BETA

Activities of Burkhard BALZ related to 2012/0150(COD)

Plenary speeches (1)

Framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms - Deposit guarantee schemes (debate)
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2012/0150(COD)

Amendments (37)

Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13 a (new)
(13a) In order to ensure a uniform and consistent approach for determining the criteria triggering the resolution of an institution, the European Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 30
(30) The limitations on the rights of shareholders and creditors should be in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The resolution tools should therefore be applied only to those institutions that are failing or likely to fail, and only when it is necessary to pursue the objective of financial stability in the general interest. The specifics of public sector entities owned by regional or central governments with explicit guarantee arrangements or comparable liability instruments provided by these governments should be considered. In particular, resolution tools should be applied where the institution cannot be wound up under normal insolvency proceedings without destabilizing the financial system and the measures are necessary in order to ensure the rapid transfer and continuation of systemically important functions and where there is no reasonable prospect for any alternative private solution, including any increase of capital by the existing shareholders or by any third party sufficient to restore the full viability of the institution.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 318 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 3
3. Resolution authorities may be the competent authorities for supervision for the purposes of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, central banks, competent ministries or other public administrative authorities, provided that Member States adopt rules and arrangements necessary to avoid conflicts of interest between the functions of supervision pursuant to Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC or the other functions of the relevant authority and the functions of resolution authorities pursuant to this Directive, including rules regarding professional secrecy. In particular, Member States shall ensure that, within the competent authorities, central banks, competent ministries or other public administrative authorities there is a separation between the resolution function and the supervisory or other functions of the relevant authority. The resolution function shall pursue only the objectives defined in this Directive.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 365 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new)
Member States shall make sure that competent and resolution authorities take into account the structure, business activity, size and interconnectedness of the institution when applying measures and instruments set out in this Directive.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 385 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that each institution that is not part of a group draws up and maintains a recovery plan providing, through measures taken by the management of the institution or by a group entity, for the restoration of its financial situation following significant deterioration. The host competent authority may request a specific recovery plan to be drawn up for the subsidiary in that Member State if the operations of the institution’s subsidiary constitute a significant share of that Member State's financial system. Recovery plans shall be considered as a governance arrangement within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC.
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that the institutions update their recovery plans at least annuallyevery two years or after change to the legal or organisational structure of the institution, its business or its financial situation, which could have a material effect on, or necessitates a change to the recovery plan. Competent authorities may require institutions to update their recovery plans more frequently.
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 405 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 5
5. The competent authorities shall ensure that institutions include in recovery plans appropriate conditions and procedures to ensure the timely implementation of recovery actions as well as a wide range of recovery options. Competent authorities shall ensure that firminstitutions test their recovery plans against a range of scenarios of financial distress, varying in their severity including system wide events, legal-entity specific stress and group-wide stres relevant to the institutions' specific conditions.
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 416 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1
EBA, in consultation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), shall develop draft technical standards specifying the range ofdifferent scenarios to be used for the purposes of paragraph 5 of this Article in accordance with Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 523 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. Resolution authorities, in consultation with competent authorities, shall draw up a resolution plan for each institution that is not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 of Directive 2006/48/EC. The resolution plan shall be disclosed to the institution concerned and provide for the resolution actions which the resolution and competent authorities may take where the institution meets the conditions for resolution.
2013/01/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 907 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the competent authority or resolution authority determines on the basis of objective and predefined criteria that the institution is failing or likely to fail;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 916 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) the institution is in breach or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will be in breach, in the near future, of the objective and predefined criteria for fulfilling its capital requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority because the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its own funds;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 918 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the assets of the institution are or there are objective elementsre are objective or predefined criteria to support a determination that the assets of the institution are or will be, in the near future, less than its liabilities;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 920 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c
(c) the institution is or there are objective elementsre are objective or predefined criteria to support a determination that the institution is or will be, in the near future, unable to pay its obligations as they fall due;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 937 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 27 – paragraph 5
5. The Commission, taking into account, where appropriate, the experience acquired in the application of EBA guidelines, shall adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 103 aimed at specifyto definge the circumstances when an institution shall be considered as failing or likely to failobjective criteria for the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1 and points (a) to (c) of paragraph 2.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 962 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Member States shall ensure that resolution tools are applied proportionally and in accordance with the legal form of the credit institution concerned.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1079 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) all deposits that are guaranteed in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1143 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 38 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. The bail-in toll shall not be applied to the liabilities of an institution issued before the entry into force of this directive.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1176 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point d
(d) the extent to which the Deposit Guarantee Scheme could contribute to the financing of resolution in accordance with Article 99amount of covered deposits of an institution which are guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC;
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1179 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 39 – paragraph 3 – point d a (new)
(d a) the membership in a risk mitigating solidarity system, which aims at the prevention of resolution events by reporting requirements and early interventions in the sense of the resolution of the European Parliament of 16 February 2012 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast).
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1273 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 50 a (new)
Article 50 a Government stabilisation tool 1. In order to give effect to the government financial stabilisation tools, Member States shall ensure that their competent authorities have the resolution powers specified in Articles 56 to 63. 2. In times of systemic crisis Member States shall have the possibility, without prejudice to the use of other resolution tools and in accordance with State aid rules, to participate in the resolution of a credit institution or investment firm or to intervene directly in order to avoid its winding up through certain financial stabilisation tools, with a view to avoid contagion effects and maintaining financial stability in the Members State as well as in the Union as a whole. Such action shall be carried out in close cooperation between the competent ministry and the resolution authority. 3. A Member State may determine the existence of a systemic crisis for the purpose of this Directive. 4. The Commission may, after consulting the ESRB, question the Member State's assessment of the systemic crisis precondition. 5. If all the conditions in Art. 27 (1) are met and capital has been written down in accordance with Art. 51, Member States may take a credit institution in its entirety into temporary public ownership. For that purpose the Member State may make one or more share transfer orders in which the transferee is: a) a nominee of the Member State; or b) a company wholly owned by the Member State Member States shall ensure that institutions subject to the temporary public ownership tool are managed on commercial and professional basis. Having exercised the temporary public ownership tool, Member States shall ensure that the institution is transferred back to the private sector as soon as commercial and financial circumstances allow.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1435 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 91 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) the power to raise ex post extraordinary contributions as specified in Article 95, andeleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1450 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 93 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that, in a period no longer than 10 years after the entry into force of this directive, the available financial means of their financing arrangements reach at least 1% of the amount of covered deposits of all the credit institutions authorised in their territory which are guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1472 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) if a Member State has availed itself of the option provided for in Article 99(5) of this Directive to use the funds of Deposit Guarantee Scheme for the purposes of Article 92 of this Directive, the contribution from each institution shall be pro-rata to the amount of its liabilities excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC with respect to the total liabilities, excluding own funds and deposits guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC, of all the institutions authorised in the territory of the Member State.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1476 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) if a Member State has not availed itself of the option provided for in Article 99(5) to use the funds of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme for the purposes of Article 92, the contribution from each institution shall be pro-rata to the total amount of its liabilities, excluding own funds, with respect to the total liabilities, excluding own funds, of all the institutions authorised in the territory of the Member State.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1485 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
(c a) the annual contributions applied in the Member States which aim at mitigating the costs of resolution for the public are accountable to the contributions of this Directive.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1504 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 94 – paragraph 7 – point b a (new)
(b a) the existence of a risk mitigating solidarity system, which aims at the prevention of resolution events by reporting requirements and early interventions in the sense of the resolution of the European Parliament of 16 February 2012 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (recast);
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1524 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 95
Article 95 Extraordinary ex post contributions 1. Where the available financial means are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the financing arrangements, Member States shall ensure that extraordinary ex post contributions are raised from the institutions authorised in their territory, in order to cover the additional amounts. These extraordinary contributions shall be allocated between institutions in accordance with the rules set out in Article 94(2). 2. The provisions of Article 94(4) to (8) shall be applicable to the contributions raised under this article.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1530 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 96 – paragraph 1
Member States shall ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction are enabled to contract borrowings or other forms of support from financial institutions, the central bank, or other third parties, in the event that the amounts raised in accordance with Article 94 are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the financing arrangements, and the extraordinary contributions provided for in Article 95 are not immediately accessiblex-post contributions are not deemed possible due to the risk to overall financial stability which such ex-post contributions would create.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1540 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 97 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shallmay ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction shall have the rightopportunity to borrow from all other financing arrangements within the Union for the resolution of cross-border institutions, in the event that the amounts raised under Article 94 are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expense incurred by the use of the financing arrangements, and the extraordinary contributions foreseen in Article 95 are not immediately accessible.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1547 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Member States shallmay ensure that financing arrangements under their jurisdiction are obligedcan be authorised by the resolution authority of that Member State to lend to other financing arrangements within the Union in the circumstances specified under paragraph 1.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1556 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 97 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Subject to the first subparagraph, national financing arrangements shall not be obligauthorised to lend to another national financing arrangement in those circonstances when the resolution authority of the Member State of the financing arrangement considers that it would not have sufficient funds to finance any foreseeable resolution in the near future. In any case they should not be obligauthorised to lend more than half of the funds that the national financing arrangement has available at the moment when the borrowing request is formalised.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1616 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 99 – paragraph 5
5. Member States may also provide that the available financial means of deposit guarantee schemes established in their territory may be used for the purposes of Article 92(1), provided that the deposit guarantee schemes comply, where applicable, with the provisions laid down in Articles 93 to 98.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1618 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 99 – paragraph 6
6. Member States shall ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme has arrangements in place to ensure that, following a contribution made by the deposit guarantee scheme under paragraphs 1 or 5 and where the depositors of the institution under resolution need to be reimbursed, the members of the scheme can immediately provide the scheme with the amounts that have to be paid.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1624 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 99 – paragraph 7
7. Where Member States avail themselves of the option provided for under paragraph 5 of this Article, the deposit guarantee schemes shall be considered as financing arrangements for the purpose of Article 91. In that case Member States may abstain from establishing separate funding arrangements.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1629 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 99 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1
Where a Member State avails itself of the option provided for in paragraph 5, the following priority rule shall apply to the use of available financial means of the deposit guarantee scheme.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1632 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 99 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2
If the deposit guarantee scheme is, at the same time, requested to use its available financial means for the purposes specified in Article 92 or for the purpose of the first paragraph of this Article, and for the repayment of depositors and early interventions under Directive 94/19/EC, and the available financial means are insufficient to satisfy all these requests, priority shall be given to the repayment of depositors and early interventions under Directive 94/19/EC and to the actions specified under paragraph 1 of this Article, over the payments for the purposes provided for in Article 92 of this Directive.
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1633 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 99 – paragraph 9
9. Where eligible deposits with an institution under resolution are transferred to another entity through the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool, the depositors have no claim under Directive 94/19/EC against the deposit guarantee scheme in relation to any part of their deposits with the institution under resolution that are not transferred, provided that the amount of funds transferred is equal to or more than the aggregate coverage level laid down in Article 7 of Directive 94/19/EC.deleted
2012/12/20
Committee: ECON