BETA

30 Amendments of Burkhard BALZ related to 2013/0253(COD)

Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) MirrorWithing the scope of the Council Regulation (EU) No …/…, a single resolution mechanism should cover all credit institutions establBanking Union, it should be differentiated between the supervision and resolution of credit institutions on the European and national level. Credit institutions which are directly supervished inat the participating Member States. HowEuropean lever,l within the framework of athe SSM should fall under the scope of this Regulation. The single resolution mechanism, it should be possible to resolve directly any credit institution of a participating Member State in order to avoid asymmetries within the internal market in the treatment of failing institutions and creditors during a resolution processhence cover all credit institutions which fall under the direct supervision of the ECB. Credit institutions which are supervised on the national level should also be resolved at the national level. To the extent that parent undertakings, investment firms and financial institutions are included in the consolidated supervision by the ECB, they should be included in the scope of the single resolution mechanism. Although the ECB will not supervise those institutions on a solo basis, it will be the only supervisor that will have a global perception of the risk to which a group, and indirectly the individual members, is exposed to. To exclude entities which form part of the consolidated supervision within the scope of the ECB from the scope of the single resolution mechanism would make it impossible to plan for the resolution of banking groups and to adopt a group resolution strategy, and would make any resolution decisions much less effective.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
(16) The ECB, as the supervisor within the SSM, is the best placed to assess whether a credit institution is failing or likely to fail and whether there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector or supervisory action would prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe. The Board, upon notification of the ECB, should provide a recommendation to the Commission. Given the need to balance the different interests at stake the Commission should decide whether or not to place an institution under resolution and should also decide on a clear and detailed resolution framework establishing the resolution actions to be taken by the Board. Within this framework, the Board should decide on a resolution scheme and instruct the national resolution authorities on the resolution tools and powers to be executed at national level.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 a (new)
(16a) The European Commission should not have a leading role in the resolution procedure as set out in this Regulation and should not have any decision-making power in relation to the resolution of a credit institution referred to in Article 2.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
(23) To ensure a uniform approach for institutions and groupsGiven the sensitivity of the information which need to be included in the resolution plans, the Board should not be empowered to draw up resolution plans for such institutions and groups. The Board should assess the resolvability of institutions and groups, and take measures aimed at removing impediments to resolvability, if any. The Board should require national resolution authorities to apply such appropriate measures designed to remove impediments to resolvability in order to ensure consistency andIt should be the national resolution authorities that draw up the resolution plans for the cresolvability of thedit institutions and groups concerned.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) In order to minimise disruption to the financial market and to the economy, the resolution process should be accomplished in a short time. The Commission should, throughout the resolution procedure, have access to any information which it deems necessary to take an informed decision in the resolution process. Where the Commission decides to put an institution under resolution, the Board should immediately adop not have any leading role in the resolution process and should not have the power to decide to put a cresolution scheme establishing the details of the resolution tools and powers to be applied, and the use of any financing arrangementsdit institution under resolution.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) credit institutions established in participating Member States; which are directly supervised by the Single Supervisory Mechanism according to Article 6(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No [ ] conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions; (This amendment applies throughout the text.)
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 317 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
1. The Board shall draw up resolution plans for the entitiesnational resolution authority of the participating Member State in which the entity or group referred to inunder Article 2 and for groups.is established shall draw up a resolution plan for the entity or group concerned. (This amendment applies throughout the text.)
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 324 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the national resolution authorities shall forward to the Board all information necessary to draw up and implement the resolution plans, as obtained by them in accordance with Articles 10 and 12(1) of Directive [ ], without prejudice to Chapter 5 of this Title.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 4
4. The resolution plan shall provide for the resolution actions which the Commission and the Board mayneed to be taken where an entity referred to in Article 2 or a group meet the conditions for resolution. The resolution plan shall take into consideration a range of scenarios including that the event of failure may be idiosyncratic or may occur at a time of broader financial instability or of system wide events. The resolution plan shall not assume any extraordinary public financial support besides the use of the Fund established in accordance with this Regulation.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 355 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 7
7. The Board shall draw up the resolution plans in cooperation with the supervisor or consolidating supervisor and with the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States in which the entities are established.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 474 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
When applying the bail-in tool to an institution under resolution, and without prejudice to liabilities excluded from the bail-in tool under Article 24(3), the Commission shall decide on, and the Board and the national resolution authorities of the participating Member States shall exercise the write down and conversion powers to claims following a reverse order of priority to the following order for normal insolvency procedurein accordance with Article 43 of Directive [ ] establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 481 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) claims related to eligible deposits and claims from deposit guarantee schemes;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 488 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) unsecured non preferred claims;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 493 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) claims subordinated other than those mentioned in points (d) to (f);deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 498 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) claims from senior executives and directors;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 503 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) claims related to additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments;deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 508 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) claims rdelaeted to common equity Tier 1 instruments;
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 513 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
starting from point (f) and ending with point (a).deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 548 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 6
6. Having regard to the urgency of the circumstances in the case, the Commission shall decide, on its own initiative or taking into account, if any, the communication referred to in paragraph 1 or the recommendation of the Board referred to in paragraph 5, whether or not to place the entity under resolution, and on the framework of the resolution tools that shall be applied in respect of the entity concerned and of the use of the Fund to support the resolution action. The Commission, on its own initiative, may decide to place an entity under resolution if all the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 are medeleted (This amendment applies throughout the text.)
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 652 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
The bail-in tool may be applied for either of the following purposes and in accordance with Article 37 and 38 of Directive [ ] establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms:
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 780 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 39 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. A member appointed by the ESM;
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 817 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 2
2. The Executive Director shall take part in the voting. The members appointed by the Commission, the ECB and the ESM shall not have voting rights.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 819 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 49 – paragraph 1
1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, the members of the Board referred to in Article 4039(1)(a) to (d) shall participate in the executive sessions of the Board. The members appointed by the Commission, the ECB and the ESM shall not have voting rights.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 841 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 1
1. When deliberating on an individual entity or a group established only in one participating Member State, the Board shall take its decisions in its executive sessions by a simple majority of its participating members with voting rights. In case of a tie the Executive Director shall have a casting vote.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 847 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 51 – paragraph 2
2. When deliberating on a cross-border group, the Board shall take its decisions in its executive sessions by a simple majority of its participating members with voting rights. The members of the Board referred to in Article 40(239(1)(a), (b) and (e) and the member appointed by the Member State in which the group level resolution authority is situated shall each have one vote. The other participating members with voting rights shall each have a voting right equal to a fraction of one vote and the number of national resolution authorities of the Member States in which a subsidiary or entity covered by consolidated supervision is established. In case of a tie the Executive Director shall have a casting vote.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 930 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 65 – paragraph 1
1. In a period no longer than 10 years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the available financial means of the Fund shall reach at least 1% of the amount of deposits of allthe credit institutions authorised in the participating Member States which arereferred to under Article 2 guaranteed under Directive 94/19/EC.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 941 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 66 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The individual contribution of each institution shall be raised at least annually and shall be calculated pro-rata to the amount of its liabilities excluding own funds and covered deposits, with respect to the total liabilities, excluding own funds and covered deposits, of all thethe credit institutions authorised in the territories of the participating Member Statesreferred to under Article 2.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 966 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 67 – paragraph 1
1. Where the available financial means are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the Fund, the Board shall raise in accordance with Article 62 extraordinary ex post contributions from the credit institutions authorised in the territories of participating Member Statesreferred to under Article 2, in order to cover the additional amounts. These extraordinary contributions shall be allocated between institutions in accordance with the rules set out in Article 66.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1004 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 – paragraph 4
4. In the event resources of a deposit guarantee scheme are not sufficient to cover the payments to be made to depositors, and other resources are not immediately available from the relevant participating Member State, the Fund may lend the necessary resources to that deposit guarantee scheme provided that all the conditions under Article 10 of Directive 94/19/EC are met.deleted
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1050 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 88 – paragraph 3
Article 24 shall apply from 1 January 20185.
2013/10/22
Committee: ECON