28 Amendments of Ramon TREMOSA i BALCELLS related to 2013/2277(INI)
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is based on a draft macroeconomic adjustment programme prepared by the Member State requesting financial assistance and approved by the Council; whereas a MoU is an agreement between the Member State concerned and the Troika, which results from negotiations and whereby a Member State undertakes to carry out a number of actions in exchange for financial assistance; whereas the Commission signs the MoU on behalf of euro area finance ministers; whereas it is stipulated in the ESM Treaty that a Member State requesting assistance from the ESM has also to address a request for assistance to the IMF;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas the ECJ has stated in its Pringle ruling that the prohibition laid down in Article 125 TFEU ensures that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline and that compliance with such discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the financial stability of the monetary union; it stresses, however, that Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member State which remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K a (new)
Recital K a (new)
Ka. Whereas the system should evolve towards a bigger democratic accountability of EU institutions, including the possibility that the European Parliament votes on the approval of adjustment programs.
Amendment 143 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver on sustainable public finances, sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensiveis also requires the programme to deliver on modernising the public sector to establish a lean and efficient public administration as a pre- condition for the swift and proper implementation of these programmes and further structural reforms; whereas the programmes could only partly correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
Recital L a (new)
La. whereas it is crucial to recognize in this context that the four Member States under assistance were very different in terms of their industrial and financial structures and that for this reason one- size fits all policies could not work;
Amendment 154 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L a (new)
Recital L a (new)
La. Whereas programme countries have received several hundred billion euros from other countries in the eurozone.
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L b (new)
Recital L b (new)
Lb. Whereas the European public should be aware that creditor countries risk losing several billion euros in case that an OSI materialises in the coming years.
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the precise triggers for the crises differed in all four Member States; points out that excessive public and private debt, and a loss of competitiveness played a crucial role all of which could not be prevented by the existing EU economic governance framework;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notes that while domestic policy mistakes were important factors in the development of the underlying vulnerabilities, all four Member States also fell victim to repercussions of the global financial crisis that first surfaced with Lehman Brothers and further spread to the euro area, exposing rigidities and incompleteness in the fiscal and structural architecture of the EMU;
Amendment 282 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Believes that data should be published on the use that European funds from bail-outs. The quantity of funds directed to finance the deficit, fund the government and repay private creditors should be clarified.
Amendment 371 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Deeply regrets that the return of credit to the healthy private sector is not one of the main objectives in rescue programmes directed to the banking sector.
Amendment 388 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Points out that each Member State's reform efforts need to be tailor-made taking the experiences and histories of the respective country into consideration;
Amendment 429 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal and the financial sector programme for Spain; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken;
Amendment 549 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries; deplores that too often the one-size fits all approach taken to crisis management did not fully consider the balance in the social impact of the prescribed policy measures;
Amendment 584 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency; welcomes however that since the entry into force of Regulation No 472/2013 which codifies the surveillance procedures to be employed in the euro for countries experiencing financial difficulties, a de facto mandate for the Troika has been established; calls for full implementation and full ownership of this regulation;
Amendment 618 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 c (new)
Paragraph 30 c (new)
30c. Stresses that despite the Commission acting on behalf of the Member States the ultimate political responsibility for the design and approval of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes lies with EU Finance Ministers and their governments;
Amendment 619 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 d (new)
Paragraph 30 d (new)
30d. Deplores that neither the President of the Eurogroup nor the President of the European Council did attend the hearings in the European Parliament on the role of the Troika;
Amendment 624 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Notes the admission by the former President of the Eurogroup before the European Parliament that the Eurogroup endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without considering their specific policy implications; stresses that, if accurate, this does not discharge euro area finance ministers from their political responsibility for the macroeconomic adjustment programmes and the MoUs;
Amendment 646 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Points equally to a possible conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States as well as its mandate under the Treaty; requests that possible ECB conflicts of interest, especially as regards crucial liquidity policy are carefully scrutinized; notes that throughout the crisis, the ECB has had crucial information on the health of the banking sector and financial stability in general, and that it has subsequently exerted policy leverage on decision- makers, at least in the cases of the Greek debt-restructuring, the Cypriot ELA operations and the Irish non-inclusion of senior-bondholders in the bail-in; calls for the appropriate lessons to be learnt;
Amendment 659 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Notes that the ECB’'s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 and the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducing the ECB’s role to that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the active involvement of the ECB in any matters related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies ris therefore on uncertain legal groundks being outside its mandate;
Amendment 671 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generally weak democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives; Notes with concern that three independent institutions of the Troika with an uneven distribution of responsibility between them, coupled with differing mandates and negotiation and decision-making structures with different levels of accountability, resulted in a lack of appropriate scrutiny and democratic accountability of the Troika as a whole;
Amendment 688 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35a. Recalls that the Parliaments of the Member States requesting financial assistance approved the macroeconomic adjustment programmes; points out that a national parliament objected to such a programme and thereby proved wrong the criticism that there is no alternative but to approve as objection to and revision of programmes is possible;
Amendment 696 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)
Paragraph 36 a (new)
3a. Deplores that EU institutions are being portrayed as the scapegoat for adverse effects in Member States' macroeconomic adjustment while it is the Member States' Finance Ministers that bear the political responsibility for the Troika and its operations; stresses that this may lead to increased Euroscepticism although responsibility lies with the national not the European level;
Amendment 697 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 b (new)
Paragraph 36 b (new)
36b. Calls on the Eurogroup, the Council and the European Council to assume full responsibility for the operations of the Troika;
Amendment 850 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 a (new)
Paragraph 43 a (new)
43a. Requests that in any reform of the Troika framework the ECB role is carefully analysed in order to align it with the ECB mandate; requests especially to assess the viability granting the ECB a transparent and clearly defined advisory role while not allowing it to be a full negotiation partner and discontinuing ECB co-signing mission statements;
Amendment 851 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 b (new)
Paragraph 43 b (new)
43b. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of decisions of the Eurogroup with regard to financial assistance as finance ministers bear the ultimate political responsibility for macroeconomic adjustment programmes and their implementation while often neither being directly accountable to their national parliament nor the European Parliament for specific decisions; believes that before financial assistance is being granted the President of the Eurogroup should be heard before the European Parliament and the EU finance ministers in their respective parliament; stresses that the President of the Eurogroup and the finance ministers should both be required to regularly report to the European parliament and national parliaments;
Amendment 852 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 a (new)
Paragraph 43 a (new)
43a. Believes that in political actions derived from the adjustment programmes conditionality, the Commission should be fully accountable to the MEPs and should answer all the parliamentary questions presented.
Amendment 889 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45 a (new)
Paragraph 45 a (new)
45a. Stresses that the EU and the euro area in particular need to continue the path of economic reforms to increase the overall competitiveness of the Union, to create growth and jobs, and to make it more resilient to external shocks;