BETA

23 Amendments of Derk Jan EPPINK related to 2012/2028(INI)

Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
- having regard to Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the eurozone is in a unique situation, with eurozone Member States sharing a single currency but no common fiscal policy or common bond marketstructural deficiencies inherent to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) from its very beginning have amplified and put the eurozone in a strained situation as moral hazard became widespread and most of the Member States of the eurozone (EU-17) failed to maintain balanced public finances;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits Member States from assuming liabilities of another Member State;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Bb. whereas the current sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone underlines the crucial need for the EU-17 to launch or complete needed structural reforms as identified in their respective National Reform Programmes and the Commission's Country Specific Recommendations;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Bc. whereas credible commitments to growth-friendly austerity measures are a prerequisite for any sustainable solution of the excessive debt and deficit situation of most of the eurozone Member States;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)
Bd. whereas mutualisation of eurozone sovereign debt cannot per se solve the loss of competitiveness of the euro area, and whereas the sharing of credit risk stemming from individual eurozone Member States' lack of fiscal discipline could foster the assumption driven by moral hazard that it is possible for some eurozone countries to get out of difficulties without having to undertake needed structural reforms;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B e (new)
Be. whereas issuance of common eurozone bonds poses also a strategic risk to participating Member States;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Is deeply concerned, however, that despite Member States‘ reform and consolidation efforts euro area sovereign bond markets are in distress, reflected in widening spreads and high volatility; notes that the immediate trigger and root cause of rising spreads were financial markets' concerns about the solidity of some eurozone countries;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that there is an urgent need to further discuss a longer-term visiondiscuss without taboos longer-term forecasts and development prognoses for the euro areazone which ensures soun balanced public financesbudgeting, sustainable growth and high levels of employment, while preventing moral hazard and supporting convergence;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Points out that it is in the long-term strategic interest of the eurozone and of its Member States to draw all possible benefits from issuing the euro, su currency which has establishing a common liquid and diversified bond market and establishing the euro asthe potential of becoming a global reserve currency in the long term;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Stresses that all existing and future instruments or institutions which are sensu stricto or sensu lato part of the economic governance framework of the Union need to be democratically legitimised and made accountable by involving the parliaments of the Member States and the European Parliament in the setting-up and running of these instruments or institutions; encourages where applicable the use of national referendums in line with national constitutional provisions to increase the democratic legitimacy of such instruments or institutions following a broad public debate;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Highlights that any policy that requires fiscally solid countries to subsidize countries with high deficits and debt levels violates at least the spirit, if not the letter, of Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Believes that the prospect of common bonds can foster stability in the euro area and be an additional element to incentivisethat do not per se sufficiently prevent from spreading of moral hazard risk to undermine the euro zone by weakening market discipline, endangering compliance with the srevised Stability and gGrowth pPact; reiterates its position that sequ and prevencting is a key issue involving a binding roadmap, included in the annex, similar to the Maastricht criteria for introducing the single currencythe implementation by eurozone Member States of much needed structural reform and fiscal consolidation measures;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Considers that common bonds, if backed by joint or several guarantees with each participating Member State being liable not only for its own share of the issuance, but also for the share of all others, including those Member States failing to honour their obligations, risk to trigger contagion with rating downgrades in the eurozone; whereas downgrading of a larger AAA-rated eurozone Member State could result in downgrading of the common bond, which could in turn feedback negatively on the credit ratings of the other participating Member States; whereas downgrading of the eurozone as a whole may ultimately hamper the creditworthiness and ratings of non- eurozone Member States, thus leaving the whole EU-27 short of sustainable credit;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Considers that unlimited ownership of common bonds by foreign institutional or private holders may impact on the decision-making of the Member States guaranteeing such issuance; whereas foreign holders of these common bonds may in exchange of purchasing them require various concessions from the issuing Member States or the Union as a whole;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Urges Member States to seriously consider the option of immediatelyTakes note of the proposals to establishing a European Redemption Fund in order to allow participating countries to reduce excessive debt over a maximum period of 25 years by using the interest rate savings for debt reduction;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Urges Member States to seriously consider the immediate issuance ofTakes note of the proposals to issue common short-term debt in the form of eurobills to protect Member States with fundamentally sustainable fiscal polices from illiquidity runs and the negative feedback loop between sovereign and banking crises;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Considers however premature the implementation of the ideas of an ERF and eurobills which have neither been thoroughly assessed by the Commission nor have been debated in the national parliaments of EU Member States, the European Parliament and Council; Stresses also that the Commission should take into account the viewpoints of the ECB, the ESRB and ESMA before presenting any legislative proposal on these ideas;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Takes note of the various proposals to unwind existing structural imbalances within the eurozone by implementing an orderly break-up of the euro currency; considers however that the Commission in close cooperation with relevant institutions such as Council, the eurozone, the EP and the ECB should step up its efforts to implement growth- friendly austerity measures in the most indebted eurozone Member States to prevent this ultimate scenario or limit its scope to the going off of individual countries;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Calls on the Commission to prepare contingency plans allowing a rapid implementation of these schemeindependent impact assessments of these various proposals;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Invites the ECB and the Eurozone to clearly express their views on the impact of each proposal on the competitiveness of the eurozone and its Member States and on the capacity of each of the proposals to solve or contribute to solve the current sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Believes that, in parallel, there is an urgent need to recapitalise the European banking sector and to further complete financial integration in the EU; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals for a single financial supervisory authority to oversee systemic financial institutions, a banking resolution regime including a recapitalisation fund and an EU-wide deposit guarantee scheme;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Advocates that, where a Member State whose currency is the euro is unwilling to surrender its budgetary sovereignty, it should be given the option of leaving the eurozone; the European Commission and the Eurogroup - acting in liaison with the ECB - should assist the Member State concerned with practical steps to make a withdrawal from the eurozone feasible and as smooth as possible;
2012/07/12
Committee: ECON