measures limiting the aid to the minimum and burden sharing, and measures limiting distortions of competition.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46 a (new)

(46a) The resolution authorities shall only apply the bail-in tool after the completion of a thorough evaluation of the institution that led to the conclusion that, no other alternative resolution tools would be enough to achieve the resolution objectives, either when applied per se, or in conjunction.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 50

(50) To avoid institutions structuring their liabilities in a manner that impedes the effectiveness of the bail in tool it is appropriate to establish that the institutions should have at all times an aggregate amount of own funds, subordinated debt and senior liabilities subject to the bail in tool expressed as a percentage of the total liabilities of the institution, that do not qualify as own funds for the purposes of Directive 2006/48/EC or Directive 2006/49/EC. Resolution authorities should also be able to require that this percentage is totally or partially composed of own funds and subordinated debt.deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1

1. Each Member States shall designate one ~~or more~~ resolution authorit~~ies~~y that ~~are~~is empowered to apply the resolution tools and exercise the resolution powers.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 5

5. Where the designated authority in accordance with paragraph 1 is not the competent ministry in a Member State, any decision of the designated authority pursuant to this Directive shall be taken in consultation with the competent ministry. However, if such decision may lead to systemic or national implications and/or if it arises out of a systemic international crisis, than the competent ministry shall have the ultimate decision making regarding any decision of the designated authority.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. The contents of the plans referred to in Articles 5, 7, 9 and 11 shall not be revealed to anyone, including the institution’s shareholders, with the exception of the competent authorities, resolution authorities, and the persons involved in their preparation and approval.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that each institution that is not part of a group draws up and maintains a recovery plan providing, through measures to be taken by the management of the institution or by a group entity, for the restoration of its financial situation following significant deterioration. The host competent authority may request a specific recovery plan to be drawn up for the subsidiary in that Member State if the operations of the institution's subsidiary constitute a significant share of that Member State's financial system. Recovery plans shall be considered as a governance arrangement within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC.

2013/01/11
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 3

3. Recovery plans shall ~~not assume any access to or receipt of extraordinary public financial support but shall~~ include, where applicable, an analysis of how and when an institution may apply for the use of central bank facilities in stressed conditions and available collateral.

2013/01/11
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 6

6. EBA, in consultation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), shall develop draft technical standards specifying the range of scenarios to be used for the purposes of paragraph 5 of this Article in accordance with Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.deleted

2013/01/11
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities draw up group resolution plans. Group resolution plans shall include both a plan for resolution at the level of the parent undertaking or institution subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Article 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC and the resolution plans for both the individual subsidiary institutions and, where systematically relevant, the resolution plans for individual branches, all drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of this Directive. The group resolution plans shall also include plans for the resolution of the companies referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1 and plans for the resolution of institutions with branches in other Member States in compliance with the provisions of Directive 2001/24/EC.

2013/01/11
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e

(e) identify how the group resolution actions could be financed and, where appropriate, set out principles for sharing responsibility, on an equitable basis, for that financing between sources of funding in different Member States. The plan shall not assume extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 91. Those principles shall be set out on the basis of equitable and balanced criteria and shall take into account, in particular, the economic impact of the resolution in the Member States affected and the distribution of the supervisory powers between the different competent authorities.

2013/01/11
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 1

1. The group level resolution authorities ~~and~~, the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries and the relevant branches, in consultation with the relevant competent authorities, shall consult each other within the resolution college and shall take all reasonable steps to reach a joint decision in regards to the application of measures identified in accordance with Article 14(3).

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 2

2. The group level resolution authority, in cooperation with the consolidating supervisor and EBA in accordance with Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, shall prepare and submit a report to the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision and to the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries and relevant branches. The report shall be prepared in consultation with the competent authorities, and shall analyse the substantive impediments to the effective application of the resolution tools and the exercising of the resolution powers in relation to the group. The report shall also recommend any proportionate and targeted measures that, in the authorities' view, are necessary or appropriate to remove those impediments.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 4

4. The group level resolution authority shall communicate any measure proposed by the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision to the consolidating supervisor, EBA ~~and~~, the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries and the resolution authorities of relevant branches. The group level resolution authorities and the resolution authorities of the subsidiaries, in consultation with the competent authorities, shall do everything within their power to reach a joint decision within the resolution college regarding the identification of the material impediments, and if necessary, the assessment of the measures proposed by the parent undertakings or institution subject to consolidated supervision and the measures required by the authorities in order to address or remove the impediments.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 1

1. In order to overcome potential legal impediments to providing financial support within a group of institutions, Member States shall ensure that a parent institution in a Member State, or a Union parent institution, or a company referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1and its subsidiaries that are institutions or financial institutions covered by the supervision of the parent undertaking, may enter into an agreement to provide financial support to any other party to the agreement that experiences financial difficulties, provided that the conditions laid down in this chapter are satisfied. The provisions in this chapter shall not restrict the operation of centralised funding within a group of institutions in normal circumstances.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The agreements referred to in paragraph 1 are optional between institutions of the group, and, in case of existence, they should be kept strictly confidential, having the institutions the right to decide whether it is of their interest to participate in these arrangements.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 22 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Member States shall ensure that institutions that have entered into a group financial support agreement pursuant to Article 16 ~~to make public a description of the agreement and the names of the entities that are party to it and update that information at least annually~~notify supervisory authorities about the existence of such agreements. There should be no public disclosure whatsoever, neither regarding the existence of the agreements, nor its contents, except to supervisory and/or resolution authorities. The confidentiality includes non-disclosure to shareholders, even in the case of listed or otherwise publicly traded companies.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) require the management of the institution to implement one or more of the arrangements and measures set out in the recovery plan, or to update such recovery plan when the circumstances that led to the Early Intervention are different from the assumptions set out in the initial recovery plan;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) upon verification of different assumptions, require the management of the institution to examine the situation, identify measures to overcome any problems identified and draw up a~~n action program~~ new recovery plan to overcome those problems and a timetable for its implementation;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) re~~quir~~place the senior management of the institution ~~to remove~~ and replace one or more board members ~~or managing directors~~ if these persons are found unfit to perform their duties pursuant to Article 11 of Directive 2006/48/EC, or in cases of fraud or of proven bad management;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point e

~~(e) require the management of the institution to draw up a plan for negotiation on restructuring of debt with some or all of its creditors;~~deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point f

(f) acquire, including through on-site inspections, all the information necessary in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution, including carrying out an evaluation of the assets and liabilities of the institution;deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point g

(g) contact potential purchasers in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution, subject to the conditions laid down in article 33(2) and the confidentiality provisions laid down in Article 77.deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 24 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. The special manager shall: (1) Conduct a fair valuation of the company under the terms of Article 24a; (2) Elaborate a report on the institution's situation based on the valuation conducted under the terms of Article 24a where it: i. updates the institution's financial situation; ii. grants an opinion regarding the institution's future viability; iii. recommends the restructuring of the institution or its entering into resolution; (3) Submit both options to the competent authorities, for approval; (4) Upon a decision of restructuring, the special manager shall draw up a restructuring plan that may include, among other measures, the voluntary renegotiation of debt with some or all of its creditors; (5) Gather information and take the necessary steps in order to prepare the institution for Resolution, if that is to be the case; (6) Contact potential purchasers in order to prepare for the resolution of the institution, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 33(2) and the confidentiality provisions laid down in Article 77.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 24 a (new)

Article 24a Valuation at Early Intervention 1. Special Management shall ensure that a fair and realistic valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution is carried out, preferably by an independent entity. The special management shall endorse that valuation. Where an independent valuator is not possible to be endorsed due to the emergency of the situation, special management may carry out this valuation itself. 2. Without prejudice to the Union State aid framework, where applicable, the valuation required by paragraph 1 shall be based on prudent and realistic assumptions, including as to rates of default and severity of losses, and its objective shall be to assess the market value of the assets and liabilities of the institution. However, where the market for a specific asset or liability is not functioning properly, the valuation may reflect the long term economic value of those assets or liabilities. 3. The valuation shall be supplemented by the following information as appearing in the accounting books and records of the institution: (a) an updated balance sheet and a report on the economic and financial situation of the institution; (b) a note providing an analysis and an estimate of the value of the assets; (c) the list of outstanding liabilities shown in the books and records of the institution, with an indication of the respective credits and priority level under the applicable insolvency law; (d) the list of assets held by the institution for account of third parties who have ownership rights on those assets.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) senior management of the institution under resolution is replac~~deleted;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 30 – title

~~Preliminary va~~Valuation at Resoluation

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 37 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

~~If the condition set out in the first subparagraph is not fulfilled,~~Only after Member States sha~~ll apply any of~~ve evaluated the resolution tools referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of subparagraph 2 of Article 31 ~~(2)~~, and the ~~bail-in tool referred to in point (b) of paragraph 2 of this Article, as appropriate~~aforementioned evaluation of each one, or a combination of these, reveals they are insufficient to restore the viability of an institution, shall resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 37 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3 a. The resolution authorities shall apply bail-in after having proceeded to an evaluation of the institution that led to the conclusion that no other alternative resolution tools would be enough to achieve the resolution objectives, either when applied per se, or in conjunction.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a

(a) all deposits ~~that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC~~;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

(b) secured liabilities, such as covered bonds in a covered pool or register;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d

(d) interbank money-market liabilities with an original maturity of less than one month;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e a (new)

(e a) arising from positions in derivatives in case the underlying assets are held by the institution and have been excluded from bail-in;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e b (new)

(e b) derivatives that have been contractualised between institutions that do not have a Credit Support Annex agreement;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e c (new)

(e c) deposit guarantee schemes;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3

Point (c) of paragraph 2 shall not prevent resolution authorities, where appropriate, from exercising those powers in relation to any amount of a deposit that exceeds the coverage under that Directive.deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 3

3. Where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, they may exclude from the application of the write-down and conversion powers liabilities arising from derivatives that do not fall within the scope of point (d) of paragraph 2, if that exclusion is necessary or appropriate to achieve the objectives specified in points (a) and (b) and (d) of Article 26(2). except if those liabilities derived from positions that were closed by counterparties that exercised termination clauses related to the credit situation of the institution;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 4 – point a

~~(a) specific classes of liabilities covered by point (d) of paragraph 2, and.~~deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 39

~~Article 39~~deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 40

~~Article 40~~deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – point a

~~(a) cancel existing shares;~~deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 51 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Resolution authorities may only apply the bail-in tool after having proceeded to an evaluation of the situation and of the institution that led to the conclusion that no other alternative resolution tools are enough to achieve the resolution objectives, either when applied per se or in conjunction. Member States shall require that before any resolution action is taken, resolution authorities exercise the write down power, in accordance with the provisions of Article 52 and without delay, in relation to relevant capital instruments issued by an institution when one or more of the following circumstances apply:

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 56 – paragraph 1 – point j

~~(j) the power to cancel shares or other instruments of ownership of an institution under resolution;~~deleted

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 75 – paragraph 5

5. The resolution authority shall ensure that the documents providing proof of the instruments referred to in paragraph 4 are sent to the known shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution, if the latter's share or instruments of ownership are not admitted to trading on a regulated market.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 91 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall establish financing arrangements for the purpose of ensuring the effective application by the resolution authority of the resolution tools and powers. The financing arrangements shall be used only in accordance with the resolution objectives and the principles set out in Articles 26 and 29 and be completely separate and independent from deposit guarantee schemes.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 93 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than 10 years after the entry into force of this directive, the available financial means of their financing arrangements reach at least 1[...]% of the amount of deposits liabilities excluding own funds and covered deposits, of all the credit institutions authorised in their territory ~~which are guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC~~.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 93 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Member States may extend the initial period of time for a maximum of four years in case the financing arrangements make cumulated disbursements superior to ~~0.5~~[...]% of covered deposits.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 93 – paragraph 3

3. If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in paragraph 2, contributions raised in accordance with Article 94 shall resume until the target level is reached. Where the available financial means amount to less than half of the target level, the annual contributions shall not be less than ~~0.25% of~~[...]% of liabilities excluding own funds and covered deposits.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 3

3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 93 may include payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in the first paragraph of Article 92. The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 350% of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction ~~are obliged to~~may lend to other financing arrangements within the Union in the circumstances specified under paragraph 1.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall ~~not be obliged to~~may not lend to another national financing arrangement in those circonumstances when the resolution authority of the Member State of the financing arrangement considers that it would not have sufficient funds to finance any foreseeable resolution in the near future. In any case they ~~should not be obliged to~~may not lend more than half of the funds that the national financing arrangement has available at the moment when the borrowing request is formalised, or if the amount of the loan would result in reducing the national arrangement's funding to a level below the minimum threshold percentage.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

(2) a summary of the material changes to the institution since the most recently filed recovery plan. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the meaning of of "material changes". EBA shall submit those draft regulatory standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Annex 1 – section 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6

(6) a detailed description of any material impediment to the effective and timely execution of the plan, including consideration of impact on the rest of the group, customers and counterparties. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the meaning of of "material changes". EBA shall submit those draft regulatory standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive;

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2012/0150(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Annex 1 – section 3 – paragraph 1 – point 10

(10) The extent to which the institution or the group has tested its management information systems under stress scenarios defined by the resolution authority. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards on stress scenarios. EBA shall submit those regulatory technical standards to the Commission within twelve months from the date of entry into force of this Directive. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

2012/12/20
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas the EU's internal market with mobility of persons, services, goods and capital is not fully functioning and there are still areas that need to be improved;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas excessive debt in the MS has triggered the current financial crisis and;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas the current ~~economic and~~ financial crisis has led to a significant rise in public debt in Europe;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

Ca. whereas states with high deficits are currently facing the need to apply measures to increase their taxes, those measures should not be harmful to growth;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes that tax policies must aim to foster European competitiveness and lowers costs for European business, namely for Small and Medium Enterprises;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Calls upon the Member States to make their tax systems more growth-friendly by improving tax design and implementing shifts towards less distortionary taxes while safeguarding the social market objective;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Notes that MS w~~ith high deficits will have to increase tax revenues through higher taxes, pursue expenditure reducti~~ho suffered the worst decline in GDP growth and who faced higher deficits were the ones ~~and increase public savings~~who had to increase their taxes the most;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Takes note of the recent initiatives of the Commission in the field of taxation, such as, on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, on a Financial Transaction Tax and on the field of energy;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)

3b. Welcomes the introduction of the European Semester as a possible revenue generator for the MS by the mean of the exchange of best practices for a more coordinated and sustainable fiscal path;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Notes that eliminating tax obstacles can play an important role in increasing citizens' ability and confidence to work, retire, shop and together with enterprises to invest in the EU;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

7a. Welcomes that the Commission wants to increase its efforts to ensure that all EU citizens have access to information and advice they need on tax rules within the EU;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)

7b. Notes that Member States have agreed that citizens should have better access to tax information;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)

7c. Underlines the importance of ensuring that citizens do note face tax obstacles to exercising the freedoms in the Internal Market;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Calls on the Commission to share information about best practices in Europe concerning information to citizens and businesses, to foster European competitiveness, to develop appropriate tools for exchange of information and to set up pilot projects;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

10a. Notes that double taxation is a barrier to cross-border activities and investments and that there is need for coordinated solutions to overcome this problem; Calls upon the Commission in 2012 to come forward with some proposals;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Calls on the Commission to ~~make access to the~~continue it's work in Europe Direct and Your Europe citizens' advice services ~~easier~~ and to further develop the Europe Direct web portal so that ~~EU citizens can find information from EU 27 tax authoritie~~tax related information can be easier to access by EU citizens;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Believes that the EU Treaty obliges MS to resolve the issue of double taxation~~; reminds MS therefore about the content of Articles 4(3) and 26 of the TFEU~~, as articles 4(3) and 26 of the TFEU regarding the Internal Market read;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)

22a. Calls on the MS to improve the procedures which allows Small and Medium Enterprises to claim-back VAT paid faster; thus shortening the reimbursement period;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)

30a. Asks the Commission for more swift action towards tax evasion and fraud;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2271(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)

32a. Calls on the European Commission to identify and give priority of policy measures that have fiscal implications of the MS Stability and Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes;

2011/11/23
Committee: ECON

2011/2181(INI)

Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Marianne THYSSEN, Diogo FEIO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the Commission's green paper on the EU corporate governance framework; believes that, given the diverse nature of existing national frameworks and individual listed companies, a proportional and flexible approach to corporate governance must be applied;, but also calls for the fact that the excessive bureaucratic burden need to be avoided.

2011/11/16
Committee: ECON

2011/2181(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point 1 (new)

(1) Considers that companies should put in place mechanisms (trainings, information briefings, regular newsletters, etc) to increase shareholders awareness, participation and responsibility, and exchange best practices, as long as this would not impose disproportionate burdens on companies.

2011/11/16
Committee: ECON

2011/2181(INI)

Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Marianne THYSSEN, Diogo FEIO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4

4. Believes that existing codes should be strengthened and that more effective monitoring of codes and better quality of explanations are required; stresses that shareholders (not only the majority but also the minority ones) must remain central to the governance of companies and their role must be enhanced, not diminished; believes that shareholders should inform regulators when a company provides an unacceptable explanation for departing from a code of practice;

2011/11/16
Committee: ECON

2011/2181(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 – point 1 (new)

(1) Emphasizes that the Green Book deals with the enterprises listed on stock, although it would be practical to also involve the OTC enterprises and the SMEs under a differentiated approach into the subject of corporate governance framework for European companies;

2011/11/16
Committee: ECON

2011/2181(INI)

Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ, Theodor Dumitru STOLOJAN, Marianne THYSSEN, Diogo FEIO

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Stresses that a well-governed company should be transparent and accountable to its shareholders and other stakeholders; reaffirms that directors of corporates have to take account of the sustainability, long- term interests when taking decisions, in order to minimise risks;

2011/11/16
Committee: ECON

2011/2157(INI)

Mário DAVID, Maria da Graça CARVALHO, Diogo FEIO, Vital MOREIRA

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Emphasises the importance of a wider geographical and strategic approach when looking prospectively at the ENP, recalling that, following the European Parliament’s Resolution of 19 January 2006 on the ENP, the EU established in November 2007 specific policies on Atlantic island countries neighbouring EU outermost regions adjacent to the European continent, where special questions of geographical proximity, cultural and historical affinity and mutual security were found to be relevant; welcomes the high level of results achieved and the dynamism of the specific policies already implemented, namely the EU-Cape Verde Special Partnership; and calls on the EU to further strengthen its dialogue and policy convergence with these countries and to support their efforts to consolidate political, social and economic reforms;

2011/10/11
Committee: AFET

2011/2111(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - are countries with extremely different history, culture, societies and political and economical systems and whereas an historical geopolitical antagonism has existed between some of them, and that they show diverse degrees of commitment to main European values;

2011/11/10
Committee: AFET

2011/2111(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Notes that ~~the BRICS have embarked on quasi-permanent coordination of foreign polic~~Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have coordinated on some foreign policy matters, namely by abstaining from the vote on UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya (South Africa was not yet part of the BRICS at that time), by deferring the vote on the EU'’s role in UNGA, and through their coinciding positions on Côte d'’Ivoire, Sudan and the placement of weapons in outer space, as well as by coordinating their action through the ~~BRICS~~ir Leaders'’ meetings. Points out that ~~the BRICS seem to be challenging~~some of these countries have aspirations to occupy a more central role on the current system of international governance; believes that if the EU will duly take into account their new weight, in political and economic terms, and of the ~~BRICS and~~ other emerging powers, this may contribute to an orderly reform of global governance without any destabilising effects;

2011/11/10
Committee: AFET

2011/2111(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Stresses that the occasional convergence between the BRICS on some issues and international forums should not lead the European Union to consider and relate with these five countries as if they were a cohesive block; on the contrary, notwithstanding the necessary coordination and exchange of information between main EU Foreign Policy decision-makers and the EU Delegations in those countries, the EU should choose an approach towards them that takes into account their differences and focus particularly on the improvement of the relationships with those who not only share but consistently put into practice main European values, such as democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights;

2011/11/10
Committee: AFET

2011/2111(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Notes that, with very different growth patterns, most of the BRICS have resisted the economical and financial crisis more robustly than European countries and are now back to stable growth. Naturally there are some lessons which Europe may learn from the BRICS, regarding financial regulation and economic policies. Also, the commercial dimension of the relation between Europe and the BRICS should take into account the fast development of those markets and the opportunities created to European investors and entrepreneurs;

2011/11/10
Committee: AFET

2011/2094(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Welcomes the Commission Report on Competition Policy 2010; highlights, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of this report, that competition policy has brought numerous benefits in terms of consumer welfare and continues to be an essential tool for preserving the single market; stresses that thsome rules need to be updated to deal with new challenges;

2011/10/03
Committee: ECON

2011/2094(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

15a. Points out that there are innumerable cases of undertakings occupying a clearly dominant position in the new-technology markets, particularly the internet, without causing any actual harm for users of these platforms or products and without leading to abusive practices or closure of the market; encourages the Commission, bearing in mind the particularly volatile nature of these markets, where one day’s dominant position can be the next day’s marginal one, to adopt specific sectoral guidelines for these markets;

2011/10/03
Committee: ECON

2011/2094(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)

15b. Urges the Commission to analyse the aviation sector, in particular code-share agreements between airlines which in many cases do not produce any benefits for consumers but merely contribute to greater closure of the market, leading to abuses of dominant positions and concerted practices between undertakings which would otherwise have to act competitively;

2011/10/03
Committee: ECON

2011/2094(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)

15c. Urges the Commission to pay particular attention to examining oligopolistic markets, since the existence of sectors where competition is limited generally leads to absence of innovation, abusive practices and a deterioration in the quality of the products and services provided, causing genuine harm to consumers and the market;

2011/10/03
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Considers that ~~until further notice,~~ the European Semester is the valid ~~contribution to the implementation of the EU strategy and of an~~framework for the effective economic govern~~ment, notably~~ance of the euro area Member States that are linked by a joint and common responsibility, ~~and that behind the wording a process over the full year~~bringing together the multilateral surveillance of budgetary and macroeconomic policies and the implementation of the European Strategy for Growth and Jobs as embodied in the EU2020 Strategy, and that much is at stake for EU institutions and Member States;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Emphasises that the success of the Europe 2020 strategy depends on the commitment of the EU as a whole, and on ownership by Member States, and their national parliaments, local and regional authorities and social partners; recalls the importance of a strong and properly functioning social dialogue and collective agreements ~~within the framework of the Europe 2020 strategy, as well as the promotion of a genuine European social dialogue on macroeconomic policies and measur~~in Member States;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Believes that the introduction of the ‘European Semester’ and enhanced fiscal and economic policy coordination should leave enough scope and flexibility of to the EU Member States to pursue atheir own effective ~~alternative counter-cyclical strategy and stability policy, geared to distribution and development and~~budgetary, economic and social strategy, providing for an adequate level of public services and infrastructure for EU citizens,;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7.Notes that the European Semester is now the annual framework for ensuring sustained convergence of the economic performance of the Member States and closer coordination of economic and fiscal policies and, as such, including the formulation and surveillance of the implementation of the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union (Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, the submission and assessment of Member States' Stability or Convergence Programmes, the submission and assessment of Member States' National Reform Programmes supporting the Union's strategy for growth and jobs, the surveillance to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances), the formulation and examination of the implementation of the employment guidelines; recalls that the European Semester shall take place without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament conferred on it by the TFEU; calls on the Commission to develop proposals establishing how these different instruments are differentiated, create spill- over effects across policy areas and fit together;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

12. Emphasises that steps needed to improve the European economic governance capacity should not lead to any deficit in democratic legitimacy and accountability; warns, therefore, against a set-up of the Annual Growth Survey as a bureaucratic act which lacks the approval of the European Parliamentbe accompanied by similar steps to improve the democratic legitimacy and accountability;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

~~13. Request that the AGS be transformed into "Annual Sustainability Guidelines”(ASG);~~deleted

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

~~14. Calls for the Commission to adopt the Annual Sustainability Guidelines by 10 January each year with a specific chapter on and guidelines for the euro area;~~deleted

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15.Calls on the Commission, when drawing up the Annual ~~Sustainability Guidelines~~Growth Survey, to draw upon ~~heterodox~~ broad scientific expertise to the greatest extent possible and to take relevant recommendations of the European Parliament into account;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Calls on the Commission clearly to assess, in the Annual ~~Sustainability Guidelines~~Growth Survey, the main economic problems of the EU and individual Member States, and to propose priority measures to overcome those problems, and to ~~identify the ini~~enhance competiative~~s taken by the Union and the~~ness and economic growth in Member States t~~o support~~hrough long-term structural reforms and investment, to remove obstacles to growth, ~~achieve the targets laid down in the Treaties and the current economic strategy,~~ implement the 7 flagships and reduce macroeconomic imbalances;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Calls on the Commission and Council to ensure that policy guidance for fiscal consolidation and structural reforms ~~are fully coher~~is complemented and co~~nsistent~~mpatible with the Union~~'s objectives of social and sustainable developmen~~ strategy for growth and jobs; reiterates that these inter linkages should not provide for exemptions to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact; considers that, in defining and implementing the Annual ~~Sustainability Guidelines~~Growth Survey, the Union must take into account ~~the impact of~~ developments in micro-financial legislation, in particular prudential regulation, on long-term investment stimulating sustainable growth and job creation; believes that the country-specific recommendations ~~need to be subject of~~should be accompanied by social impact assessments ~~so as to ensure tha~~, taking into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training, retraining and protection of human health ~~are met~~;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Calls on the Commission to identify explicitly in the Annual ~~Sustainability Guidelines~~Growth Survey potential cross-border spill- over effects of major economic policy measures implemented at the EU level as well as in Member States;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Calls on the commissioners responsible for the European Semester to come and debate the Annual ~~Sustainability Guidelines~~Growth Survey with the relevant EP committees as soon as it has been adopted by the Commission;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. Calls on the Council to come to Parliament to explain ~~and justify~~ any significant changes it has made to the Commission’s proposed recommendations; request the Commission to take part in this hearing to provide its views on the situation;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Calls on the Commission and the Council to step up the role of the macroeconomic dialogue introduced by the Cologne Council in June 1999 so as to improve the interaction among those responsible for wage development, and fiscal ~~and monetary~~ policy;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a

27 a. Takes note that the crisis and the developments especially inside the euro area call for an upgrading of the European dimension of the economic policies of its Member States~~, calls on the EP to adapt to this evolution~~;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. ~~Takes note~~Reminds that the EP ~~has not~~is in the process of adapteding its structure to the evolution brought by the Lisbon treaty regarding the new role and powers of the President of the European Council and the Eurogroup, and intends to use its increased powers to their full extent;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

~~31. Asks for the ASO to be subject to a vote with co-decision powers for the European Parliament before the Spring Council;~~deleted

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32

32. ~~Is concerned abou~~Reminds that the democratic legitimacy inof the ~~introduction of the European Semester, maintains that the Parliament, N~~European Semester at the European level should be ensured by the European Parliament, recognizes that national Pparliaments as well as local and Rregional elected representatives have a crucial role to play in establishing the necessary ~~democratic legitimacy~~national ownership;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

34. Intends to organise, from 2013, prior to the Spring European Council each year, an interparliamentary forum at the European Parliament for members of the competent national parliamentary committees, recommends that this meeting be an integrated part of the annual meeting organised by the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for members of national parliaments; proposes that this forum include meetings of the political groups and the relevant committees, along with a plenary sitting affording an opportunity to adopt a joint resolution in preparation for the Spring European Council; instructs its President to represent it at the European Spring Council on the basis of the resolution thus adopted; invites the European social partners to participate in this meeting and provide their views;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36

36. ~~Underl~~Remineds th~~e need for~~at country- specific recommendations ~~to be based on~~are subject to democratic procedures; warns against the establishment of any practice that lacks parliamentary approval at the European and national level; notes that this applies especially to recommendations which could undermine social regulation and parliamentary scrutiny;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. Wishes an economic dialogue to be held at Parliament with the heads of state or government of those Member States intending to make use of the European financial Stability Facility and Mechanism as well as the European Stability Mechanism, before the latter is activated; urges the Council and the Commission to ensure the consistency of economic conditionality and adjustment programmes in the framework of any rescue programme with Union's overarching objectives of social and sustainable development and in particular employment and economic policy guidelines as well as EU 2020 objectives; asks to include recommendations addressed in the framework of the EU Semester to Member States under financial assistance to take account explicitly of these consistency requirements;deleted

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Intends to conduct a~~n audit~~ hearing of the Union's macroeconomic situation in the autumn, having recourse to ~~heterodox and international external~~ independent advice and in consultation with the relevant stakeholders, and in particular the social partners, in order to foster debate and obtain a second opinion on economic issues in preparation for its discussions with the Commission prior to the drafting of the Annual Growth Survey;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 48

48. ~~Calls for the development of the concept of a European Treasury to strengthen the implementation capacity of the European semester and the economic pillar of EMU~~Welcomes the strengthening of the implementation capacity of the European semester and the economic and fiscal pillar of EMU; underlines that the EU should continue working on enhanced coordination and further strengthening of the independent role of the European Commission in multilateral budgetary and economic surveillance;

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/2071(INI)

Diogo FEIO, Corien WORTMANN-KOOL

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 49

49. Underlines that the policy guidance to Member States partly concerns policy areas like wages and pensions that in line with Article 153 of the TFEU fall under the competences of Member States and social partners; eEmphasizes that democratic accountability needs to be ensured and the principles of subsidiarity and social dialogue are to be respected ~~in order to preserve the policy space required for National implementation;~~ ; Or. eenen

2011/10/10
Committee: ECON

2011/0417(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – point iii a (new)

(iiia) issued by a qualifying portfolio undertaking and acquired by the qualifying venture capital fund from other venture capital fund, established under a Member State's regime in the Union.

2012/03/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0417(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)

If the venture capital fund manager does not comply with this Regulation, despite the measures taken by the competent authority of the home Member State, the competent authority of the host Member State shall take all the necessary measures to protect investors, after informing the competent authority of the home Member State.

2012/03/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0417(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 b (new)

In the event of a disagreement between the competent authority of the home Member State and the competent authority of the host Member State regarding the adequacy of the EuVECA for investors in the host market, either or both of the competent authorities concerned may refer the matter to ESMA under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

2012/03/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)

(5a) The aim of this Regulation is to put in place further European mechanisms for the coordination and surveillance of Member States budgetary and economic policies. Nevertheless, prudence should be shown in all steps of the way, and for this reason, no matters related to the Member States debt issuance plans, the renewal of outstanding debt and other relevant operations should be made public, and they should be used for internal coordination only. This arises from the potential risk that a Member State may be subject to by making its financial needs known in advance to the financial markets.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 b (new)

(5b) Furthermore, the Commission should put forward a report, and if necessary a proposal, to the European Parliament and to the Council, evaluating the possibility of the creation of a European debt authority that would be responsible for managing and coordinating all issues related with the annual debt issuance plan of the Member States, the renewal of outstanding debt, and the assessment of the sustainability of all Member States governments debt. Moreover, that authority should periodically publish data related to Member States public debt, deficit and other macroeconomic indicators.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)

(6a) The common budgetary plan timeline must be, at its most, coherent with the Member States budgetary timeframe. If not a Commission opinion regarding the draft budgetary plans has the potential risk of lacking democratic legitimacy in the national parliaments.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)

(10a) In the context of better coordination and ex ante discussion among Member States of any major economic and fiscal policy reform plans with potential spill- over effects, the Commission should put forward a report, and if necessary a proposal, to the European Parliament and the to Council, with a detailed plan of how will such coordination operate, in what format will the discussions take place, which are the policies contemplated, and what will be the political consequences to the Member States and national parliaments of decisions that may come out of such coordination and ex ante discussion; such Commission opinion shall, at least, incorporate this coordination with the European Semester framework.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 b (new)

(10b) Furthermore, strengthening economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments. While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of the dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State which is the subject of a Council decision imposing an interest-bearing deposit or an annual fine in accordance with this Regulation. The Member State's participation in such an exchange of views is voluntary.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)

(13a) This Regulation will be followed by a proposal from the Commission to set in place a European redemption fund such as that proposed by the German council of economic experts or other proposals that follow the same line as well as a roadmap to joint management of sovereign debt issuance.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall submit annually to the Commission and the Eurogroup a draft budgetary plan for the forthcoming year no later than 15 October.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. The draft budgetary plan guidelines, to be adopted by delegated act, shall not create an excessive extra burden to Member States governments; their content and rules shall be designed in a simple and easy way to comply with.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

All related issues with the annual debt issuance plan of the Member States, such as financial needs, renewal of outstanding debt or others, shall not be made public and be used only for coordination within the euro area.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1

1. The Commission shall, if necessary, adopt an opinion on the draft budgetary plan ~~by 30~~no later than 15 November.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article -11 (new)

Article -11 Economic Dialogue In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss decisions taken pursuant to Article 5(5), Article 6(4), Article 7(5), Article 8(4) and Article 9(3). The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by such decisions to participate in an exchange of views.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Rodi KRATSA-TSAGAROPOULOU

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 a (new)

Article 11a Commission report Three months upon entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall put forward a report, and if necessary a proposal, to the European Parliament and to the Council, with a detailed plan of how coordination and ex ante discussion among Member States of any major economic and fiscal policy reform plans with potential spill-over effects operate, in what format will the discussions take place, which are the policies contemplated, and what will be the political consequences to the Member States and national parliaments of decisions that may come out of such coordination and ex ante discussion.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 b (new)

Article 11b Additional Commission proposals 1. The Commission shall, where appropriate, come with proposals to address decisively the current sovereign debt crisis, such as the European redemption fund. 2. The Commission shall, where appropriate, issue a concrete roadmap for the implementation of stability bonds.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0386(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 c (new)

Article 11 c European debt authority By ...*, the Commission shall put forward a report, and if necessary a proposal, to the European Parliament and to the Council, evaluating the possibility of the creation of a European debt authority, which would be responsible to manage and coordinate all issues related with the annual debt issuance plan of the Member States, the renewal of their outstanding debt and the assessment of the sustainability of all Member States governments debt, as well as a annual publication of data related to Member States public debt, deficit and other macroeconomic indicators. ____________ * OJ please insert date: three months after entry into force of this Regulation.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)

(3a) Furthermore, the Commission should put forward a report, and if necessary a proposal, to the European Parliament and to the Council, evaluating the possibility of the creation of a European debt authority, which would be responsible for managing and coordinating all issues relating to the annual debt issuance plan of the Member States, the renewal of outstanding debt and with the assessment of the sustainability of all Member States' governments debt. Moreover, the European debt authority should periodically publish data relating to Member States public debt, deficit and other macroeconomic indicators.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) A decision regarding the non- compliance of a Member State with its adjustment programme would also entail a suspension of payments or commitments of Union funds as provided by Article 21(6) of Regulation (EU) No XXX laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the common strategic framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006,deleted

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 a (new)

Article 1a Enhanced budgetary rules and economic coordination 1. With a view to coordinating better the planning of their national debt issuance, Member States shall report in advance on their public debt issuance plans to the Commission and to the Council. 2. With a view to benchmarking best practices and working towards a more closely coordinated economic policy, the Member States shall ensure that all major economic and fiscal policy reforms that they plan to undertake are discussed in advance and, where appropriate, they shall coordinate those reforms with the other Member States. 3. In addition to complying with Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, Member States shall ensure that the budgetary position of the general government is balanced or in surplus. The budgetary position of the general government shall be deemed to be balanced if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objective as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0,5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Member States shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. The Member States may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances as defined in the Stability and Growth Pact. Where the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the lower limit of the medium-term objective specified under the second subparagraph can reach a structural deficit of no higher than 1,0 % of the gross domestic product at market prices.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1

1. The Commission ~~may~~shall decide to make a Member State experiencing severe ~~difficulties with regard to its financial stability subject to enhanced surveillance~~financing problems with serious threats to its financial stability, likely to have adverse spill-over effects on other Member States whose currency is the euro or a detrimental impact on the sustainability of public finances, subject to enhanced surveillance. That decision shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority, within 10 days, to reject it. The Member State concerned shall be given the possibility to express its views beforehand. The Commission shall decide every six months whether to prolong the enhanced surveillance.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2

2. The Commission shall decide to make a Member State receiving a financial assistance on a precautionary basis from one or several other States, the EFSF, the ESM or any other International Financial Institution, such as the IMF, subject to enhanced surveillance. The decision shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, within 10 days, to reject it. The Commission shall establish a list of the precautionary financial assistance instruments concerned and keep it updated to take into account possible changes in the financial support policy of the EFSF, ESM or of any other relevant International Financial Institution.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 5

5. Where it is concluded - on the basis of the assessment foreseen in paragraph 4 - that further measures are needed ~~and~~or the financial situation of the Member State concerned has significant adverse effects on the financial stability of the euro area, the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may recommend to the Member State concerned to seek financial assistance and to prepare a macro-economic adjustment programme. ~~The Council may decide to make this recommendation public.~~

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2

2. The Co~~uncil, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall approve the adjustment programme~~mmission proposal of the adjustment programme shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority, within 10 days, to reject it.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4

4. The Commission - in liaison with the ECB - shall examine with the Member State concerned the changes that may be needed to its adjustment programme. The Council, ~~acting by a qualified majority~~ on a proposal from the Commission, shall decide on any change to be made to the adjustment programme. This decision shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority, within 10 days, to reject it.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1

1. A Member State shall be under post- programme surveillance as long as a minimum of 75% of the financial assistance received from one or several other Member State(s), the EFSM, the EFSF or the ESM has not been repaid. The Co~~uncil, acting on a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may extend the duration of the post programme surveillance~~mmission proposal to extend the duration of the post programme surveillance shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority to reject it.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 4

4. The ~~Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the~~ Commission~~, may~~ recommendation to ~~the~~a Member State, under post programme surveillance, to adopt corrective measures shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by qualified majority to reject it.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0385(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 a (new)

Article 13a Review Clause By ...*, the Commission shall put forward a report, and if necessary a proposal, to the European Parliament and to the Council, evaluating the possibility of the creation of a European debt authority, which would be responsible for managing and coordinating all issues relating to the annual debt issuance plan of the Member States, the renewal of their outstanding debt and the assessment of the sustainability of all Member States' government debts, as well as a annual publication of data relating to Member States public debt, deficit and other macroeconomic indicators. _______________ * OJ please insert date: three months after entry into force of this Regulation.

2012/03/13
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

(2) The European Parliament issued a resolution on credit ratings agencies on 8 June 2011 calling for enhanced regulation on credit rating agencies. At an informal ECOFIN meeting of September 30 and October 1, 2010, the Council of the European Union acknowledged that further efforts should be made to address a number of issues related to credit rating activities, including the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings and the risk of conflict of interests ~~stemming from the remuneration model of rating agencies~~. The European Council of 23 October 2011 concluded that progress is needed on reducing overreliance on credit ratings.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)

(5a) Overreliance on external credit ratings occurs when financial institutions and institutional investors rely solely or mechanistically on ratings issued by credit rating agencies while neglecting their own due diligence and internal risk management obligations. Therefore, it is essential to reinforce the financial institutions and institutional investor's due diligence obligations and internal risk management obligations when acquiring financial products, especially complex or structured products. Financial regulation should also increase the disclosure obligations for issuers of financial products, especially for highly complex or structured products.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 b (new)

(5b) Overreliance on external credit ratings shall be reduced and all the automatic effects deriving from ratings should be gradually eliminated. Regulation should, therefore, encourage credit institutions and investment firms to put in place internal models of risk assessment and impose due diligence obligations upon investors.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 already provided a first round of measures to address the question of independence and integrity of credit rating agencies and their credit rating activities. The objectives of guaranteeing the independence of credit rating agencies and of identifying, managing and, to the extent possible, avoiding any conflict of interest that could arise were already underlying several provisions of that Regulation in 2009. Whilst providing a sound basis, the existing rules do not appear to have had a sufficient impact in this regard. ~~Credit rating agencies still are not perceived as sufficiently independent actors.~~ The selection and remuneration of the credit rating agency by the rated entity (issuer- pays model) ~~engenders inherent~~might increase the risk of conflicts of interest, which are insufficiently addressed by the existing rules. Under this model, there are incentives for credit rating agencies to issue complacency ratings on the issuer in order to secure a long-standing business relationship guaranteeing revenues or in order to secure additional work and revenues. Moreover, relationships between the shareholders of credit rating agencies and the rated entities may cause conflicts of interest which are not sufficiently dealt with by the existing rules. ~~As a result, credit ratings issued under the issuer-pays model may be perceived as the credit ratings that suit the issuer rather than the credit ratings needed by the investor.~~ Without prejudice to the conclusions of the report to be submitted by the Commission on the issuer-pays model by December 2012 pursuant to Article 39(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, it is essential to reinforce the conditions of independence applying to credit rating agencies in order to increase the level of credibility and independence of credit ratings ~~issued under the issuer-pays model~~.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) The credit rating market shows that, traditionally, credit rating agencies and rated entities enter into long-lasting relationships. This raises the threat of familiarity, as the credit rating agency may become too sympathetic to the desires of the rated entity. In those circumstances, the impartiality of credit rating agencies over time could become questionable. Indeed, credit rating agencies mandated and paid by a corporate issuer are incentivised to issue overly favourable ratings on that rated entity or its debt instruments in order to maintain the business relationship with such issuer. Issuers are also subject to incentives that favour long-lasting relationships, such as the lock-in effect: an issuer may refrain from changing credit rating agency as this may raise concerns of investors regarding the issuer's creditworthiness. This problem was already identified in Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, which required credit rating agencies to apply a rotation mechanism providing for gradual changes in analytical teams and credit rating committees so that the independence of the rating analysts and persons approving credit ratings would not be compromised. The success of those rules, however, was highly dependant on a behavioural solution internal to the credit rating agency: the actual independence and professionalism of the employees of the credit rating agency vis-à-vis the commercial interests of the credit rating agency itself. These rules were not designed to provide sufficient guarantee towards third parties that the conflicts of interest arising from the long-lasting relationship would effectively be mitigated or avoided. It therefore appears necessary to provide for a structural response having a higher impact on third parties. This could be achieved effectively by limiting the period during which a credit rating agency can continuously provide credit ratings on the same issuer or its debt instruments. Setting out a maximum duration of the business relationship between the issuer which is rated or which issued the rated debt instruments and the credit rating agency should remove the incentive for issuing favourable ratings on that issuer. Additionally, requiring the rotation of credit rating agencies as a normal and regular market practice should also effectively address the lock-in effect, where an issuer refrains from changing credit rating agency as this would raise concerns of investors regarding the issuer's creditworthiness. Finally, the rotation of credit rating agencies should have positive effects on the rating market as it would facilitate new market entries and offer existing credit rating agencies the opportunity to extend their business to new areas.deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7 a (new)

(7a) The recognition of a credit rating agency as an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) should not increase the foreclosure of a market already dominated by three main undertakings. ECB, EBA and the national central banks, without making the process easier or less demanding, should provide for the recognition of more credit rating agencies as ECAI as a way to open the market to the entrance of new undertakings.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) ~~Regular rotation of credit rating agencies issuing credit ratings on an issuer or its debt instruments should~~It is important to find ways to bring more diversity to the evaluation of the creditworthiness of the issuer that selects and pays that credit rating agency. Multiple and different views, perspectives and methodologies applied by credit rating agencies should produce more diverse credit ratings and ultimately improve the assessment of the creditworthiness of the issuers. For this diversity to play a role and to avoid complacency of both issuers and credit rating agencies, the maximum duration of the business relationship between the credit rating agency and the issuer paying must be restricted to a level guaranteeing regular fresh looks at the creditworthiness of issuers. Therefore, a time period of three years would seem appropriate, also considering the need to provide certain continuity within the credit ratings. The risk of conflict of interest increases in situations where the credit rating agency frequently issues credit ratings on debt instruments of the same issuer within a shA system of a mandatory double rating should be designed so that institutions, issuers or their related third parties and sovereigns always use at least two ECAI ratings for the regulatorty p~~eriod of time. In those cases, the maximum duration of the business relationship should be sho~~urposes set in legislation. Further to guarantee similar results. Hence, the business relationship should stop after a credit rating has rated ten debt instruments of the same issuer. However, in order to avoid imposing a disproportionate burden on issuers and credit rating agencies, no requirement to change credit more, alternatives shall be put in place so that institutions, issuers or their related third parties and sovereigns may, without restrating agency within the first 12 months of the business relationship should be imposed. Where an issuer mandates more than one credit rating agency, either because as an issuer of structured finance instruments he is obliged to do so, or on a voluntary basis, it should be sufficient that the strict rotation periods only apply to one of the credit rating agencies. However, also in this case, the business relationship between the issuer and the additional credit rating agencies should not exceed a period of six yearst, choose the first ECAI and the second shall be appointed by an independent authority, from all recognized ECAI. This shall not prevent the mandating party to use credit ratings from more than one credit rating agency.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) The rule requiring rotation of credit rating agencies needs to be enforced in a credible manner to be meaningful. The rotation rule would not achieve its objectives if the outgoing credit rating agency were allowed to provide rating services to the same issuer again within a too short period of time. Therefore, it is important to provide for an appropriate period within which such credit rating agency may not be mandated by the same issuer to provide rating services. That period should be sufficiently long to allow the incoming credit rating agency to effectively provide its rating services to the issuer, to ensure that the issuer is truly exposed to a new scrutiny under a different approach and to guarantee that the credit ratings issued by the new credit rating agency provide enough continuity. That period should allow that an issuer cannot rely on comfortable arrangements with only two credit rating agencies that would replace each other on a continuous basis, as this could lead to maintaining the familiarity threat. Hence, the period during which the outgoing credit rating agency should not provide rating services to the issuer should generally be set at four years.deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) The change of credit rating agency inevitably increases the risk that knowledge about the rated entity acquired by the outgoing rating agency is lost. As a result, the incoming credit rating agency would have to make considerable efforts to acquire the knowledge necessary to carry out its work. However, a smooth transition should be ensured by establishing a requirement on the outgoing credit rating agency to transfer relevant information on the rated entity or instruments to the incoming credit rating agency.deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

(11) Requiring issuers to regularly change the credit rating agency they mandate to issue credit ratings is proportionate to the objective pursued. This requirement only applies to certain regulated institutions (registered credit rating agencies) which provide a service affecting the public interest (credit ratings that can be used for regulatory purposes) under certain conditions (issuer-pays model). The privilege of having its services recognised as playing an important role in the regulation of the financial services market and being approved to carry out this function, entails the need to respect certain obligations in order to guarantee independence and the perception of independence in all circumstances. A credit rating agency which is prevented from providing credit rating services to a particular issuer would still be allowed to provide credit ratings to other issuersnstitutions, issuers or their related third parties and sovereigns to have a double rating - one from a chosen credit rating agency and a second from an appointed one - is proportionate to the objective pursued. This requirement only applies to certain credit ratings (those used for regulatory purposes) which provide a service affecting the public interest. In a market context where the ~~rot~~double rationg rule applies to all players, business opportunities will arise since all issuers would need to change credit rating agency. Moreover, credit rating agencies may always issue unsolicited credit ratings on the same issuer, capitalising on their experience. Unsolicited ratings are not constrained by the issuer-pays model and therefore are less affected by potential conflicts of interests. For issuers, the maximum duration of the business relationship with a credit rating agency or the rule on the employment of more than one credit rating agency also represents a restriction on their freedom to conduct their own business. However, this restriction is necessary on public-interest grounds considering the interference of the issuer-pays model with the necessary independence of credit rating agencies to guarantee independent credit ratings that can be used by investors for regulatory purposes. At the same time, these restrictions do not go beyond what is necessary and should rather be seen as an element increasing the issuer's creditworthiness towards other parties, and ultimately the marketthe appointed credit rating agency shall be chosen among all recognised ECAI. The appointment of the second credit rating agency by an independent authority shall favour smaller credit rating agencies already operating in the market and recognised.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

(12) One of the specificities of sovereign ratings is that the issuer-pays model generally does not apply. Instead, the majority of ratings are produced as unsolicited ratings, providing the basis for both solicited and unsolicited ratings of the financial institutions of the country concerned. It is therefore not necessary to require the rotation of credit rating agencies issuing sovereign ratings.deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

(13) The independence of a credit rating agency vis-à-vis a rated entity ~~is also~~might be affected by possible conflict of interests of any of its significant shareholders with the rated entity: Aa shareholder of a credit rating agency could be a member of the administrative or supervisory board of a rated entity or a related third party. The rules of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 addressed this type of situation only as regards the conflicts of interest caused by rating analysts, persons approving the credit ratings or other employees of the credit rating agency. The Regulation was, however, silent as regards potential conflicts of interest caused by shareholders or members of credit rating agencies. With a view to enhancing the perception of independence of credit rating agencies vis-à-vis the rated entities, it is appropriate to extend the existing rules applying to conflicts of interest caused by employees of the credit rating agencies also to those caused by shareholders or members holding a significant position within the credit rating agency. Hence, the credit rating agency should abstain from issuing credit ratings, or should disclose that the credit rating may be affected, where a shareholder or member holding 10% of the voting rights of that agency is also a member of the administrative or supervisory board of the rated entity or has invested in the rated entity. Moreover, where a shareholder or member is in a position to significantly influence the business activity of the credit rating agency, that person should not provide consultancy or advisory services to the rated entity or a related third party regarding its corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities or activitiesHence, the credit rating agency should disclose that the credit rating may be affected, where a shareholder or member holding 10% of the voting rights of that agency is also a member of the administrative or supervisory board of the rated entity or has invested in the rated entity.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) The rules on independence and prevention of conflicts of interest, could become ineffective if credit rating agencies were not independent from each other. A sufficiently high number of credit rating agencies, unconnected with both the outgoing credit rating agency in case of rotation and with the credit rating agency providing credit rating services in parallel to the same issuer, is necessary for a workable application of those rules. In the absence of sufficient choice of credit rating agencies for the issuer in the current market, the implementation of these rules aimed at enhancing independence conditions would risk becoming ineffective. Therefore, it is appropriate to require a strict separation of the outgoing agency from the incoming credit rating agency in case of rotation as well as of the two credit rating agencies providing rating services in parallel to the same issuer. The credit rating agencies concerned should not be linked to each other by control, by being part of the same group of credit rating agencies, by being shareholder or member of or being able to exercise voting rights in any of the other agencies, or by being able to appoint members of the administrative, management or supervisory boards of any of the other credit rating agencies.deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 a (new)

(14a) Credit rating agencies should establish, maintain, enforce, and document an effective internal control structure governing the implementation of policies and procedures to the prevention and control of possible conflicts of interest and to ensure the independence of ratings, analysts and rating teams regarding shareholders, administrative and management bodies and sales and marketing activities. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) should be put in place on the topic of corporate governance, organizational, and management of conflict of interest. SOPs should be periodically reviewed and monitored to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal control structure and whether it should be updated.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 b (new)

(14b) Credit rating agencies shall submit an annual internal controls report to ESMA, which shall contain a description of the responsibility of management in establishing and maintaining an effective internal control structure and an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) The perception of independence of credit rating agencies wcould be particularly ~~affect~~damaged should the same shareholders or members be investing in different credit rating agencies not belonging to the same group of credit rating agencies, at least if this investment reaches a certain size that could allow these shareholders or members to exercise a certain influence on the agency's business. Therefore, in order to ensure the ~~independence (and the~~ perception of independence) of credit rating agencies, it is appropriate to provide for ~~stricter~~more transparent rules regarding the relations between the credit rating agencies and their shareholders. For this reason, ~~no person should simultaneously hold a participation of 5% or more in more than one credit rating agency, unless the agencies concerned belong to the same group~~all 10 % or more shareholders should be publicly and periodically disclosed.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) ~~The objective of ensuring sufficient independence of credit rating agencies entails that investors should not hold simultaneously investments of 5 % or more in more than one credit rating agency.~~ Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market requests that those persons controlling 510 % of the voting rights in a listed company results should disclose it to the public, because, inter alia, of the interest for investors to know about changes in the voting structure of such company. 510 % of the voting rights is considered therefore to be a major holding capable of influencing the voting structure in a company. It is therefore appropriate to use the 510 % level for the purposes of ~~restricting the simultaneous investment in more than one~~disclosure of shareholder's participations in credit rating agencyies. This measure cannot be considered disproportionate, given that all registered credit rating agencies in the Union are non- listed undertakings therefore not subject to the transparency and procedural rules that apply to listed companies in the EU. Often unlisted undertakings are governed by shareholders' protocols or agreements and the number of shareholders or members is usually low. Therefore, even a minority position in an unlisted credit rating agency could be influential. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that purely economic investments in credit rating agencies are still possible, this limitation to simultaneously investments in more than one credit rating agency should not be extended to investments channelled though collective investment schemes managed by third parties independent from the investor and not subject to his or her influence.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

(17) The ~~new rules limiting the duration of the business relationship between an issuer and the~~mandatory double rating and the recognition of ECAI status to more and smaller credit rating agenc~~y would~~ies can significantly reshape the credit rating market in the Union, which today remains largely concentrated. New market opportunities would arise for small and mid-size credit rating agencies, which would need to develop to take up those challenges in the first years following the entry into force of the new rules. Those developments are likely to bring new diversity into the market. The objectives and the effectiveness of the new rules would, however, be largely jeopardised if, during these initial years, large established credit rating agencies would prevent their competitors from developing credible alternatives by acquiring them. Further consolidation in the credit rating market driven by large established players would result in a reduction of the number of available registered credit rating agencies, thus creating selection difficulties for issuers at the moment in which they regulThe Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the Merger Regulation) is a specific legal instrument necessarly ~~need to appoint one or more new credit rating agencies and disturb~~to permit effective control of all concentrations ing t~~he smooth fun~~erms of their effecti on~~ing of the new rules. More importantly, further consolidation driven by large established credit rating agencies would particularly prevent the emergence of mo~~ the structure of competition in the Union. This Regulation shall therefore apply to all mergers and concentrations with a community dimension between cre di~~versity in the market~~t rating agencies.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) The effectiveness of the rules on independence and prevention of conflict of interest which require that credit rating agencies should not provide for a long period of time credit rating services to the same issuer could be undermined if credit rating agencies where allowed to become directly or indirectly shareholders or members of other credit rating agencies.deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) It is important to ensure that relevant modifications to the rating methodologies do not result in less rigorous methodologies. For that purpose, issuers, investors and other interested parties should have the opportunity to comment on any intended relevant change of rating methodologies. This will help them to understand the reasons behind new methodologies and for the change in question. Comments provided by issuers and investors on the draft methodologies may provide valuable input for the credit rating agencies in defining the methodologies. Moreover, ESMA should verify and confirm the compliance of new rating methodologies with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 and the relevant regulatory technical standard before methodologies are applied in practice. ESMA should verify that the proposed methodologies are rigorous, systematic, continuous and subject to validation based on historical experience, including back-testingbe notified when new methodologies are applied in practice. However, this ~~ver~~notification ~~process~~ should not grant ESMA any power to judge the appropriateness of the proposed methodology or the content of the credit ratings issued following the application of the methodologies or to certify or pre-approve methodologies used by credit rating agencies.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) Due to the complexity of structured finance instruments, credit rating agencies have not always succeeded in ensuring a sufficiently high quality of credit ratings issued on such instruments. This has led to a loss of market confidence in this type of credit ratings. In order to regain confidence it would be appropriate to require issuers or their related third parties to engage two different credit rating agencies for the provision of credit ratings on structured finance instruments, which could lead to different and competing assessments. This could also reduce the over-reliance on a single credit rating and enhance competition.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) Investors, issuers and other interested parties should have access to up to date rating information on a central webpage. A European Rating Index (EURIX) ~~established by ESMA~~ should allow investors to easily compare all ratings that exist with regard to a specific rated entity and provide them with average ratings. In order to enable investors to compare ratings on the same entity issued by different credit rating agencies it is necessary that credit rating agencies use a harmonised rating scale, to be developed by ESMA and adopted by the Commission as a regulatory technical standard. The use of the harmonised rating scale should only be mandatory for the publication of the ratings on the EURIX webpage while credit rating agencies should be free to use their own rating scales when publishing the ratings on their own websites. The mandatory use of a harmonised rating scale should not have a harmonising effect on methodologies and processes of credit rating agencies, but should be limited to making the rating outcome comparable. It is important that the EURIX webpage shows, in addition to an aggregate rating index, all available ratings per instrument in order to allow investors to consider the whole variety of opinions before taking their own investment decision. The aggregate rating index may help investors to get a first indication of the creditworthiness of an entity. The EURIX should help smaller and new credit rating agencies to gain visibility. The European Rating Index would complement the information on h, EURIX shall create an equivalence chart between all different rating scales used by credit rating agencies. The equivalence chart may help investors to get a first indication of the creditworthiness of an entity rated by several different agencies. Historical performance data ~~to be published by~~on credit rating agencies ~~in ESMA's central repository. The European Parliament supported the establishment of such European Rating Index in its resolution on credit rating agencies of 8 June 2011~~shall be periodically published by ESMA.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

(24) Credit ratings, whether issued for regulatory purposes or not, have a significant impact on investment decisions. Hence, credit rating agencies have an important responsibility ~~towards investors~~ in ensuring that they comply with the rules of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 so that their ratings are independent, objective and of adequate quality. However, in the absence of a contractual relationship between the credit rating agency and the investor, investors are not always in a position to enforce the agency's responsibility towards them. Therefore, it is important to provide for an adequate right of redress for investors who relied on a credit rating issued in breach of the rules of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. The investor should be able to hold the credit rating agency liable, when acting intentionally or with gross negligence, for any damage caused by an infringement of that Regulation which had an impact on the rating outcome. Infringements which do not impact the rating outcome, such as breaches of transparency obligations, should not trigger civil liability claims.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26

(26) It is important to provide investors with an effective right of redress against credit rating agencies. ~~As investors do not have close insight in internal procedures of credit rating agencies a partial reversal of t~~The burden of proof ~~with~~as regard tos the existence of an infringement and the infringement's impact on the rating outcome ~~seems to be appropriate if the investor has made a reasonable case in favour of the existence of such an infringement. However, the burden of proof~~, and also as regards the existence of a damage and the causality of the infringement for the damage, ~~both being closer to the sphere of the investor,~~ should fully be on the investor.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

(28) The fact that institutional investors including investment managers are obliged to carry out their own assessment of the creditworthiness of assets should not prevent courts from finding that an infringement of this Regulation by a credit rating agency has caused damage to an investor for which that credit rating agency is liable. While this Regulation will improve the possibilities of investors to make an own risk assessment they will continue to have more limited access to information than the credit agencies themselves. Furthermore, in particular smaller investors often will lack the capability to critically review an external rating provided by a credit rating agency.deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29

(29) In order to further mitigate conflicts of interest and facilitate fair competition in the credit rating market, it is important to ensure that the fees charged by credit rating agencies to customers are not discriminatory. Differences in fees charged for the same type of service should only be justifiable by a difference in the actual costs in providing this service to different customers. Moreover, the fees charged for rating services to a given issuer should not depend on the results or outcome of the work performed ~~or on the provision of related (ancillary) services~~. Furthermore, in order to allow for the effective supervision of those rules, credit rating agencies should disclose to ESMA the fees received from each of their clients and their general pricing policy.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32

(32) In view of the specificities of sovereign ratings and in order to reduce the risk of volatility, it is appropriate to require credit rating agencies to only publish these ratings after the close of business of the trading venues established in the Union and at least one hour before their opening. Also, sovereign ratings should be published twice a year on predefined dates set by ESMA. Whenever special circumstances may justify a review, such credit rating review may be publish outside those predefined dates, together with a full explanatory statement on the grounds of such unplanned review. If accompanied by the explanatory statement mentioned above, such review cannot be challenged on the grounds of extemporaneity.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34

(34) The Commission should adopt the draft regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA regarding ~~the content of the handover file when a credit rating agency is replaced by another credit rating agency,~~ the content, frequency and presentation of the information to be provided by issuers on structured finance instruments, ~~harmonisation of the standard rating scale to be used by credit rating agencies,~~ the presentation of the information, including structure, format, method and timing of reporting, that credit rating agencies, EBA and national central banks of Member States should disclose to ESMA in relation to EURIX and the content and format of the periodic reporting on fees charged by credit rating agencies for the purposes of ongoing supervision by ESMA. The Commission should adopt those standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 of the Treaty and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36 a (new)

(36a) The Commission should put forward a report, and if necessary a proposal, to the European Parliament and to the Council, evaluating the possibility of the creation, within the Commission, of a European debt authority, which would be responsible to manage and coordinate all issues related with the annual debt issuance plan of the Member States, the renewal of outstanding debt and with the assessment of the sustainability of all Member States governments debt. Moreover, the European debt authority should periodically publish all data related to Member States public debt, deficit and other macroeconomic indicators on a single website. While not itself being a credit rating agency and while not itself issuing credit ratings, the European debt authority should provide investors with all relevant data regarding sovereign debt and other key macroeconomic indicators. Such disclosure on a single website should help decrease overreliance on credit ratings and enhance transparency.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36 b (new)

(36b) The Commission should put forward, by the end of 2012, a report regarding the feasibility of a network of smaller credit rating agencies in order to increase competition in the market. Such report should evaluate the possibility of ensuring European financial support to the creation of such network - taking into consideration the potential conflict of interest arising from such public funding - and other possible non financial incentives to be put in place to this objective.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 1 – paragraph 1

This Regulation introduces a common regulatory approach in order to enhance the integrity, transparency, responsibility, good governance and ~~reliability~~independence of credit rating activities, contributing to the quality of credit ratings issued in the Union, thereby contributing to the smooth functioning of the internal market while achieving a high level of consumer and investor protection. It lays down conditions for the issuing of credit ratings and rules on the organisation and conduct of credit rating agencies, including their shareholders and members, to promote credit rating agencies' independence, the avoidance of conflicts of interest and the enhancement of ~~consumer and~~ investor protection.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 3 – point c

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point w

(w) “rating outlook” means an opinion regarding the likely direction of a credit rating over the ~~short and medium term~~time period specified by the relevant credit rating agency in that opinion.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 6

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 5b – title

Reliance on credit ratings by the European Supervisory Authorities ~~and~~, the European Systemic Risk Board and the European Central Bank

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 6

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 5b – paragraph 1

The European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ~~(*)~~1 (EBA), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ~~(**)~~2 (EIOPA) ~~and ESMA~~, ESMA and the ECB shall not refer to credit ratings in their guidelines, recommendations and draft technical standards where such references have the potential to trigger mechanistic reliance on credit ratings by competent authorities or financial market participants. Accordingly, and at the latest by 31 December 2013, EBA, EIOPA ~~and ESMA~~, ESMA and the ECB shall review and remove where appropriate all references to credit ratings in existing guidelines and recommendations. _____________ 1 OJ 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12. 2 OJ 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 6

Article 5c Due diligence obligations and internal risk management Financial institutions and institutional investors shall perform all due diligence obligations and internal risk management obligations when acquiring financial products, especially in regard to complex or structured products. When investors disregard intentionally or with gross negligence their due diligence and their internal risk management obligations, credit rating agencies shall not be held liable for damage or loss arising from such conduct.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 7 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 – paragraph 3 a (new)

(7a) In Article 6, the following paragraph is added: "3a. A credit rating agency shall not provide consultancy or advisory services to the rated entity or a related third party regarding the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities or activities of that rated entity or related third party."

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 7 b (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 – paragraph 3 b (new)

(7b) In Article 6, the following paragraph is added: "3b. Credit Rating Agencies shall establish, maintain, enforce, and document an effective internal control structure governing the implementation of policies and procedures to the prevention and control of possible conflicts of interest and to ensure the independence of ratings, analysts and rating teams regarding shareholders, administrative and management bodies and sales and marketing activities. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) shall be put in place with regard to corporate governance, organisation, and the management of conflict of interest. SOPs shall be periodically monitored and reviewed in order to evaluate their effectiveness and assess whether they should be updated."

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 7 c (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6 – paragraph 3 c (new)

(7b) In Article 6, the following paragraph is added: "3c. Credit rating agencies shall submit an annual internal controls report to ESMA, which shall contain a description of the responsibility of their management in establishing and maintaining an effective internal control structure and an assessment of the effectiveness of their internal control structure."

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6a – paragraph 1

1. All shareholders or a members of a credit rating agency holding at least 510 % of the capital or of the voting rights in that agency shall not (a) hold 5% or more of the capital of any other credit rating agency. This prohibition does not apply to holdings in diversified collective investment schemes, including managed funds such as pension funds or life insurance, provided that the holdings in diversified collective investment schemes do not put him or her in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of those schemes; (b) have the right or the power to exercise 5% or more of the voting rights in any other credit rating agency; (c) have the right or the power to appoint or remove members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of any other credit rating agency; (d) be member of the administrative, management or supervisory body of any other credit rating agency; (e) have the power to exercise, or actually exercise, dominant influence or control over any other credit rating agency.should be publicly disclosed. (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6a – paragraph 2

2. ~~This Article does not apply to investmen~~Where a shareholder or a member of a credit rating agency holding at least 10% of the capital or the voting rights in otherat credit rating agenc~~ies belonging to the same group of credit rating agencies~~y is also a member of the administrative or supervisory board of the rated entity or has invested in the rated entity, that relationship shall be publicly disclosed and the credit rating agency shall disclose the fact that its rating could be affected.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 8

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 6b

Article 6b Maximum duration of the contractual relationship with a credit rating agency 1. Where a credit rating agency has entered into a contract with an issuer or its related third party for the issuing of credit ratings on that issuer, it shall not issue credit ratings on that issuer for a period exceeding three years. 2. Where a credit rating agency has entered into a contract with an issuer or its related third party for the issuing of credit ratings on the debt instruments of that issuer, the following shall apply: (a) when those credit ratings are issued within a period exceeding an initial period of twelve months but shorter than three years, the credit rating agency shall not issue any further credit ratings on those debt instruments from the moment that ten debt instruments have been rated; (b) when at least ten credit ratings are issued within an initial period of twelve months, that credit rating agency shall not issue any further credit ratings on those debt instruments after the end of that period; (c) when less than ten credit ratings are issued, the credit rating agency shall not issue any further credit ratings on those debt instruments from the moment a period of 3 years have elapsed. 3. Where an issuer has entered into a contract regarding the same matter with more than one credit rating agency, the limitations set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall only apply to one of these agencies. However, none of these agencies shall have a contractual relationship with the issuer exceeding a period of six years. 4. The credit rating agency referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall not enter into a contract with the issuer or its related third parties for the issuing of credit ratings on the issuer or its debt instruments for a period of four years from the end of the maximum duration period of the contractual relationship referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3. The first subparagraph shall also apply to: (a) a credit rating agency belonging to the same group of credit rating agencies as the credit rating agency referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2; (b) a credit rating agency which is a shareholder or member of the credit rating agency referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2; (c) a credit rating agency in which the credit rating agency referred to in paragraph 1 and 2 is a shareholder or member. 5. Paragraphs 1 to 4shall not apply to sovereign ratings. 6. Where following the end of the maximum duration period of the contractual relationship, pursuant to the rules in paragraphs 1 and 2, a credit rating agency is replaced by another credit rating agency, the exiting credit rating agency shall provide the incoming credit rating agency with a handover file. Such file shall include relevant information concerning the rated entity and the rated debt instruments as may reasonably be necessary to ensure the comparability with the ratings carried out by the exiting credit rating agency. The exiting rating agency shall be able to demonstrate to ESMA that such information has been provided to the incoming credit rating agency. 7. ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify technical requirements on the content of the handover file referred to in paragraph 5. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in this paragraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.deleted (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 10 – point c

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8 – paragraph 5a – subparagraph 1

5a. A credit rating agency that intends to introduce significant changes or use ~~any~~ new rating methodologies, models or key rating assumptions shall without undue delay inform ESMA and publish the proposed relevant changes or proposed new methodologies on its website inviting stakeholders to submit comments for a period not shorter than one month, together with a detailed explanation of the reasons for and the implications of the proposed changes or proposed new methodologies.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 10 – point c

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8 – paragraph 5a – subparagraph 2

After expiry of the consultation period referred to in the first subparagraph~~, the credit rating agency shall notify ESMA of the intended changes or proposed new methodologies~~ and after the approval of the changes or new methodologies, the credit rating agency shall notify them to ESMA without undue delay.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 10 – point d – point i

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8 – paragraph 6 – introductory part

6. When methodologies, models or key assumptions used in credit rating activities are changed ~~following the decision of ESMA referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 22a,~~ a credit rating agency shall without undue delay:

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 10 – point d – point ii

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8 – paragraph 6 – point aa

(aa) i~~mmediately~~nform ESMA and publish on its website the new methodologies ~~together~~ with a detailed explanation ~~thereof~~;

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 10 – point e

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8 – paragraph 7 – point a

~~(a) notify those errors to ESMA and all affected rated entities;~~deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 10 – point e

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8 – paragraph 7 – point b

~~(b) publish those errors on its website;~~deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 10 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8a (new)

10a. The following Article is inserted: "Article -8a Sovereign ratings 1. Sovereign credit ratings shall be reviewed at least every six months. 2. The sovereign credit rating reviews referred to in paragraph 1 shall be published only twice a year, on predefined dates that shall be established by ESMA. 3. Credit rating agencies shall publish sovereign credit rating reviews after close of business in all trading venues established in the Union and at least one hour before their opening. 4. Where justified by particular circumstances regarding the situation of a the country concerned, sovereign credit rating reviews may be publish on dates other than those established by ESMA under paragraph 2, together with a full explanatory statement on the grounds of such unplanned review. 5. Where sovereign credit ratings are published in accordance with paragraph 4, they shall not be challenged on the ground of their extemporaneity."

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8b – title

Double credit rating ~~of structured finance instruments~~

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8b – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. All credit ratings used for regulatory purposes shall take into account the ratings issued by two credit rating agencies recognised as external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs). Each credit rating agency shall provide its own independent credit rating.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8b – paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. The issuer shall mandate the first ECAI whose rating will be considered for regulatory purposes. The issuer may more than one credit rating agency, but only one rating shall be used for regulatory purposes. The second credit rating taken into account for regulatory purposes shall be issued by an ECAI appointed by ESMA. ESMA shall develop regulatory technical standards regarding the selection and appointment procedures relating to ECAIs, ensuring the fairness and transparency of those procedures. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [...] Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the second subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8b – paragraph 2

2. The credit rating agencies ~~mandated by an issuer or its related third parties~~ referred in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall comply with the following conditions:

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 11

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 8b – paragraph 2 – point e

(e) none of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body in a credit rating agency is a member of the of the administrative, management or supervisory body of any of the other credit rating agencies;deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 12

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 10 – paragraph 2

2. Credit rating agencies shall ensure that credit ratings and rating outlooks are presented and processed in accordance with the requirements set out in Section D of Annex I and that credit ratings which are not intended by a credit rating agency to be used for regulatory purposes are clearly and prominently identified as such.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 14

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 11a – paragraph 1

1. Any registered and any certified credit rating agency shall, ~~when issuing~~no later than one working day following the publication of a credit rating or a rating outlook, submit to ESMA rating information, including the rating and outlook of the rated instrument, information on the type of rating, the type of rating action, and date and hour of publication~~. The rating submitted shall be based upon the harmonised rating scale referred to in point (a) of Article 21(4a).~~

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 14

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 11a – paragraph 2

2. ESMA shall establish a European Rating Index which will ~~include all credit ratings submitted to ESMA pursuant to paragraph 1 and an aggregated rating index for any rated debt instrument. The index and individual credit ratings~~constitute an aggregated rating-implied index for any rated debt instrument, derived from all credit ratings submitted to ESMA pursuant to paragraph 1, the credit risk measurements submitted by EBA derived from the internal models of banks authorised to use such models in the Union and, where available, from credit risk measurements submitted to ESMA by the national central banks of the Member States and other European and global public authorities. The index shall be published on ESMA's website.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 17

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 19 – paragraph 1

1. ESMA shall charge fees to the credit rating agencies which are registered in accordance with this Regulation and the regulation on fees referred to in paragraph 2. Those fees shall be referable only to, but shall fully cover, ESMA's necessary and reasonable expenditure relating to the registration, certification and supervision of credit rating agencies and the reimbursement of any costs that the competent authorities may incur carrying out work pursuant to this Regulation insofar as that work relates to the supervision of credit rating agencies, in particular as a result of any delegation of tasks in accordance with Article 30.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 18 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 21 – paragraph 4 – point a

(a) a harmonised standard rating scale to be used, in accordance with Article 11a, by registered and certified credit rating agencies, which will be based upon the metric to measure credit risk and the number of rating categories and cut off values for each rating categoryn equivalence chart between the rating scales used by registered and certified credit rating agencies;

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 18 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 21 – paragraph 4 – point b

(b) the content and the presentation of the information, including structure, format, method and timing of reporting that credit rating agencies shall disclose to ESMA in accordance with Article 11a (1) and the information that EBA and the national central banks shall disclose to ESMA in accordance with Article 11a(2); and

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 19 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 22a – title

Examination of ~~rating methodologies~~compliance with the back- testing obligation

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 19 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 22a – paragraph 3

(b) the following paragraph 3 is added: ‘3. ESMA shall also verify that any intended changes to rating methodologies notified by a credit rating agency in accordance with Article 8(5a) comply with the criteria laid down in Article 8(3) as specified in the regulatory technical standard referred to in point (d) of Article 21(4). The credit rating agency may only apply the new rating methodology after ESMA has confirmed the methodology's compliance with Article 8(3). [ESMA shall be able to exercise the powers referred to in the first subparagraph from the date of entry into force of the regulatory technical standard referred to in point (d) of Article 21(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.] Where the regulatory technical standard referred to in point (d) of Article 21(4) is not in force, ESMA shall not be able to exercise the power referred to in the first subparagraph.’deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 20

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 35a – paragraph 4

4. Where an investor establishes facts from which it may be inferred that a credit rating agency has committed any of the infringements listed in Annex III, ~~it will be for~~such an investor will have to produce proof that the credit rating agency ~~to prove that it has not~~has committed thate infringement ~~or that that infringement did not have an~~intentionally or with gross negligence and that such infringement has had a significant impact on the issued credit rating.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 20

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 35a – paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. The right of redress set out in this Article shall not prevent ESMA from fully performing its powers laid down in Article 36a.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 20

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 35a – paragraph 5 b (new)

5b. This Article shall not apply where the investor, intentionally or with gross negligence, does not comply with its due diligence and internal management obligations as laid down in Article 5c.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 21 – point b b (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 36a – paragraph 4 a (new)

(bb) In Article 36a, the following paragraph is added: "4a. The basic amounts of fines defined within the limits set out in paragraph 2 shall be adjusted, where appropriate, by taking into account any damages paid or to be paid following a civil liability action pursuant Article 35a."

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 24 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 39 – paragraph 1

~~By 7 December~~1. By July 20123, the Commission shall make an assessment of the application of this Regulation, including an assessment of the reliance on credit ratings in the Union, the impact on the level of concentration in the credit rating market, the cost and benefits of impacts of the Regulation ~~and of~~, the appropriateness of the remuneration of the credit rating agency by the rated entity (issuer-pays model), and whether conflicts of interest in the credit rating market are appropriately mitigated, in particular whether the measures adopted under this Regulation fulfil the objectives of enhancing ratings quality or whether additional measures are necessary. The Commission shall submit a report thereon to the European Parliament and the Council.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 24 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 39 – paragraph 4

4. By 1 July 2015, the Commission shall assess the situation in the credit rating market, in particular the availability of sufficient choice in order to comply with the requirements set out in Article~~s 6b and~~ 8b. The review shall also assess the need to extend the scope of the obligations in Article 8a ~~to include other financial products, including covered bonds~~.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 24 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 40a a (new)

(24 a) The following article is inserted: "Article 40aa European debt authority By ...*, in order to reduce overreliance on credit ratings, the Commission shall put forward a report, and if appropriate a proposal, to the European Parliament and to the Council, evaluating the possibility of the creation, within the Commission, of a European debt authority that would be responsible to manage and coordinate all issues related with the annual debt issuance plan of the Member States, the renewal of their outstanding debt and the assessment of the sustainability of all Member States governments debt, as well as a annual publication of data related to Member States public debt, deficit and other macroeconomic indicators. The European debt authority shall provide investors with all relevant data regarding sovereign debt and other key macroeconomic indicators published on a single website."

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – point 24 b (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Article 40a b (new)

(24b) The following article is inserted: "Article 40ab Credit rating agency network The Commission shall put forward, by the end of 2012, a report regarding the feasibility of a network of smaller credit rating agencies in order to increase competition in the market. That report shall evaluate the possibility of ensuring European financial support to the creation of such network, taking into consideration the potential conflict of interest arising from such public funding, and other possible non-financial incentives to be put in place to this objective."

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 3

Point (8) of Article 1 of this Regulation in relation to Article 6a(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 shall apply from [1 year after the entry into force of this Regulation] as regards any shareholder or member of a credit rating agency which on 15 November 2011 held 510% or more of the capital of more than one credit rating agency.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – point 1 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex I – Section B – point 3

(b) point 3 is amended as follows: (i) the introductory sentence of the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: '3. A credit rating agency shall not issue a credit rating or a rating outlook in any of the following circumstances, or shall, in the case of an existing credit rating or rating outlook, immediately disclose where the credit rating or rating outlook is potentially affected by the following:' (ii) the following point (aa) is inserted after point (a): '(aa) a shareholder or member of a credit rating agency holding, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of either the capital or the voting rights of that credit rating agency or being otherwise in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the credit rating agency, directly or indirectly owns financial instruments of the rated entity or a related third party or has any other direct or indirect ownership interest in that entity or party, other than holdings in diversified collective investment schemes, including managed funds such as pension funds or life insurance, which do not put him in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the scheme;'; (iii) the following point (ba) is inserted after point (b): '(ba) the credit rating is issued with respect to a rated entity or a related third party which directly or indirectly holds 10% or more of either the capital or the voting rights of that credit rating agency;'; (iv) the following point (ca) is inserted after point (c): '(ca) a shareholder or member of a credit rating agency holding, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of either the capital or the voting rights of that credit rating agency or being otherwise in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the credit rating agency, is a member of the administrative or supervisory board of the rated entity or a related third party;'; (v) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: 'A credit rating agency shall also immediately assess whether there are grounds for re-rating or withdrawing the existing credit rating or credit outlook.'deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – point 1 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex III – Part I – points 26a to 26 f

(b) the following new points 26a to 26f are inserted: '26a. The credit rating agency which entered into a contract with an issuer or its related third party for the issuing of credit ratings on the issuer infringes Article 6b(1) by issuing credit ratings on this issuer for a period exceeding three years. 26b. The credit rating agency which entered into a contract with an issuer or its related third party for the issuing of credit ratings on the debt instruments of the issuer infringes Article 6b(2) by issuing credit ratings on at least ten debt instruments of the same issuer during a period exceeding 12 months or by issuing credit ratings on the debt instruments of the issuer for a period exceeding 3 years. 26c. The credit rating agency which entered into a contract with an issuer alongside at least one more credit rating agency infringes Article 6b(3) by having a contractual relationship with the issuer for a period exceeding six years. 26d. The credit rating agency which entered into a contract with an issuer or its related third party for the issuing of credit ratings on the issuer or its debt instruments of the issuer infringes Article 6b(4) by not respecting the prohibition to issue credit ratings on the issuer or its debt instruments for a period of four years from the end of the maximum duration period of the contractual relationship referred to in paragraphs1 to 3 of Article 6b. 26e. The credit rating agency which entered into a contract with an issuer or its related third party for the issuing of credit ratings on the issuer or its debt instruments of the issuer infringes Article 6b(6) by not making available at the end of the maximum duration period of the contractual relationship with the issuer or its related third party a handover file with the required information to an incoming credit rating agency contracted by the issuer or its related third party to issue credit ratings on this issuer or its debt instruments.'deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – point 1 – point h

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex III – Part I – point 46a

46a. The credit rating agency infringes ~~the second subparagraph of Article 8(5) in conjunction with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 8(5)~~Article 10a by not monitoring its sovereign ratings or by not reviewing its sovereign ratings on an ongoing basis and at least every 6 months.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – point 2 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex III – Part II – point 3a and 3b

(a) the following points 3a and 3b are inserted: ‘3a. The credit rating agency infringes the second subparagraph of Article 8(5a) by not notifying ESMA of the intended changes to the rating methodologies, models or key assumptions or of the proposed new methodologies, models or key assumptions. 3b. The credit rating agency infringes point (a) of Article 8(7) by not notifying ESMA of discovered errors in its methodologies or in their application.’deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – point 3 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex III – Part III – point 3a

3a. The credit rating agency infringes the first subparagraph of Article 8(5a) by not notifying ESMA and publishing on its website the proposed relevant changes to the methodologies, models or key rating assumptions or the proposed new methodologies, models or key rating assumptions together with a detailed explanation of the reasons for and the implications of the proposed changes.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – point 3 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex III – Part III – point 4a

4a. The credit rating agency infringes point (aa) of Article 8(6), where it intends to use new methodologies, by not ~~publishing immediately~~notifying ESMA and publishing on its website the new methodologies together with a detailed explanation ~~thereof~~without undue delay.

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – point 3 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex III – Part III – point 4b

~~4b. The credit rating agency infringes point (a) of Article 8(7) by not notifying affected rated entities of discovered errors in its methodologies or in their application.~~deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Annex III – point 3 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009
Annex III – Part III – point 4c

~~4c. The credit rating agency infringes point (b) of Article 8(7) by not publishing on its website discovered errors in its methodologies or in their application.’~~deleted

2012/04/17
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 44

(44) In order to take account of the technical developments in the financial markets, in auditing and the audit profession and to specify the requirements laid down in this Regulation, the Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In particular, the use of delegated acts is necessary to ~~adapt the list of related audit services and of non-audit services as well as to~~ set out the level of fees that ESMA could charge for delivering the European Quality Certificate to statutory auditors and audit firms. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level and with the European Group of Auditors Oversight Bodies ("EGAOB") . The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council.

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 45

(45) In order to ensure legal certainty and the smooth transition to the regime introduced by this Regulation, it is important to introduce a transitional regime regarding the entry into force of ~~the obligation to rotate audit firms, the obligation to organise a selection procedure for the choice of audit firm and the conversion of audit firms into firms that only provide audit services~~certain of the obligations in this Regulation.

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

A statutory auditor or an audit firm carrying out a statutory audit of a public- interest entit~~ies may~~y shall not provide to the audited entity~~, to~~ or its ~~parent~~controlled undertaking ~~and to its controlled undertakings statutory audit services and rela~~s, either directly or indirectly, any non-audit services that are prohibited fin~~ancial audit services~~ paragraph 3 below.

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

Where the statutory auditor or audit firm belongs to a network, ano other member of such network may provide to the audited entity, to its parent undertaking within the Union and to its controlled undertakings within the Union ~~statutory~~ the non-audit services ~~or related financial audit services~~that are prohibited under paragraph 3 below.

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

A statutory auditor or an audit firm carrying out statutory audit of public- interest entities shall not directly or indirectly provide to the audited entity, to its parent undertaking and to its controlled undertakings non-audit services.deleted

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

Where the statutory auditor belongs to a network, no member of such network shall provide to the audited entity, to its parent undertaking and to its controlled undertakings within the Union any non- audit services.deleted

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 6

6. ~~The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 68 for the purpose of adapting the list of related financial audit services referred to in~~Member States may exceptionally add to the list of services prohibited by virtue of paragraph 23 a~~nd the list of non-audit services referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article. When using such powers, the Commission shall take into account developments in auditing and the audit profess~~bove, for statutory auditors or audit firms for which the relevant Member State is the home Member State, provided such additions result from existing requirements under national law or regulation.

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point c

(c) ~~request permission~~seek the approval from the audit committee to provide any the non-audit services ~~referred to in Article 10(3)(b)(i) and (ii) to the audited entity~~to the audited entity or to its controlled undertakings in the European Union, other than those prohibited services referred to in Article 10(3) and those audit related and other assurance services referred to in Article 10(2);

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 2 – point r

~~(r) indicate the non-audit services referred to in Article 10(3)(b)(i) and (ii) that the audit committee allowed the statutory auditor or the audit firm to provide to the audited entity;~~deleted

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 5 – point f

(f) a~~uthorise, on a case by case basis,~~pprove the provision by the statutory auditor or audit firm ~~of the services referred to in Article 10(3)(b)(i) and (ii) of this Regulation to~~ to the audited entity and its controlled undertakings in the Union of all non-audit services other than those prohibited services referred to in Article 10(3) and those audit related and other a~~udited entity~~ssurance services referred to in Article 10(2).

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – title

Duration of the statutory audit engagement

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

The public-interest entity shall appoint a statutory auditor or audit firm for an ~~initial~~ engagement period that shall not be ~~short~~longer than ~~two~~six years.

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 a (new)

(1a) The audit committee shall consider whether or not to initiate a tender process for the statutory audit following the conditions set out in Article 32.

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

The public-interest entity may renew thise audit engagement ~~only once~~providing that such renewal is proposed by the audit committee and is approved by the shareholders’ meeting.

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

~~The maximum duration of the combined two engagements shall not exceed 6 years.~~deleted

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 2

2. After the expiry of the maximum duration of the engagement referred to in paragraph 1, the statutory auditor or audit firm or any members of its network within the Union, where applicable, shall not undertake the statutory audit of the public-interest entity concerned until a period of at least four years has elapsed.deleted

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0359(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 3

3. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, on an exceptional basis the public-interest entity may request the competent authority referred to in Article 35(1) to grant an extension to re-appoint the statutory auditor or audit firm for an additional engagement. In case of appointment of two statutory auditors or audit firms, this third engagement shall not exceed three years. In case of appointment of one statutory auditor or audit firm, this third engagement shall not exceed two years.deleted

2012/10/29
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)

(1a) The programme as such and its success are vital in the present economic situation, bearing in mind that the Union needs to move towards closer economic, fiscal, and budgetary policy cooperation and coordination.

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 b (new)

(1b) The free movement of capital cannot be used as a way to evade tax, in particular for Member States whose currency is the euro and which are experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area.

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

(2) The programme activities, i.e. the European Information Systems, the joint actions for tax officials and the common training initiatives, are expected to contribute to the realisation of the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. In providing a framework for activities which strive for more efficient tax authorities, strengthen the competitiveness of businesses, promote employment and contribute to the protection of the Union’s financial and economic interests, the programme will actively strengthen the functioning of the taxation systems in the internal market while gradually eliminating existing barriers and distortions within the market.

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) To support the process of accession and association by third countries, not only should the programme ~~should~~ be open for the participation of acceding and candidate countries as well as potential candidates and partner countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy if certain conditions are fulfilled, but the Commission should also establish the conditions enabling accession to be brought about. Considering the increasing interconnectivity of the world economy, the programme continues to provide for the possibility to involve external experts, such as representatives of governmental authorities, economic operators and their organisations or representatives of international organisations, in certain activities.

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) Given the increasing globalisation, an efficient fight against fraud should equally have an international dimension. It is therefore ~~usefu~~essential to enable the Union to conclude agreements on technical cooperation with developed third countries to allow those countries to use the Union components of the European Information Systems to support a secure exchange of information between them and the Member States in the framework of bilateral tax agreements.

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1

1. A multi-annual action programme “Fiscalis 2020” (“the programme”) is hereby established to improve the operation of the taxation systems in the internal market and cooperation and coordination thereof.

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1

1. The general objective of the programme shall be to strengthen the internal market through efficient and effective taxation systems. and to eradicate tax fraud, tax evasion, and tax avoidance through cooperation.

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) to support ~~the~~coordinated preparation from the outset, coherent application, without distortions, and effective implementation of Union tax law

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) to fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance~~, in particular by enhancing~~ through effective and efficient administrative cooperation and exchange of information based on clear- cut transparent rules and efficient, operational means of communication between stakeholders

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0341B(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) IT capacity building to enhance the development of tax authorities and support them more effectively for the purposes of: development, maintenance, operation and quality control, of Union components of European Information Systems set out in point 1 of the Annex and, new European Information Systems established under Union legislation

2012/10/16
Committee: ECON

2011/0298(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 20 – paragraph 1

1. Member States shall require that investment firms and market operators operating an OTFs establish arrangements preventing the execution of client orders in an OTF against the proprietary capital of the investment firm or market operator operating the OTF~~. The investment firm shall not act as a systematic internalis~~, except where the relevant client has elected in writing to opt-in to arrangements permitting the execution of the client's orders in anthat OTF ~~operated by itself. An OTF shall not connect with another OTF in a way which enables orders in different OTFs to interact~~against proprietary capital of the investment firm or market operator operating that OTF for client facilitation purposes.

2012/05/15
Committee: ECON

2011/0298(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 20 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4 a. Member States shall require that investment firms or market operators operating an OTF take appropriate steps to identify and manage any conflicts of interest arising in connection with the oversight and operation of their OTF.

2012/05/15
Committee: ECON

2011/0298(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 24 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1

– the investment firm and its services; when investment advice is provided, information shall specify ~~whether~~that the advice is provided on an independent basis and ~~whether it is based on a broad or on a more restricted analysis of the market and shall indicate whether~~on a reasonable analysis of the market that suits the client's best interests and shall indicate periodicity with which the investment firm will provide the client with the on-going assessment of the suitability of the financial instruments recommended to clients,

2012/05/15
Committee: ECON

2011/0298(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 24 – paragraph 5 – introductory part

5. When the investment firm ~~informs the client that investment advice is provided on an independent basis~~provides investment advice, the firm:

2012/05/15
Committee: ECON

2011/0298(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a – point iv

(iv) shares or units in UCITS excluding structured UCITS as referred to in Article 36 paragraph 1 subparagraph 2 of Commission Regulation 583/2010 and other UCITS based on complex portfolio management techniques;

2012/05/15
Committee: ECON

2011/0298(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 7

7. ESMA shall develop by [] at the latest, and update periodically, guidelines for the assessment of financial instruments incorporating a structure which makes it difficult for the client to understand the risk involved in accordance with paragraph 3 (a) and of UCITS based on complex portfolio management techniques.

2012/05/15
Committee: ECON

2011/0298(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 71 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) require existing telephone and existing data traffic records held by investment firms where a reasonable suspicion exists that such records related to the subject- matter of the inspection may be relevant to prove a breach by the investment firm of its obligations under this Directive; these records shall however not concern the content of the communication to which they relate;

2012/05/15
Committee: ECON

2011/0298(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 96 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)

(fa) the compliance by investment firms with the best execution obligations provided in [Article 27] and the level of pre-trade transparency in the EU market, notably on the quality and accessibility of pre-trade information by investors, taking into account inter alia the level of market fragmentation. The Commission shall submit its report accompanied, if appropriate, by a legislative proposal for the establishment of a consolidated tape for pre-trade information.

2012/05/15
Committee: ECON

2011/0296(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) This new category of organised trading facility will complement the existing types of trading venues. While regulated markets and multilateral trading facilities are characterised by non-discretionary execution of transactions, the operator of an organised trading facility should have discretion over how a transaction is to be executed. Consequently, conduct of business rules including conflicts management, best execution and client order handling obligations should apply to the transactions concluded on an OTF operated by an investment firm or a market operator. However, because an OTF constitutes a genuine trading platform, the platform operator should be neutral. Therefore, the operator of an OTF should not be allowed to execute in the OTF any transaction between multiple third-party buying and selling interests including client orders brought together in the system against his own proprietary capital~~. This also excludes them from acting as systematic internalisers in the OTF operated by them~~, except where proprietary capital is used in order to facilitate client orders.

2012/05/14
Committee: ECON

2011/0296(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) In order to ensure uniform applicable conditions between trading venues, the same pre- and post-trade transparency requirements should apply to the different types of venues. The transparency requirements should be calibrated for different types of instruments, including equity, bonds, and derivatives, and for different types of trading, including order- book and quote-driven systems such as request for quotes as well as hybrid and voice broking systems, and take account of issuance, transaction size and characteristics of national markets.

2012/05/14
Committee: ECON

2011/0296(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3 – point b

(b) the size orand type of orders for which pre- trade disclosure may be waived under paragraph 1 for each class of financial instrument concerned;

2012/05/14
Committee: ECON

2011/0296(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b

(b) the conditions for authorising a regulated market, an investment firm, including a systematic internaliser or an investment firm or market operator operating an MTF or an OTF for a deferred publication of trades and the criteria to be applied when deciding the transactions for which, due to their size or the type (including prevailing liquidity profile or the specific characteristics of the trading activity) of share, depositary receipt, exchange-traded fund, certificate or other similar financial instrument involved, deferred publication is allowed for each class of financial instrument concerned.

2012/05/14
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) Inside information can be abused before an issuer is under the obligation to disclose it. The state of contract negotiations, terms provisionally agreed in contract negotiations, the possibility of the placement of financial instruments, conditions under which financial instruments will be marketed, or provisional terms for the placement of financial instruments may be relevant information for investors. Therefore, such information should qualify as inside information. However, such information may not be sufficiently precise for the issuer to be under an obligation to disclose it. In such cases, the prohibition against insider dealing should apply, but the obligation on the issuer to disclose the information should not.deleted

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 a (new)

(14 a) When inside information concerns a process which occurs in stages, each stage of the process as well as the overall process could be information of a precise nature.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31

(31) Existing telephone and data traffic records from investment firms executing transactions, and existing telephone and data traffic records from telecom operators constitute crucial, and sometimes the only, evidence to detect and prove the existence of insider dealing and market manipulation. Telephone and data traffic records may establish the identity of a person responsible for the dissemination of false or misleading information, that persons have been in contact at a certain time, and that a relationship exists between two or more people. In order to introduce a level playing field in the Union in relation to the access by competent authorities to telephone and existing data traffic records held by a telecommunication operator or by an investment firm, competent authorities should be able to require existing telephone and existing data traffic records held by a telecommunication operator or by an investment firm, ~~where a reasonable suspicion exists that such~~violation of this Regulation or Directive [new MAD]. Telephone and data traffic records rhelated to the subject-matter of the inspection may be relevant to prove insider dealing or market manipulation as defined in [new MAD] in violation of this Regulation or Directive [new MAD]. Telephone and data traffic records do not encompass the content of such recordsd by telecom operators do not encompass the content of such records. This shall not limit the powers of competent authorities to request and have access to telephone and data traffic records referred to in article [16(7) of New MiFID], including its content.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point e

(e) information not falling within paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) relating to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments, which is not generally available to the public, but which, if it were available to a reasonable investor, who regularly deals on the market and in the financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract concerned, would be regarded by that person as relevant when deciding the terms on which transactions in the financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract should be effected.deleted

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 7

7. Where the person referred to in paragraph 1 is a legal person, the provisions of that paragraph shall not apply to a transaction by the legal person if the legal person had in place effective arrangements which ensure that no person in possession of inside information relevant to the transaction had any involvement in the decision or behaved in such a way as to influence the decision or had any contact with those involved in the decision whereby the information could have been transmitted or its existence could have been indicated.deleted

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

(a) entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade or any other behaviour which ~~has the following consequences~~:

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point a – indent 1

– it gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of, a financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract; or

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point a – indent 2

– it secures, or is likely to secure, the price of one or several financial instruments or a related spot commodity contracts at an abnormal or artificial level;

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade or any other behaviour affecting, or likely to affect, the price of one or several financial instruments or a related spot commodity contract, which employs a fictitious device or any other form of deception or contrivance; or

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c – introductory part

(c) disseminating information through the media, including the Internet, or by any other means, which has or is likely to have the consequences referred to in subparagraph (a), where the person who made the dissemination knew, or ought to have known, that the information was false or misleading. When information is disseminated for the purposes of journalism, such dissemination of information shall be assessed taking into account the rules governing the freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media, unless:

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3 – introductory part

3. The following behaviour shall be considered as market ~~manipulation or attempts to engage in market~~ manipulation:

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3 – point a

(a) conduct by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, to secure a dominant position over the supply of or demand for a financial instrument or related spot commodity contracts which has or is likely to have the effect of fixing, directly or indirectly, purchase or sale prices or creat~~ing~~es or is likely to create other unfair trading conditions,

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3 – point b

(b) the buying or selling of financial instruments at the close of the market with the effect or ~~intention~~likely effect of misleading investors acting on the basis of closing prices,

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 3 – point c – introductory part

(c) the sending of orders to a trading venue by means of algorithmic trading, including ~~high frequency~~by means of algorithmic trading, with~~out an intention to trade bu~~ the effect for ~~the purpose~~likely effect of:

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Where an issuer of a financial instrument or emission allowance market participant has decided to delayed the disclosure of inside information under this paragraph it shall immediately inform the competent authority ~~that disclosure of the information was delayed immediately after the information is disclosed to the public~~of such decision. Such information to competent authorities shall not preclude in any way the power of competent authorities to sanction a breach of this Regulation.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3

3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions totalling under EUR 20,000 over the period of ~~a calendar year~~12 months and calculated since the date of the last notification or the date of appointment of the person to discharge managerial responsibilities if no notification has yet been made.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 2 – point f

(f) require existing telephone and existing data traffic records held by a telecommunication operator or by an investment firm, where a reasonable suspicion exists that such records related to the subject-matter of the inspection may be relevant to prove insider dealing or market manipulation as defined in[new MAD] in violation of this Regulation or Directive [new MAD]; these records shall however not concern the content of the communication to which they relate.]where such records may be relevant to prove a violation of this Regulation or Directive [new MAD]; these records shall however not concern the content of the communication to which they relate.] Point (f) shall not prejudice in any way the powers of competent authorities to request telephone and electronic records of investment firms, notably those referred to in article 16(7) of Directive [MiFID 2], nor restrict the power to access to its content.

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0295(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point k

(k) administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined; , if higher than any of the maximum amounts referred to in points (l) or (m), as applicable;

2012/05/11
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 51 a (new)

(51a) The CRD framework, being one of the pillars upon which the overreliance on external credit rating was built, should take into account the G20 conclusions, FSB principles and the proposals of the European Commission amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies and amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to UCITS and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, regarding the excessive reliance on external credit ratings. Therefore banks should be encouraged to use internal rather than external credit ratings even for purposes of calculating regulatory capital requirements.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 51 b (new)

(51b) Overreliance on external credit ratings should be reduced and all the automatic effects deriving from ratings should be gradually eliminated. Regulation should, therefore, require credit institutions and investment firms to put in place sound credit granting criteria and credit decision processes. External credit ratings may be used as one factor among others in this process but they should not rely solely or mechanistically on external ratings and these should not prevail.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 51 c (new)

(51c) The recognition of a Credit Rating Agency as an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) should not increase the foreclosure of a market already dominated by three main undertakings. EBA and Central Banks, without making the process easier or less demanding, should provide for the recognition of more Credit Rating Agencies as ECAI as a way to open the market to other undertakings.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 76 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Competent authorities shall ensure that internal ratings used by institutions do not rely solely or mechanistically on external credit ratings and that these do not prevail over internal assessment.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 77 – point b

(b) Institutions have internal methodologies that enable them to assess the credit risk of exposures to individual borrowers, securities or counterparties as well as credit risk at the portfolio level. In ~~particular, in~~ternal methodologies shall not rely solely or mechanistically on external ratings. Where own funds requirements are based on a rating by an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) or based on the fact that an exposure is unrated, institutions shall use their own methodologies in order to assess the appropriateness of the rank-ordering of credit risk implicit in those own funds requirements and take the result into account in their allocation of internal capital;

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 124 – paragraph 2

2. Institutions shall meet the requirement imposed by paragraph 1 with Common Equity Tier 1 capital or other loss absorbing items such as provisions in excess over expected losses, additional tier 1 or alternatively with equivalent contingent capital insofar as this constitutes other fully loss absorbing capital, which shall be additional to any Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained to meet the own funds requirement imposed by Article 87 of Regulation ~~[inserted by OP~~(EU) No. .../2012 of ... [on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms], the requirement to maintain a Capital Conservation Buffer under Article 123 and any requirement imposed under Article 100.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 127 – paragraph 1

1. Where a designated authority, in accordance with Article 126(5), or a relevant third country authority has set a countercyclical buffer rate in excess of 2.5% of the total risk exposure amount referred to in Article 87(3) of Regulation ~~[inserted by OP~~(EU) No. .../2012 of ... [on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms], the other designated authorities ~~may~~shall recognise that buffer rate for the purposes of the calculation by domestically authorised institutions of their institution specific countercyclical capital buffers.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 127 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Where a designated authority or a relevant third country authority has set a countercyclical buffer rate in excess of 2.5% of the total risk exposure amount referred to in Article 127(1), the ESRB shall evaluate that specific buffer rate and, if appropriate, issue a recommendation to the designated authorities concerning the appropriate countercyclical buffer rate for exposures to that third country, in accordance to Article 128(3).

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 127 – paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. In accordance with Article 128(3), after a recommendation made by the ESRB to any designated authority to set out a different countercyclical buffer rate, as foreseen in paragraph 2a, all other designated authorities shall apply the same recognized rate.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0203(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 150 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. EBA in cooperation with EIOPA and ESMA shall ensure an effective reduction on reliance on external ratings and shall gradually provide for the elimination of all mechanistic and automatic effects of an external credit rating still existing in Union law.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Jean-Paul GAUZÈS, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21 a (new)

(21a) Where the deduction of the minority interests included in consolidated Common Equity Tier 1 capital results in a disproportionate increase of capital requirement for certain types of credit institutions or investment firms, such institutions or firms should be exempted from the application of such rule.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25 a (new)

(25a) Overreliance on external credit ratings shall be reduced and all the automatic effects deriving from ratings should be gradually eliminate. Regulation should, therefore, require credit institutions and investment firms to put in place sound credit granting criteria and credit decision processes. External credit ratings may be used as one factor among others in this process but they should not rely solely or mechanistically on external ratings and these should not prevail.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27 a (new)

(27a) The minority interests arising from intermediate financial holding companies that are subject to the requirements of this Regulation on a subconsolidated basis may also be eligible (within the relevant limits) to the Common Equity Tier 1 of the group on a consolidated basis, as the Common Equity Tier 1 capital of an intermediate financial holding company attributable to minority interests and the part of that same capital attributable to the parent company support both pari passu the losses of their subsidiaries when they occur.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 69 a (new)

(69a) The sovereign debt crisis and the statement of 26 October 2011 of the Head of State or Government of Member States whose currency is the euro have demonstrated that the current situation of government bonds no longer corresponds with the economic reality; Therefore, it may be of interest that, when the current situation of the European Union as a whole has reached a stabilized path, the Commission may submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council proposing options to future adjustment to the treatment of sovereign debt.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 72 a (new)

(72a) The recognition of a Credit Rating Agency as an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) should not increase the foreclosure of a market already dominated by three main undertakings. EBA and Central Banks, without making the process easier or less demanding, should provide for the recognition of more Credit Rating Agencies as ECAI as a way to open the market to other undertakings.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 72 b (new)

(72b) This Regulation should ensure that institutions always use at least two ECAI ratings for the regulatory purposes set therein. Furthermore, alternatives should be put in place in the future so that institutions may, without restraint, choose the first ECAI and the second should be appointed by an independent authority, from all recognized ECAI. This should not prevent institutions to use external ratings from more than one credit rating agency.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(ba) the amount of intangible assets to be deducted shall be reduced by the amount of software classified as intangible assets under the relevant accounting standards.

2012/03/07
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Jean-Paul GAUZÈS, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 79 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Where the parent company of a credit institution or of an investment firm is a non operating holding company having a minority control over its consolidated risk- weighted assets, such credit institution or investment firm is exempted, with regard to its relations with the minority subsidiaries concerned, from the application of the provisions of this Article. As the case may be, competent authorities may impose such rule on a case by case basis to a credit institution or an investment firm which they deemed exposed to a high degree of systemic risk.

2012/03/08
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 79 – paragraph 1 a (new)

Competent authorities may permit institutions not to subtract from the minority interests of a cross-guarantee scheme the result of multiplying the amount referred to in paragraph 1(a) by the percentage referred to in paragraph 1(b) subject to the conditions laid down in Article 108(7).

2012/03/08
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 400 – paragraph 1 – point 2

(2) ‘Retail deposit’ means a liability to a natural person or to a small and medium sized enterprise ~~where the aggregate liability to such clients or group of connected clients is less than 1 million EUR~~as defined by the IRB approach in the capital framework.

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 410 – paragraph 5

5. Institutions shall multiply liabilities resulting from deposits by clients that are not financial customers by 750% to the extent they do not fall under paragraph 4 and 5. EBA shall test the appropriateness of the calibration of the outflows in accordance with paragraph 6 by taking into account historical data provided by institutions.

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 443 – paragraph 1 – point k a (new)

(k a) the requirements for large exposures laid down in Articles 384 to 392

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 443 – paragraph 1 – point k b (new)

(k b) The public disclosure requirements laid down in Articles 418 to 440.

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 443 a (new)

Article 443a Macro-prudential risks at the national level 1.In order to address macro-prudential risks at the national level, each designated authority in the Member States shall be empowered to impose on domestically authorised institutions stricter prudential requirements, as those laid down for the Commission under article 443. 2.Each designated authority shall notify the Commission, the EBA and the ESRB before the adoption of such stricter requirements, leaving appropriate time for coordination. 3.Based on the assessment that the macro- prudential risks identified by the designated authority do not exist, the Commission may adopt a decision to suspend the resolution of the Member State's designated authority. This decision should take place in the 30 days that follow the notification carried out by the designated authority. 4.In the absence of a decision from the Commission in the deadline specified in the paragraph 3, the decision of the designated authority should not be suspended.

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 458 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2 a. In cases where certain closed defined benefit plans of Member States are similar to the first pillar of social systems, when meeting the criteria of Article 451(1)(a), competent authorities may allow for the maintenance of the additional filters until 31 of December of 2028 as set out in Article 461(1)(a);

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 461 – paragraph 1

1. By way of derogation from Articles 29 to 33, 53 and 63, during the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2017, institutions shall make adjustments to include in or deduct from Common Equity Tier 1 items, Tier 1 items, Tier 2 items or own funds items the applicable percentage of filters or deductions required under national transposition measures for Articles 57, 61 and 66 of Directive 2006/48/EC, and for Articles 13 and 16 of Directive 2006/49/EC, or under other national provisions and which are not required in accordance with Part Two.

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 462 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) the instruments were issued prior to ~~20 July 2011~~the date of application of this Regulation;

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2011/0202(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 477 a (new)

Article 477a International Implementation of Basel III 1. In regard to the international nature of the Basel framework and the risks associated with a non-simultaneous implementation of the changes to that framework in major jurisdictions, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council, by 31 December 2014, on progress made towards the international implementation of the changes to the capital adequacy and liquidity framework and, if appropriate, with the necessary legislative proposals. 2. The relevant committee of the European Parliament may invite representatives of the Basel Committee, President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the Eurogroup, to appear before the committee for an exchange views.

2012/03/09
Committee: ECON

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)

(1 a) Tax policies must aim to foster European competitiveness and lower costs for European business, in particular for small and medium enterprises.

2011/12/12
Committee: ECON

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 b (new)

(1 b) More cooperation among tax authorities can lead to a significant decrease on costs and administrative burdens for business operating cross- border within the EU.

2011/12/12
Committee: ECON

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 c (new)

(1c) Bearing in mind how important small and medium-sized enterprises are in the European business sector and the key role they play, an impact assessment should be carried out that will cast light on the added value that this Directive will offer for SMEs and the obstacles it will pose for them, accompanied, where necessary, by fresh proposals.

2011/12/12
Committee: ECON

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 5 a (new)

(5 a) This Directive is not a first step towards harmonisation of the corporate tax rates of the Member States. If, however, when this Directive is assessed, it becomes apparent that the economic efficiency, effectiveness and equitability of corporate taxation would benefit from a certain harmonisation of rates, this should be limited to the establishment of a corresponding minimum level.

2011/12/12
Committee: ECON

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 7 a (new)

(7a) An assessment of the economic impact that these new rules will have on local authorities' management systems should be carried out and properly studied, in particular the added costs that may arise for these authorities, and a study should also be carried out on the method to be used in order to calculate the redistribution of the tax base.

2011/12/12
Committee: ECON

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9 a (new)

(9a) The system for calculating the redistribution of the tax base should be accompanied by a study covering the various possible methods that could be applied, as well as the method for calculating each of the factors to be included.

2011/12/12
Committee: ECON

2011/0058(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 133 – title

~~Review~~(Does not affect English version.)

2011/12/12
Committee: ECON

2011/0006(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article -1 – point 1 (new)

Directive 2002/92/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

(1) In Article 3(2), the following subparagraph is added: ‘Member States shall communicate the information gathered by the information point on a regular basis to the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (EIOPA), which shall publish it on its website.’

2011/09/23
Committee: ECON

2011/0006(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – point 21

Directive 2009/138/EC
Article 111 – paragraph 2

2. The Commission may adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 301a and subject to the conditions of Articles 301b and 301c, laying down quantitative limits and asset eligibility criteria. Those delegated acts shallIn order to ensure consistent harmonisation in relation to solvency capital requirement, EIOPA may develop draft regulatory standards, laying down quantitative limits and asset eligibility criteria in order to address risks which are not adequately covered by a sub-module. EIOPA may submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 March 2012. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010. Those regulatory technical standards may apply to assets covering technical provisions, excluding assets held in respect of life insurance contracts where the investment risk is borne by the policy holders. Those ~~measures shall~~regulatory technical standards may be reviewed by the Commission in the light of developments in the standard formula and financial markets.

2011/09/23
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

E a. Whereas the absence of regulatory certainty in this sector is putting at risk the proper functioning of EU financial markets and therefore requires the EU Commission, before coming forward with further amendments to Regulation 1060/2009, to properly identify the gaps in the new framework and provide an impact assessment on the range of alternatives available to fill such gap including the possibility of further legislative proposals.

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Is aware of the inherent conflict of interest if market participants devise internal credit risk assessments for their own regulatory capital requirements, and hence sees the need to increase supervisors‘ responsibilities, capacity and resources for monitoring, assessing and overseeing the adequacy of the internal models and of the risk management of such market participants;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Highlights the global nature of the credit rating industry and urges the Commission and Member States to work on a global approach, based on the highest standards, in order to preserve a level playing field and prevent regulatory arbitrage while keeping markets open;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Believes that the start-up financing costs to cover the first three years of the ECRaF's work need to be carefully calculated; that these initial costs should take the form of a lump-sum capital payment and should be provided by the financial services industry with the involvement of both users and issuers; asks the Commission to produce a detailed impact assessment, viability analysis, and cost estimate for the necessary financing in this respect; considers that the new ECRaF should be fully self-sufficient after the three-year start-up period;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Considers that, to ensure its credibility, the management, staff and governance structure of the new ECRaF need to be fully autonomous vis-à-vis the Member States, the Commission and all other public bodies and operates in accordance with amended Regulation (EC) no 1060/2009;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Points out that, in order to enable investors to adequately to assess risk and to fulfil their due-diligence and fiduciary duties, increased disclosure of information is necessary in the field of structured finance instruments to allow investors to make informed judgments; considers that sophisticated investors should be able to rate the underlying credits from which they can then derive the risk of a securitised product;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Asks the Commission to propose a revision of Directive 2003/71/EC and Directive 2004/109/EC in order to ensure that sufficient accurate and complete information on structured finance instruments is more widely available;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

17 a. Alongside with increased transparency of the rating process and its internal auditing, calls for stronger supervision of CRAs by EU supervisory authorities and of more intrusive supervision by national supervisory authorities of the use /dependency on ratings by financial institutions;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Considers that the costs of both ratings should be borne by the issuer and that the first rating should be by a hired CRA, at the choice of the issuer, while the second CRA should be ~~assigned by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to a different CRA on the base of merit, taking historic performance into account~~nominated by an independent authority;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Considers that, as almost all information on sovereigns is available in the public domain~~, l~~ and more will be available as a result of the reinforced economic governance, market players should make better use of it in making their investment decisions. Larger and more sophisticated market players should use internal models to assess sovereign credit risk;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2302(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Points out that the ultimate responsibility for an investment decisions lies with the financial market participant, i.e. the asset manager, financial institution or sophisticated investor; these should have effective risk management capabilities subject to adequate oversight by the administration;

2011/01/20
Committee: ECON

2010/2277(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Calls for improved access to capital markets for SMEs and for the simplification of their accounting reporting obligations and reduction of administrative burden;

2011/01/21
Committee: ECON

2010/2277(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Underlines the importance of improving the European Union's economic governance in order to provide the economic conditions for enterprises to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the single market allowing them to grow and become more competitive and calls for this linkage to be made explicitly in the Single Market Act;

2011/01/21
Committee: ECON

2010/2277(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)

1c. Emphasises the need for effective implementation and completion of the financial supervisory package to achieve a sustainable internal market; an assessment by the Commission to ensure such implementation should be undertaken throughout the EU and a correlation table published in a yearly basis; to that aim, best practices should be motivated amongst national and EU supervisory entities;

2011/01/21
Committee: ECON

2010/2277(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3

3. Calls on the Commission to integrate competition policy and tools in its single market strategy, taking into account specific features of SMEs;

2011/01/21
Committee: ECON

2010/2277(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Urges use of the EU budget to increase the credit granted by the EIB in partnership with the banking and private sectors, and the creation of a project bond scheme in order to finance European projects aimed at strengthening the recovery of growth and employment;

2011/01/21
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 33 a (new)

having regard of the Commission Communication of 30 June on Enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs – Tools for stronger EU economic governance COM(2010) 367/2,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 33 b (new)

having regard to the Council (ECOFIN) conclusions of 7 September 2010 approving a stronger monitoring of economic and budgetary policies (the European Semester),

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

A a. whereas both the current framework for economic governance and surveillance and the regulatory framework for financial services have not provided enough stability and growth,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

B a. whereas the Treaty of Lisbon transforms the former 'Community method', adapting and strengthening it, into a 'Union method' in which, in essence: – the European Council defines the general political directions and priorities, – the Commission promotes the general interest of the Union and takes appropriate initiatives to that end, – the European Parliament and the Council jointly exercise legislative and budgetary functions on the basis of the Commission's proposals,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)

C a. whereas a fully independent Central Bank is a necessary requirement for a stable euro, low inflation and favourable financing conditions for growth and jobs,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)

C b. whereas more attention must be given to implicit liabilities and off-balance sheet operations which may increase public debt in the medium and long term and reduce transparency,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C c (new)

C c. whereas policy makers have to identify and tackle the common economic and social challenges the EU economies are facing in a coordinated manner,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C d (new)

C d. whereas a permanent crises resolution mechanism, including procedures for debt restructuring or orderly default, should be established in order to safeguard financial stability in the event of a sovereign and private debt crisis, while protecting the ECB’s independence,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)

E a. whereas fiscal policy of many Member States has often been pro-cyclical and country-specific medium-term budgetary objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have seldom been strictly enforced nor implemented,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)

G a. whereas the European Parliament has for years urged improvements in economic governance both inside the union and as regards EU external representation in international economic and monetary forums,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)

H a. whereas the decisions taken during Spring 2010 to safeguard the stability of the euro are only temporary solutions and will need to be supported by policy measures at national level and a stronger economic governance framework at the EU level, particularly among the euro area Member States,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex 1 – heading 1 – paragraph 1 – indent 3

– ~~Following in-depth joint and bilateral surveillance based on the scoreboard referred to above in accordance with the Integrated Guidelines,~~In-depth country specific surveillance should take place, if revealed necessary by the scoreboard referred to above and the concerned Member States should decide on national policies intaking into a cco~~ordinated manner taking into account~~unt Commission recommendations and the Union dimension of ~~their national~~such policies,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex 1 – heading 1 – paragraph 1 – indent 4 a (new)

– Establish a mechanism at the national level to assess the implementation of the Europe 2020 priorities in the National Reform Programme and how to achieve the relevant national targets in this respect in order to support the yearly evaluation by the EU institutions,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex 1 – heading 1 – paragraph 1 – indent 6

– Establish a "Union semester" for a first comparison and assessment of draft budgets of Member States (main elements and assumptions) in order to better evaluate the implementation and future execution of the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) and the National Reform Programmes (NRPs), taking due account of the national annual budget procedures and multi-annual budgetary frameworks: Member States shall submit their SCPs and NRPs to the Commission in April, after due involvement of national parliaments and taking into account EU level rules and conclusions; the European Parliament may on its part establish a systematic way to support a public debate and increase awareness, visibility and accountability of these procedures and how the EU institutions have implanted the agreed rules,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex 1 – heading 2 – paragraph 1 – indent 1

– Launch the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)/ Excessive Debt Surveillance Procedure (EDSP) on the basis of gross debt levels. The ~~EDF/~~EDSP including detailed regular reports on the debt dynamics and development (including "sustainability stress-tests"), would be triggered for all Member States in which government debt level exceeds the 60 % threshold and is not diminishing at satisfactory pace. The EDP/EDSP would be on "stand-still" as long as the country fulfils its MTFO and would be abrogated once the debt level is below 60 %; consolidated efforts should be proportional to the underlying fiscal position and should privilege expenditure restraints.

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex 1 – heading 2 – paragraph 1 – indent 3

– Establish a clear harmonised framework to measure and monitor debt dynamics, including implicit and contingent liabilities, such as public guarantees in public-private-partnership investments, and the costs such type of investments bring to the country budget throughout the years,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex 1 – heading 2 – paragraph 1 – indent 5

– Establish minimum rules and guidelines for national budgetary procedures (i.e. annual and multiannual financial frameworks) and institutions in order to implement the obligation in Article 3 of the Protocol (No 12) on Excessive Deficit Procedure. Those national frameworks should include sufficient information on both the expenditure and revenue sides of the planned budgetary actions in order to enable sensible discussion and scrutiny of the budgetary plans at both the national and Union level,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex 1 – heading 4 – introductory part

Recommendation 4 : Establish a robust and credible excessive debt prevention ~~and resolution~~ mechanism for the euro area. An impact assessment and feasibility study should be undertaken before any legislative act (based Article 352 TFEU or any other appropriate legal base) aiming to:

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex 1 – heading 6 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

The legislative act to be adopted should aim to: - ensure that any legislative initiatives regarding financial services are in line with the macro-economic policies in order to guaratee the necessary transparency and market stability, and consequently to boost confidence in the markets and economic development,

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Annex 1 – heading 6 – paragraph 1 – indent 1

~~– Assess the possible revision of the capital requirements for credit institutions in order better to differentiate between capital ratios applied to sovereign debt issues by a Member State.~~deleted

2010/09/10
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)

– having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s consultative document on an international framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring5,

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9 a (new)

– having regard to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank on Bank Resolution Funds (COM(2010)254),

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas banks should focus more on the core business of banking, namely lending to the real economy; whereas the Basel Committee and the Commission have to find ways to promote this core business while not losing sight of the need to extend regulatory reform to currently non-regulated entities in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage,

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

18a. Urges the Basel Committee and the Commission, when defining the treatment for holdings in financial sector entities, to take proper account the specifics of the European banc assurance model, that has demonstrated its resilience during the financial crisis, and calls the Basel Committee attention to the European Financial Conglomerates Regulation, that has proven to be an efficient framework to avoid double counting of capital;

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)

18b. Asks the Basel Committee and the Commission to better define the treatment of reciprocal financial cross holding agreements to avoid the excessive penalization for the growth of European Banks in emerging markets and de- coupled economies (ex: Africa and Latin America);

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)

18c. Calls on the Commission to take proper account of the differences in pension models across countries in order to assure a level playing field and to develop volatility and pro-cyclicality dampening mechanisms for capital requirements related to pension funds;

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 d (new)

18d. Asks for the Commission to consider a balanced treatment between unrealized gains and losses, in order to contain volatility and pro-cyclicality;

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)

19a. Calls the attention, however, to the fact that liquidity requires a dynamic measurement, and standards should only be used as a complement to a wider set of measures and pieces of information;

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)

19b. Calls on the Commission to carefully consider the impact on forthcoming regulations from including the liquidity standards under Pillar 1;

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

21a. Urges the Commission to define the criteria for high quality liquid assets in accordance with the current definition of European Central Bank Eligible assets for monetary policy operations (repo facility). In particular, highly rated securitization and covered bonds eligible for ECB repo facility resulting from bank’s lending activity to households and SME’s, should be accepted for the liquidity buffer;

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)

21b. Urges the Commission to include all Euro zone sovereign debt as high quality liquid assets regardless its specific rating, reducing the disproportional impact of rating agencies actions;

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 c (new)

21c. Calls on the Commission to analyze the inherent inconsistencies of the “Net Stable Funding Ratio” (NSFR) given the underlying scenarios assumed by the ratio;

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Notes the concept of a "crude" LR as a possible backstop against building excessive leverage, but has strong concerns about its added value and its eventual inclusion under Pillar 1;

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2074(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Is of the view that such a ratio, in order to be effective, must comprise off- balance sheet items and derivatives, must be clearly defined, simple and comparable internationally and should take into account the different leverage ratios existing internationally;deleted

2010/06/15
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas there is an urgent need to look in greater depth at the phenomenon of the falling birth rate in the European Union and its causes and implications, with a view to reversing this worrying trend,

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas thsome Member States have taken steps to reduce their administrative expenditure, bring their healthcare spending under control and reform their health and retirement systems and whereas all the Member States should adopt the best practice in this area,

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital I

I. whereas the over-indebtedness of families fully justifies tax incentives to encourage saving and calls for people to consume less despite the risk that some tax incentives that advantage economic agents with a strong propensity to save ~~are liable to~~may fuel excess saving leading to financial bubbles,

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J

J. whereas population trends are shaped by changes in the fertility rate, which are to a large degree dependent on maternity incentives and benefits, and migration flows,

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital L

L. whereas there is still considerable demand for a welfare state in some Member States, and whereas the welfare state has not necessarily sapped those countries’ economic dynamism in the past; whereas, however, the new circumstances give good reason for serious thought to be given to what is and what should be the role of the State,

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

1. Draws attention to the undesirable effects – in terms of deteriorating employment, human capital and purchasing power – of prematurely withdrawing support measures and to those that will inevitably result from its extension beyond what is justifiable;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Calls on the Commission to draw up a Green Paper on the birth rate in the European Union in order to identify the causes and implications of the falling birth rate, as well as solutions and alternatives regarding this problem;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Emphasises that, in a context of chronic under-utilisation of production capacity, structural measures would have little impact if nothing were done to support demand, since firms, whose capital resources are under-utilised, would have little reason to invest, and acknowledges that the freer the market is, the more such firms will be able to make use of their resources and the better they will respond to demand;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Takes the view that the Commission should ~~defin~~give due consideration to sufficiently flexible indicators of a ‘recovering economy’ in order to determine the point at which exit strategies should be deployed, for example where an economy has reached its normal production capacity utilisation rate;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Agrees with the Commission that ‘successful fiscal expansion to counter recession and longer-term fiscal sustainability are not incompatible’, but warns against the risks of excessive and artificial expansion based on higher public expenditure, which are liable to undermine the policy;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. Emphasises that some public-sector and welfare spending is more than just unproductive expenditure, since it also has a beneficial impact on the accumulation of physical and human capital and on effective demand and that, in view of the limited resources available, it is important to opt for those types of spending which will have such an impact;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Emphasises that the resulting increase in the potential growth rate would ~~in turn~~, possibly, be likely to relax constraints on financing such expenditure, thanks to the ensuing tax revenue;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. Emphasises that the role of social protection systems as ‘social safety nets’ has proven particularly effective in times of crisis, and that such systems can be maintained by, inter alia, broadening their financing base; draws attention, however, to the fact that they should benefit those who actually need them in such a way that, ideally, this state of need does not last any longer than necessary and does not become a way of life, but rather has a springboard effect, facilitating a return to working life for as many as possible and a permanent and more effective means of assistance for the most serious cases;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Recalls that the long-term balance of compulsory pension schemes depends not only on population trends, but also on the productivity of assets (which affects the potential growth rate) and the proportion of GDP allocated to the financing of such schemes and that an increase in the funding for such schemes, in particular through higher taxation, can have a counterproductive effect on productivity;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Asks the Commission to carry out studies that will afford a basis for assessing the quality of the Member States’ debts – which determines interest rates on government borrowing – in order to improve the information available to ~~credit-rating agencies~~the market;

2010/03/09
Committee: ECON

2010/2008(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas in the future, too, firms need to be able to manage the risks inherent to their business in a targeted fashion, under their own responsibility, and at comprehensible prices, and whereas, taking into account the specificities of small and medium enterprises with regard to bilateral derivatives, firms arshould be responsible for risk,

2010/04/13
Committee: ECON

2010/2008(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H

H. w~~hereas small and medium-sized enterprises use derivatives under special conditions in that, as regards capital charges and financing variation margins, they are dependent on exemption~~ith regard to the specific circumstances under which small and medium sized companies rely on derivatives,

2010/04/13
Committee: ECON

2010/2008(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Notes that, as regards regulation, a distinction must be made between derivatives to hedge firms’ transactions and pure financial market derivatives, in particular those which may involve systemic risk;

2010/04/13
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 1

(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided by the Treaty, should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sustainable growth, and sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 7

(7) The establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit based on the debt criterion and the steps leading to it should not be based solely on non- compliance with the numerical benchmark, but always take into account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the Commission report under Article 126(3) of the TreatNon-compliance with the numerical benchmark for debt reduction should not be sufficient for the establishment of an excessive deficit, which should take into account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the Commission report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty. The assessment of the effect of the cycle and the composition of the stock- flow adjustment on debt developments need to be analysed carefully.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8

(8) In the establishment of the existence of an excessive deficit based on the deficit criterion and the steps leading to it there is a need to take into account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty if the government debt to gross domestic product does not exceed the reference value. These factors should always be taken into account when establishing the existence of an excessive deficit based on the debt criterion and in the steps leading to it.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8 a (new)

(8a) Even when the existence of the excessive deficit has been established, all the relevant factors should be taken into account in the subsequent steps of the procedure. In particular, the implementation of policies aimed at increasing the medium-term rate for potential growth in the context of the common growth strategy of the Union should be appropriately taken into account when setting the deadline for correcting the excessive deficit and eventually extending it.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 8 b (new)

(8b) In taking into account systemic pensions reforms among the relevant factors, the central consideration should be whether they enhance the long-term sustainability of the overall pension system, while not increasing risks for the medium-term budgetary position.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 9

(9) The Commission report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty should appropriately consider the quality of the national fiscal framework, as it plays a crucial role in supporting fiscal consolidation and sustainable public finances. This consideration should include the minimum requirements as laid down in Council Directive […] on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States as well as other agreed desirable requirements for fiscal discipline.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Recital 10

(10) In order to support the monitoring of compliance with Council recommendations and notices for the correction of the situations of excessive deficit, there is a need that these specify annual budgetary targets consistent with the required fiscal improvement in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary measures. In this context, the 0.5% of GDP annual benchmark should be understood as annual average basis.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 1

1. This Regulation sets out the provisions to speed up and clarify the excessive deficit procedure~~, having as its~~. This procedure has the objective to deter excessive government deficits and, if they occur, to further prompt their correction, where compliance with the budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of the government deficit and government debt criteria.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new)

The Council shall use the reversed qualified majority voting when deciding on the adoption of recommendations and notices based on Commission formal positions' under Article 126 of the Treaty.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point a

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

1. The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with the second indent of Article 126 (2) (a) of the Treaty, when resulting from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and w~~hich has~~ith a major impact on the financial position of general government, or when resulting from a severe economic downturn.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 1a

1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) is to be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with Article 126 (2) (b) of the Treaty if the differential with respect to the reference value has reduced over the previous three years at an average rate of the order of one-twentieth per year~~. For a period of 3 ye~~, as a benchmark, following an assessment made over a three-year period. The requirement under the debt criterion shall be also considered fulfilled if the budgetarsy f~~rom [date of entering into force of this Regulation - to be inserted], account shall be taken of the backward-looking nature of this indicator in its application.~~ orecasts as provided by the Commission indicate that the required reduction in the differential will occur over the three-year period encompassing the two years following the last year for which the data is available. For a Member State that is subject to an excessive deficit procedure at [date of adoption of this Regulation - to be inserted] and for a period of three years from the correction of the excessive deficit, the requirement under the debt criterion shall be considered fulfilled if the Member State concerned makes sufficient progress towards compliance as assessed in the Council opinions on its Stability or Convergence Programme.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point c

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 3

3. The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty shall take into account all relevant factors as indicated in that Article insofar they affect significantly the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the concerned Member State. The report shall appropriately reflect: – The developments in the medium-term economic position (in particular potential growth~~, prevailing cyclical condi~~ and cyclical developments, inflations, ~~inflation,~~the implementation of policies in the context of common growth strategy of the Union and prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances) ~~and~~; – The developments in the medium-term budgetary position (in particular, fiscal consolidation efforts in “good times”, public investment, the implementation of policies in the context of the common growth strategy for the Union and the overall quality of public finances, in particular, compliance with Council Directive […] on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States).primary expenditure and revenue developments against prevailing cyclical conditions, public investment and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks); – The developments of the current public expenditure should also be taken into account in particular that it remains stable in real terms; – The report shall also analyse developments in the medium-term government debt position ~~as relevant (in particular, it appropriately reflects~~, its dynamics and sustainability (in particular, risk factors including the maturity structure and currency denomination of the debt, stock- flow ~~opera~~adjustment and its compositions, accumulated reserves and other ~~government~~financial assets; guarantees, notably linked to the financial sector; implicit liabilities ~~both explicit and implicit~~ related to ageing and private debt to the extent that it may represent a contingent implicit liability for the government).; – Furthermore, the Commission shall give due consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess ~~in qualitative terms the excess over the reference value~~ compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Commission and to the Council. In that context, special consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and to achieving Union policy goals, including fin~~ancial stability.~~ particular debt incurred in the form of bilateral and multilateral support between Member States in the context of financial and sovereign debt crisis. When preparing a report, the Commission may request additional information from the Member State concerned.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point d

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 4

4. The Commission and the Council shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, ~~specifically,~~to the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and~~/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors~~ debt criteria by the concerned Member State. Relevant factors shall be taken into account as appropriate in both the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article 126 of the Treaty, namely, to confirm that the concerned Member State should be placed in excessive deficit to reach the opposite conclusion and the subsequent steps of Article 126, as specified in Art. 2(5) and 2(6) of this Regulation. When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, these factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article 126 of the Treaty only if the double condition of the overarching principle that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary is fully met.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point d a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 5

(d a) paragraph 5 is amended as follows: 5. The Commission and the Council, in all budgetary assessments in the framework of the excessive deficit procedure, shall give due consideration to the implementation of pension reforms introducing a multipillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar. In particular, consideration shall be given to the features of the overall pension system created by the reform, namely whether it promotes long-term sustainability while not increasing risks for the medium-term budgetary position.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – subpoint d b (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. However, these factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point d b (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 6

(db) Paragraph 6 is amended as follows: 6. If the Council, taking into account the position of the Commission, has decided, on the basis of Article 126(6) of the Treaty, that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Commission and the Council shall take into account the relevant factors mentioned in paragraph 3, as they affect the situation of the concerned Member State, also in the subsequent procedural steps of Article 126, including as specified in Articles 3(4), 3(5) and 5(2) of this Regulation, namely in establishing a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending it. However those relevant factors shall not be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) of the Treaty on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of Article 126.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point e

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 – paragraph 7

7. In the case of Member States where the excess of the deficit or the breach of the requirements of the debt criterion according to Article 126 (2) (b) of the Treaty reflects the implementation of a pension reform introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar, the Commission and the Council shall also consider the cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar when assessing developments in EDP deficit and debt figures. ~~In cases where the debt ratio exceeds the reference value, the cost of the reform shall be considered only if the deficit remains close to the reference value.~~ For that purpose, for a period of five years starting from the date of entry into force of such a reform, consideration shall be given to its net cost as reflected in deficit and debt developments on the basis of a linear degressive scale. When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, consideration shall be given to the net cost of the reform only if the deficit remains close to the reference value, unless the debt ratio does not exceed the reference value. Additionally, irrespective of the date of entry into force of the reform, its net cost as reflected in debt developments shall be given consideration for a transitional period of five years from [date of entry into force of this Regulation, to be inserted] on the basis of the same linear degressive scale. The net cost as thus calculated shall be taken into account also for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) of the Treaty on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of Article 126 of the Treaty, if the deficit has declined substantially and continuously and has reached a level that comes close to the reference value and, in case of non- fulfilment of the requirements of the debt criterion, the debt has been put on a declining path. Moreover, equal consideration shall be given to the reduction in this net cost resulting from the ~~partial or total reversal of an above mentioned pension reform~~reversal of such a reform decided after [date of entry into force of this Regulation, to be inserted].

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Section 1 a (new)

2a. The following Section is inserted: "SECTION 1a DIALOGUE ON MACRO-ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY SURVEILLANCE"

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 b (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 2 a (new)

2b. The following Article is inserted: "Article 2a In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the Member States' parliaments and governments, or any other relevant body, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may conduct public debates and hearings, in particular regarding Article 126 (8) of the Treaty on the macro-economic and budgetary surveillance undertaken by the Council and the Commission."

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point -a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 1

(-a) paragraph 1 is amended as follows: 1. Within 10 days of the adoption by the Commission of a report issued in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty, the Economic and Financial Committee shall formulate an opinion in accordance with Article 126(4) of the Treaty.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point c

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4

4. The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) of the Treaty shall establish a deadline of six months at most for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the situation, the deadline for effective action could be reduced to three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit, which should be completed in the year following its identification unless there are special circumstances. In the recommendation, the Council shall request that the Member State achieves annual budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the recommendation.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point d

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 4a

4a. Within the deadline ~~of six month at most~~ provided for in paragraph 4, the Member State concerned shall report to the Commission and the Council on action taken in response to the Council recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty. The report shall include the targets for the government expenditure, namely the evolution of the public current expenditure, and for the discretionary measures on the revenue side consistent with the Council recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty, as well as information on the measures taken and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets. The Commission may request additional reporting from the Member State. The report shall be made public.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point e

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 3 – paragraph 5

5. If effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors mentioned in Article 2(3) of this Regulation, may notably extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. The Council shall assess the existence of unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances against the economic forecasts in its recommendation. TIn case of a severe economic downturn, the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) of the Treaty ion ~~case of a severe economic downturn of a general nature~~the condition that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium-term.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4 – point -a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 4 – paragraph 1

(-a) in Article 4, paragraph 1 is amended as follows: 1. Any Council decision to make public its recommendations, where it is established that no effective action has been taken in accordance with Article 126 (8) of the Treaty, shall be taken immediately after the expiry of the deadline set in accordance with Article 3 (4) of this Regulation. At the same time, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall submit a formal report to the European Council.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 4

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 4 – paragraph 2

2. The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) of the Treaty, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 3(4a) of this Regulation and its implementation as well as on any other publicly announced decisions by the Government of the Member State concerned. When the Council establishes, in accordance with Article 126(8), that the Member State concerned failed to take effective action, it shall report to the European Council. The European Commission may carry out on-site monitoring visits in accordance with Article 10a. For participating Member States, and Member States participating in the ERM II, such visits shall be carried out in liaison with the ECB. The Commission shall report to the Council and the European Parliament on the outcome of the visit and shall make its findings public.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – point b

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 1a

1a. Following the Council notice given in accordance with Article 126(9) of the Treaty, the Member State concerned shall report to the Commission and the Council on action taken in response to the Council notice. The report shall include the targets for the government expenditure, namely the evolution of the current expenditure and for the discretionary measures on the revenue side as well as information on the actions being taken in response to the specific Council recommendations so as to allow the Council to take, if necessary, the decision in accordance with Article 6 (2) of this Regulation. The Commission shall monitor and evaluate adjustment measures taken to address the excessive deficit by means of a visit in accordance with Article 10a and prepare a report to the Council. This report shall be made public.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 5 – point c

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 5 – paragraph 2

2. If effective action has been taken in compliance with a ~~notice~~recommendation under Article 126(97) of the Treaty and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occur after the adoption of that ~~notice~~recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised ~~notice~~recommendation under Article 126(97) of the Treaty. The revised ~~notice~~recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors mentioned in Article 2(3) of this Regulation, may notably extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. The Council shall assess the existence of unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances against the economic forecasts in its ~~notice. T~~recommendation. In case of a severe economic downturn, the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised ~~notice~~recommendation under Article 126(97) of the Treaty ion c~~ase of a severe economic downturn of a general nature~~ondition that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium-term.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0276(CNS)

Proposal for a regulation – amending act
Article 1 – point 14

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
Article 16

Fines referred to in Article 12 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 of the Treaty, and shall be distributed among participating Member States which do not have excessive deficit as determined in accordance with Article 126(6) of the Treaty and which are not the subject of an excessive imbalance procedure within assigned to stability mechanisms to provide financial assistance, created by Member States whose currency is the euro in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, notably the European Financial Stability Facility or any other mechani~~ng of Regulation (EU) No […/…], in proportion to their share in the total gros~~sm that may substitute this latter after its ndat~~ional income (GNI) of the eligible Member States~~e of expiry.

2011/02/15
Committee: ECON

2010/0250(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Astrid LULLING

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new)

(1 a) “Benchmark" means any published figure calculated by the application of a formula to the value of one or more underlying assets or prices by reference to which the amount payable under a derivative is determined.

2011/03/30
Committee: ECON

2010/0250(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Burkhard BALZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6

(6) ’financial counterparty'’ means an undertaking established in the Union which is an authorised investment firms as set out in Directive 2004/39/EC, an authorised credit institutions as defined in Directive 2006/48/EC, an authorised insurance undertakings as defined in Directive 73/239/EEC, an authorised assurance undertakings as defined in Directive 2002/83/EC, an authorised reinsurance undertakings as defined in Directive 2005/68/EC, an authorised undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC, an authorised institutions for occupational retirement provision as defined in Directive 2003/41/EC or and alternative investment fund~~s managers~~ as defined in Directive 2010/.../EU other than such an alternative investment fund whose sole investment policy is to develop or invest in physical real estate (directly or indirectly through subsidiary entities, co-ownership or joint venture participations);

2011/03/30
Committee: ECON

2010/0250(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Burkhard BALZ

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 21

(21) ’‘independent member of the board' means a member of the board that has no business, family or other relationship that raises a conflict of interest with the CCP, its controlling shareholder(s) or management or its clearing members or management;. A board member who is a director or employee of a clearing member, exchange, clearing house, multilateral trading facility, systematic internaliser, broking crossing network, client of a clearing member, service provider or other entity shall not thereby be disqualified from being an independent board member unless the entity of which he is a director or employee has a direct conflict of interest with the CCP.

2011/03/30
Committee: ECON

2010/0250(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

A CCP shall have a board of which at least one ~~third~~quarter, but no less than two, of its members are independent. The compensation of the independent and other non-executive members of the board shall not be linked to the business performance of the CCP.

2011/03/30
Committee: ECON

2010/0250(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Astrid LULLING

Proposal for a regulation
Article 38 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1 a. For any derivative whose value is calculated by reference to a commercial index or other benchmark, CCPs should be permitted non-discriminatory access to information on the composition, methodology and prices of that benchmark and should be automatically granted at a commercially reasonable price, and in any event at a price no higher than the lowest price that the benchmark provider has licensed the relevant intellectual property rights to another CCP or related entity in the preceding 12 months, the intellectual property rights necessary in respect of such information to enable CCPs to clear such derivatives.

2011/03/30
Committee: ECON

2010/0250(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Astrid LULLING

Proposal for a regulation
Article 38 – paragraph 1 b (new)

1 b. No CCP or related entities may enter into an agreement with any benchmark provider the effect of which would be either (i) to prevent any other CCP obtaining access to such information or rights as referred to in paragraph 2; or (ii) to prevent any other CCP from obtaining access to such information or rights on terms any less advantageous than those conferred on that CCP

2011/03/30
Committee: ECON

2010/0199(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5

Directive 97/9/EC
Article 4a – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

3. The target fund level shall be financed prior to and irrespective of the occurrence of any event relevant under Article 2(2) or (2b). Member States shall ensure that the level of funding for each scheme is reached within a ~~ten~~five-year period after the entry into force of this Directive ~~and that e~~, in what concerns ex-ante funded ICS. Regarding ex-post funded ICS, the transitional period should be set for a ten-year period. Each scheme should adopts and compl~~ies~~y with an appropriate planning in order to fulfil this objective.

2011/03/02
Committee: ECON

2009/2133(INI)

Diogo FEIO, José Ignacio SALAFRANCA SÁNCHEZ-NEYRA

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Calls on the Commission, the Council, the Member States and the next High Representative to consider the strategic importance of European world languages as a fundamental part of Europe's public diplomacy, especially when establishing the linguistic rules by which the EEAS is to operate.

2009/10/16
Committee: AFET

2009/0144(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) Serious threats to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the financial system in the ~~Community~~European Union require a swift and concerted response at ~~Community~~European Union level. The Authority should therefore be able to require national supervisory authorities to take specific actions to remedy an emergency situation. ~~As the determination of an emergency situation involves a significant degree of discretion~~Bearing mind the sensitivity of the issue, thise power should be conferred on the Commission. To ensure an effective response to the emergency situation, in the event of inaction by the competent national supervisory authorities, the Authority should be empowered to adopt, as a last resort, decisions directly addressed to financial market participants in areas of Community law directly applicable to them aimed at mitigating the effects of the crisis and restoring confidence in the marketto determine the existence of an emergency situation should be conferred on the Council, following appropriate consultation with the Commission, the ESRB and, where appropriate, the European Supervisory Authorities.

2010/03/24
Committee: ECON

2009/0144(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1

1. In the case of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the ~~Community, the Commission, upon its own initiative or following a request by the Authority, the Council, or the ESRB~~European Union, the Council, following appropriate consultations with the Commission, the ESRB, and where appropriate, the European Supervisory Authorities, may adopt a decision addressed to the Authority, determining the existence of an emergency situation for the purposes of this regulation.

2010/03/24
Committee: ECON

2009/0144(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. As soon as it issues a warning the Council shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament, the ESRB, the Commission and the European Supervisory Authority.

2010/03/24
Committee: ECON

2009/0144(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2

2. Where the ~~Commission has adopted a decision~~existence of an emergency situation is declared pursuant to paragraph 1, the Authority may adopt ~~individual decisions requiring competent authorities~~decisions addressed to the competent authorities of Member States requiring them to take the necessary action in accordance with the legislation referred to in Article 1(2) to address any risks that may jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system by ensuring that financial market participants and competent authorities satisfy the requirements laid down in that legislation.

2010/03/24
Committee: ECON

2009/0144(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. In the case of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the European Union, the Authority shall actively facilitate and, where deemed necessary, coordinate any actions undertaken by the relevant national competent supervisory authorities.

2010/03/24
Committee: ECON

2009/0144(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. The Council shall review the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 at appropriate intervals and at least once a month and declare the discontinuation of the emergency situation, as soon as appropriate

2010/03/24
Committee: ECON

2009/0144(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

1. The Board of Supervisors shall act on the basis of qualified majority of its members, as defined in Article ~~205~~16 of the Treaty on European Union, for acts specified in Articles 7, 8 and all measures and decisions adopted under Chapter VI. For all other decisions, the Board of Supervisors shall decide by simple majority and each member shall have one vote.

2010/03/24
Committee: ECON

2009/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) Serious threats to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the financial system in the ~~Community~~European Union require a swift and concerted response at ~~Community~~European Union level. The Authority should therefore be able to require national supervisory authorities to take specific actions to remedy an emergency situation. ~~As the determination of an emergency situation involves a significant degree of discretion~~Bearing in mind the sensitive nature of the issue, thise power should be conferred on the Commission. To ensure an effective response to the emergency situation, in the event of inaction by national supervisory authorities, the Authority should be empowered to adopt, as a last resort, decisions directly addressed to financial institutions in areas of Community law directly applicable to them aimed at mitigating the effects of the crisis and restoring confidence in the marketto determine the existence of an emergency situation should be conferred on the Council, following appropriate consultation with the Commission, the ESRB and, where appropriate, the European Supervisory Authorities.

2010/03/23
Committee: ECON

2009/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1

In the case of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the ~~Community, the Commission, upon its own initiative or following a request by the Authority, the Council, or the ESRB~~Union, the Council, following appropriate consultations with the Commission, the ESRB, and where appropriate, the European Supervisory Authorities, may adopt a decision addressed to the Authority, determining the existence of an emergency situation for the purposes of this regulation.

2010/03/23
Committee: ECON

2009/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. As soon as it issues a warning, the Council shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament, the ESRB, the Commission and the European Supervisory Authority.

2010/03/23
Committee: ECON

2009/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2

2. Where the ~~Commission has adopted a decision~~existence of an emergency situation is declared pursuant to paragraph 1, the Authority may adopt ~~individual decisions requiring~~decisions addressed to the national supervisory authorities of Member States requiring them to take the necessary action in accordance with the legislation referred to in Article 1(2) to address any risks that may jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system by ensuring that financial institutions and national supervisory authorities satisfy the requirements laid down in that legislation.

2010/03/23
Committee: ECON

2009/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. In the event of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union, the Authority shall actively facilitate and, where necessary, coordinate any actions undertaken by the relevant national competent supervisory authorities.

2010/03/23
Committee: ECON

2009/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. The Council shall review the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 at appropriate intervals and in any event at least once a month and declare the discontinuation of the emergency situation as soon as appropriate.

2010/03/23
Committee: ECON

2009/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1

1. The Board of Supervisors shall act on the basis of qualified majority of its members, as defined in Article ~~205~~16 of the Treaty on European Union, for acts specified in Articles 7, 8 and all measures and decisions adopted under Chapter VI. AFor all other decisions of, the Board of Supervisors shall ~~be taken~~decide by simple majority ~~of members~~and each member shall have one vote.

2010/03/23
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) Serious threats to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the financial system in the ~~Community~~European Union require a swift and concerted response at ~~Community~~European Union level. The Authority should therefore be able to require national supervisory authorities to take specific actions to remedy an emergency situation. ~~As the determination~~Bearing mind the sensitivity of the issue, the power to determine the existence of an emergency situation involves a significant degree of discretion, this power should be conferred on the Commission. To ensure an effective response to the emergency situation, in the event of inaction by the competent national supervisory authorities, the Authority should be empowered to adopt, as a last resort, decisions directly addressed to financial institutions in areas of Community law directly applicable to them aimed at mitigating the effects of the crisis and restoring confidence in the marketuncil, following appropriate consultation with the Commission, the ESRB and, where appropriate, the European Supervisory Authorities.

2010/03/26
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) In order to ensure efficient and effective supervision and a balanced consideration of the positions of the competent authorities in different Member States, the Authority should be able to settle disagreements cross-border situations between those competent authorities with binding effect, including within colleges of supervisors. A conciliation phase should be provided for, during which the competent authorities may reach an agreement. The Authority’s competence should also cover disagreements on the procedural obligations in the cooperation process as well as on the interpretation and application of Community law in supervisory decisions. Existing conciliation mechanisms provided for in sectoral legislation have to be respected. In the event of inaction by the national supervisory authorities concerned, the Authority should be empowered to adopt, as a last resort, decisions directly addressed to financial institutions in areas of Community law directly applicable to theme or content of an action or inaction by a competent authority of a Member State.

2010/03/26
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1

(1) 'financial institutions' means ~~'credit institutions' as defined in Directive 2006/48/EC, 'investment firms' as defined in~~undertakings and entities subject to any of the legislative acts mentioned in Article 1(2). However, with regard to Directive 200~~6/49~~5/60/EC, ~~and '~~‘financial ~~conglomerates'~~institutions’ means only credit and financial institutions as defined in that Directive ~~2002/87/EC;~~ ;

2010/03/26
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1

6. Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission under Article 226 of the Treaty, where ~~a competent authority does not comply with~~ the decision referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article within the period of time specified therein has not been not complied with, where such non- compliance significantly affects the financial system of Member States other than that of the relevant competent authority, and where it is necessary to remedy in a timely manner the non compliance by theat competent authority in order to maintain or restore neutral conditions of competition in the market or ensure the orderly functioning and integrity of the financial system, the Authority may, where the relevant requirements of the legislation referred to in Article 1(2) are directly applicable to financial institutions, adopt an individual decision addressed to a financial institution requiring the necessary action to comply with its obligations under Community law including the cessation of any practice.

2010/04/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1

1. In the case of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Community, the Co~~mmission, upon its own initiative or following a request by the Authority, the Council, or the ESRB~~uncil, following appropriate consultations with the Commission, the ESRB, and where appropriate, the European Supervisory Authorities, may adopt a decision addressed to the Authority, determining the existence of an emergency situation for the purposes of this regulation.

2010/04/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. As soon as it issues a warning the Council shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament, the ESRB, the Commission and the European Supervisory Authority.

2010/04/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2

2. Where the ~~Commission has adopted a decision~~existence of an emergency situation is declared pursuant to paragraph 1, the Authority may adopt ~~individual decisions requiring competent authorities~~decisions addressed to the competent authorities of Member States requiring them to take the necessary action in accordance with the legislation referred to in Article 1(2) to address any risks that may jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system by ensuring that financial institutions and competent authorities satisfy the requirements laid down in that legislation.

2010/04/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. In the case of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the European Union, the Authority shall actively facilitate and, where deemed necessary, coordinate any actions undertaken by the relevant national competent supervisory authorities.

2010/04/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2 b (new)

2b. The Council shall review the decision pursuant to paragraph 1 at appropriate intervals and at least once a month and declare the discontinuation of the emergency situation, as soon as appropriate.

2010/04/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3

3. Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission under Article 226 of the Treaty, where a competent authority does not comply with the decision of the Authority referred to in paragraph 2 within the period laid down therein, where such non-compliance significantly affects the financial system of Member States other than that of the relevant competent authority, the Authority may, where the relevant requirements laid down in the legislation referred to in Article 1(2) are directly applicable to financial institutions, adopt an individual decision addressed to a financial institution requiring the necessary action to comply with its obligations under that legislation, including the cessation of any practice.

2010/04/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0142(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

AFor all other decisions of, the Board of Supervisors shall ~~be taken~~decide by simple majority ~~of members~~and each member shall have one vote.

2010/03/26
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 8 Directive

(8) A valid prospectus, drawn up by the issuer or the offeror and available to the public at the time of the final placement of securities through financial intermediaries or in any subsequent resale of securities, provides sufficient information for investors to make informed investment decisions. Therefore, financial intermediaries placing or subsequently reselling the securities should be entitled to rely upon the initial prospectus published by the issuer or the offeror as long as this is valid and duly supplemented in accordance with Articles 9 and ~~Article~~ 16 of Directive 2003/71/EC and the issuer or the offeror responsible for drawing up such prospectus consents to its use. ~~In this case no other prospectus should be required. However, in cas~~The issuer or the offeror should be able to attach conditions to his or her consent. In the event that consent to use the prospectus has been given, the issuer or the offeror responsible for drawing up the initial prospectus should be liable for the information stated therein and no other prospectus should be required. Where, notwithstanding such consent, the final terms of the resale prospectus have to be updated, the financial intermediary making use of the prospectus should be liable for the additional information stated in the prospectus, and for updating the final terms with the resale price. However, where the issuer or the offeror responsible for drawing up such initial prospectus does not consent to its use, the financial intermediary should be required to publish a new prospectus. Where the financial intermediary chooses to use the initial prospectus without consent, the intermediary should be liable for the information stated in the initial prospectus.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Vicky FORD, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 10

(10) The summary of the prospectus ishould be replaced by a key information document, which will be a key source of information for retail investors. It should be short, simple, clear and easy for targeted investors to understand. It should focus on ~~the key information~~essential elements that investors need in order to be able to make informed investment decisions. Its content should not be restricted to any predetermined number of words. The format and content of the summary should be determined in a way that ensures comparability with other investment products that are similar to decide which offers of securities to consider further. It should be concise and should present the information in a specified order to allow harmonisation to the highest extent possible and to facilitate comparability between prospectuses. ESMA should provide advice to the Commission (i) as to the scope of application of key information documents in the context of securities, (ii) the potential for the PRIPs initiative to be developed further in~~vestment proposal described in the prospectus. Therefore,~~ the context of the forthcoming review of Directive 2004/39/EC and in light thereof (iii) as to any consequential implementing measures. Member States should ~~attach~~ensure that no civil liability on the basis of the summary not only if it is misleading, inaccurate or inconsistent, when read together with the other parts of the prospectus, but also if it does not provide key information enabling investors to take informed investment decisions and to compare the securities with other investment produattaches to any person solely on the basis of the key information document, including any translation thereof, unless it is misleading, inaccurate or inconsistent, when read together with the other parts of the prospectus. Key investor information should contain a clear warning in this respects.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Vicky FORD, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 10 a (new)

(10a) The PRIP initiative will clarify how to ensure adequate investor protection and comparability between PRIPS and UCITS at a pre-contractual stage. The distribution aspect is of paramount importance when ensuring retail investor protection. Directives 2003/71/EC and 2004/109/EC should, if necessary, be amended by a horizontal measure in this respect in due course.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 11

(11) In order to improve the efficiency of cross border right issues and to adequately take into account the size of issuers, notably credit institutions issuing the securities mentioned in Article 1(2)(j) of Directive 2003/71/EC at or above the limit laid down in that Article and companies with reduced market capitalization, a proportionate disclosure regime should be introduced for rights issues and for offers of shares of SMEs referred to in Article 2(1)(f) of Directive 2003/71/EC, and issuers with reduced market capitalization and offers of non-equity securities referred to in Article 1(2)(j) of Directive 2003/71/EC issued by credit institutions at or above the limit laid down in that Article.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 11 b (new)

(11b) Taking into consideration the different national markets, the threshold to be set up in accordance with Articles 24, 24a and 24b regarding reduced market capitalisation should not lead to the adoption of different thresholds across the Union.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Vicky FORD, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 19

(19) In ~~particular, in~~ order to take account of the technical developments in the financial markets and to ensure uniform application of Directive 2003/71/EC, the Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing measures to update the limits established in that Directive. Since those measures are of general scope and are designed to amend non-essential elements of Directive 2003/71/EC by supplementing it with new nonessential elements, they must be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny provided for in Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/ECdelegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning the updating of the limits established in Directive 2003/71/EC, and, following the outcome of the PRIPs initiative, specifying, if necessary, further detail on the content and form of the key information document.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 1 – point a – point i

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – point h

(h) securities included in an offer where the total consideration of the offer in the Community is less than EUR ~~2 5~~5 000 000, which limit shall be calculated over a period of 12 months;

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point a – point i

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point e

(i) Persons or entities that are considered to be or treated on request as professional clients in accordance with Annex II to Directive 2004/39/EC, or recognised as eligible counterparties in accordance with Article 24 of Directive 2004/39/EC; and, investment firms and credit institutions shall inform their clients about their status as qualified investor under this Directive.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 – point a – point ii

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point e

(ii) points (ii), (iii), (iv) and (~~iii~~v) are deleted.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 a (new)

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 2 – paragraphs 2 and 3

2a. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 2 are deleted.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 2 b (new)

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 2 – paragraph 4

2b. Article 2(4) is replaced by the following: "4. In order to take account of technical developments on financial markets and to ensure uniform application of this Directive, the Commission shall lay down, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Articles 24, 24a and 24b, the definitions referred to in paragraph 1, including adjustment of the figures used for the definition of SMEs, the elements to be included in the key information and the thresholds for reduced market capitalisation, taking into account the situation on different markets, Union legislation and recommendations as well as economic developments [...]."

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Vicky FORD, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point -a (new)

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point b

(-a) In paragraph 2, point (b) is replaced by the following: "(b) an offer of securities addressed to fewer than 250 natural or legal persons per Member State, other than qualified investors; and/or"

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point -a a (new)

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point c

(-aa) In paragraph 2, point (c) is replaced by the following: "(c) an offer of securities addressed to investors who acquire securities for a total consideration of at least EUR 100 000 per investor, for each separate offer; and/or"

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point -a b (new)

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point d

(-aa) In paragraph 2, point (d) is replaced by the following: "d) an offer of securities whose denomination per unit amounts to at least EUR 100 000; and/or"

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 – point b

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 3 – paragraph 2

Member States shall not require another prospectus in any such subsequent resale of securities or final placement of securities through financial intermediaries as long as a valid prospectus is available in accordance with Article 9 and the issuer or the person responsible for drawing up such prospectus ~~consents to its use.~~ and another entity which, pursuant to national law, is liable for the accuracy of the content of such prospectus consents to its use. Where, notwithstanding such consent, the final terms of the resale prospectus have to be updated, the financial intermediary making use of the prospectus shall be liable for the additional information.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 3 b (new)

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b

3b. In Article 4(1), point (b) is replaced by the following: "(c) securities offered, allotted or to be allotted in connection with a merger or division, provided that a document is available containing information which is regarded by the competent authority as being equivalent to that of the prospectus, taking into account the requirements of Union legislation;"

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Vicky FORD, Diogo FEIO

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 5

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

2. The prospectus shall contain information concerning the issuer and the securities to be offered to the public or to be admitted to trading on a regulated market. ItThe prospectus shall also include a ~~summary. The summary~~key information document. The key information document shall, in a brief manner and in non-technical language, convey the essential characteristics and risks associated with the issuer, any guarantor and the securities,. It shall be in the language in which the prospectus was originally drawn up. The format and content of the ~~summary~~key information document of the prospectus shall provide ~~key information in order to enable investors to ta~~, in conjunction with the prospectus, appropriate information about the essential characteristics of the securities concerned in order to enable investors to determine whether to consider investing in the securities. The key inform~~ed investment decisions and to compare the secu~~ation document shall include information on the following essential elements in respect of the securities concerned: (a) essential information on the issuer, if applicable, the guarantor, and the securities to be offered to the public or to be admitted to trading on a regulated market; (b) a short descripti~~es with other investment products. The summary~~on of the risks associated with and essential characteristics of the investment in the relative security; (c) details of the offer and admission to trading; (d) the assets, liabilities and financial position of the securities, if applicable; (e) the reasons for the offer and prospective use of proceeds, where appropriate; (f) any rights attaching to the securities; and (g) the general terms and associated costs. The key information document shall also contain a warning that:

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Diogo FEIO, Othmar KARAS

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 9 – point b

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 9 – paragraph 4

4. A registration document, as referred to in Article 5(3), previously filed ~~and approved~~, shall be valid for a period of up to 24 months provided that it has been supplemented in accordance with Article 16. The registration document, supplemented if necessary in accordance with Article 16, accompanied by the securities note and the summary note shall be considered to constitute a valid prospectus.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 14

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 16 – paragraph 1

1. Every significant new factor, material mistake or inaccuracy relating to the information included in the prospectus which is capable of affecting the assessment of the securities and which arises or is noted between the time when the prospectus is approved and the final closing of the offer to the public or, as the case may be, the time when trading on a regulated market begins, whichever occurs ~~earli~~later, shall be mentioned in a supplement to the prospectus. Such a supplement shall be approved in the same way in a maximum of seven working days and published in accordance with at least the same arrangements as were applied when the original prospectus was published. The ~~summary~~key information document, and any translations thereof, shall also be supplemented, if necessary to take into account the new information included in the supplement.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0132(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1 – point 14

Directive 2003/71/EC
Article 16 – paragraph 2

2. IRegarding an offer of securities to the public, investors who have already agreed to purchase or subscribe for the securities before the supplement is published shall have the right, exercisable within two working days after the publication of the supplement, to withdraw their acceptances, provided that the new factor, mistake or inaccuracy referred to in paragraph 1 did arise before the final closing of the offer to the public and the delivery of the securities. This period may be extended by the issuer, or the offeror ~~or the person asking for the admission to trading on a regulated marke~~. The final date of the right of withdrawal shall be stated in the supplement.

2010/02/25
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 12 a (new)

(12a) The Leaders’ statement following the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh on 24 and 25 September 2009 set out the international consensus concerning remuneration of staff in banks and other systemically important financial services firms. Those principles should apply to appropriate staff at systemically important AIFM which fall within the scope of this Directive. The Commission should adopt implementing measures to that end, ensuring that any such measures are proportionate and even-handedly implemented with regard to the competitiveness of AIFM established in the EU.

2010/02/12
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 19

(19) A~~IFM~~ Member State should ~~also~~ be able to market AIF domiciled in third countries to professional investors both in the home Member State of the AIFM and in other Member States. That right should be subject to notification procedures and the existence of a tax agreement with the third country concerned which ensures an efficient exchange of information with the tax authorities in the domicile of the Community investors. Given the fact that such AIF and the third country in which they are domiciled have to meet additional requirements, some of which first have to be laid down in implementing measures, the rights granted under the Directive to market AIF domiciled in third countries to professional investors should only become effective three years after the transposition period. In the meantime Member States may allow or continue to allow AIFM to market AIF domiciled in third countries to professional investors on their territory subject to national law. During this period of three years, AIFM can however not market such AIF to professional investors in other Member States on the basis of rights granted under this Directiveallow AIFM to market in its territory AIF domiciled in third countries to investors in that Member State, if appropriate cooperation arrangements are in place between the competent authorities of the AIFM home Member State and the supervisory authority of the relevant third country.

2010/02/12
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 21

(21) Subject to the existence of an equivalent regulatory framework in a third country, as well as of effective access for AIFM established in the Community to the market of that third country, Member States should be allowed to authorise AIFM in accordance with the provisions of this Directive, without requiring that it has a registered office in the Community, after a period of three years as from the end of the transposition period. This period takes account of the fact that such AIFM and the third country in which they are domiciled have to meet additional requirements some of which first have to be laid down by implementing measures.deleted

2010/02/12
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – point e

(e) ‘Marketing’ means any general offering or placement ~~of units or shares in an AIF to or with investors domiciled in the Community, regardless of at whose in~~, at the initiative of an AIFM or of an intermediary responsible for distribution, of units or shares in an AIF to or with investors domiciled in the Union, but does not mean: (i) any unsolicited offer or (ii) any offer or approach legitimat~~ive the offer or placement takes place;~~ely made in a Member state under the laws of such Member State and other that any law implementing this directive.

2010/02/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – point l

(l) ‘Leverage’ means any method by which the AIFM increases the exposure of an AIF it manages to a particular investments whether through borrowing of cash or securities, or ~~leverage embedded~~through in derivative positions or; the level of leverage shall bye a~~ny other mean~~ssessed in all cases on an appropriately netted and risk-adjusted basis;

2010/02/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 a (new)

Article 9a Remuneration policy The AIFM shall set up and implement sound remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with effective risk management and long-term value creation.

2010/02/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 b (new)

Article 9b Notification The AIFM shall inform Member States’ competent authorities about the characteristics of its remuneration policies and practices.

2010/02/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 9 c (new)

Article 9c Competent authorities Member States’ competent authorities may react and take appropriate corrective measures to offset risks that may result in the failure of an AIFM to implement sound remuneration policies and practices.

2010/02/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 14 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. The above paragraphs shall not apply to AIFM only managing AIF: (a) which are not leveraged; (b) which have no redemption rights exercisable during a period of five years following the date of constitution of each AIF; (c) which have fixed capital commitments; (d) where fees are based on capital commitments; (e) where investors have the right to change the AIFM; (f) where specific provisions are included in the contractual agreement regarding the winding-up of an AIFM to protect investors during a transition. The above paragraphs shall also not apply to portfolios of a feeder AIF insofar as it consists of shares or units in a master AIF.

2010/02/15
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)

(ca) the amount of remuneration, split into fixed and variable remuneration, paid by a systemically important AIFM and, where relevant, by any AIF managed by such an AIFM, to senior executives and other employees having a material impact on the firm’s risk exposure.

2010/02/16
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 21 – paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. An AIFM managing one or more AIF employing leverage on a systemically significant basis shall make available to the competent authorities of its home Member State information about the overall level of leverage employed by each AIF it manages, a breakdown between leverage arising from borrowing of cash or securities and leverage embedded in financial derivatives and, where known, the extent to which AIF's assets have been re-used under leveraging arrangements. That information shall include the identity of the five largest sources of borrowed cash or securities for each of the AIF managed by the AIFM, and the amounts of leverage received from each of those entities for each of the AIF managed by the AIFM.

2010/02/16
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 3

3. In order to ensure the stability and integrity of the financial system, the Commission shall adopt implementing measures setting limits to the level of leverage AIFM can employ. These limits should take into account, inter alia, the type of AIF, their strategy and the sources of their leverage. Those measures designed to amend non- essential elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 49(3).deleted

2010/03/08
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 35 – paragraph 1

An AIFM may only market shares or units of an AIF domiciled in a third country to professional investors domiciled in a Member State, if the third country has signed an agreement with this Member State which fully complies with the standards laid down in Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and ensures an effective exchange of information in tax matters Member State may allow AIFM to market on its own territory shares or units of an AIF domiciled in a third country if appropriate cooperation arrangements are in place between the competent authorities of the home Member State of the AIFM and the supervisory authority of that third country.

2010/02/18
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 35 – paragraph 2

Where AIFM market shares or units of AIF domiciled in a third country the home Member States may prolong the period referred to in Article 31(3), when this is necessary to check whether the conditions of this Directive are met.deleted

2010/02/18
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 35 – paragraph 3

Before allowing AIFM to market shares or units of AIF domiciled in a third country, the home Member State shall have particular regard to the arrangements made by the AIFM in accordance with Article 38, where relevant.deleted

2010/02/18
Committee: ECON

2009/0064(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 39

Authorisation of AIFM established in third countries 1. accordance with this Directive, AIFM established in a third country to market units or shares of an AIF to professional investors in the Community under the conditions of this Directive, provided that: (a) the third country is the subject of a decision taken pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) stating that its legislation regarding prudential regulation and on-going supervision is equivalent to the provisions of this Directive and is effectively enforced; (b) the third country is the subject of a decision taken pursuant to paragraph 3 (b) stating that it grants Community AIFM effective market access comparable to that granted by the Community to AIFM from that third country; (c) the AIFM provides the competent authorities of the Member State in which it applies for authorisation with the information referred to in Articles 5 and 31 ; (d) a cooperation-agreement between the competent authorities of that Member State and the supervisor of the AIFM exists which ensures an efficient exchange of all information that are relevant for monitoring the potential implications of the activities of the AIFM for the stability of systemically relevant financial institutions and the orderly functioning of markets in which the AIFM is active. (e) the third country has signed an agreement with the Member State in which it applies for authorisation which fully complies with the standards laid down in Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and ensures an effective exchange of information in tax matters. 2. The Commission shall adopt implementing measures aimed at establishing: (a) general equivalence criteria for the equivalence and effective enforcement of third country legislation on prudential regulation and on-going supervision, based on the requirements laid down in Chapters III, IV and V. (b) general criteria for assessing whether third countries grant Community AIFM effective market access comparable to that granted by the Community to AIFM from those third countries. Those measures, designed to amend non- essential elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 49(3). 3. On the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission shall, in accordance with the regulatory procedure referred to in Article 49(2), adopt implementing measures stating: (a) that the legislation on prudential regulation and ongoing supervision of AIFM in a third country is equivalent to this Directive and effectively enforced; (b) that a third country grant Community AIFM effective market access at least comparable to that granted by the Community to AIFM from that third country.Article 39 deleted Member States may authorise, in

2010/02/18
Committee: ECON

2009/0035(COD)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 1

The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs calls on the Committee on Legal Affairs, as the committee responsible, to propose ~~rejection of~~that the Commission proposal be amended as proposed in the above amendments, and to ask for a general revision of the 4th and 7th Company Law Directives in 2010, in particular as regards SMEs and micro- entities whose annual net turnover from cross-border trade is above 10%, accompanied by an all-inclusive impact assessment.

2009/10/02
Committee: ECON

2009/0035(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 6

(6) Micro-entities are however often subject to the same reporting rules as larger companies. Those rules put a burden on them which is not in proportion to their size and is therefore disproportionate for the smallest enterprises as compared to the larger enterprises. Therefore it should be possible immediately to exempt micro- entities ~~from the obligation to draw up annual accounts~~whose activities are essentially carried out in a Member State or at local or regional level, and whose annual net turnover from cross-border transactions is 10% or less, from the obligation to draw up annual accounts in accordance with the 4th Company Law Directive (Directive 78/660/EEC), even if such accounts provide an input for statistical information.

2009/10/02
Committee: ECON

2009/0035(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1

Directive 78/660/EEC
Article 1a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

In addition to these requirements, and in order for micro-entities to be exempted from the scope of the Directive by the Member State, they must carry out their activities essentially in the Member State or at local or regional level, with an annual net turnover from cross-border transactions of 10% or less.

2009/10/02
Committee: ECON

2009/0035(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1

Directive 78/660/EEC
Article 1a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

2. Where on its balance sheet date, a company exceeds the limits of two of the three criteria set out in paragraph 1 in two consecutive financial years, or where more than 10% of its annual net turnover after two consecutive years stems from cross- border trade, even though its activities are essentially carried out at the level of the Member State or at local or regional level, that company may no longer benefit from the exemption referred to in that paragraph.

2009/10/02
Committee: ECON

2009/0035(COD)

Proposal for a directive – amending act
Article 1

Directive 78/660/EEC
Article 1a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

Where on its balance sheet date, a company has ceased to exceed the limits of two of the three criteria set out in paragraph 1, and where 10% or less of its annual net turnover stemmed from cross- border trade, since its activities were essentially carried out at the level of the Member State or at local or regional level, it may benefit from the exemption referred to in that paragraph, provided that it has not exceeded those limits in two consecutive financial years.

2009/10/02
Committee: ECON