Activities of Sylvie GOULARD related to 2013/2277(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries PDF (350 KB) DOC (175 KB)
Amendments (54)
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the Troika and its role have been enshrined in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 and mentioned in the Treaty on the ESM;
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 has been adopted in the European Parliament with 528 votes in favour, 81 against and 71 abstentions;
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
Ac. whereas the ECJ has confirmed in its ruling on Pringle C-370/12 that the Commission and the ECB can be entrusted with the tasks conferred to them in the ESM Treaty;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas, within the Troika, the Commission is responsible for negotiating the conditions for financial assistance for euro area Member States ‘in liaison with the ECB’ and ’wherever possible together with the IMF’, the financial assistance hereinafter referred to as ‘EU-IMF assistance’, but the Council is responsible for approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme;
Amendment 54 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the Troika is the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side, the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by the EurogroupEU Finance Ministers;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is based on a draft macroeconomic adjustment programme prepared by the Member State requesting financial assistance and approved by the Council; whereas a MoU is an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas the Commission signs the MoU on behalf of euro area finance ministers; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM has also to address a request for assistance to the IMF;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas the ECJ has stated in its Pringle ruling that the prohibition laid down in Article 125 TFEU ensures that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline and that compliance with such discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the financial stability of the monetary union; it stresses, however, that Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member State which remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the Task Force for Greece was set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to design and implement structural reforms to improve the functioning of the economy and society and create the conditions for sustained recovery and job creation, as well as to speed up the absorption of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in Greece and to provide critical resources to finance investment;
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver on sustainable public finances, sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensiveis also requires the programme to deliver on modernising the public sector to establish a lean and efficient public administration as a pre- condition for the swift and proper implementation of these programmes and further structural reforms; whereas the programmes could only partly correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
Recital L a (new)
La. whereas it is crucial to recognize in this context that the four Member States under assistance were very different in terms of their industrial and financial structures and that for this reason one- size fits all policies could not work;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States; points out that excessive public and private debt, and a loss of competitiveness played a crucial role all of which could not be prevented by the existing EU economic governance framework;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notes that while domestic policy mistakes were important factors in the development of the underlying vulnerabilities, all four Member States also fell victim to repercussions of the global financial crisis that first surfaced with Lehman Brothers and further spread to the euro area, exposing rigidities and incompleteness in the fiscal and structural architecture of the EMU;
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that, prior to the beginning of the EU-IMF assistance programme initiated in the spring of 2010, there was a dual fear associated with the ‘'insolvency’' and ’'non- sustainability’' of the public finances of Greece as a result of the constantly declining competitiveness of the Greek economy and decades of imprudent fiscal policy, with the government deficit reaching 15.7% of GDP in 2009, and the debt-to-GDP ratio continuing on an upward trend since 2003 when it stood at 97.4%, reaching 1297% in 2009 and 156.9% in 2012; is of the opinion that the problematic situation of Greece was also due to statistical fraud; recalls that because of the European parliament's insistence Eurostat (the statistical office of the European Union) is now endowed with powers and means to deliver a solid basis of reliable and objective statistics;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme in 2013, speculations about the systemic instability in the Cypriot economy had been ongoing for a long time, owing inter alia to the exposure of Cypriot banks to overleveraged local property companies, the Greek debt crisis, the downgrading of Cypriot government bonds by international rating agencies, the inability to refund public expenditure from the international markets, and the initial reluctance of the government to restructure the troubled financial sector; recalls also that the situation has been complexified by the overreliance on savings coming from Russian citizens and by the recourse to a loan from the Russian authorities;
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. recalls that cheap and excessive private capital flows were permitted to Member States, which have since become programme countries, from other Member States with their explicit or tacit support;
Amendment 235 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. notes that the allocation of EU funds, inter alia structural funds, was not optimal;
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Notes that the initial agreement between the Greek authorities on the one side and the EU and IMF on the other was adopted on 2 May 2010 in the relevant MoUs containing , the policy conditionality for EU-IMF financial assistance; further notes that, following five reviews and the insufficient success of the first programme, a second programme had to be adopted in March 2012, which has been reviewed three times since; recalls the legal uncertainties created because of the agreement made by two Member States on October 2010 (the "Deauville deal") in the absence of a European framework;
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary union; regrets that the Council of Ministers has consistently refused to develop a long term and comprehensive approach and only based its decisions on a country by country approach;
Amendment 275 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary union; deplores that the EU structural funds and other policies aiming at long term economic convergence within the Union had not effectively delivered;
Amendment 361 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Points out that EU Finance Ministers approved the macroeconomic adjustment programmes;
Amendment 388 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Points out that each Member State's reform efforts need to be tailor-made taking the experiences and histories of the respective country into consideration;
Amendment 420 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack ofuneven progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken; and recommends implementing measures that would make all parties contribute fairly to tax revenues
Amendment 429 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal and the financial sector programme for Spain; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken;
Amendment 530 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 549 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; deplores that too often the one-size fits all approach taken to crisis management did not fully consider the balance in the social impact of the prescribed policy measures;
Amendment 584 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency; welcomes however that since the entry into force of Regulation No 472/2013 which codifies the surveillance procedures to be employed in the euro for countries experiencing financial difficulties, a de facto mandate for the Troika has been established; calls for full implementation and full ownership of this regulation;
Amendment 606 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Points out that due to its ad hoc nature there was no appropriate legal basis for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law; recalls that, in the context of the Regulation on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area (Gauzès report), the EP has already introduced some elements of accountability concerning the Troika;
Amendment 616 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30a. Points out that the Troika and its role are defined in Article 6 and 7 of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013;
Amendment 617 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 b (new)
Paragraph 30 b (new)
30b. Reminds that the Member State which requests financial assistance is responsible for the preparation of its macroeconomic adjustment programme and stresses that macroeconomic adjustment programmes are being approved by a qualified majority of EU Finance Ministers;
Amendment 618 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 c (new)
Paragraph 30 c (new)
30c. Stresses that despite the Commission acting on behalf of the Member States the ultimate political responsibility for the design and approval of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes lies with EU Finance Ministers and their governments;
Amendment 619 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 d (new)
Paragraph 30 d (new)
30d. Deplores that neither the President of the Eurogroup nor the President of the European Council did attend the hearings in the European Parliament on the role of the Troika;
Amendment 624 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Notes the admission by the former President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without considering their specific policy implications; stresses that, if accurate, this does not discharge euro area finance ministers from their political responsibility for the macroeconomic adjustment programmes and the MoUs;
Amendment 646 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Points equally to a possible conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States as well as its mandate under the Treaty; requests that possible ECB conflicts of interest, especially as regards crucial liquidity policy are carefully scrutinized; notes that throughout the crisis, the ECB has had crucial information on the health of the banking sector and financial stability in general, and that it has subsequently exerted policy leverage on decision- makers, at least in the cases of the Greek debt-restructuring, the Cypriot ELA operations and the Irish non-inclusion of senior-bondholders in the bail-in; calls for the appropriate lessons to be learnt;
Amendment 659 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Notes that the ECB’'s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 and the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the active involvement of the ECB in any matters related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies ris therefore on uncertain legal groundks being outside its mandate;
Amendment 671 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives; Notes with concern that three independent institutions of the Troika with an uneven distribution of responsibility between them, coupled with differing mandates and negotiation and decision-making structures with different levels of accountability, resulted in a lack of appropriate scrutiny and democratic accountability of the Troika as a whole;
Amendment 688 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35a. Recalls that the Parliaments of the Member States requesting financial assistance approved the macroeconomic adjustment programmes; points out that a national parliament objected to such a programme and thereby proved wrong the criticism that there is no alternative but to approve as objection to and revision of programmes is possible;
Amendment 691 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Notes that formal decisions are made by both, following preparatory work by the Troika, formal decisions are made, according to their respective legal statutes and roles, by the Eurogroup and the IMF separately, with a crucial role now given to the ESM as it is the organisation responsible for deciding on financial assistance, thus putting governments, including those of the Member States directly concerned, at the centre of any decisions taken;
Amendment 696 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)
Paragraph 36 a (new)
3a. Deplores that EU institutions are being portrayed as the scapegoat for adverse effects in Member States' macroeconomic adjustment while it is the Member States' Finance Ministers that bear the political responsibility for the Troika and its operations; stresses that this may lead to increased Euroscepticism although responsibility lies with the national not the European level;
Amendment 697 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 b (new)
Paragraph 36 b (new)
36b. Calls on the Eurogroup, the Council and the European Council to assume full responsibility for the operations of the Troika;
Amendment 728 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Reiterates its call for all decisions related to the strengthening of the EMU to be taken on the basis of the Treaty on European Union; takes the view that any departure from the Community method and increased use of intergovernmental agreements woulhave proven not to be efficient enough, and divide and weaken the Union, including the euro area;
Amendment 773 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Stresses that as long as Member States make direct contributions from their national budget to the ESM national parliaments should approve financial assistance; recommends for this purpose that all Member States establish an appropriate mechanism by which their parliaments approve financial assistance and monitor implementation to enhance ownership and democratic accountability; stresses that the ESM should evolve towards Community-method management as provided for in the ESM Treaty and demands that the ESM be made accountable to the European Parliament including with respect to decisions to grant financial assistance, in order to exert democratic accountability over the ESM;
Amendment 846 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; requests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up their duties and should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament;
Amendment 850 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 a (new)
Paragraph 43 a (new)
43a. Requests that in any reform of the Troika framework the ECB role is carefully analysed in order to align it with the ECB mandate; requests especially to assess the viability granting the ECB a transparent and clearly defined advisory role while not allowing it to be a full negotiation partner and discontinuing ECB co-signing mission statements;
Amendment 851 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 b (new)
Paragraph 43 b (new)
43b. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of decisions of the Eurogroup with regard to financial assistance as finance ministers bear the ultimate political responsibility for macroeconomic adjustment programmes and their implementation while often neither being directly accountable to their national parliament nor the European Parliament for specific decisions; believes that before financial assistance is being granted the President of the Eurogroup should be heard before the European Parliament and the EU finance ministers in their respective parliament; stresses that the President of the Eurogroup and the finance ministers should both be required to regularly report to the European parliament and national parliaments;
Amendment 865 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
Paragraph 44
44. Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup, amending MoUs with the Member States receiving EU-IMF financial assistance to include appropriate democratic accountability at both national and European levels; calls for European guidelines to be established in order to ensure appropriate democratic control on the implementation of measures at national level; proposes the creation of a permanent chairman of the Eurogroup, who would be one of the Vice-chairs of the Commission and accountable in front of the European parliament;
Amendment 889 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Paragraph 45 a (new)
45a. Stresses that the EU and the euro area in particular need to continue the path of economic reforms to increase the overall competitiveness of the Union, to create growth and jobs, and to make it more resilient to external shocks;
Amendment 890 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Amendment 891 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 b (new)
Paragraph 45 b (new)
45b. Asks the Commission, in accordance with article 138 TFEU, to propose appropriate measures to ensure unified representation of the euro area within the international financial institutions and conferences and particularly in the IMF, in order to replace the current system of individual Member State representation at the international level;
Amendment 892 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 c (new)
Paragraph 45 c (new)
45c. Calls for the full implementation of the 6-pack and the 2-pack, allowing notably for a better and public dialogue between all parties involved (through the European Semester and the Economic Dialogue); believes that the EP could act as an arbitration court when a Member State calls into question a sanction which has been proposed and not been opposed by the Council in the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) or the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP);
Amendment 893 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 d (new)
Paragraph 45 d (new)
45d. Proposes that for each programme country the Commission sets up a "growth task force" composed inter alia of experts coming, among others, from the Member States, the EIB, in association with representatives of the private sector and civil society in order to allow ownership, to suggest options to promote growth which would complement fiscal consolidation and structural reforms; this task force would have the objective of restoring confidence and therefore enabling investments; the Commission should build on the experience of the "Twinning" instrument for cooperation between Public Administrations of EU Member States (MS) and of beneficiary countries;
Amendment 894 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 e (new)
Paragraph 45 e (new)
45e. Is of the opinion that the situation of the euro area as a whole (including spill- over effects resulting from national policies on other Member States) should be better taken into account when looking at the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) or when the Commission is drafting the AGS;
Amendment 895 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 f (new)
Paragraph 45 f (new)
45f. Believes that the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) should also clearly assess any Member State's overreliance on a particular sector of activity;
Amendment 896 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 g (new)
Paragraph 45 g (new)
45g. Recalls the necessity of measures to safeguard tax revenues, in particular for programme countries enshrined in the regulation n°472/2013 of the European parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (Gauzès report), by taking "measures in close cooperation with the Commission and in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, with the IMF, aiming to reinforce the efficiency and effectiveness of revenue collection capacity and the fight against tax fraud and evasion, with a view to increasing its fiscal revenue"; recalls that effective steps to fight and prevent fiscal fraud both within and outside the EU should be taken rapidly;
Amendment 897 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 h (new)
Paragraph 45 h (new)
45h. Is convinced of the need for a thorough analysis of the use of EU funds in order to assess their real effects, to dramatically increase their consistency with the objectives of the macroeconomic adjustment programme and to better take into account the use of EU funds in the euro area as whole;