8 Amendments of Carlo CASINI related to 2013/2077(INI)
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Reiterates that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union and Protocol No 2, are of a general and fundamental nature, binding the institutions in their entire activityexercising the powers of the Union with the sole exception that the principle of subsidiarity does not apply in those rare areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the Union;
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes the factNotes that the Member States’ parliaments are showing an ever greater interest in the proper application of these principles by the institutions of the Union. This is illustrated by the fact that in 2011 the European Parliament received 77 reasoned opinions claiming that a draft legislative act did not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, and 523 other contributions criticising inter alia non- respect of the principle of proportionality, whereas the respective figures for 2010 were 41 and 299;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Highlights that the principle of subsidiarity constitutes a political guideline on the exercise of powers at Union level; regrets that there is thus no possibility for the principle to be enforced by a court within that system;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the subsidiarity principle as formulated in the Treaties permits Union action only ‘if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States’, which means that the ‘subsidiarity check’ to a certain degree also implies a ‘proportionality check’ highlighting the functional complementarity of the two principlesle, under the proportionality principle, the substance and form of Union action must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties; points out that subsidiarity and proportionality are closely related but distinct: while the former relates to the appropriateness of Union action in sectors which do not come within its exclusive competence, the second relates to proportionality between the means and ends stipulated by the legislator and is a general rule governing the exercise of Union powers; notes that consideration of proportionality regarding a draft legislative act must logically follow consideration of subsidiarity, while, at the same time, verification of subsidiarity would not be sufficiently effective in the absence of verification of proportionality;
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. RegretNotes that the Commission received only a small number of parliamentary questions (32 out of more than 12 000) in 2011 on issues relating to compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and encourages its Members to makreflecting the fact that very few national parliaments have morade use of this tool of parliamentary scrutiny;
Amendment 31 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Highlights the fact that in 2011 the Commission received 64 reasoned opinions within the meaning of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which represents a considerable increase in comparison to 2010; draws attention however to the fact that no Commission proposalin 2011 no proposal for a legislative act received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow or orange card procedures’ under the Protocol; notes, however, that on 22 May 2012 a 'yellow card procedure' was for the first time triggered by a Commission proposal (proposal for a Council regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, i.e. the proposal for the 'Monti II' Regulation); stresses that the Commission withdrew the proposal, not because it considered that the principle of subsidiarity had been infringed, but because it realised that the proposal was unlikely to garner enough political support in the European Parliament and Council to ensure its adoption;
Amendment 32 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Paragraph 9 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Takes the view that the mechanism for verification of the subsidiarity principle must be designed and put to use as a major instrument for collaboration between European and national institutions; notes with satisfaction that this instrument is used in practice as a means of communication and cooperative dialogue among the different institutional levels of the multi-level European system;
Amendment 43 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Points out that there is growing concern in Member States such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands about the European Union institutions interfering in too many domestic issuesNotes that, in the context of greater democratic legitimacy, close attention should be paid to the early warning system.