4 Amendments of Burkhard BALZ related to 2013/2047(INI)
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas mandatory central clearing haspositively contributes to decreasing the overall systemic risk of financial markets, it has yet increased the concentration of systemic risk in CCPs and all CCPs are systemically important in their own markets;
Amendment 46 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the Commission to recognise that while the aim ofit is unclear whether ring-fencing asset classes within a default fund of a CCP is sufficient to limit contagion, it is unclear whether this will be sufficient to prevent such contagion in practicen practice; therefore calls on the Commission to recommend for CCPs to define recovery and resolution plans in a way that the failure of one asset class does not necessarily trigger the resolution of the entire CCP;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Asserts that reaching the dividing-line between recovery and resolution in the case of CCPs is when the default waterfall is exhausted,shall necessitatinge the option for the supervisor to remove the CCP's management board;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Underlines that any voluntary participation of clearing members in loss allocation before removal of theloss allocation may involve client money in case of a CCP's recovery, after clearing member money has already been involved; therefore recommends that the recovery plans of CCP's management should not involve client money, whileinclude distinct information on the potential level of costs that may be passed on by clearing members to their clients; suggests further that the resolution authority, once responsible, may employ loss allocation tools such as variation margin cutting or refilling of the default fund by the non- defaulting clearing members;