BETA

43 Amendments of Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ related to 2012/0242(CNS)

Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerationsnotwithstanding the right of national authorities to address macro- prudential or systemic risk identified at the level of a Member State. In particular, the single supervisory mechanism should be consistent with the functioning of the internal market for financial services and with the free movement of capital. A single supervisory mechanism is the basis for the next steps towards the banking union. This reflects the principle that any introduction of common intervention mechanisms in relation to any participating Member States in case of crises should be preceded by common controls to reduce the likelihood that intervention mechanisms will have to be used.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) As the Eeuro area's central bank with extensiveaccess to multiple information resources, with widely recognised expertise and having macroeconomic and financial stability issueintained its credibility through the crisis, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECBSpecific tasks should therefore be conferred specific taskson the ECB concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions within the Eeuro area.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
(14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should therefore have the task toa role in authoriseation of credit institutions and should be responsible forin the withdrawal of authorisations.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions' financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions' prudential soundness. The ECB should have the task to ensure compliance with those rules and to set higher prudential requirements and apply additional measures to credit institutions in the cases specifically set out in Union acts.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 214 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
(18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
(25) In order to ensure consistency between supervisory responsibilities conferred on the ECB and decision making within the EBA, the ECB should coordinate a common position amongst representatives of the national authorities of the participating Member States in relation to matters falling within its competence.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
(25) In order to ensure consistency between supervisory responsibilities conferred on the ECB and decision making within the EBA, the ECB should coordinate a common position amongst representatives of the national authorities of the participating Member States in relation to matters falling within its competence.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
(29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a European institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States not participating in the common currency should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the new mechanism. However, it is a necessary pre-condition for an effective exercise of supervisory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented fully and without delay. Member States wishing to participate in the new mechanism should therefore undertake to ensure that their national competent authorities will abide by and adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB. The ECB should be able to establish a close cooperation with the competent authorities of a Member State not participating in the common currency. It should be obliged to establish the cooperation where the conditions set out in this regulation are met. The conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close co-operation take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board should allow the greatest possible involvement of those represenensure equal treatment of all participating Member Statives taking into account the limits following from the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, in particular as regards the integrity of its decision making process.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
(34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way. The ECB should therefore be accountable for the exercise of these tasks towards the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers respectively the Eurogroup as democratically legitimised institutions representing the European people and the Member States. That should include regular reporting and responding to questions. Where national supervisors take action under this Regulation, accountability arrangements provided under national law should continue to apply.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 335 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
(36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice-Chair, their termbe composed of representatives from the ECB and national authorities from participating Member States. The board should be chaired by a Chair appointed by the supervisory board, on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge of financial institutions and markets, and of experience relevant to financial supervision and regulation, following an open selection procedure. The supervisory board should also elect, from among its members, the Vice-Chair who should carry out the functions of the Chairperson in his absence. The term of office of the Chair should not exceed five years and should be renewable once. The term of office of the Vice-Chair should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB should be able to delegate certain clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions to the supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council, which can give instructions and directions to that body. The supervisory board may be supported by a steering committee with a more limited compositionWhen exercising its tasks, the supervisory board should take account of all relevant facts and circumstances in the participating Member States and should perform its duties in the interest of the Union as a whole. The national competent authorities of the participating Member States represented in the supervisory board should have equal voting rights.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 47 a (new)
(47a) Whereas the pending financial crisis contributed immensely to the fragmentation of European financial markets, it is indispensable to enhance the common integrated financial framework. However, it should be borne in mind that the deepening of integration in the EMU cannot give rise to new, not outlined in the Treaties, convergence criteria, which can create additional barriers to entry for countries under a temporary derogation.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 396 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 47 b (new)
(47b) Whereas, efforts to secure financial stability within the EU require a diversified approach to distinctive types of risks in different markets and considering that the economies of the Member States, including those in the EMU, remain heterogeneous and that economic cycles are not synchronized, it should be borne in mind that according to the ESRB Recommendation (ESRB/2011/3) and standard no. 138 of Basel III, effective response to the problems of macroeconomic imbalances necessitates the use of discretionary instruments at local level. Moreover, the scope to customize macroprudential instruments is of the utmost significance to the Member States remaining in the EMU, due to their inability to use macroeconomic automatic stabilizers, such as interest rate or exchange rate.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 409 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1
This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the EU and each Member State, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 412 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1
(1) 'participating Member State' means a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established a close cooperation with the ECB in accordance with Article 6;
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 413 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1
(1) 'participating Member State' means a Member State whose currency is the euro; or a Member State whose currency is not the euro, which has entered into a close cooperation in accordance with Article 6.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 422 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)
(3a) The ECB shall co-operate closely with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any other similar facility of a participating Member States whose currency is not the Euro where a credit institution has received or applied for financial assistance from that facility.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 468 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) only in the cases specifically set out in Union acts, to set higher prudential requirements and apply additional measures to credit institutions;deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 472 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) To impose capital buffers to be held by credit institutions in addition to own funds requirements referred to in (c), including setting countercyclical buffer rates and any other measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks in the cases specifically set out in Union acts;deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 474 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e
(e) To impose capital buffers to be held by credit institutions in addition to own funds requirements referred to in (c), including setting countercyclical buffer rates and any other measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks in the cases specifically set out in Union acts;deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 496 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k
(k) To carry out supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention where a credit institution does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements, including recovery plans and intra group financial support arrangements, in coordination with the relevant resolution authorities;
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 504 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l
(l) To coordinate and express a common position of representatives from competent authorities of the participating Member States when participating in the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board of the European Banking Authority, for issues relating to the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 525 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3
3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act including technical standards developed by EBA and adopted by the Commission, the ECB may adopt regulations and recommendations and take decisions to implement or apply Union law, to the extent necessary to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, and only where those Union acts, do not deal with certain aspects necessary for the proper exercise of the ECB's tasks or do not deal with them in sufficient detail. Before adopting a regulation, the ECB shall conduct open public consultations, including EBA and the Commission, and analyse the potential related costs and benefits.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 588 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 4
4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by the ECB for the purposes of the tasks mentioned in Article 4(1). Instructions given by the ECB shall not interfere with the exercise of voting rights by competent authorities of participating Member States within the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board of the European Banking Authority.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 615 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
1. Within the limits set out in this Article, the ECB shall carry out the tasks in the areas referred to in Article 4 (1) and (2) in relation to credit institutions established in a participating Member State whose currency is not the euro, where a close cooperation has been established between the ECB and the national competent authority of such Member State in accordance with this Article.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 627 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a non participating Member State, whose currency is not the euro, shall be established, by a decision adopted by the ECB, where the following conditions are met:
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 636 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with this Article shall take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 639 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3
3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with this Article shall take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board.deleted
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 650 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. The Member State that has established a close cooperation with ECB may request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation at any time. In this case, the ECB shall immediately proceed to adopt a decision terminating the close cooperation. The decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and shall specify the date from which it is legally valid.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 721 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
If the credit institution complies with all conditions of authorisation set out in national law of that Member State, the national competent authority shall take, within the period provided for by national law, a decision to propose to the ECB to grant the authorisation. The decision shall be notified to the ECB and to . In other credit instituases, the national concernedmpetent authority shall reject the application for authorisation.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 724 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
When the ECB receives the proposal from the national competent authority referred to in the second subparagraph, it shall grant the authorisation where the conditions set out in Union law are met. The decisionexamine the proposal within 45 working days, extendable once for the same period in duly justified cases, and grant the authorisation where the conditions set out in Union law are met. In all other cases, the ECB shall reject the application for authorisation. The decision taken in accordance with this paragraph shall be notified and explained to the credit institution and to the national competent authority concerned.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 729 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Where the national competent authority which has proposed the authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 considers that the authorisation must be withdrawn in accordance with the national law, it shall submit a proposal to the ECB to that end. In that case, the ECB may withdraw the authorisationshall take a decision on the proposed withdrawal taking full account of the justification for withdrawal put forward by the national competent authority.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 800 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. The planning and execupreparation of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State (hereinafter "supervisory board"). The representatives of the national competent authorities of non- participating Member States shall have an observer status in the supervisory board. Non-participating Member States' representatives shall have the right to present their views in the process in relation to a decision which will have an effect on a credit institution in whose college of supervisors the Member State is represented. Those views shall be duly taken into account.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 812 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECBdrafting of decisions to be taken by the ECB with regards to supervisory tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State (hereinafter ‘s'Supervisory bBoard').
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 819 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2
2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the Governing Council from the members, with the exception of the President,supervisory board, and a Vice-Chair elected by and from the members of the supervisory board of the ECB. The Chair shall be appointed ofn the Executive Board, and a Vice-Chair elected by and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECBbasis of merit, skills, knowledge of financial institutions and markets, and of experience relevant to financial supervision and regulation, following an open selection procedure.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 829 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 2
2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the Governing Couperson. Appointment shall be made on the basis of merit, skills, knowledge of financial institutions and markets, and of experience relevant to financial from the members, with the exception of the Presidsupervision and regulation, following an open selection procedure. The Chairperson shall be appointed by common accord of the government,s of the Executive Board, and a Vice-Chair elected by and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECBMember States at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the supervisory board, after it has consulted the Council and the European Parliament. The Supervisory Board elects from among its members two Vice-Chairmen.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 835 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
3. The Governing Council of the ECB may delegate clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions regarding individual or a set of identifiable credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies to tsupervisory board shall carry out full preparatory works regarding the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB and propose to the Governing Council of the ECB complete draft decisions, which shall be considered as adopted unless they are rejected by the Governing Council. The supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Councilhall specify a relevant timeframe, which shall be no less than 48 hours unless earlier adoption is indispensable to prevent irreparable damage.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 839 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
3. The Governing Council of the ECB may delegate clearly defined supervisory tasks and relatedFor the purpose of paragraph 1 the Governing Council of the ECB authorises the Supervisory Board to draft decisions regarding individual or a set of identifiable credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies to the supervisory board, subject to. The Supervisory Board proposes a decision for final adoption by the Goversight and responsibility of the Governing Councilning Council. The decision proposed by the Supervisory Board shall be considered as adopted unless it is rejected by the Governing Council. The Governing Council can only accept or reject the proposed decision. If the Governing Council rejects the proposed decision, it shall be returned to the Supervisory Board for a review.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 860 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 6
6. The Chair of the European Banking Authority and, a member of the European Commission may participate as observers in the meetings of the supervisory boardand chairmen of national competent authorities from Member States remaining outside the SSM may participate as observers in the meetings of the supervisory board on condition that their request has been accepted by the supervisory board by simple majority. The Supervisory board may, if appropriately justified, restrict observers' access to confidential data.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 864 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 7
7. The Governing Council shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board includingand shall make them public. They shall ensure equal treatment of all participating Member States, including voting rights. They shall also include rules on the term of office of the Chair and the Vice-Chair. The term of off, whiceh shall not exceed five years and shall not be renewable.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 943 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) the effects on non-participating Member States;
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 958 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 a (new)
Article 26a 1. The ECB shall ensure that none of its supervisory decision impinges in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of non- participating Member States. 2. Where a Member State considers that a decision taken by ECB impinges on its fiscal responsibilities, it may notify the ECB, the Commission and the Council within 3 working days after notification of the ECB's decision. In its notification, the Member State shall clearly and specifically explain why and how the decision impinges on its fiscal responsibilities. In the case of such notification, the decision of the ECB shall be suspended. The Council shall, within 10 working days, convene a meeting and take a decision, by a simple majority of its members, as to whether the ECB's decision is revoked. Where the Council, after having considered the matter, does not take a decision to revoke the ECB's decision, the suspension of the ECB's decision shall be terminated.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 960 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 b (new)
1. The Commission shall monitor the functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism on an ongoing basis. 2. In the case of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union or threaten to distort competition in the internal market, especially in relation to the non- participating Member States, the Commission shall actively facilitate and, where deemed necessary, coordinate any actions undertaken by the relevant competent authorities including the ECB. 3. The Commission shall issue a warning or use other remedial action in response to the risks identified. 4. The Commission shall submit the warning, together with any appropriate proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council. 5. In order to be able to perform its role, the Commission shall be fully informed of any relevant developments, and shall participate as an observer in the supervisory board of the ECB.
2012/10/30
Committee: ECON