2012/0242(CNS) Prudential supervision of credit institutions: conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB)
Lead committee dossier:
Progress: Procedure completed
| Role | Committee | Rapporteur | Shadows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lead | ECON |
THYSSEN Marianne ( PPE)
|
PITTELLA Gianni ( S&D),
KLINZ Wolf ( ALDE),
LAMBERTS Philippe ( Verts/ALE),
STREJČEK Ivo ( ECR)
|
| Committee Opinion | AFCO |
DUFF Andrew ( ALDE)
|
Ashley FOX ( ECR),
Morten MESSERSCHMIDT ( ECR)
|
| Committee Opinion | LIBE | ||
| Committee Opinion | JURI |
Lead committee dossier:
Legal Basis:
TFEU 127-p6
Legal Basis:
TFEU 127-p6Subjects
- 2.50.04 Banks and credit
- 2.50.08 Financial services, financial reporting and auditing
- 2.50.10 Financial supervision
- 5.10.01 Convergence of economic policies, public deficit, interest rates
- 5.20.01 Coordination of monetary policies, European Monetary Institute (EMI), Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
- 5.20.02 Single currency, euro, euro area
- 5.20.03 European Central Bank (ECB), ESCB
Events
2023/04/18
EC - Follow-up document
Documents
2017/10/13
EC - Follow-up document
Documents
2017/10/11
EC - Follow-up document
Details
This Commission report assesses the setting up and functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) to determine its effectiveness as the first pillar of the Banking Union. It is also the first review by the Commission of the application of the SSM Regulation in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
The report concludes that the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism was successful overall . The organisational difficulties observed at the initial stage have been well managed by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central authorities (ACN).
The ECB, with the support of the NCAs, has set up the necessary procedures and tools that enabled the smooth transfer of supervisory competences over significant institutions and the exercise by the ECB of its coordinating and oversight functions. On the basis of such framework the ECB has taken up fully its supervisory role and has managed to establish in two years a good reputation as an effective and rigorous supervisory authority.
No major issues have been detected in relation to the independence of the ECB . As regards the separation principle, the ECB should ensure that all safeguards are in place and applied, especially as regards services underpinning both the supervisory function of the ECB and all other functions performed by the ECB. The ECB is also invited to ensure the appropriate involvement of the Supervisory Board in macro-prudential decision-making.
The use of mechanisms for holding the ECB accountable has not demonstrated shortcomings in the way the ECB pursues its supervisory tasks . Certain disagreements arose concerning the scope of the mandate of the ECA to review the ECB – an issue that is expected to be solved through the declared commitment to better cooperation in the context of the second review that will be conducted by the ECA.
The relationship between the ECB and the EBA constitutes another important aspect of the functioning of the SSM in the context of the internal market. This review observed a positive dynamic of interaction which is mutually beneficial, and encourages the ECB to continue cooperating and coordinating with the EBA, especially as regards the implementation of the single rulebook.
The effectiveness of supervision of euro area banks has improved already in the first years of SSM functioning :
for significant institutions , the regulatory framework is more harmonised, and supervision is based on common methodologies applied in a consistent way. The quality of supervision is perceived as having increased in relation to several core supervisory areas, especially the SREP, internal models, fit and proper assessments and the functioning of colleges; the ECB also took important steps in harmonising supervisory practices for less significant institutions , but more time is required to increase the level of harmonisation and promote the use of common best practices in the supervision of LSIs.
Overall, the application of the SSM Regulation appears to work well in practice, with no major changes needed to the legal framework at this stage .
The shortcomings noted in this report may be corrected mainly through actions to be taken by the ECB or through amendments to relevant Union law that are currently discussed by the European Parliament and the Council in the context of the Proposals made by the Commission in November 2016.
Documents
2013/12/06
EC - Commission response to text adopted in plenary
Documents
2013/10/29
Final act published in Official Journal
Details
PURPOSE: to establish a framework allowing the European Central Bank to perform specific tasks relating to bank supervision in the context of the creation of a banking union.
LEGISLATIVE ACT: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.
CONTENT: the regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions , with a view to contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and each Member State. THE ECB should carry out the tasks entrusted to it from 4 November 2014.
With the Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 creating a European Banking Authority (EBA), the present regulation foresees the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) of banks and other financial institutions, also putting in place one of the key elements of the European banking union.
The SSM is composed of the ECB and Member State supervisory authorities . It covers the Euro area as well as non-participating countries on the basis of a memorandum of understanding establishing a close cooperation. Member States outside the Euro area have full and equal voting rights on the monitoring committee.
The ECB directly supervises the euro area banks in close cooperation with the national supervisory authorities. It is responsible for the operation of the SSM.
When carrying out the tasks conferred on it, and without prejudice to the objective to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions, the ECB should have full regard to the diversity of credit institutions and their size and business models.
The European Parliament has called on various occasions for a European body to be directly responsible for certain supervisory tasks over financial institutions, starting with its resolution of 13 April 2000 , then that of 21 November 2002 on prudential supervision rules in the European Union
Tasks conferred on the ECB : in terms of regulation, the ECB shall be exclusively competent to carry out the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the euro area:
· to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw authorisations of credit institutions subject to certain reservations;
· to assess notifications of the acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings in credit institutions, except in the case of a bank resolution;
· to ensure compliance with the acts which impose prudential requirements on credit institutions in the areas of own funds requirements, securitisation, large exposure limits, liquidity, leverage, and reporting and public disclosure of information on those matters;
· to carry out supervisory reviews , including stress tests and their possible publication;
· to carry out supervision on a consolidated basis over credit institutions’ parents established in one of the participating Member States;
· to carry out supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans, and early intervention where a credit institution or group does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements.
The ECB may also apply higher requirements for capital buffers , subject to close cooperation with the national authorities.
Tasks not conferred on the ECB, such as consumer protection, the fight against money laundering, payments services and supervision of branches of credit institutions from third countries, should remain with the national authorities.
Separation of tasks : to avoid any conflict of interest between the objectives of monetary policy and prudential supervision, the regulation stipulates that the tasks relating to monetary policy be strictly separated from its monitoring tasks.
Sanctions : in the case of breach of EU law, the ECB may impose on credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies administrative pecuniary penalties of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined, or up to 10 % of the total annual turnover, as defined in relevant Union law, of a legal person in the preceding business year.
Independence, transparency and democratic control : the ECB and the competent national suthorities must act independently within the SSM. The ECB shall be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for the implementation of this Regulation. At the request of the European Parliament, the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB shall participate in a hearing on the execution of its supervisory tasks by the competent committees of the European Parliament.
The ECB shall also forward its reports to the European Parliament and to the Council to the national parliaments of the participating Member States. The national parliaments of the participating Member States may present to the ECB any observations or questions on the execution of its supervisory tasks, to which the ECB must reply.
Supervisory board : the supervisory board becomes the fundamental body in the execution of its supervisory tasks. It is composed of its Chair and Vice Chair, and four representatives of the ECB, and one representative of the national competent authority in each participating Member State.
After hearing the Supervisory Board, the ECB shall submit to the European Parliament , for approval, a proposal for the appointment of the Chair and the Vice-Chair. Following the approval of this proposal, the Council shall adopt an implementing decision. The Chair’s term of office cannot exceed five years (non-renewable).
ENTRY INTO FORCE: 30/10/2013.
2013/10/15
EP/CSL - Act adopted by Council after consultation of Parliament
2013/10/15
EP - End of procedure in Parliament
2013/10/15
CSL - Council Meeting
2013/09/12
EP - Decision by Parliament
Details
The European Parliament adopted by 559 votes to 62 with 18 abstentions, in the framework of a special legislative procedure, (consultation of Parliament) a legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.
Parliament approves the Commission proposal as amended.
Subject matter and scope : the ECB will be entrusted with specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and each Member State, with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage.
When carrying out its tasks, the ECB shall have full regard to the different types, business models and sizes of credit institutions.
Tasks conferred on the ECB: The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism (SSM). Both the ECB and national competent authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and an obligation to exchange information.
The SSM is defined as the system of financial supervision composed by the ECB and national competent authorities of participating Member States.
‘Participating Member State’ means a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established a close cooperation.
Within this framework, the ECB will be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
· to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw authorisations of credit institutions subject to certain conditions;
· for credit institutions established in a participating Member State, which wish to establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a non participating Member State, to carry out the tasks which the competent authority of the home Member State shall have under the relevant Union law;
· to assess notifications of the acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings in credit institutions, except in the case of a bank resolution;
· to ensure compliance with the acts which impose prudential requirements on credit institutions in the areas of own funds requirements, securitisation, large exposure limits, liquidity, leverage, and reporting and public disclosure of information on those matters;
· to carry out supervisory reviews, including where appropriate in coordination with EBA, stress tests and their possible publication;
· to carry out supervision on a consolidated basis over credit institutions' parents established in one of the participating Member States;
· to carry out supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans, and early intervention where a credit institution or group in relation to which the ECB is the consolidating supervisor, does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements.
Macroprudential tasks and tools : whenever appropriate or deemed required, the national competent authorities shall apply requirements for capital buffers to be held by credit institutions at the relevant level in addition to own funds requirements.
The ECB may, if deemed necessary, apply higher requirements for capital buffers than applied by the national competent authorities, while cooperating closely with the national designated authorities in the Member States concerned.
Early intervention : in order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied at an early stage. The ECB should have the task of carrying out early intervention actions as laid down in relevant Union law. It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities.
Close cooperation with the competent authorities of participating Member States whose currency is not the euro: the ECB may address instructions to the national competent authority or to the national designated authority of the participating Member State whose currency is not the euro. It may decide to issue a warning to the Member State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken in certain cases.
If a participating Member State whose currency is not the euro notifies the ECB of its reasoned disagreement with a draft decision of the Supervisory Board, it shall inform the Governing Council, stating its reasons.
The Governing Council will decide on the matter and explain its decision in writing. The Member State concerned may request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation with immediate effect and will not be bound by the ensuing decision.
Penalties: in order to enable the ECB to effectively carry out its tasks relating to the enforcement of supervisory rules set out in directly applicable Union law, the ECB should be empowered to impose pecuniary penalties on credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies for breaches of such rules.
Transparency and democratic control : when carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM shall act independently.
The ECB shall be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for the implementation of the Regulation.
At the request of the European Parliament, the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB shall participate in a hearing on the execution of its supervisory tasks by the competent committees of the European Parliament.
The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament.
Role of national parliaments : this role is strengthened. When submitting reports to the European Parliament and the Council the ECB shall simultaneously forward that report directly to the national parliaments of the participating Member States. National parliaments may address to the ECB their reasoned observations on that report and may request the ECB to reply in writing to any observations or questions submitted by them to the ECB in respect of the tasks of the ECB.
The national parliament of a participating Member State may invite the Chair or a member of the Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of views in relation to the supervision of credit institutions in that Member State together with a representative of the national competent authority.
Monetary policy functions and the exercise of supervisory tasks: these two functions must be carried out in full separation, in order to avoid conflicts of interests. The ECB must be able to ensure that the Governing Council operates in a completely differentiated manner as regards monetary and supervisory functions.
Organisational separation of staff should concern all services needed for independent monetary policy purposes and should ensure that the exercise of the tasks is fully subject to democratic accountability and oversight.
The Supervisory Board : this should be an essential body in the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB. It shall be presided over by a Chair and have a Vice-Chair. It will include representatives of the ECB and national competent authorities.
After hearing the Supervisory Board, the ECB shall submit a proposal for the appointment of the Chair and the Vice-Chair to the European Parliament for approval . Following the approval of this proposal, the Council shall adopt an implementing decision. The Chair shall be chosen on the basis of an open selection procedure, on which the European Parliament and the Council shall be kept duly informed. The Chair's term of office will not exceed five years and will not be renewable.
Documents
2013/05/22
EP - Results of vote in Parliament
Documents
2013/05/22
EP - Decision by Parliament
Details
The European Parliament adopted amendments on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.
The matter has been referred back to the committee responsible . The vote has been postponed.
The main amendments adopted in plenary are the following :
Subject matter and scope : the ECB is conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the EU and each Member State, with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage.
When fulfilling its tasks, and without prejudice to the objective to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions, the ECB shall have full regard to the different types, business models and sizes of credit institutions. The exercise of the ECB's tasks should: (i) contribute in particular to ensure that credit institutions fully internalise all costs caused by their activities so as to avoid moral hazard and the excessive risk taking arising from it ; (ii) take full account of the relevant macroeconomic conditions in Member States, in particular the stability of the supply of credit and facilitation of productive activities for the economy at large.
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) : this is defined as a European system of financial supervision composed by the European Central Bank and national competent authorities of participating Member States. ‘Participating Member State’ shall mean a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established a close cooperation in accordance with this Regulation. The ECB and the national competent authorities of non-participating Member States shall conclude a memorandum of understanding describing in general terms how they will cooperate with one another in the performance of their supervisory tasks.
Where necessary the ECB shall enter into memoranda of understanding with competent authorities of Member States responsible for markets in financial instruments. Such memoranda shall be made available to the European Parliament, the Council and competent authorities of all Member States.
Tasks conferred on the ECB : the ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB and national competent authorities. The ECB shall be responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the single supervisory mechanism. Both the ECB and national competent authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and an obligation to exchange information .
Within this framework, the ECB shall be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw authorisations of credit institutions subject to certain provisions; for credit institutions established in a participating Member State, which wish to establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a non participating Member State, to carry out the tasks which the competent authority of the home Member State shall have under the relevant Union law; to assess applications for the acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings in credit institutions, except in the case of a bank resolution; to ensure compliance with the acts which impose prudential requirements on credit institutions in the areas of own funds requirements, securitisation, large exposure limits, liquidity, leverage, and reporting and public disclosure of information on those matters; to carry out supervision on a consolidated basis over credit institutions' parents established in one of the participating Member States; to carry out supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans, and early intervention where a credit institution or group in relation to which the ECB is the consolidating supervisor, does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements.
The ECB should have the supervisory power to remove a member of a management body in accordance with the provisions of this regulation.
For the carrying out of its tasks and the exercise of its supervisory powers, the ECB should apply the material rules relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions . Those rules are composed of the relevant Union law, in particular directly applicable Regulations or Directives, such as those on capital requirements for banks and on financial conglomerates.
Macroprudential tasks and tools : whenever appropriate or deemed required, the competent or designated authorities of the participating Member States shall apply requirements for capital buffers to be held by credit institutions at the relevant level in accordance with relevant Union law in addition to own funds requirements. The ECB may, if deemed necessary, instead of the national competent or national designated authorities of the participating Member State, ap ply higher requirements for capital buffers than applied by the national competent or national designated authorities of participating Member States to be held by credit institutions at the relevant level.
Early intervention and precautionary powers : within the scope of the tasks conferred on the ECB, national law confers on national competent authorities certain powers which are currently not required by Union law, including certain early intervention and precautionary powers. The ECB should be able to require national authorities to make use of these powers, in order to ensure the performance of full and effective supervision within the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
Close cooperation with the competent authorities of participating Member States whose currency is not the Euro : the ECB may address instructions to the national competent authority of the participating Member State whose currency is not the Euro. It may decide to issue a warning to the Member State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken in certain cases.
If a non-euro participating Member State disagrees with a draft decision of the Supervisory Board, it shall inform the Governing Council of its reasoned disagreement. The Governing Council shall then decide about the matter within five working days, taking fully into account those reasons, and explain in writing its decision to the Member State concerned. The Member State concerned may request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation with immediate effect and will not be bound by the ensuing decision.
Role of national parliaments : the role for national parliaments is appropriate given the potential impact that supervisory measures may have on public finances, credit institutions, their customers and employees, and the markets in the participating Member States. In this regard, the ECB should also forward the reports, which it addresses to the European Parliament and the Council, to the national parliaments of the participating Member States . National parliaments of the participating Member States should be able to address any observations or questions to the ECB on the performance of its supervisory tasks, to which the ECB may reply. The parliament of a participating Member State should also be able to invite the Chair or a representative of the Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of views in relation to the supervision of credit institutions in that Member State together with a representative of the national competent authority.
Monetary and supervisory functions : these should be carried out separately. The ECB shall ensure that the operation of the Governing Council is completely differentiated as regards monetary and supervisory functions.
Organisational separation of staff should ensure that the exercise of the tasks conferred by this Regulation is fully subject to democratic accountability and oversight as provided for by this Regulation.
Supervisory Board : this should be an essential body in the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB. The Council should be given the power to adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board. After hearing the Supervisory Board, the ECB should submit a proposal for the appointment of the Chair and the Vice-Chair to the European Parliament for approval. Following the approval of this proposal, the Council should adopt that implementing decision.
The Chair should be chosen on the basis of an open selection procedure, on which the European Parliament and the Council should be kept duly informed. The term of office should not exceed five years and should not be renewable.
Documents
2013/05/21
EP - Debate in Parliament
Documents
2013/03/20
CZ_SENATE - Contribution
Documents
2013/02/12
CSL - Debate in Council
Documents
2013/02/12
CSL - Council Meeting
2013/01/22
CSL - Debate in Council
Documents
2013/01/22
CSL - Council Meeting
2012/12/20
IT_SENATE - Contribution
Documents
2012/12/04
CSL - Debate in Council
Details
The Council held a policy debate on proposals aimed at establishing a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for the oversight of credit institutions, as part of a broader plan to establish a banking union.
The proposals involve two regulations:
one conferring supervisory tasks on the European Central Bank, the other modifying Regulation 1093/2010 establishing the European Banking Authority . The draft EBA amending regulation is based on article 114 of the TFEU, which requires a qualified majority for adoption by the Council, in agreement with the Parliament.
In its conclusions of 18 and 19 October 2012, the European Council set 1 January 2013 as the deadline for agreeing on the legal framework set out in the two regulations, while indicating that work on operational implementation would take place during 2013. The European Council emphasised the need to:
ensure a clear separation between ECB monetary policy and supervision functions, and the equitable treatment and representation of both euro and non-euro area Member States participating in the SSM; establish a single rulebook underpinning the centralised supervision; ensure a level playing field between those Member States which take part in the SSM and those which do not and to find an acceptable and balanced solution regarding changes to voting modalities and decisions under the European Banking Authority (EBA) Regulation; adopt rapidly the provisions relating to the harmonisation of national resolution and deposit guarantee frameworks based on the Commission's legislative proposals on bank recovery and resolution and on national deposit guarantee schemes; ensure a fair balance between home and host countries.
Lastly, the Council agreed to hold an extra meeting on a date yet to be set before the European Council on 13 and 14 December 2012 in order to reach an agreement that would enable negotiations with the European Parliament to start with the aim of approving the texts before the end of the year .
Documents
2012/12/04
CSL - Council Meeting
2012/12/03
EP - Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading
Details
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted, within the framework of a special legislative procedure (consultation with Parliament), the report by Marianne THYSSEN (EPP, BE) on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions.
The parliamentary committee proposed that the European Parliament amend the Commission proposal as follows:
Clearly defined tasks: Members specify that the Regulation entrusts the ECB with clearly defined tasks in relation to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and in each Member State participating in the Union, with full regard to a duty of care.
“Participating Member State” means a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which chooses to participate in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) foreseen by the Regulation.
In fulfilling its tasks, the ECB shall respect the different types and size of credit institutions. It should also take care to ensure that the national competent authorities of all participating Member States shall be treated on an equal footing and to respect a fair balance between the rights of participating Member States.
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) : this is defined as a European system of financial supervision composed by the European Central Bank and national competent authorities of participating Member States. Within the SSM, the ECB and competent national authorites should cooperate faithfully and be obliged to exchange information.
Whilst always ensuring supervisory consistency within the SSM, the ECB shall request the national competent authorities to assist the ECB in the performance of the tasks conferred on it as well as the powers and obligations in relation to all credit institutions, in particular in relation to credit institutions:
· which have not received or sought direct or indirect financial support from theEuropean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any other future European financial assistance facility: or
· which do not pose a systemic risk, as defined in EU law, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies.
Draft supervisory decisions of the national competent authorities shall be deemed adopted by the ECB unless it rejects them within a deadline not exceeding 10 working days. The ECB shall monitor national competent authorities on an ongoing basis.
National competent authorities shall inform the ECB without delay where:
· there are serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB;
· the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB .
Moreover, the ECB may at any time and under any circumstances assume the responsibilities of the national competent authorities and carry out all or specific supervisory tasks directly.
Participation in the SSM of Member States whose currency is not the euro (close cooperation) : the ECB shall carry out its tasks in relation to credit institutions established in a participating Member State whose currency is not the euro.
A close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a Member State whose currency is not the euro choosing to participateshall be established, by a decision adopted by the ECB, where certain conditions are met. Where these conditions are no longer met, the ECB may decide to issue a warning to the national competent authority of the Member State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken.
If no such corrective action is undertaken, the ECB may suspend or terminate the close cooperation with that Member State .
Board of Appeal : Members propose that the ECB establish an Administrative Board of Appeal (composed of five individuals) for the purposes of settling appeals against decisions by the ECB acting as a single supervisor under this Regulation.
Members of the Board of Appeal and two alternates shall be appointed by the ECB for a term of five years, which may be extended once , following a public call for expressions of interest published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and after consultation of the Banking Supervisory Board. They shall not be bound by any instructions. A decision by the ECB within the MSU by the Board of Appeal or, in cases where there is no right of appeal to the Board of Appeal, may be contested before the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with Article 263 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.
Accountability and reporting : Members make the following requests:
· at the request of theEuropean Parliament, the Chairof theSupervisory Board shall participate in a hearing on the execution of its supervisory tasks , including the fees levied and the expenditure incurred, by the competent committees of the Parliament;
· upon request the Chair of the Banking Supervisory Board shall provide the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in camera any confidential information concerning its tasks which are required for the exercise of the European Parliament’s powers under the Treaty and under this regulation;
· at the request of a national parliament of a participating Member State, a representative of the Banking Supervisory Board, together with a representative of the competent national authority, shall appear before that parliament and answer questions about the performance of supervisory tasks.
Moreover, this Regulation is without prejudice to the right of the European Parliament:
· to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law pursuant to Article 226 TFEU;
· or to require the setting up of an independent inquiry into actions or failure to act of the ECB that have or may have led to a significant event in relation to financial stability, confidence or failure of a credit institution.
Reporting of Violations : the ECB shall ensure that effective mechanisms are put in place for reporting of breaches of this Regulation, including specific procedures for the receipt of reports of breaches and their follow-up.
Banking Supervisory Board : the amendments state that the Banking Supervisory Board shall include a Chairman or Chairwoman , appointed by the Governing Council after an open selection procedure on the basis of merit, skills and thorough knowledge of financial institutions and financial supervision and after approval by the European Parliament .
When exercising its tasks, the Banking Supervisory Board shall take account of all relevant facts and circumstances in the participating Member States and shall perform its duties in the interest of the Union as a whole. All members of the Banking Supervisory Board shall have equal voting rights.
By the 1 January 2014 , the ECB shall carry out in full the supervisory tasks conferred on it by this Regulation.
Documents
2012/11/30
EP - Committee opinion
Documents
2012/11/28
EP - Vote in committee
2012/11/27
ECB - European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report
Details
OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
on a proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and a
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority)
Since both texts relate to the conferral of specific supervisory tasks on the ECB and the establishment of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM), and despite the distinct legislative procedures applying to these texts, the ECB has adopted a single opinion on the two proposals .
The ECB broadly welcomes such proposals, which are in line with the main findings of the report by the President of the European Council and the conclusions of the European Council of 29 June and 18 October 2012. The ECB stands ready to perform the new tasks relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions provided for in the proposed SSM regulation. The ECB considers that Article 127(6) of the Treaty constitutes the appropriate legal basis for rapidly and effectively conferring specific supervisory tasks upon the ECB.
The ECB supports the conclusions of the Interim Report by the President of the European Council on economic and monetary union and an integrated financial framework and is of the opinion that such a single resolution mechanism - focused on a European Resolution Authority - is indeed a necessary complement to the SSM to achieve a well-functioning financial market union. Therefore, such a mechanism should be established, or at least there should be clear deadlines for its establishment, when the ECB assumes its supervisory responsibility in full.
From the ECB’s perspective, the proposed SSM regulation should comply with the following main principles :
· the ECB, within the SSM, should be able to carry out the tasks assigned to it effectively and rigorously without any risk to its reputation;
· the ECB is of the view that the proposed SSM regulation should enable the activation of the macro-prudential instruments provided by Union law, either at the initiative of the ECB or the national authorities;
· the ECB should remain independent in carrying out all its tasks; the ECB considers that the liability of the ECB, the national competent authorities and their respective officials should only be incurred in cases of intentional misconduct or gross negligence;
· there should be a strict separation between the ECB’s new tasks concerning supervision and its monetary policy tasks assigned by the Treaty to prevent potential conflicts of interest and ensure autonomous decision-making for the performance of these tasks;
· the ECB should be able to have full recourse to the knowledge, expertise and operational resources of national supervisory authorities;
· the SSM should operate in a manner fully consistent with the principles underpinning the single market in financial services and in full adherence to the single rulebook for financial services. In this regard, the ECB also welcomes the possibility to involve non-euro area Member States in the SSM to ensure greater harmonisation of supervisory practices within the European Union, thus strengthening the internal market;
· the ECB is ready to comply with the highest standards of accountability for the supervisory tasks.
The ECB stresses the importance of reaching an agreement on the above proposals by the end of 2012 to maintain the envisaged timetable, namely the entry into force of the proposed SSM regulation on 1 January 2013, gradual operational implementation in the course of 2013, and full implementation by 1 January 2014.
To ensure that the proposed SSM regulation can in the future be technically adjusted , the ECB recommends that the European Council considers having recourse to Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union under which the European Council may either authorise the Council to act by qualified majority for future technical amendments to the proposed SSM regulation, or for such amendments to be adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure.
Documents
2012/11/19
EP - DUFF Andrew (ALDE) appointed as rapporteur in AFCO
2012/11/14
IT_CHAMBER - Contribution
Documents
2012/11/13
CSL - Debate in Council
Details
The Council discussed proposals aimed at establishing a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for credit institutions in the eurozone and in other EU Member States choosing to participate. The two proposed regulations are a key element of a broader plan to establish a banking union for the euro area .
The first proposal conferring specific supervisory tasks on the European Central Bank, is based on Article 127 (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which requires unanimity for adoption by the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB. The second proposal modifying Regulation 1093/2010 establishing the European Banking Authority, is based on Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which requires a qualified majority for adoption by the Council, in agreement with the Parliament.
The October European Council set 1 January 2013 as the deadline for agreeing on the legal framework set out in the two regulations, whilst indicating that work on operational implementation would take place during 2013.
According to the Presidency’s progress report of 6 November 2012, consensus is emerging on a number of issues, in particular the separation within the ECB of monetary policy and supervisory functions (Article 18 of the ECB Regulation), subject to finalisation of the drafting. Nevertheless, certain other matters remain open:
1. The equitable treatment of euro-area and non-euro area Member States . There are two important issues in this regard:
(i) The status and role of non-euro area Member States who choose to participate in the SSM (under Articles 6 and 19 of the ECB proposal ): the Presidency has amended the Commission’s proposal to allow for all participating Member States to be treated equally in the Supervisory Board (i.e. non-euro area participating Member States will be voting members).
Furthermore, the Presidency has already introduced a number of safeguards for participating non-euro area Member States. More work is needed to meet the concerns of delegations. Nonetheless the Presidency finds that these safeguards should lay the foundations for a satisfactory compromise, subject to further guidance from the Council, especially on the voting rights in the supervisory board.
(ii) The changes to voting modalities in the EBA (Article 1(7) of the EBA proposal): a number of Member States consider that the voting rules should still be further (thoroughly) reviewed, and allow for additional safeguards, e.g. in terms of double majority requirements, in all cases (including qualified majority voting). Against this backdrop, the Presidency considers that further political guidance from the Council is needed to find the adequate balance between anti-discrimination safeguards for non-participating Member States and effective decision-making.
The Presidency has decided in its forthcoming compromise to make it clear that when the EBA engages in binding mediation, all competent authorities, including the ECB acting in its supervisory capacity, will be treated equally.
2. The distribution of tasks between the ECB and the NCAs: the Commission proposal assigned a wide range of tasks to the ECB with regard to all credit institutions established in the Member States participating in the SSM. Most of them have proved uncontroversial, except in particular those referring to so-called "macroprudential tools" (especially, the setting of buffers under the ECB Proposal) and to the coordination of a single position of NCAs from Member States participating in the SSM.
The Commission proposal was not very explicit in regard to the respective roles of the ECB and the NCAs in their foreseen cooperation within the SSM. Without touching the basic principle of the ECB's exclusive responsibility, the Presidency has introduced a number of significant changes, which aim to establish the supervisory architecture, without prejudice to further specifications. A certain number of improvements were proposed, especially on the exact competences to be granted to the ECB and on the modalities for cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs.
Lastly, the question of granting and withdrawal of authorisation has given rise to concerns by some delegations which find that the key issue of access to and removal from the market should remain within the remit of national authorities.
3. Phasing in of the SSM (Article 27 of the ECB proposal): some delegations have questioned the phasing-in arrangements proposed by the Commission and suggestions have been made to seek a more flexible phasing-in arrangement, thus leaving the ECB more time to prepare for the taking over of its new supervisory tasks.
Documents
2012/11/13
CSL - Council Meeting
2012/11/07
PT_PARLIAMENT - Contribution
Documents
2012/11/07
BG_PARLIAMENT - Contribution
Documents
2012/11/06
DE_BUNDESRAT - Contribution
Documents
2012/10/30
EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2012/10/30
EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2012/10/30
EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2012/10/30
EP - Amendments tabled in committee
Documents
2012/10/22
EP - Committee referral announced in Parliament
2012/10/08
EP - Committee draft report
Documents
2012/09/12
EC - Legislative proposal published
Details
OBJECTIVE: to confer specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the context of creating a banking union.
PROPOSED ACT: Council Regulation.
BACKGROUND: the creation of the European Banking Authority (EBA) by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), and of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) already contributed to improved cooperation between national supervisors and to the development of a single rulebook for financial services in the EU. However, supervision of banks remains to a large extent within national boundaries and thereby fails to keep up with integrated banking markets.
In May 2012 the Commission has therefore called for a banking union to restore confidence in banks and in the euro. Among the key elements of the banking union will be a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) with direct oversight of banks. The European Council conclusions of 29 June 2012 invited the President of the European Council to develop a road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union.
The European Parliament called on various occasions for a European body to be directly responsible for certain supervisory tasks over financial institutions, starting with its resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the Commission communication on implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan, and of 21 November 2002 on prudential supervision rules in the European Union.
The present proposal accompanies a related proposal amending the Regulation establishing the EBA towards a new bank monitoring system in order to ensure that EBA decision-making structures continue to be balanced and to preserve fully the integrity of the Single Market.
IMPACT ANALYSIS: the Commission has taken into account the analysis done in the context of the adoption of the "supervisory package" creating the European Supervisory Authorities, which assessed operational, governance, financial and legal aspects relevant to the establishment of a SSM.
LEGAL BASIS: Article 127 (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
CONTENT: the proposal foresees that the ECB will be responsible for specific tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions which are established in Member States whose currency is the Euro (participating Member States) with the objective to promote the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.
After a transitional period, the ECB:
· will be responsible for carrying out key supervisory tasks for all credit institutions established in participating Member States, regardless of their business model or size;
· shall be the host supervisor for credit institutions established in non-participating Member States, which establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a participating Member State .
The ECB will carry out its tasks within the framework of the ESFS and will cooperate closely with national supervisors and the EBA. The EBA will keep its powers and tasks to further develop the single rulebook and ensure convergence and consistency of supervisory practice.
Tasks of the ECB : the ECB will be exclusively competent for key supervisory tasks which are indispensable to detect risks for banks' viability and require them to take the necessary action . It will, inter alia, be the competent authority for licensing and authorizing credit institutions:
· assessing qualifying holdings,
· ensuring compliance with the minimum capital requirements, ensuring the adequacy of internal capital in relation to the risk profile of a credit institution (Pillar 2 measures),
· supervising financial conglomerates .
However, the ECB will be only responsible for carrying out its tasks for the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates on a group-wide basis, while the prudential supervision of the individual insurance undertaking itself will be carried out by national competent authorities.
Role of national supervisors : National supervisors will continue to play an important role with the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM):
1) all tasks not conferred on the ECB will remain with national supervisors . for example, national supervisors will remain in charge of consumer protection and the fight against money laundering, and of the supervision of third country credit institutions establishing branches or providing cross-border services within a Member State;
2) even for the tasks conferred on the ECB, most day-to-day verifications and other supervisory activities necessary to prepare and implement the ECB's acts could be exercised by national supervisors operating as an integral part of the SSM.
Powers of the ECB : the ECB will have the supervisory powers that those authorities shall have in accordance with the EU banking legislation. Those include supervisory powers:
· the authorisation of credit institutions and the withdrawal of authorisations and the removal of a member of a credit institution's management board;
· the power to impose pecuniary sanctions and periodic penalty payments;
· all necessary investigatory powers, including on-site inspections, to be able to carry out its tasks.
Relationship with Member States whose currency is not the Euro: as regards the supervision of cross-border banks active both within and outside the Euro area, the proposal does not affect in any way the position of non participating Member States in the Colleges of Supervisors set up under Directive 2006/48/EC. The provisions on those colleges and the obligation to cooperate and exchange information in consolidated supervision and between home and host supervisors will apply fully to the ECB – as the competent authority for the participating Member States.
S ubject to meeting specific conditions Member States that have not adopted the euro but wish to participate in the banking union will be able to enter into a close supervisory cooperation with the ECB.
Entry into force : due to the urgency of setting up an effective SSM, the regulation will enter into force on 1 January 2013. A phasing-in approach is envisaged:
· as of 1 January 2013, the ECB will be able to to apply its supervisory tasks to any banks, in particular banks which have received or requested public financial assistance;
· as of 1 July 2013, the most significant credit institutions of European systemic importance shall be subject to ECB supervision;
· in relation to all other banks, the ECB will assume in full its tasks as from 1 January 2014 at the latest.
BUDGETARY IMPLICATION: this proposal has no implication for the Union budget, since in accordance with the Treaty the ECB's budget is not part of the Union budget.
Documents
2012/09/11
EP - THYSSEN Marianne (PPE) appointed as rapporteur in ECON
Documents
- Follow-up document: COM(2023)0212
- Follow-up document: EUR-Lex
- Follow-up document: EUR-Lex
- Follow-up document: SWD(2017)0336
- Follow-up document: COM(2017)0591
- Follow-up document: EUR-Lex
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2013)774
- Final act published in Official Journal: Regulation 2013/1024
- Final act published in Official Journal: OJ L 287 29.10.2013, p. 0063
- Decision by Parliament: T7-0372/2013
- Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament
- Decision by Parliament: T7-0213/2013
- Debate in Parliament: Debate in Parliament
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Debate in Council: 3220
- Debate in Council: 3215
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Debate in Council: 3205
- Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A7-0392/2012
- Committee opinion: PE498.084
- European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: N7-0045/2013
- European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: OJ C 030 01.02.2013, p. 0006
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Debate in Council: 3198
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE498.138
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE498.139
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE498.140
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE498.151
- Committee draft report: PE497.794
- Legislative proposal published: COM(2012)0511
- Legislative proposal published: EUR-Lex
- Committee draft report: PE497.794
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE498.138
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE498.139
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE498.140
- Amendments tabled in committee: PE498.151
- European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: N7-0045/2013 OJ C 030 01.02.2013, p. 0006
- Committee opinion: PE498.084
- Commission response to text adopted in plenary: SP(2013)774
- Follow-up document: COM(2017)0591 EUR-Lex
- Follow-up document: EUR-Lex SWD(2017)0336
- Follow-up document: COM(2023)0212 EUR-Lex
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
- Contribution: COM(2012)0511
Activities
Votes
A7-0392/2012 - Marianne Thyssen - Résolution législative #
2013/09/12 Outcome: +: 559, -: 62, 0: 18
EFD
NI
GUE/NGL| Amendments | Dossier |
| 1036 |
2012/0242(CNS)
2012/10/30
ECON
932 amendments...
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The solidity of credit institutions is in many instances still closely linked to the
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The solidity of credit institutions is in many instances still closely linked to the Member State in which they are established. Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually reinforcing market trends. This may lead to risks for the viability of some credit institutions as well as for the stability of the financial system, and
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) The European Banking Authority (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), and the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of that Regulation and of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EIOPA), and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA) have significantly improved cooperation between banking supervisors within the Union, despite initial widespread opposition. EBA is making important contributions to the creation of a single rulebook for financial services in the Union, and has been crucial in implementing in a consistent way the recapitalisation of major
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) The European Banking Authority (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), and the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of that Regulation and of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EIOPA), and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA)
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) The European Banking Authority (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), and the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of that Regulation and of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EIOPA), and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA) have
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) The European Banking Authority (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority),4 and the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of that Regulation and of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EIOPA),5 and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA)6 have significantly improved cooperation between banking supervisors within the Union. EBA is making important contributions to the creation of a single rulebook for financial services
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) The European Banking Authority (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European
Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 (8) The European Council conclusions of 29 June 2012 invited the President of the European Council to develop a road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. On the same day, the Euro area Heads of State or Government Summit pointed out that when an effective single supervisory mechanism is established involving the ECB for banks in the euro area, the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly which would rely on
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 (8) The European Council conclusions of 29 June 2012 invited the President of the European Council to develop a road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. This road map can only be developed on condition that at the same time strict, binding minimum agreements are reached on social affairs in the EU, particularly concerning European minimum wages and the approach to poverty and fiscal harmonisation within the EU. On the same day, the Euro area Heads of State or Government Summit pointed out that when an effective single supervisory mechanism is established involving the ECB for banks in the euro area, the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly which would rely on appropriate conditionality, including compliance with state aid rules.
Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 (8) The European Council conclusions of 29 June 2012 invited the President of the European Council to develop a road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. On the same day, the Euro area Heads of State or Government Summit pointed out that when an effective single Euro area supervisory mechanism is established involving the ECB for banks in the euro area, the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly which would
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 a (new) (8 a) The European Council on 18 October 2012 concluded that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the EU's institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards Member States which do not use the single currency and by respect for the integrity of the single market. The integrated financial framework will have a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which will be open to the extent possible to all Member States wishing to participate.
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 a (new) (8 a) The progress towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union and, to this end the creation of the single Euro area supervisory mechanism (SEASM), should respect both the right of those Member States that have an opt-out from having to introduce the euro and the democratic legitimacy of those Member States that choose to retain their respective national currencies.
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A
Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up under the lead of the European Banking Authority, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services and a single handbook for financial supervision for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework. . In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the banking union should apply at least to all Euro area Member States. With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market,
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework.
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9)
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework.
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism,
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism for prudential supervision of banks, and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework. . In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the banking union should apply at least to all Euro area Member States. With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market, and to the extent that this is institutionally
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a common European deposit insurance and resolution framework. In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the banking union should apply at least to all Euro area Member States. With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market, and to the extent that this is institutionally possible, the banking union should also be open to the participation of other Member States outside the euro area, striking the appropriate balance between their rights and responsibilities in this framework.
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 a (new) (9 a) The banking union should be underpinned by proper checks and balances and accountability mechanisms between political institutions at an EU and national level and those bodies exercising supervisory responsibilities at both the EU and the national level.
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 a (new) (9 a) Temporary currency-swap agreements between the national central banks of non-euro area member states and the ECB could be offered to those member states opting-in to the single supervisor. This would contribute towards a better balance between rights and responsibilities.
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 b (new) (9 b) The implementation of the banking union should at all its different stages ensure that due consideration be given to the potential mutual spill-over effects of the banking union in the euro area for non-euro area members. To this aim, appropriate preventive measures should be put in place to avoid possible disruption of the single market. In particular, the ECB should be required to ensure that it performs its supervisory tasks over the Euro area in a manner that is non-discriminatory and is consistent with the proper functioning of the internal market.
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 c (new) (9 c) The supervision of credit institutions in non-Euro area Member States that will not opt-into the single Euro area supervisory mechanism should continue to be ensured at the national level by their respective national competent authorities. In view of preventing or mitigating systemic risks, the national supervisors of these Member States should for the purpose of sound macroprudential supervision coordinate their supervision tasks with the relevant Agency of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS).
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to systemic credit institutions in all Member States
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations. A single supervisory mechanism is the basis for the next steps towards the banking union.
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality,
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single Euro area supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the EBA single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non-
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent, integrated, articulated and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) As a first step towards the banking union, a single supervisory mechanism should ensure that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and effective way, that the single rulebook for financial services is applied equally to credit institutions in all Member States concerned, and that those credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations. A single supervisory mechanism is the basis for the next steps towards the banking union. This reflects the principle that any possible introduction of common intervention mechanisms in case of crises including a direct access to ESM should be preceded by
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) As a first step
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 a (new) (10 a) Shifting the supervision of banks to the European level is a key to place the banking sector on a more sound footing and restore confidence in the euro. The single supervisory mechanism is based on the transfer to the European level of specific, key supervisory tasks for banks established in the euro area. With respect to the supervision of insurers, reinsurers and occupational pensions such changes are not yet foreseen. Close and constructive cooperation within the ESFS is essential for efficient supervision throughout Europe. It is only pragmatic to opt for a step by step approach within the ESFS to enhance consistency and convergence for supervisory practices. However, European supervisors irrespective of the financial area in question should have adequate resources and powers at hands in order to properly fulfil their tasks. Installing a single supervisory mechanism for banks therefore also calls for some alignments in the EIOPA Regulation, concerning the collection of information, the establishment and scope of action and the decision-making.
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 a (new) (10 a) The implementation of a single rule book for financial services should be concluded as soon as possible, while the common deposit insurance and resolution framework in the Euro area should follow soon after the setting up of the single supervisory mechanism, and with a specified deadline, as they respectively the second and third fundamental pillars, of a true European banking union.
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 b (new) (10 b) The single supervisory mechanism should provide for a single and indivisible common supervisory framework and rule book, applicable equally to all Credit Institutions, independently of their nature, dimension, complexity or interconnectedness. The single supervisory mechanism should be applied in a way that does not allow for any kind of segmentation, qualification or discrimination whatsoever among credit institutions in terms of quality and strictness of prudential supervision.
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, enjoying implementing powers of its own, the ECB is well
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions within the
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive and widely recognized expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues,
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB
Amendment 146 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECB should therefore be, on a temporary basis and until a permanent supervisory structure has been put in place, conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions within the Euro area. This permanent structure should be in place by the end of 2015 at the latest, building on the existing European supervisory authorities while drawing upon the expertise and experience of the ECB, particularly for the execution of supervisory tasks. For this reason, all tasks conferred on the ECB in this regulation shall be regarded as temporary, even where not explicitly stated.
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB
Amendment 148 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out certain clear defined supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision.
Amendment 149 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area’s central bank
Amendment 150 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Euro area Member States Central Banks of the Eurosystem are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions within the Euro area.
Amendment 151 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions within the Euro area.
Amendment 152 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area’s central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability and sustainability of Europe’s financial system. Indeed in many Member States Central Banks are already responsible for banking supervision. The ECB should therefore be conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions within the Euro area. .
Amendment 153 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 a (new) (11 a) Such definition of principles and policies (methods, processes, practices and standards) falls under the exclusive competence of the ECB and it could never be delegated since it confers on it the role of guardian of prudential supervision's quality, consistency and uniformity.
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) The ECB should be conferred those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with national authorities of the participating Member States in the single Euro area supervisory mechanism. The ECB's tasks should
Amendment 155 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) The ECB should be conferred only those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) The ECB should be conferred all those specific supervisory
Amendment 157 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) The ECB should be conferred those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with EBA and national authorities. The ECB's tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macro-prudential stability.
Amendment 158 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) The ECB should be conferred only those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial
Amendment 159 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) The ECB should be conferred those specific prudential supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with national authorities. The ECB's tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macro-prudential stability
Amendment 160 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) The ECB should be conferred those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with national authorities. The ECB's tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macro-prudential stability in cooperation with ESRB.
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12)
Amendment 162 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 a (new) (12 a) The mandate given to the ECB through this Directive shall only apply to those Member States whose currency is the euro. Any decision or recommendation issued by the ECB to the authorities of a Member State whose currency is not the euro, including those who have entered into a close cooperation agreement with the ECB as specified in this Directive, shall be of an advisory character only.
Amendment 163 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) S
Amendment 164 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13)
Amendment 165 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can
Amendment 166 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise s
Amendment 167 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13)
Amendment 168 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability due to their interconnectivity or bad management. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise supervisory tasks in relation to all banks of participating Member States without exception. Nevertheless the ECB should take into account principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
Amendment 169 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability at the national level and/or within the Euro area. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise supervisory tasks in relation to all banks of
Amendment 170 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise supervisory tasks under the single supervisory mechanism, which should consist of the ECB and the competent national authorities, in relation to all banks of participating Member States.
Amendment 171 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise supervisory tasks in relation to all banks of participating Member States without exception.
Amendment 172 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) Safety and soundness of large banks is essential to ensure the stability of the financial system. However, recent experience shows that smaller banks can also pose a threat to financial stability. Therefore, the ECB should be able to exercise prudential supervisory tasks in relation to all banks of participating Member States.
Amendment 173 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 a (new) (13a) National competent authorities should continue to supervise the credit institutions that fall outside the scope of direct ECB supervision. The ECB, together with the EBA and the national supervisory authorities, should create a supervisory framework for the supervision of those credit institutions which are not directly supervised by the ECB. As part of their duties under the supervisory framework, national competent authorities should submit a report to the ECB on a quarterly basis.
Amendment 174 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 a (new) (13 a) National competent authorities should continue to supervise the credit institutions that fall outside the scope of supervision on European level. EBA should establish a supervisory framework for the supervision by national competent authorities of credit institutions falling outside the scope of supervision on European level. As part of their duties under the supervisory framework, national competent authorities should submit a report to EBA on a quarterly basis. EBA should monitor national competent authorities on an ongoing basis.
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 a (new) (13a) National competent authorities should continue to supervise the credit institutions that fall outside the scope of direct ECB supervision. The ECB, together with the EBA and the national supervisory authorities, should create a supervisory framework for the supervision of those credit institutions which are not directly supervised by the ECB. As part of their duties under the supervisory framework, national competent authorities should submit a report to the ECB on a quarterly basis.
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 a (new) (13 a) The ECB must be empowered to agree contractual arrangements with the national competent authorities of non- euro area states which participate in the banking union in order to enable the ECB to conduct the same supervisory tasks in relation to non-euro area banks.
Amendment 177 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 a (new) (13 a) The ECB may, under its full discretion, delegate to national competent authorities the execution of some tasks concerning prudential supervision while, at the same time, maintaining full responsibility for coordination, monitoring and control of national competent authorities.
Amendment 178 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 b (new) (13 b) In case of delegation of any tasks concerning prudential supervision, national competent authorities could be empowered to take decisions relating to the execution of those tasks although within the common supervisory framework and rule book established by the ECB.
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 c (new) (13 c) As a result of this delegation, national competent authorities should be accountable to the ECB. As part of their duties under the common supervisory framework and rule book, national competent authorities should submit regular reports to the ECB.
Amendment 180 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 d (new) (13 d) The ECB should monitor and control national competent authorities under the common supervisory framework and rule book on an ongoing basis, making use of the powers referred to in this Regulation as well as of any powers arising out of the normal management process of delegation, such as the power to conduct audits and peer reviews of national competent authorities.
Amendment 181 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 e (new) (13 e) In addition to ongoing reporting, national competent authorities should inform the ECB without delay of any serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution, where the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of that credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions.
Amendment 182 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 f (new) (13 f) The ECB may, at any moment, decide to take over the direct supervision of any credit institution in a participating Member State, in particular when the national competent authorities fail to perform their duties under this Regulation or when there is evidence that the credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, is about to pose a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or to the stability of the financial system, or to exacerbate a pre- existing threat.
Amendment 183 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 g (new) (13 g) The Colleges of Supervision, under the exclusive guidance and control of the ECB, should continue to exist for credit institutions with cross-border activity, for purposes of regular supervision and most particularly for purposes of dealing with a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or stability of the financial system.
Amendment 184 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 h (new) (13 h) Whenever a competent national authority believes that a major supervisory decision from the ECB might have been disproportionate in its impact and involves serious danger for the national economy and/or financial system of the corresponding Member State, the competent national authorities shall warn and have the right to appeal.
Amendment 185 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the
Amendment 186 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should therefore have the task to authorise credit institutions and should be responsible for the withdrawal of authorisations. Accordingly the ECB must also assume the necessary accountability and liabilities that would rest with the competent authorities whose power it is replacing.
Amendment 187 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should therefore have
Amendment 188 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should
Amendment 189 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should therefore have at request from EBA the task to authorise credit institutions and
Amendment 190 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of systemic credit institutions in the euro area is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should therefore have the task to authorise credit institutions and should be responsible for the withdrawal of authorisations.
Amendment 191 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of systemic credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should therefore have the task to authorise credit institutions and should be responsible for the withdrawal of authorisations.
Amendment 192 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) In addition to the conditions set out in Union legislative acts for authorisation of credit institutions and the cases for withdrawal of such authorisations, Member States may currently provide for further conditions for authorisation and cases for withdrawal of authorisation. The ECB should therefore carry out its task to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw the authorisation in case of non- compliance with national law upon a proposal by the relevant national competent authority, which assesses compliance with the relevant conditions set out by national law. It is nevertheless noted that these differences in national law constitute an unlevel playing field in that they lead to differences in supervisory culture and will need addressing in due course.
Amendment 193 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) In addition to the conditions set out in Union l
Amendment 194 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) In addition to the conditions set out in Union legislative acts for authorisation of credit institutions and the cases for withdrawal of such authorisations, Member
Amendment 195 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) In addition to the conditions set out in Union legislative acts for authorisation of credit institutions and the cases for withdrawal of such authorisations, Member States may currently provide for further conditions for authorisation and cases for withdrawal of authorisation. The ECB should therefore carry out its task to authorise credit institutions of the Euro area and to withdraw the authorisation in case of non-
Amendment 196 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 (15) In addition to the conditions set out in Union legislative acts for authorisation of systemic credit institutions in the euro area and the cases for withdrawal of such authorisations, Member States may currently provide for further conditions for authorisation and cases for withdrawal of authorisation. The ECB should therefore carry out its task to authorise credit institutions and to withdraw the authorisation in case of non-
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 a (new) (15 a) Nevertheless in order to achieve a fully effective supervisory framework in the Union it is crucial to go beyond the current legal limitations of the mechanism set up around the ECB and include all Member States irrespective their currencies, and all credit institutions, financial conglomerates, investment firms and insurance companies operational throughout the Union in the future. Therefore it is necessary to start preparing an essential institutional framework including possible changes of the Treaty as soon as possible in order to create a Single Supervisory Authority in the co-decision procedure. A Single Supervisory Authority, once fully operational, shall take over supervisory tasks granted to the ECB according to this Regulation and play a central role in the ESFS. The work towards this goal should not start later than by 2015 together with the envisaged review of the EFSF and this Regulation.
Amendment 198 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 b (new) (15 b) Setting up of the single supervisory mechanism within the ECB can assure identical interpretation and implementation of the EBA single rulebook only in participating Member States. In order to ensure the proper interpretation and implementation of the single rulebook in the same way throughout the Union further steps in the future will be necessary within the new Single Supervisory Authority.
Amendment 199 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16)
Amendment 200 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchase of a significant stake in a credit institution is an indispensable tool to ensure the continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit institutions’ owners. The ECB as a Union institution is well-placed to carry out such an assessment
Amendment 201 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchase of a significant stake in a credit institution of the Euro area is an indispensable tool to ensure the continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit institutions' owners. The ECB as a Union institution is well-placed to carry out such an assessment without imposing undue restrictions to the internal market. The ECB should have the task to assess the acquisition and disposal of significant holdings in credit institutions of the Euro area.
Amendment 202 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchase of a significant stake in a credit institution is an indispensable tool to ensure the continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit institutions' owners. The ECB as a Union institution is well-placed to carry out such an assessment without imposing undue restrictions to the internal market. The ECB should have the task to assess the prudential implications of acquisition and disposal of significant holdings in credit institutions.
Amendment 203 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchase of a significant stake in a credit institution is an indispensable tool to ensure the continuous suitability and financial soundness of credit institutions' owners. The ECB as a Union institution is well-placed to carry out such an assessment without imposing undue restrictions to the internal market. The ECB should at the request of EBA have the task to assess the acquisition and disposal of significant holdings in credit institutions.
Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 a (new) (16 a) It is necessary for a fast and efficient appeal level external to the ECB to be established. With regard to legal appeal to courts for institutions and individuals from a decision or action of the ECB, this should reside with the home Member State for parent institutions and branches and with the Member State of incorporation for subsidiaries. The ECB shall appear as required by judicial proceedings.
Amendment 205 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 a (new) (16 a) The ECB's Supervisory Board should ensure that, when performing the supervisory tasks as set out in this Regulation, it is guaranteed that a level- playing-field between credit institutions in the participating Member States is respected. EBA should, within the scope of its powers conferred by Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 1093/2010, give guidance to the ECB's Supervisory Board and any other European Union competent authority in case they impose any discretionary prudential requirement as specifically provided for in a Union act.
Amendment 206 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions’
Amendment 207 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions' financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions' prudential soundness. The ECB should have the task to ensure compliance with those rules
Amendment 208 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions’ financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions’ prudential soundness.
Amendment 209 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions’ financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions’ prudential soundness. The ECB should have the task, under the single supervisory mechanism, to ensure compliance with
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions' financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions' prudential soundness. The ECB should
Amendment 211 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions' financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions' prudential soundness. The ECB should have the task to ensure compliance with those rules and to set higher prudential requirements and apply additional measures to credit institutions of the Euro area in the cases specifically set out in Union acts.
Amendment 212 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 Amendment 213 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 Amendment 214 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 Amendment 215 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) Additional capital buffers, as permitted by Union law relating to prudential supervision of credit institutions, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that individual credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth in the markets in which they are active a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them, noting also the need for macro-prudential controls at the national level unless there is fiscal union.
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions of the Euro area comply with them.
Amendment 217 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task, jointly with the EBA, to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them.
Amendment 218 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should at request of EBA have the task to impose such buffers and to ensure credit institutions comply with them.
Amendment 219 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them in the cases specifically set out in Union acts.
Amendment 220 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer
Amendment 221 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that credit institutions accumulate during periods of economic growth a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods, are key prudential tools to ensure the availability of adequate loss absorbency. The ECB should have the task, under the single supervisory mechanism, to impose such buffers and ensure credit institutions comply with them.
Amendment 222 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 a (new) (18 a) In non-euro Member States which have established a close cooperation with the ECB, the tasks of setting higher prudential requirements, applying additional measures to credit institutions as well as imposing and enforcing additional capital buffers should all remain with national competent authorities as long as the Member State concerned does not take part in a common mechanism where the responsibility for recapitalisation and resolution of financial institutions is placed at the European level. Where only national mechanisms can be used, these supervisory tools need to be adjusted at the national level so that the safety of national credit institutions matches the capacity of those national mechanisms.
Amendment 223 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and
Amendment 224 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements. The ECB should therefore have the task to apply for credit institutions of the Euro area requirements ensuring that credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and processes for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital. In case of deficiencies it should also have the task to impose appropriate measures including specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication
Amendment 225 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements. The ECB should therefore have the task to apply Union requirements in prudential regulation ensuring that credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and processes for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital. In case of deficiencies it should also have the task to impose appropriate measures including specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication requirements, and specific liquidity requirements.
Amendment 226 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements. The ECB should therefore have the task to apply requirements ensuring that systemic credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and processes for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital. In case of deficiencies it should also have the task to impose appropriate measures including specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication requirements, and specific liquidity requirements.
Amendment 227 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements. The ECB should therefore have on behalf of EBA the task to apply requirements ensuring that credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and
Amendment 228 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements. The ECB should therefore have the task, under the single supervisory mechanism, to apply requirements ensuring that credit institutions have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms, including strategies and processes for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital. In case of deficiencies it should also have the task to impose appropriate measures including specific additional own funds requirements, specific publication requirements, and specific liquidity requirements.
Amendment 229 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 a (new) (19 a) Systemic and moral hazard risks may cause very negative consequences to the solvency and safety of financial institutions and financial stability. They may harm also the functioning of the internal market, the real economy, the use of the euro as single currency and the public finances. They deserve an intense, effective and reliable supervision.
Amendment 230 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 b (new) (19 b) Systemic risks are defined in accordance with Article 2(c) of the Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 which defines it as a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy. All types of financial intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may be potentially systemically important to some degree.
Amendment 231 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 c (new) (19 c) Moral hazard is defined as a risk produced when actors in financial services do not bear the full cost of their actions and are thus more likely to take such actions with the potential to pose serious negative consequences for the internal market, the financial stability, the real economy and the public finances. This definition is inspired by the OECD Glossary of terms. The Eurobanking Central Supervisor (ECS) should prevent and minimise these kinds of risks that incentivise financial players to increase their risks and to behave against the interest of the others, which is totally contrary to the essence of the EMU.
Amendment 232 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) Risks for the safety and soundness of a credit institution can arise both at the level of an individual credit institution and at the level of a banking group or of a financial conglomerate. Specific supervisory arrangements to mitigate these risks are important to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions. In addition to supervision of
Amendment 233 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) Risks for the safety and soundness of a credit institution can arise both at the level of an individual credit institution and at the level of a banking group or of a financial conglomerate. Specific supervisory arrangements to mitigate these risks are important to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions. In addition to supervision of
Amendment 234 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) Risks for the safety and soundness of
Amendment 235 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 (20) Risks for the safety and soundness of a credit institution can arise both at the level of an individual credit institution and at the level of a banking group or of a financial conglomerate. Specific supervisory arrangements to mitigate these risks are important to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions. In addition to supervision of individual credit institutions, the ECB's tasks under the single supervisory mechanism should include supervision at the consolidated level, supplementary supervision, supervision of financial holding companies and supervision of mixed financial holding companies.
Amendment 236 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an Euro area credit institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. The ECB should have the task to carry out early intervention actions as defined in relevant Union law applicable to credit institutions of the Euro area. It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities in the Euro area Member State where the credit institution concerned is established / headquartered prior to any intervention. Pending the conferral of resolution powers for the Euro area on a European body, the ECB should moreover coordinate appropriately with the national authorities of the Euro area Members States concerned to ensure a common understanding about respective responsibilities in case of crises, in particular in the context of the cross border crisis management groups and the future resolution colleges established for these purposes.
Amendment 237 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. The ECB should have the task to carry out early intervention actions as defined in relevant Union law. It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities. Pending the c
Amendment 238 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. The ECB, together with the EBA, should have the task to carry out early intervention actions as defined in relevant Union law. It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities. Pending the conferral of
Amendment 239 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. The ECB should have the task to carry out early intervention actions as defined in relevant Union law relating to prudential supervision. It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities. Pending the conferral of resolution powers on a European body, the ECB should moreover coordinate appropriately with the national authorities concerned to ensure a common understanding about respective responsibilities in case of crises, in particular in the context of the cross border crisis management groups and the future resolution colleges established for these purposes.
Amendment 240 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it. The ECB should have the task to carry out early intervention actions on behalf of EBA as defined in relevant Union law. It should however coordinate its early intervention action with the relevant resolution authorities. Pending the conferral of resolution powers on a European body, the ECB should moreover coordinate appropriately with the national authorities concerned to ensure a common understanding about respective responsibilities in case of crises, in particular in the context of the cross border crisis management groups and the future resolution colleges established for these purposes.
Amendment 241 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied
Amendment 242 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) Specific supervisory tasks
Amendment 244 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) Supervisory tasks over Euro area credit institutions not conferred on the ECB should remain with national authorities. Those tasks should include the power to receive notifications from credit institutions in relation to the right of establishment and the free provision of services, to supervise bodies which are not covered by the definition of credit institutions under Union law but which are supervised as credit institutions under national law, to supervise credit institutions from third countries establishing a branch or providing cross-border services in the Union, to supervise payments services, to carry out day-to-day verifications of credit institutions, to carry out the function of competent authorities over credit institutions in relation to markets in financial instruments and the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) Supervisory
Amendment 246 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 (22) Supervisory tasks not conferred on the E
Amendment 247 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 a (new) (22 a) The Commission should propose a revision of prudential legislation to harmonise the supervision of credit institutions from third countries establishing a branch or providing cross- border services in the Union. Subsequent to any such legislative proposal the ECB should be empowered to perform the necessary tasks.
Amendment 248 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) The ECB should carry out the tasks conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system
Amendment 249 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) The ECB should carry out the tasks conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system of the Union and the unity and integrity of the Internal Market, thereby ensuring also the protection of depositors and improving the functioning of the Internal Market, in accordance with the Treaties and single rulebook for financial services in the Union. In particular the ECB shall comply with all aspects of equality and non-discrimination on the basis of gender, nationality or between Member States and with any Union legislative measures intended to redress imbalances.
Amendment 250 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) The ECB should carry out the specific tasks conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of systemic credit institutions and the stability of the financial system of the Union and the unity and integrity of the Internal Market
Amendment 251 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) The ECB should carry out the
Amendment 252 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) The ECB should carry out the tasks conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions of the Euro area and the stability of the financial system of the Union and the unity and integrity of the Internal Market, thereby ensuring also the protection of depositors and improving the functioning of the Internal Market, in accordance with the EBA single rulebook for financial services in the Union.
Amendment 253 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) The
Amendment 254 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23) The ECB should carry out the tasks conferred on it with a view to ensuring the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability and sustainability of the financial system of the Union and the unity and integrity of the Internal Market, thereby ensuring also the protection of depositors and improving the functioning of the Internal Market, in accordance with the single rulebook for financial services in the Union.
Amendment 255 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 23 (23)
Amendment 256 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) The conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB
Amendment 257 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) The conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB for some of the Member States should be consistent with the framework of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) set up in 2010 and its underlying objective to develop the single rulebook and enhance convergence of supervisory practices across the whole
Amendment 258 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) The conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB for
Amendment 259 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24)
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) The conferral of supervisory tasks on the
Amendment 261 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) The conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB for some of the Member States should be consistent with the framework of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) set up in 2010 and its underlying objective to develop the single rulebook and enhance convergence of supervisory practices across the whole
Amendment 262 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 Amendment 263 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 Amendment 264 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 Amendment 265 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 Amendment 266 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 (25)
Amendment 267 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 (25) In order to ensure consistency between the Euro area supervisory responsibilities conferred on the ECB and decision making within the EBA, the ECB should coordinate a common position amongst representatives of the national authorities of the participating Member States in the single Euro area supervisory mechanism in relation to matters falling within its competence
Amendment 268 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 (25) In order to
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 (25) In order to ensure consistency between supervisory responsibilities conferred on the ECB and decision making within the EBA, the ECB should coordinate a common position amongst representatives of the national authorities of the participating Member States in relation to matters falling within its competence. The ECB must fully respect the role of EBA in establishing the single rulebook for Union's banking sector and for the role of EBA in monitoring the application of the rules across the Union as a whole.
Amendment 270 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 (25) In order to ensure consistency between specific supervisory responsibilities conferred on the ECB and decision making within the EBA, the ECB should coordinate a common position amongst representatives of the national authorities of the participating Member States in relation to matters falling within its competence.
Amendment 271 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The ECB should carry out its tasks subject to and in compliance with any Union law rule including the whole of primary and secondary Union law, Commission decisions in the area of State aids, competition rules and merger control and the single rulebook applying to all Member States. The EBA is entrusted with
Amendment 272 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The ECB should carry out its tasks subject to and in compliance with any Union law rule including the whole of primary and secondary Union law, Commission decisions in the area of State aids, competition rules and merger control
Amendment 273 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The ECB should carry out its
Amendment 274 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The ECB should carry out its tasks subject to and in compliance with any Union law rule including the whole of primary and secondary Union law, Commission decisions in the area of State aids, competition rules and merger control and the single rulebook applying to all Member States. The EBA is entrusted with developing draft technical standards and guidelines and recommendations ensuring supervisory convergence and consistency of supervisory outcomes within the Union. The ECB should not replace the exercise of these tasks by the EBA, and should therefore exercise powers to adopt regulations in accordance with Article 132 TFEU only where Union acts adopted by the European Commission upon drafts developed by the EBA or guidelines and recommendations issued by the EBA do not deal with certain aspects necessary for the proper exercise of the ECB's tasks or do not deal with them in sufficient detail and providing there is no detrimental impact on the single market or assumption of responsibilities assigned to the EBA.
Amendment 275 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 27 (27) In order to ensure that supervisory rules and decisions are applied by credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies, effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions should be imposed in case of breaches. In accordance with Article 132(3) TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions, the ECB is entitled to impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply with obligations under its regulations and decisions. Moreover, in order to enable the ECB as part of the single Euro area supervisory mechanism to effectively carry out its tasks relating to the enforcement of supervisory rules set out in directly applicable Union law, the ECB should be empowered to impose pecuniary sanctions on credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies for breaches of such rules. National authorities of the participating Member States in the single Euro area supervisory mechanism should remain able to apply sanctions in case of failure to comply with obligations stemming from national law transposing Union Directives. Where the ECB considers it appropriate for the fulfilment of its tasks that a sanction is applied for such breaches, it should be able to refer the matter to national authorities for those purposes.
Amendment 276 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 27 (27) In order to ensure that supervisory rules and decisions are applied by credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies, effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions should be imposed in case of breaches. In accordance with Article 132(3) TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions, the ECB
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 27 (27) In order to ensure that supervisory rules and decisions are applied by credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies, effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions should be imposed in case of breaches. In accordance with Article 132(3) TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) No. 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions, the ECB is entitled to impose fines or periodic penalty payments on systemic undertakings for failure to comply with obligations under its regulations and decisions. Moreover, in order to enable the ECB to effectively carry out its tasks relating to the enforcement of supervisory rules set out in directly applicable Union law, the ECB should be empowered to impose pecuniary sanctions on credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies for breaches of such rules. National authorities should remain able to apply sanctions in case of failure to comply with obligations stemming from national law transposing Union Directives. Where the ECB considers it appropriate for the fulfilment of its tasks that a sanction is applied for such breaches, it should be able to refer the matter to national authorities for those purposes.
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for these purposes. Therefore, in order to ensure high quality European supervision national supervisors should assist the ECB in the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the exercise of the ECB supervisory tasks. This should include in particular the ongoing day-to-day assessment of a bank's situation and related on site verifications. In order to secure a smooth cooperation between national supervisors and the ECB and a fast facilitation of the ECB supervisory expertise, at least 5% of the human resources of each national supervisor should be delegated to work within the ECB single supervisor in both ECB headquarters and participating Member States by 1 January 2015.
Amendment 279 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for
Amendment 280 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for these purposes. In the past, however, some national supervisors have failed to detect risks in their financial systems. Therefore, in order to ensure high quality European supervision national supervisors should assist the ECB in the preparation and implementation of any acts
Amendment 281 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for these purposes. Therefore, in order to ensure high quality European supervision national supervisors of the participating Member States in the single Euro area supervisory mechanism should assist the ECB in the preparation and implementation of any acts relating to the exercise of the ECB supervisory tasks in the Euro area. This should include in particular the ongoing day-to-day assessment of a bank's situation and related on site verifications.
Amendment 282 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within
Amendment 283 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for these purposes. Therefore, in order to ensure high quality European supervision national supervisors should assist the
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29)
Amendment 285 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB
Amendment 286 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a European institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States not participating in the common currency should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the new mechanism. However, it is a necessary pre-
Amendment 287 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to
Amendment 288 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a European institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States not participating in the common currency should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the new mechanism. However, it is a necessary pre- condition for an effective exercise of supervisory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented fully and without delay. Member States wishing to participate in the new mechanism should therefore undertake to ensure that their national competent authorities will abide by and adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB and the ECB must assume the corresponding national level legal responsibility and democratic accountability for such actions including being subject to an inquiry, court or parliamentary appearance. The ECB should be able to establish a close cooperation with the competent authorities of a Member State not participating in the common currency. It should be obliged to establish the cooperation where the conditions set out in this regulation are met. The conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close co-operation take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board should allow the greatest possible involvement of those representatives taking into account the legal limits following from the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, in particular as regards the integrity of its decision making process, but noting that the independence requirements for monetary policy do not extend to the tasks assigned under policies relating to prudential supervision.
Amendment 289 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a European institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States not participating in the common currency should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the new mechanism. However, it is a necessary pre- condition for an effective exercise of supervisory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented fully and without delay. Member States wishing to participate in the new mechanism should therefore undertake to ensure that their national competent authorities will abide by and adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB.
Amendment 290 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the E
Amendment 291 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a
Amendment 292 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) Participation in the single supervisory mechanism shall be of a full and equal character also for those Member States whose currency is not the euro and who wish to opt in .As regards the supervision of cross-
Amendment 293 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB
Amendment 294 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition,
Amendment 295 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 a (new) (29 a) The conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the non-euro area Member States take part in the activities of the Supervisory Board should allow full and equal representation with the competent authorities of the euro area States. The powers of the Supervisory Board are to plan and execute the ECB's supervisory tasks. The Supervisory Board should exercise its powers in full recognition that the Governing Council of the ECB is the ultimate executive authority of the ECB.
Amendment 296 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 30 Amendment 297 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 30 (30) In order to carry out its tasks, the ECB should have appropriate supervisory powers. Union law on the prudential supervision of credit institutions provides for certain powers to be conferred on competent authorities designated by the Member States for those purposes. To the extent that these powers fall within the scope of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB,
Amendment 298 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 30 (30) In order to carry out its tasks, the ECB should have appropriate supervisory powers over credit institutions of the Euro area. Union law on the prudential supervision of credit institutions provides
Amendment 299 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 30 (30) In order to carry out its
Amendment 300 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 30 (30) In order to carry out its tasks, the ECB should have appropriate supervisory powers. Union law on the prudential supervision of credit institutions provides for certain powers to be conferred on competent authorities designated by the Member States for those purposes. To the extent that these powers fall within the scope of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB, for participating Member States the ECB should be considered the competent authority and should have the powers conferred on competent authorities by Union law. This includes powers conferred by those acts on the competent authorities of the home and the host Member States and the powers conferred on designated authorities. The ECB must assume the corresponding national level legal responsibility and democratic accountability.
Amendment 301 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 30 (30) In order to carry out its
Amendment 302 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) In order to carry out its
Amendment 303 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) In order to carry out
Amendment 304 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the ECB, acting under the terms of the single supervisory mechanism, or the competent national authority, should be able to require all necessary information, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections. These powers should apply to supervised entities, persons involved in the activities of those entities and related third parties, third parties to whom those entities have outsourced operational functions or activities and persons otherwise closely and substantially related or connected to the activities of those entities, including the staff of a supervised entity who are not directly involved in its activities but who, due to their function within the entity, may hold important information on a specific matter and firms which have provided services to those entities. The ECB, acting under the terms of the single supervisory mechanism, or the competent national authority, should be able to require information by simple request under which the addressee is not obliged to provide the information but, in the event that it does so voluntarily, the information provided should not be incorrect or misleading and should be made available without delay. The ECB should also be able to require information by decision.
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the ECB should be able to require all necessary information, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections in cooperation with national supervisors. These powers should apply to supervised entities, persons involved in the activities of those entities and related third parties, third parties to whom those entities have outsourced operational functions or activities and persons otherwise closely and substantially related or connected to the activities of those entities, including the staff of a supervised entity who are not directly involved in its activities but who, due to their function within the entity, may hold important information on a specific matter and firms which have provided services to those entities. The ECB should be able to require information by simple request under which the addressee is not obliged to provide the information but, in the event that it does so voluntarily, the information provided should not be incorrect or misleading and should be made available without delay. The ECB should also be able to require information by decision.
Amendment 306 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 (31) In order to carry out its tasks effectively, the ECB should be able to require all necessary information, and to conduct investigations and on-site inspections. These powers should apply to supervised entities, persons involved in the activities of those entities and related third parties, third parties to whom those entities have outsourced operational functions or activities and persons otherwise closely and substantially related or connected to the activities of those entities, including the staff of a supervised entity who are not directly involved in its activities but who, due to their function within the entity, may hold important information on a specific matter and firms which have provided services to those entities. The ECB should be able to require information by simple request under which the addressee is not obliged to provide the information but, in the event that it does so voluntarily, the information provided should not be incorrect or misleading and should be made available without delay. The ECB should also be able to require information by decision. The ECB and the national supervisory authorities will have access to the same information without credit institutions being subject to double reporting requirements.
Amendment 307 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 32 (32) Where credit institutions exercise their right of establishment or to provide services in another Member State, or where several entities in a group are established in different Member States, Union law provides for specific procedures and for attribution of competences between the Member States concerned. To the extent that the E
Amendment 308 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33)
Amendment 309 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) In its decision-making procedures, the ECB should be bound by Union rules and general principles on due process and transparency. The right of the addressees of the ECB's decisions to be heard
Amendment 310 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) In its decision-making procedures, the ECB should be bound by Union rules and general principles on due process and transparency. The right of the addressees of the ECB's decisions to
Amendment 311 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) In its decision-making procedures, the ECB should be bound by Union rules and general principles on due process and transparency. The right of the addressees of the ECB's decisions to be heard in national and EU courts should be fully respected.
Amendment 312 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) In its decision-making procedures, the ECB should be bound by Union rules and general principles on due process and transparency. The right of the addressees of the ECB's decisions to be heard should be fully respected. The Supervisory Board should publish its minutes.
Amendment 313 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way.
Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way. The ECB should therefore be accountable for the exercise of these tasks towards the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers respectively the Eurogroup as democratically legitimised institutions representing the European people and the Member States. That should include regular reporting and responding to questions. Where national supervisors take action under this Regulation, accountability arrangements provided under national law should continue to apply. The ECB should also be accountable to national parliaments for any actions imposed at least until such time as common financial backstops available to all participating Member States replace direct national taxpayer liability.
Amendment 315 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way.
Amendment 316 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the
Amendment 317 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way. The ECB should therefore be accountable for the exercise of these tasks towards the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers
Amendment 318 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way. The ECB should therefore be accountable for the exercise of these tasks towards the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers
Amendment 319 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB and its successor to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way. The ECB
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 (34) The conferral of supervisory tasks implies a significant responsibility for the ECB to safeguard financial stability in the Union, and to use its supervisory powers in the most effective and proportionate way. The ECB should therefore be accountable for the exercise of these tasks towards the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers
Amendment 321 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 a (new) (34 a) The ECB should also regularly exchange information on its supervisory tasks as part of the single Euro area supervisory mechanism with all members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the ESFS in order to ensure exchange of best practices and peer review.
Amendment 322 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 a (new) (34 a) The Supervisory Board should present an annual report to the European Parliament and the Council. Representatives of the Supervisory Board may be invited to appear before relevant committees of the European Parliament or the national parliaments of the participating Member States. The right of the European Parliament to establish a temporary committee of enquiry should apply to the activities of the Supervisory Board.
Amendment 323 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 a (new) (34a) Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community1 applies to the ECB by virtue of Article 342 TFEU.
Amendment 324 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 a (new) (34 a) At the request of the parliaments of the participating Member States and of the European Parliament, a representative of the supervisory board of the ECB, together with the national and European competent authority, may be heard in the competent committees of the parliaments concerned, on the execution of its supervisory tasks. This further strengthening of democratic accountability is appropriate given the impact that supervisory measures may have on public finances, credit institutions, their customers and employees, and the markets in the participating Member States.
Amendment 325 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 b (new) (34 b) Without prejudice to Article 263 TFEU, the Court of Justice should be enabled to review the legality of the acts of the ECB in its supervisory capacity that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à- vis third parties.
Amendment 326 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 b (new) (34b) This Regulation is without prejudice to the right of the European Parliament to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law pursuant to Article 226 TFEU.
Amendment 327 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 c (new) (34c) Pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union must review the legality of acts of, inter alia, the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.
Amendment 328 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 (35) The ECB is responsible for carrying out monetary policy functions in the Euro area with a view to maintaining price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. The exercise of supervisory tasks in the Euro area has the objective to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In order to avoid conflicts of interests and to ensure that each function is exercised in accordance with the applicable objectives, the ECB should ensure they are carried out in full separation in terms of decision making, staffing and budget, etc.
Amendment 329 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 (35) The ECB is responsible for carrying out monetary policy functions with a view to maintaining price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. The exercise of supervisory tasks has the objective to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In order to avoid conflicts of interests and to ensure that each function is exercised in accordance with the applicable objectives, the ECB should ensure they are carried out in full separation, while ensuring that members of the ECB Governing Board are not permitted to take responsibility for executive duties in the field of supervision.
Amendment 330 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 (35) The ECB is responsible for carrying out monetary policy functions with a view to maintaining price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. The exercise of supervisory tasks on behalf of EBA has the objective to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In order to avoid conflicts of interests and to ensure that each function is exercised in accordance with the applicable objectives, the ECB should ensure they are carried out in full separation. Staff involved in carrying out the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation should be organisationally separated from other ECB staff and should be subject to separate reporting lines.
Amendment 331 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 (35) The ECB is responsible for carrying out monetary policy functions with a view to maintaining price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. The exercise of supervisory tasks has the objective to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In order to avoid conflicts of interests and to ensure that each function is exercised in accordance with the applicable objectives, the ECB should ensure they are carried out in full separation. This also includes, in particular, the personnel and the tasks for which the personnel is responsible.
Amendment 332 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board of the single Euro area supervisory mechanism (hereafter Euro area supervisory board) responsible for preparing decisions on Euro area supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors of the Euro area. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice- Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the Euro area supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the
Amendment 333 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice- Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB
Amendment 334 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The
Amendment 335 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should
Amendment 336 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair, both to be elected by the ECB Governing Council following an open selection procedure and after approval by the European Parliament, and composed, in
Amendment 337 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should
Amendment 338 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice- Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB
Amendment 339 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The
Amendment 340 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a
Amendment 341 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a temporary supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up as a separate entity within the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should
Amendment 342 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board
Amendment 343 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB
Amendment 344 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the ECB Governing Council and composed, in addition, of representatives from the ECB and from national authorities. In order to allow for an appropriate rotation while ensuring the full independence of the Chair and the Vice-Chair, their term should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. In order to ensure full coordination with the activities of the EBA and with the prudential policies of the Union, the EBA and the European Commission should be observers in the supervisory board. The performance of the supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB requires the adoption of a large number of technically complex acts and decisions, including decisions on individual credit institutions. In order to effectively carry out those tasks in accordance with the principle of separation from tasks relating to monetary policy, the ECB Governing Council of the ECB should be able to delegate certain clearly defined supervisory tasks and related decisions to the supervisory board, subject to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council, which can give instructions and directions to that body.
Amendment 345 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 a (new) (36a) While it should be recognised that national competent authorities of all participating Member States should be equally treated, the supervisory board should be supported by a steering committee that ensures a balance representation of euro-area Member States and non-euro-area Member States, taking into account the importance of the banking system of participating Member States.
Amendment 346 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 a (new) (36a) The head of the single Euro area supervisory mechanism should be different from the head of the ECB and ESRB and he/she should be appointed after a hearing, and confirmation by, the European Parliament based upon a shortlist of suitably diverse candidates selected from across the EU banking sector and not exclusively the central banks.
Amendment 347 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 a (new) (36a) The Supervisory Board should be responsible for preparing and executing the decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB. Proposals of the Supervisory Board should be accepted by the Governing Council unless a qualified majority of its members rejects them.
Amendment 348 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 a (new) (36a) The minutes of the supervisory board including decisions relating to prudential supervision and voting records should be published, subject to any necessary professionally secrecy. The minutes of the Governing Council with regard to supervisory matters should be published.
Amendment 349 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 b (new) (36b) Where a national competent authority disagrees with a supervisory decision of the ECB, it may appeal to the European Banking Authority which should establish an appropriate appellate process whose decisions should be addressed to the Supervisory Board. Where an action is brought in the courts of a home or host Member State with regard to the activities of the ECB in its supervisory capacity, the ECB should be a party to that proceeding.
Amendment 350 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 b (new) (36b) Due consideration should be given to both the expertise, gender and geographical diversity of members of the Euro area supervisory board.
Amendment 351 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 (37) The supervisory board, the steering committee and staff of the ECB carrying out supervisory duties should be subject to appropriate
Amendment 352 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 37 (37) The supervisory board, the steering committee and staff of the ECB carrying out supervisory duties on behalf of EBA should be subject to appropriate professional secrecy requirements. Similar requirements should apply to the exchange of information with the staff of the ECB not involved in supervisory activities. This should not prevent the ECB from exchanging information within the limits and under the conditions set out in the relevant Union legislation, including with the European Commission for the purposes of its tasks under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and under Union law on enhanced economic and budgetary surveillance.
Amendment 353 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 38 Amendment 354 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 38 (38) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence, in particular from undue political influence and from industry interference which would affect its operational independence. At the same time, it is a founding principle of democratic societies that an independent institution bestowed with a public function should be accountable to citizens and their elected representatives for the conduct of its policies. Accountability is therefore an important counterpart of independence. As stated in the interim report "Towards a genuine economic and monetary union" of 12 October 2012, "a further strengthened role of EU institutions must be accompanied with a commensurate involvement of the European Parliament in the EU procedures". The European Parliament should put in place appropriate internal accountability modalities in order to mirror those of the Member States participating to this regulation.
Amendment 355 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 38 (38) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks as part of the single Euro area supervisory mechanism effectively, the ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence, in particular from undue political influence and from both industry and special interest groups interference which would affect its operational independence.
Amendment 356 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 38 (38) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence, in particular from undue political influence and from industry interference which would affect its operational independence. A cooling-off period of 1 year should be introduced for former members of the Supervisory Board.
Amendment 357 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 38 (38) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence,
Amendment 358 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 38 a (new) (38a) In order to support supervisory tasks of the ECB, the European Parliament should have the right to require the Supervisory Board and its members to carry out specific inquiries or investigations against individual institutions and national supervisory authorities in participating Member States where appropriate
Amendment 359 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB's independence from undue influences by national competent authorities, industry and special interest groups and market participants, and separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks.
Amendment 360 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures
Amendment 361 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB's independence from undue influences by national competent authorities and market participants, and separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks. The costs of supervision should be primarily borne by the entities subject to it. Therefore, the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB should be financed at least partly by fees charged to credit institutions. In view of the transfer of significant supervisory tasks from national authorities to the E
Amendment 362 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB's independence from undue influences
Amendment 363 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources
Amendment 364 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 40 (40) Highly motivated, well-trained and impartial staff is indispensable to effective supervision. In order to create a truly integrated supervisory mechanism, appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among national supervisors of the Member States participating in the single Euro area supervisory mechanism and the ECB should be provided for. Where necessary to avoid conflicts of interest, particularly in the supervision of large banks, the ECB should be able to request that national supervisory teams of the single Euro area supervisory mechanism involve also staff from competent authorities of other participating Member States.
Amendment 365 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 40 (40) Highly motivated, well-trained and impartial staff is indispensable to effective supervision. In order to create a truly integrated supervisory mechanism, appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among national supervisors and the ECB should be provided for. At least 5% of the human resources of each national supervisor should be delegated to work within the ECB single supervisor in both ECB headquarters and participating Member States by 01.01.2015. Where necessary to avoid conflicts of interest, particularly in the supervision of large banks, the ECB should be able to request that national supervisory teams involve also staff from competent authorities of other participating Member States.
Amendment 366 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 40 (40) Highly motivated, well-trained and impartial staff is indispensable to effective supervision. In order to create a truly integrated supervisory mechanism, appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among national supervisors and the ECB should be provided for.
Amendment 367 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 (41) Given the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the E
Amendment 368 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 (41) Given the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should carry out its tasks as part of the single Euro area supervisory mechanism in respect of international standards and in dialogue and close cooperation with supervisors outside the Union, without duplicating the international role of the EBA. It should be empowered to develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with the supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries and with international organisations, subject to coordination with the EBA and while fully respecting the existing roles and respective competences of the Member States and the Union institutions. The ECB should inform the European Parliament in its annual report on details of all administrative contacts with third country agencies and international agencies.
Amendment 369 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 (41) Given the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should carry out its tasks in respect of international standards and in dialogue and close cooperation with supervisors outside the Union,
Amendment 370 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 (41) Given the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should c
Amendment 371 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 (41) Given the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should carry out its tasks in respect of international standards and in dialogue and close cooperation with supervisors outside the Union, without duplicating or restricting the international role of the EBA. It should be empowered to develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with the supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries and with international organisations, subject to coordination with the EBA and while fully respecting the existing roles and respective competences of the Member States and the Union institutions
Amendment 372 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 a (new) (41a) The ECB should inform the European Parliament in its annual report about any contacts it has developed and administrative arrangements it has entered into with the supervisory authorities and administrations of third countries and with international organisations.
Amendment 373 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 a (new) (41a) The ECB should operate in a framework of openness, transparency and non-discrimination towards all Member States which do not use the single currency and with a duty of care towards the single market.
Amendment 374 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 b (new) (41b) The ECB should enter into memorandums of understanding with the supervisors of Member States not participating in the supervisory mechanism. Where a Member State has a systemic interest with regard to branches or subsidiaries, the competent authority of those Member State should be present as an observer in the supervisory board.
Amendment 375 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 43 a (new) (43a) It is critical that the banking union contains democratic accountability mechanisms. There should be consideration of the function of national parliaments.
Amendment 376 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks for banks of systemic importance as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for.
Amendment 377 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the E
Amendment 378 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible
Amendment 379 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for. The number of banks subject to the
Amendment 380 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks for credit institutions of systemic importance as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for.
Amendment 381 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate
Amendment 382 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of
Amendment 383 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start
Amendment 384 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the
Amendment 385 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 a (new) (44a) Each Member State whose currency is the euro should ensure consistency between national law and this Regulation, in particular concerning national competent authorities' tasks and powers regarding the tasks conferred to the ECB according to this Regulation. By way of derogation to Article 1.2 of Regulation 98/415/EC, Members States should consult the ECB before adopting any legislative or regulatory acts in order for the ECB to deliver an opinion on national acts implementing Union acts that are not directly applicable.
Amendment 386 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 b (new) (44b) In order to ensure legal continuity in the prudential surveillance, it is necessary to ensure that all decisions adopted by national competent authorities, pertaining to the tasks conferred upon the ECB by the present Regulation, before its entry into force, remain in force as long as the ECB has not modified or repealed them.
Amendment 387 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 45 (45) The current framework of prudential requirements for credit institutions and the supplementary supervision of financial
Amendment 388 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 45 (45) The current framework of prudential requirements for credit institutions
Amendment 389 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 45 (45) The current framework of prudential requirements for credit institutions and the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates is formed by Directives providing for a significant number of options and discretions for Member States when circumscribing the powers of competent authorities. Pending the adoption of new Union legislative acts which spell out the powers which competent authorities shall have directly and without reference to Member States' options or discretions, the ECB can therefore not take any decisions directly applicable to credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies. In this transitional phase, the ECB should therefore exercise its tasks only by instructing national competent authorities to act, with the ECB accepting the relevant national legal responsibility and democratic accountability.
Amendment 390 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 46 (46) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably the right to the protection of personal data, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, and has to be implemented in accordance with those rights and principles. For this purpose the ECB should be party to a proceeding brought in a home member state or a state of incorporation of a subsidiary, with regard to its activity and decisions on prudential supervision.
Amendment 391 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 47 (47) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely setting up an efficient and effective framework for the exercise of specific supervisory tasks over credit institutions by a Union institution, and ensuring the consistent application of the single rulebook to credit institutions, cannot be sufficiently achieved at the Member State level and can therefore, by reason of the pan-Union structure of the banking market and the impact of bank failures on other Member States, be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the
Amendment 392 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 47 (47) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely setting up an efficient and effective framework for the exercise of specific supervisory tasks over credit institutions of the Euro area by a Union institution, and ensuring the consistent application of the single rulebook to credit institutions, cannot be sufficiently achieved at the Member State level and can therefore, by reason of the
Amendment 393 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 47 a (new) (47a) A supervisory mechanism based on Article 127(6) of the Treaty necessarily imposes constraints in terms of participation of Member States in the ultimate decision making, the single market, democratic accountability, the scope of tasks and institutions covered by such a mechanism, particularly with regard to mixed financial holding companies including insurance, the relationship between supervisory rule making by the European Banking Authority and day to day supervision by competent authorities and potential conflicts with monetary policy objectives. In order to achieve a truly effective single supervisory mechanism that includes all Member States on an equal basis it is indispensible that the Council and the Commission give full consideration, prior to the publication of the review of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, which is due by 2 January 2014, to the timely introduction of proposals entrusting an independent Union body with implementing powers, the exercise of which it should be able to delegate to competent authorities, with regard to all aspects of prudential rules concerning all credit institutions established in the Union, using the legal acts provided for under Articles 114 and 352 TFEU and 20 TEU if necessary, in the absence of which an amendment of the TFEU remains the only option.
Amendment 394 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 47 a (new) (47a) Given the necessity to be able to oversee highly complex and inter- connected markets and institutions, including conglomerates, which requires close and daily exchanges, it is important that the Supervisory board, the EBA and the EIOPA be located in Frankfurt am Main where the ECB has its seat.
Amendment 395 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 47 a (new) (47a) Whereas the pending financial crisis contributed immensely to the fragmentation of European financial markets, it is indispensable to enhance the common integrated financial framework. However, it should be borne in mind that the deepening of integration in the EMU cannot give rise to new, not outlined in the Treaties, convergence criteria, which can create additional barriers to entry for countries under a temporary derogation.
Amendment 396 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 47 b (new) (47b) Whereas, efforts to secure financial stability within the EU require a diversified approach to distinctive types of risks in different markets and considering that the economies of the Member States, including those in the EMU, remain heterogeneous and that economic cycles are not synchronized, it should be borne in mind that according to the ESRB Recommendation (ESRB/2011/3) and standard no. 138 of Basel III, effective response to the problems of macroeconomic imbalances necessitates the use of discretionary instruments at local level. Moreover, the scope to customize macroprudential instruments is of the utmost significance to the Member States remaining in the EMU, due to their inability to use macroeconomic automatic stabilizers, such as interest rate or exchange rate.
Amendment 397 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the Euro area, with a view to directly promoting the safety and soundness of these credit institutions and indirectly the stability of the financial system of the Union, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market. When carrying its tasks the ECB should pay due regard to: - the desirability of performing the tasks as transparently as possible; - the need to act proportionately; - the need to ensure effective coordination with Member States national competent authorities. - the unity and integrity of the internal market; - the international competitiveness of the internal market, - the potential impact of its decisions on the stability of the financial systems of participating Member States; - the potential impact of its decisions on growth in the participating Member States; - accountability to the European Parliament; In accordance with the principles set out in this article, the ECB shall not seek to constrain in any way the freedom of establishment of credit institutions or the provision of banking services in any currency in any Member State. In addition, the ECB shall not seek to influence through the adoption of regulations or otherwise the location of any credit institution, including as regards the location of outsourced critical operational functions or activities.
Amendment 398 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific
Amendment 399 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings and the stability of the financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market and the pluralistic nature of the European banking industry. By the application of this Regulation the ECB shall respect especially the business model of small credit institutions which interact closely with the local economy and focus mainly on the socially most vital parts such as deposit-taking and providing financial services to the non-financial sectors in the economy.
Amendment 400 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, with
Amendment 401 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB, within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) composed of the ECB and of the national competent authorities of participating Member States, specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.
Amendment 402 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market and for the development of binding minimum social standards and fiscal harmonisation at EU level.
Amendment 403 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers, on a temporary basis and until a permanent supervisory structure has been put in place, on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.
Amendment 404 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of cross- border credit institutions with systemic importance, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system,
Amendment 405 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific and clearly defined tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions on behalf of EBA, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.
Amendment 406 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the EU and each Member State, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.
Amendment 407 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the EU and each Member State, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.
Amendment 408 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system, to ensure the use of the euro as a single currency with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.
Amendment 409 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 This Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the EU and each Member State, with due regard for the unity and integrity of the internal market.
Amendment 410 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) The objective of the ECB with regard to this regulation shall be to protect the public interest by contributing to the short, medium and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system, for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses. The ECB therefore shall contribute to: (a) improving the functioning of the internal market, including, in particular, a sound, effective and consistent level of regulation and supervision; (b) ensuring the integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of financial markets; (c) strengthening the integration of the ECB into the System of European Supervisory Authorities; (d) strengthening international supervisory coordination; (e) preventing regulatory arbitrage and promoting equal conditions of competition; (f) ensuring the taking of credit and other risks are appropriately regulated and supervised; and (g) enhancing customer protection. In the exercise of the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB shall pay particular attention to any systemic risk posed by financial institutions, the failure of which may impair the operation of the financial system or the real economy.
Amendment 411 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 a (new) The tasks conferred shall be conducted in line with EBA and recognised international standards. They must ensure the existence of a level playing field and support and facilitate productive activities for the real economy, prevent and avoid systemic and moral hazard risks as well as fiscal cost arising from failures and banking crisis.
Amendment 412 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1)
Amendment 413 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1)
Amendment 414 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1)
Amendment 415 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) "participating Member State" means a Member State whose currency is the euro or which has entered into close cooperation with the ECB in accordance with Article 6;
Amendment 416 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1) ‘participating Member State’ means a Member State whose currency is the euro and other Member States which choose to participate;
Amendment 417 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new) (1a) "non participating Member State" means a Member State whose currency is not the euro and that has not opted in the single Euro area supervisory mechanism;
Amendment 418 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new) (1a) 'non-participating Member State' means a non-euro area Member State which chooses not to participate;
Amendment 419 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new) (1a) "Associated Member State" means a Member State whose currency is not the euro and which meets the requirements to be associated to the Eurobanking Central Supervisor;
Amendment 420 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2 (2) ‘national competent authority’ means the national competent authority designated by participating or associated Member States in accordance with Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the
Amendment 421 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 (3) ‘credit institutions’ means credit institutions as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC, CCPs as defined in Article 2 Point 1 of Regulation EU 648/2012 and the European Investment Bank. With regard to Article 4 Paragraph 1 Point (c) of this Regulation, Investment Firms as defined under Article 4 Paragraph 1 Point 1 of Directive 2004/39/EC shall be treated as credit institutions;
Amendment 422 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new) (3a) The ECB shall co-operate closely with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any other similar facility of a participating Member States whose currency is not the Euro where a credit institution has received or applied for financial assistance from that facility.
Amendment 423 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new) (3a) "Systemically important financial institution (SIFIs)" means institutions as defined in CRD IV/CRR;
Amendment 424 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 5 (5) ‘mixed financial holding company’ means a mixed financial holding company as defined in Article
Amendment 425 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 Amendment 426 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new) 1092/2010 Article 2 (6a) "Systemic risk" means a risk as defined in Article 2(c) of the Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010
Amendment 427 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new) (6a) "Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)" means a European federal system of financial supervision composed by the European Central Bank and national competent authorities.
Amendment 428 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 b (new) (6b) "Moral hazard" means a risk produced when a behaviour of agents in financial services do not bear the full cost of their actions and are thus more likely to take such actions with the potential to have serious negatives consequences for the internal market, the financial stability, the real economy, the single currency or the public finances.
Amendment 429 #
Proposal for a regulation Chapter 2 – title Amendment 430 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 Amendment 432 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 The ECB shall cooperate closely with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational
Amendment 433 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 The ECB shall cooperate closely with
Amendment 434 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 The ECB shall
Amendment 435 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 The ECB, in its role within the SSM, shall cooperate closely with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board, which form part of the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of
Amendment 436 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 The supervisory board of the ECB shall cooperate closely with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board, which form part of the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, and (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment 437 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 The ECB in its supervisory capacity shall cooperate closely with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board, which form part of the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of
Amendment 438 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 The ECB shall cooperate closely with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board, which form part of the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, and (EU) No 1095/2010 and all national competent authorities.
Amendment 439 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new) The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this regulation, in conformity to the decisions of the EBA and the Single Rule Book and Single Supervisory Handbook developed by the EBA to harmonise supervisory practice throughout the Union. The ECB may develop a Supervisory Handbook for the competent authorities included in the Supervisory Mechanism created by this regulation to further specify supervisory practice within that mechanism subject to the EBA's approval.
Amendment 440 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new) In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation pursuant to Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the parties to the ESFS shall cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular in ensuring the flow of appropriate and reliable information between them.
Amendment 441 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new) In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation pursuant to Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the ECB shall cooperate with parties within the ESFS with trust and full mutual respect, in particular in ensuring the flow of appropriate and reliable information between them. For the purposes of the tasks and responsibilities set out in Regulation 1093/2010(EU) the ECB shall be considered a competent authority.
Amendment 442 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new) The ECB shall carry out its specific tasks in accordance with this Regulation and without prejudice to the competences and tasks of the other participants in the context of the single supervisory mechanism and the ESFS.
Amendment 443 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 b (new) The ECB shall, in cooperation with the competent authorities included in the mechanism established by this regulation, develop and enforce clear and effective procedures for cooperation in relation to supervisory tasks for which those competent authorities remain exclusively competent.
Amendment 444 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 a (new) Article 3a Exclusive responsibilities conferred on the ECB The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively: - competent to develop a one and indivisible common supervisory framework and rule book, on the basis of principles and policies applicable to all credit institutions equally while ensuring a coherent, integrated, articulated and effective implementation of the Union's prudential supervision policy; - responsible for the coordination, monitoring and control of national competent authorities; - responsible to pursue macro-prudential stability; - responsible to coordinate and express a common position of representatives from competent authorities of the participating Member States when participating in the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board of the European Banking Authority, for issues relating to the responsibilities conferred on the ECB by this Regulation.
Amendment 446 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – title Tasks conferred on the ECB within the SSM
Amendment 449 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The
Amendment 450 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law and in close cooperation with the EBA within a single supervisory mechanism, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to
Amendment 451 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, and in particular in accordance with the Single Rulebook and Single Supervisory Handbook supervised by EBA, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
Amendment 452 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law,
Amendment 453 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, on a temporary basis, until a permanent supervisory structure has been put in place, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
Amendment 454 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law
Amendment 455 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be obliged and exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes without delay, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States or the non participating Member States referred to in Article 6:
Amendment 456 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to
Amendment 457 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, without prejudice to the powers of the EBA and in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
Amendment 458 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, within the SSM and in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
Amendment 459 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The supervisory board of the ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the
Amendment 460 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be
Amendment 461 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be
Amendment 462 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a Amendment 463 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) To authorise credit institutions and to withdraw authorisation of systemically important cross-border credit institutions;
Amendment 464 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) To assess acquisitions and disposals of major holdings in credit institutions;
Amendment 465 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new) (ba) the notification procedure in relation to the establishment of branches and the exercise of freedom of provision of services;
Amendment 466 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) To ensure compliance with any Union acts imposing prudential requirements on systemically important cross-border credit institutions in the areas of own funds requirements, large exposure limits, liquidity, leverage, and reporting and public disclosure of information on those matters;
Amendment 467 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (ca) To assess business models of SIFIs and to ensure that they do not pose a systemic threat to the functioning of European economies;
Amendment 468 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d Amendment 469 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) only in the cases specifically set out in Union acts, to set higher prudential requirements and apply additional measures to systemically important cross- border credit institutions;
Amendment 470 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d (d)
Amendment 471 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e Amendment 472 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e Amendment 473 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e Amendment 474 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e Amendment 475 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e (e)
Amendment 476 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e (e) To impose capital buffers to be held by systemically important cross-border credit institutions in addition to own funds requirements referred to in (c), including setting countercyclical buffer rates and any other measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks in the cases specifically set out in Union acts;
Amendment 477 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point f (f)
Amendment 478 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point f (f) To apply requirements for systemically important cross-border credit institutions to have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms and effective internal capital adequacy assessment processes;
Amendment 479 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point f (f) To apply requirements specifically set out in Union acts for credit institutions to have in place robust governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms and effective internal capital adequacy assessment processes;
Amendment 480 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point g (g) To determine whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms put in place by credit institutions and the own funds held by these institutions ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks, and on the basis of that supervisory review
Amendment 481 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point g a (new) (ga) to be responsible for the ongoing valuation of assets for the purposes of prudential supervision.
Amendment 482 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point h (h) To
Amendment 483 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point h (h) To carry out
Amendment 484 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point h (h) To
Amendment 485 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point h (h) To
Amendment 486 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point h (h) To carry out supervisory stress-tests on credit institutions to support the supervisory review, and to publish the results of the tests;
Amendment 487 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point h a (new) (ha) to assist competent national authorities in the preparation of resolution plans;
Amendment 488 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point i (i) To carry out supervision on a consolidated basis over credit institutions' parents established in one of the participating Member States, including over financial holding companies and
Amendment 489 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point i (i) To carry out supervision on a consolidated basis over systemically important cross-border credit institutions' parents established in one of the participating Member States, including over financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies, and to participate in supervision on a consolidated basis, including in colleges of supervisors, in relation to parents not established in one of the participating Member State;
Amendment 490 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point j Amendment 491 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point j (j) To participate in supplementary supervision of a financial conglomerate in relation to the systemically important cross-border credit institutions included in it and assume the tasks of a coordinator where the ECB is appointed as the coordinator for a financial conglomerate in accordance with the criteria set out relevant Union law;
Amendment 492 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point j (j) To participate in supplementary supervision of a financial conglomerate in relation to the credit institutions included in it and assume the
Amendment 493 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k (k) To carry out
Amendment 494 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k (k) To carry out supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention where a credit institution
Amendment 495 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k (k) To carry out supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention where a credit institution does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements
Amendment 496 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k (k) To carry out supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention where a credit institution does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements
Amendment 497 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k (k) To carry out prudential supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention where a credit institution does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements, including recovery plans and intra group financial support arrangements that are wholly contained within the participating Member States, in coordination with the relevant resolution authorities;
Amendment 498 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k (k) To carry out supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention where a systemically important cross-border credit institution does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements, including recovery plans and intra group financial support arrangements, in coordination with the relevant resolution authorities and the EBA;
Amendment 499 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k (k) To carry out supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention, prompt correction measures and all crisis management measures that do not involve winding up where a credit institution does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements, including recovery plans and intra group financial support arrangements, in coordination with the relevant resolution authorities;
Amendment 500 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point k (k) To carry out supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention where a credit institution does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable prudential requirements, including recovery plans and intra group financial support arrangements, in coordination with the relevant resolution authorities
Amendment 501 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l Amendment 502 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l Amendment 503 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l Amendment 504 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l Amendment 505 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l (l) To
Amendment 506 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l (l) To coordinate
Amendment 507 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l (l) To coordinate
Amendment 508 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l (l) To
Amendment 509 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l (l) To coordinate
Amendment 510 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l (l) To coordinate and express a common position of representatives from competent authorities of the participating Member States when participating in the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board of the European Banking Authority, for issues relating to the tasks conferred on the ECB within the SSM by this Regulation
Amendment 511 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point l a (new) (la) To apply sanctions in accordance with according to Article 15.
Amendment 512 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. For the purpose of points (i) and (j) of the previous subparagraph, the ECB shall cooperate closely with the relevant supervisors and ESAs.
Amendment 513 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The ECB shall exercise the tasks set out in paragraph 1 in relation to credit institutions established in the participating Member States and Member States referred to in Article 6 which fall in one of the following categories: (a) credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies which have received or requested public financial assistance, such as any kind of loan, guarantee or equity; (b) the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European or global systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, categorised in a manner fully consistent with [CRD4], based on: (i) their size as reflected in, the sum of exposure values of all assets and off- balance sheet liabilities not deducted when determining the common equity tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes; (ii) the systemic risk for the domestic economy concerned, expressed as the percentage of assets of a bank divided by GDP of its home country; and (iii) their cross-border activity as reflected in cross-jurisdictional claims such as deposits and other assets in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country and cross- jurisdictional liabilities such as loans and notes in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country, and which together cover at least half of the banking sector in the euro area as a whole and in each Member State. The ECB shall give notice to each credit institution about the supervisory arrangements to which it is subject.
Amendment 514 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The ECB shall at request of EBA exercise the tasks set out in paragraph 1 in relation to credit institutions established in the participating Member States and which fall in one of the following categories: (a) credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies which have received or requested public financial assistance; (b) the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, based on: (i) their size as reflected in the sum of exposure values of all assets and off- balance sheet liabilities not deducted when determining the common equity tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes; (ii) the systemic risk for the domestic economy concerned, expressed as the percentage of assets of a bank divided by GDP of its home country; and (iii) their cross-border activity as reflected in cross-jurisdictional claims such as deposits and other assets in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country and cross- jurisdictional liabilities such as loans and notes in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country, and which together cover at least half of the banking sector in the euro area as a whole and in each Member State.
Amendment 515 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The ECB shall carry out the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 for credit institutions which: (a) have received or applied for public financial aid from special European recapitalisation programmes, or (b) are of systemic importance owing to their size, the systemic risk and their cross-border activities.
Amendment 516 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The ECB shall carry out the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 for credit institutions which: (a) have received or applied for public financial aid from special European recapitalisation programmes, or (b) are of systemic importance owing to their size, the systemic risk and their cross-border activities.
Amendment 517 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The ECB's Supervisory Board shall ensure that when performing the tasks as set out in Article 4, and in particular those in Article 4(1), (d), (e) and (g) it is guaranteed that a level-playing-field between credit institutions in the participating Member States is respected. EBA shall, within the scope of its powers conferred by Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 1093/2010, give guidance to the ECB's Supervisory Board and any other European Union competent authority in case they impose any discretionary prudential requirement as specifically provided for in a Union act.
Amendment 518 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The ECB shall carry out the tasks under paragraph 1 for credit institutions, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and financial conglomerates which: (a) have received public funds under a re- capitalisation programme or (b) are of systemic importance as defined in CRD IV.
Amendment 519 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new) 1b. For institutions established in the participating Member States or Member States referred to in Article 6 that do not fulfil the conditions set out under Paragraph 1a point (b), the ECB will establish the necessary procedures to obtain adequate and timely information on the condition of those institutions and the systemic risk they represent from the relevant competent authority. The ECB may decide to exercise the tasks set out in paragraph 1 where it deems it necessary to meet the prudential objectives set out in Article 1. When the ECB makes a decision to this effect, it shall notify the national competent authority and the credit institution concerned and publish the reasons for that decision.
Amendment 520 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 2 2. For systemically important credit institutions established in a non- participating Member State, which establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a participating Member State, the ECB shall carry out the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 for which the national competent authorities of the participating Member State are competent.
Amendment 521 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 2 2. For credit institutions established in a non-participating Member State, which
Amendment 522 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 2 2. For credit institutions established in a non-participating Member State, which establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a participating Member State, the ECB shall, within the SSM, carry out the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 for which the national competent authorities of the participating Member State are competent.
Amendment 523 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 2 2. For credit institutions established in a non-participating Member State, which establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a participating Member State, the ECB shall carry out the temporary tasks referred to in paragraph 1 for which the national
Amendment 524 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act including technical standards developed by EBA and adopted by the Commission, the ECB may adopt regulations and recommendations and take decisions to implement or apply Union law, to the extent necessary to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, and only where those Union acts do not deal with certain aspects necessary for the proper exercise of the ECB's tasks or do not deal with them in sufficient detail. Before adopting a regulation, the ECB shall conduct open public consultations, including the EBA and the Commission, and analyse the potential related costs and benefits.
Amendment 525 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act including technical standards developed by EBA and adopted by the Commission, the ECB may adopt regulations and recommendations and take decisions to implement or apply Union law, to the extent necessary to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, and only where those Union acts, do not deal with certain aspects necessary for the proper exercise of the ECB's tasks or do not deal with them in sufficient detail. Before adopting a regulation, the ECB shall conduct open public consultations, including EBA and the Commission, and analyse the potential related costs and benefits.
Amendment 526 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act, the ECB, within the SSM, may adopt regulations and recommendations and take decisions to
Amendment 527 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act, the ECB may adopt regulations and recommendations and take decisions to implement or apply Union law, to the extent necessary to carry out the tasks temporarily conferred upon it by this Regulation.
Amendment 528 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act, the ECB may, ad
Amendment 529 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act including technical standards developed by EBA and adopted by the Commission, the ECB may adopt regulations and recommendations and take decisions to set out the modalities of implementation or appl
Amendment 530 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act, the ECB may adopt regulations and recommendations and take decisions to implement or apply Union law, in close cooperation with the EBA within a single supervisory mechanism, to the extent necessary to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation.
Amendment 531 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 4 4. This regulation is without prejudice to the responsibilities and related powers of the competent authorities of the participating Member States to carry out supervisory tasks not
Amendment 532 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 4 4. This regulation is without prejudice to the responsibilities and related powers of the competent authorities of the
Amendment 533 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. In order to ensure consistent development and uniform conditions for the enforcement of this Regulation to prevent systemic and moral hazard risks and to promote the smooth use of the euro as a single currency, powers are delegated to the Commission to adopt regulatory prudential standards by means of Delegated Acts in accordance with Articles 8a to 8e and powers are conferred to the Commission to adopt implementing prudential standards through Regulations in accordance with Article 8f in relation to the powers conferred in the paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article that are not conferred on the ECB by the Article 132(1) TFEU.
Amendment 534 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. In addition to its exclusive competences conferred to it by paragraph 1, the ECB shall ensure a high level of consumer protection and the implementation and application of the legal acts referred to in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 in all participating Member States and the non participating Member States referred to in Article 6.
Amendment 535 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Additional tasks may be conferred upon the ECB by secondary legislation or by decision of participating Member States or Member States that have opted for close cooperation pursuant to Article 6, in accordance with national law.
Amendment 536 #
Proposal for a regulation Chapter II a (new) CHAPTER IIa EUROBANKING CENTRAL SUPERVISOR Article 4 a Eurobanking Central Supervisor The tasks conferred on the ECB shall be carried out through a separate organization within the ECB, namely the Eurobanking Central Supervisor (ECS).
Amendment 537 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 b (new) Article 4 b Single Supervisory Mechanism The ECS shall carry out its tasks in a single supervisory mechanism that integrates also the assisting national competent authorities.
Amendment 538 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – title National authorities of participating Member States
Amendment 539 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – title Amendment 540 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – title Amendment 541 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – title Amendment 543 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 Amendment 544 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism
Amendment 545 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB and national competent authorities until a permanent supervisory structure has been put in place which effectively takes over the task. This permanent structure shall be in place by the end of 2015 at the latest, building on the existing European Supervisory Authorities while drawing upon the expertise and experience of the ECB with regards to the execution of supervisory tasks.
Amendment 546 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single Euro area supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB and national competent authorities of the participating Member States.
Amendment 547 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within
Amendment 548 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB, the EBA and national competent authorities.
Amendment 549 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall carry out
Amendment 55 #
Draft legislative resolution Citation 2 – having regard to Article
Amendment 550 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall
Amendment 551 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the E
Amendment 552 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB
Amendment 553 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The EC
Amendment 554 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1a (new) To that end the competent national authorities shall carry out ongoing supervision of credit institutions on behalf of the ECB, unless the ECB decides to carry out the ongoing supervision of individual, or specific kinds of, credit institutions directly for reasons of financial stability or to protect the stability of the European financial system.
Amendment 555 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The ECB may, under its internal regulation, delegate on national competent authorities some of the tasks set out in Article 4(1) concerning prudential supervision.
Amendment 556 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 Amendment 557 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. National competent authorities shall assist the ECB
Amendment 558 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 559 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. National competent authorities
Amendment 56 #
Draft legislative resolution Citation 2 a (new) - having regard to Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Amendment 560 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. National competent authorities shall assist the ECB on its request with the preparation and implementation of any acts
Amendment 561 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. National competent authorities shall
Amendment 562 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 563 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. National competent authorities shall assist the ECB within the SSM on its request
Amendment 564 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 2. National competent authorities of participating and associated Member States shall assist the EC
Amendment 565 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. National competent authorities shall in particular be responsible for assisting the ECB, in accordance with paragraph 2, for credit institutions: (a) which have not received or requested public financial assistance; (b) which are not among the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, based on: (i) their size as reflected in, the sum of exposure values of all assets and off- balance sheet liabilities not deducted when determining the common equity tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes; (ii) the systemic risk for the domestic economy concerned, expressed as the percentage of assets of a bank divided by GDP of its home country; and (iii) their cross-border activity as reflected in cross-jurisdictional claims such as deposits and other assets in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country and cross- jurisdictional liabilities such as loans and notes in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country, and which together cover at least half of the banking sector in the euro area as a whole and in each Member State. National competent authorities shall submit to the ECB the necessary draft supervisory decisions to be addressed by the ECB to credit institutions which fall in one of the categories referred to in the first subparagraph.
Amendment 566 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The competent national authorities shall regularly forward to the ECB information and insights from the ongoing supervision, as well as periodic reports and bulletins by the credit institutions, and its assessments based on this data. The ECB shall be fully involved in the supervisory reporting system of the Member States.
Amendment 567 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. The national competent authorities shall inform the ECB without delay of any serious concerns about the stability and financial position, and in particular the solvency and liquidity situation, of credit institutions falling within its remit.
Amendment 568 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The ECB shall organise the practical modalities of implementation of paragraph 2 by the national supervisory authorities in discharging its tasks.
Amendment 569 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The
Amendment 57 #
Draft legislative resolution Citation 2 a (new) – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Amendment 570 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The ECB
Amendment 571 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The
Amendment 572 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The ECB shall organise, according to its internal regulation, the practical modalities of implementation of paragraph 2 by the national supervisory authorities in discharging its tasks
Amendment 573 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The ECB shall
Amendment 574 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The E
Amendment 575 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The EC
Amendment 576 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The ECB shall organise the practical modalities of implementation of paragraph
Amendment 577 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 3. The ECB together with national supervisory authorities shall organise the practical modalities of implementation of paragraph
Amendment 578 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Within the SSM, both the ECB and the national supervisory authorities are subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith and an obligation to exchange information.
Amendment 579 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. The ECB's Supervisory Board shall act as a single point of contact for all supervised credit institutions, unless this task is explicitly delegated to the national competent authorities within the supervisory framework referred to in paragraph 3.
Amendment 58 #
Draft legislative resolution Citation 3 a (new) – having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of ...,
Amendment 580 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. Without prejudice to the competencies within national law and other Union acts not covered by this Regulation, national competent authorities shall, to the extent necessary to comply with this Regulation, follow instructions given by the ECB.
Amendment 581 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. The decisions referred in paragraph 3 shall be based on objective criteria set by the Supervisory Board.
Amendment 582 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 b (new) 3b. The supervisory board of the ECB shall notify to each credit institution the supervisory arrangements to which it is subject.
Amendment 583 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 c (new) 3c. Regardless of the supervisory arrangements notified to a credit institution, the ECB may decide to take over a supervisory task assigned to a national competent authority and/or to change or revoke a decision taken by a national competent authority, namely in the following cases: (a) where there are serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution; (b) where the national competent authorities fail to perform their duties under this Regulation; (c) where a credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, may pose or is likely to pose a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or to the stability of the financial system, or may exacerbate or is likely to exacerbate a pre- existing risk to the orderly functioning and integrity of the EU financial market and/or to the stability of the financial system.
Amendment 584 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 3 d (new) 3d. The decision referred in paragraph 3c shall be notified to the national competent authority and to the credit institution concerned.
Amendment 585 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 Amendment 586 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 Amendment 587 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by the ECB for the purposes of the tasks mentioned in Article 4(1). Instructions given by the ECB shall not interfere with the exercise of voting rights by competent authorities of participating Member States within the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board of the European Banking Authority.
Amendment 588 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 4. National competent authorities shall
Amendment 589 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by the E
Amendment 59 #
Draft legislative resolution Citation 4 a (new) - having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (C-83/230),
Amendment 590 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by the ECB in this connection.
Amendment 591 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by and be accountable to the ECB.
Amendment 592 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by the EC
Amendment 593 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. National competent authorities shall continue to be responsible for supervising the credit institutions that fall outside the scope of Article 4(1a), without prejudice to the role of the ECB as set out in Articles 4b and 4c.
Amendment 594 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. The ECB shall be liable to national courts for its actions and instructions in place of any liability or duty of national competent authorities. The ECB shall be accountable to national parliaments in accordance with the custom of Member States at least until common financial mechanisms replace direct taxpayer liability in all participating Member States.
Amendment 595 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. National competent authorities shall continue to be responsible for supervising the credit institutions that fall outside the scope of Article 4(1a), without prejudice to the role of the ECB as set out in Articles 4b and 4c.
Amendment 596 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. National competent authorities shall continue to be responsible for supervision of institutions that fall outside the scope of Article 4(1a) until a single supervisory body has been set-up for the whole European Union.
Amendment 597 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Competent national authorities shall notify the ECB without delay where (a) there are well-founded concerns about the safety and/or creditworthiness of any credit institution falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) (b) the stability of the financial system is endangered by the situation of any credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) or (c) a credit institution ceases to fall within the scope of Article 4(1a).
Amendment 598 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. The competent national authority shall notify the ECB without delay where (a) there are well-founded concerns about the safety and/or creditworthiness of any credit institution falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) (b) the stability of the financial system is endangered by the situation of any credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) or (c) a credit institution ceases to fall within the scope of Article 4(1a).
Amendment 599 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. The competent national authorities shall notify the ECB without delay where (a) there are well-founded concerns about the safety and/or creditworthiness of any credit institution falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) (b) the stability of the financial system is endangered by the situation of any credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) or (c) a credit institution ceases to fall within the scope of Article 4(1a).
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation Title 1 Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the Euro area
Amendment 600 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 c (new) 4c. Following a decision by the supervisory board the ECB may take on the task of supervising credit institutions which fall outside the scope of Article 4(1a) where (a) the competent national authorities are not carrying out their duties or are not doing so adequately, (b) there is evidence that credit institutions, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, are jeopardising the proper operation and integrity of the European financial market and/or the stability of the financial system or are exacerbating an existing situation of this kind, or (c) a credit institution falls within the scope of Article 4(1a) or threatens to do so.
Amendment 601 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 c (new) 4c. Following a decision by the supervisory board the ECB may take on the task of supervising credit institutions which fall outside the scope of Article 4(1a) where (a) the competent national authorities are not carrying out their duties or are not doing so adequately, (b) there is evidence that credit institutions, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, are jeopardising the proper operation and integrity of the European financial market and/or the stability of the financial system or are exacerbating an existing situation of this kind, or (c) a credit institution falls within the scope of Article 4(1a) or threatens to do so.
Amendment 602 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 d (new) 4d. In the cases covered by Article 4(1a) and by Article 5(2), (3), (4b) and (4c) a conciliation committee shall be set up between the ECB and the competent national authority to settle disputes. Procedural rules shall be drawn up to determine the details of the committee’s operation.
Amendment 603 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 d (new) 4d. In the cases covered by Article 4(1a) and by Article 5(2), (3), (4b) and (4c) a conciliation committee shall be set up between the ECB and the competent national authority under the auspices of the EBA to settle disputes. Procedural rules shall be drawn up to determine the details of the committee’s operation.
Amendment 604 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 a (new) Amendment 605 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 a (new) Article 5 a Continuous supervision The SSM shall continuously accompany the activity of the entities that are under its supervision, even when there is no suspicion of irregularity.
Amendment 606 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – title Close cooperation with the competent authorities of
Amendment 607 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – title Amendment 608 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – title Close cooperation with the competent authorities of
Amendment 609 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – title Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation Title 1 Proposal for a
Amendment 610 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – title Amendment 611 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1. Within the limits set out in this Article, the ECB shall carry out the tasks in the areas referred to in Article 4 (1) and (2) in
Amendment 612 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1. Within the limits set out in this Article, the ECB shall carry out the tasks on behalf of EBA in the areas referred to in Article 4 (1) and (2) in relation to credit institutions established in a Member State whose currency is not the euro, where a close cooperation has been established between the ECB and the national competent authority of such Member State in accordance with this Article.
Amendment 613 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1. Within the limits set out in this Article, the ECB shall carry out the tasks in the areas referred to in Article 4 (1) and (2) in relation to credit institutions established in
Amendment 614 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1. Within the limits set out in this Article, the EC
Amendment 615 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1. Within the limits set out in this Article, the ECB shall carry out the tasks in the areas referred to in Article 4 (1) and (2) in
Amendment 616 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 To that end, the ECB may address guidelines or requests to the national competent authority of the
Amendment 617 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 To that end, the ECB may address guidelines or requests to the national competent authority of th
Amendment 618 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 To that end, the ECB may address guidelines or requests to the national competent authority of the
Amendment 619 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 To that end, the ECB may address guidelines or requests to the national competent authority of the non participating Member State. Those guidelines and requests shall only be considered as recommendations.
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation Citation -1 (new) Amendment 620 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 To that end, the ECB may address guidelines or requests to the national competent authority of the
Amendment 621 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new) Where a close cooperation has been established, the tasks referred to in points d and e of Article 4 (1) shall not be carried out by the ECB if the Member State concerned does not take part in a common mechanism where the responsibility for recapitalisation and resolution of financial institutions is placed at the European level.
Amendment 622 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a
Amendment 623 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a non
Amendment 624 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a
Amendment 625 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The
Amendment 626 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The
Amendment 627 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – introductory part 2. The close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a
Amendment 628 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) The Member State concerned notifies the other Member States, the Commission, the ECB and the EBA the request to enter into a
Amendment 629 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point a (a) The Member State concerned notifies the other Member States, the Commission, the ECS, the ECB and the EBA the request to enter into
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation Citation 1 Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 1
Amendment 630 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b – indent 1 – to ensure that it accepts that its national competent authority will
Amendment 631 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b – indent 2 – to
Amendment 632 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b – indent 2 a (new) - to be part of the programs or mechanisms of participating Member States to provide financial assistance for the recapitalisation of financial institutions or ensure financial stability.
Amendment 633 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) The Member State concerned has adopted national legal acts to ensure that its national competent authority will be obliged to adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB, in accordance with paragraph 5 and the ECB has accepted corresponding liability and accountability that previously applied to the national competent authority.
Amendment 634 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point c (c) The Member State concerned has adopted national legal acts to ensure these compromises are met and that its national competent authority will be obliged to adopt any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the EC
Amendment 635 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 Amendment 636 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 Amendment 637 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 Amendment 638 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 Amendment 639 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation Citation 1 Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the Articles 127(6) and 133 thereof,
Amendment 640 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with this Article shall take part to the activities of the Euro area Supervisory Board.
Amendment 641 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the
Amendment 642 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with this Article shall take part
Amendment 643 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 644 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a
Amendment 645 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the associated Member States
Amendment 646 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 5. Where the ECB considers that a measure relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 should be adopted by the competent authority of a concerned Member State in relation to a credit institution, financial holding company or mixed-financial holding company, it shall make a request to that authority, specifying a relevant timeframe. That timeframe shall be no less than 48 hours unless earlier adoption is indispensable to prevent irreparable damage.
Amendment 647 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 5. Where the ECB considers that a measure relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 should be adopted by the competent authority of a concerned Member State in relation to a credit institution, financial holding company or
Amendment 648 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. Where a Member State chooses to terminate the close cooperation with the ECB, the Member State concerned shall notify the ECB, the other Member States, the Commission and EBA and the decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The decision shall indicate the date from which it applies taking due consideration of supervisory effectiveness and legitimate interests of credit institutions.
Amendment 649 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. A Member State intending to terminate its close cooperation shall notify the ECB. The ECB shall adopt a decision to terminate the cooperation. The decision shall start to apply no later than 30 days after the notification. The decision shall be notified to the Member State concerned and shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The decision shall indicate the date from which it applies. Before taking the decision, the ECB shall, after having heard the views of the Member State concerned on the matter, establish a transition plan for the efficient transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the national competent authority. The plan shall take due consideration of the need to continuously maintain supervisory effectiveness and to protect the legitimate interests of credit institutions.
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation Citation 1 a (new) - having regard to Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Amendment 650 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. The Member State that has established a close cooperation with ECB may request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation at any time. In this case, the ECB shall immediately proceed to adopt a decision terminating the close cooperation. The decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and shall specify the date from which it is legally valid.
Amendment 651 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5 a (new) 5a. The Member State that has established a close cooperation with the ECB may request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation at any time. In this case, the ECB shall immediately proceed to adopt a decision terminating the close cooperation.
Amendment 652 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5a* – subparagraph 1 Amendment 653 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5a* – subparagraph 1 5a. Where the conditions set out in paragraph 2(a) to (c) are no longer met by a Member State concerned, or where its competent authority does not act in accordance with the obligation referred to in paragraph 2(c), the ECB
Amendment 654 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5a* – subparagraph 1 5a. Where the conditions set out in paragraph 2(a) to (c) are no longer met by a Member State concerned, or where its competent authority does not act in accordance with the obligation referred to in paragraph 2(c), the ECB may decide to
Amendment 655 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5a* – subparagraph 1 5a. Where the conditions set out in paragraph 2(a) to (c) are no longer met by a Member State concerned, or where its competent authority does not act in accordance with the obligation referred to in paragraph 2(c), the ECB may decide to terminate the
Amendment 656 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5a* – subparagraph 2 Amendment 657 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 5a* – subparagraph 2 The decision shall be notified to the Member State concerned and shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The decision shall indicate the date from which it applies
Amendment 658 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 a (new) Article 6a Memoranda of Understanding 1.The ECB and the national competent authority of each non-participating Member State shall prepare and maintain a memorandum of understanding describing in general terms how they will cooperate with one another in the performance of their supervisory tasks under Union law in relation to: (a) credit institutions; (b) financial holding companies; (c) mixed financial holding companies; (d) financial conglomerates. 2. The memorandum must, in particular, make provision about the following matters when performing their tasks in relation to credit institutions or banking groups in relation to which both the ECB and the national competent authority perform supervisory tasks: (a) the need for each party to have regard to the tasks of the other; (b) the arrangements for obtaining and disclosing information; (c) the co-ordination by the parties of the exercise of their powers in relation to: (i) the use of early intervention powers; (ii) investigations; (iii) disciplinary measures. (d) where there is a systemic interest the modalities for observer status of non- participating Member States on the ECB supervisory board 3. The ECB and the national competent authority shall each publish on their websites a copy of the memorandum as and when they are revised and re-issued.
Amendment 659 #
CHAPTER II b COOPERATION Article 6a Cooperation with the European Authorities of micro and macro- supervision The ECB shall cooperate closely with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board, which form part of the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, and (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation Citation 4 Amendment 660 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 Without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member States and the other Union institutions, in relation to the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation, the ECB may develop contacts
Amendment 661 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 Without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member States and the other Union institutions, in relation to the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation, the ECB may develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with supervisory authorities, international organisations and the administrations of third countries, subject to appropriate coordination with and endorsement by the EBA. Those arrangements shall not create legal obligations in respect of the Union and its Member States.
Amendment 662 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 Without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member States and the other Union institutions, in relation to the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation, the ECB may on behalf of EBA develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with supervisory authorities, international organisations and the administrations of third countries
Amendment 663 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 Without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member States and the other Union institutions, in relation to the tasks conferred on the ECB within the SSM by this Regulation, the ECB may develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with supervisory authorities, international organisations and the administrations of third countries, subject to appropriate coordination with the EBA. Those arrangements shall not create legal obligations in respect of the Union and its Member States.
Amendment 664 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 7 – paragraph 1 Without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member States and the other Union institutions including the EBA, in relation to the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation, the ECB
Amendment 665 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1. For the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by Article 4(1) and (2),
Amendment 666 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 1. For the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by Article 4(1) and (2), the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, shall be considered the competent authority in the participating Member States in accordance with the relevant acts of Union law and have the powers and obligations which competent authorities shall have under those acts.
Amendment 667 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 668 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 669 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation Citation 4 Having regard to the opinion of the European
Amendment 670 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 For the purpose of carrying out the task referred to in Article 4(1) and (2), the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, shall be considered as the designated
Amendment 671 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 Amendment 672 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 2. For the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by Article 4(1) and (2), the ECB shall have the investigatory powers set out in Section I. The ECB shall cooperate with national supervisory authorities in this regard.
Amendment 673 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 2. For the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by Article 4(1) and (2), the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, shall have the investigatory powers set out in Section I.
Amendment 674 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Where not inappropriate, the ECB shall before taking a decision inform any named addressee of its intention to adopt the decision, setting a time limit within which the addressee may express its views on the matter, taking full account of the urgency, complexity and potential consequences of the matter. Every decision of the ECB to institutions under its supervision shall be accompanied with the relevant information on the possibilities of contestation and appeal.
Amendment 675 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 a (new) Article 8a (1) The ECB shall determine its procedures in relation to the exercise of the tasks set out in Article 4(1) and (2). These procedures must be designed to secure, among other things, that decisions concerning disciplinary measures are taken by a person not directly involved in establishing the evidence upon which that decision is based. (2) The ECB shall publish guidance which may be regularly updated concerning the procedural arrangements put in place as a result of this provision.
Amendment 676 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 a (new) Article 8a Official language It must be ensured that the supervisory and investigatory powers laid down in the Regulation are exercised and implemented in the relevant official language appropriate to the seat of the credit institution, in accordance with Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community in conjunction with Article 342 TFEU.
Amendment 677 #
Proposal for a regulation Section -1 (new) – Article 8 a (new) Amendment 678 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 b (new) Article 8b Exercise of the delegation 1. The power to adopt Regulatory prudential standards referred to in Article 8a shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of 4 years from*. The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegated power not later than 6 months before the end of the 4- year period. The delegation of power shall be automatically extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council revokes it in accordance with Article 8c. 2. As soon as it adopts a Regulatory prudential standard, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. 3. The power to adopt Regulatory prudential standards is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down. _____________ *Date of entry into force of this Regulation
Amendment 679 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 c (new) Article 8c Revocation of the delegation 1. The delegation of power referred to in Article 8a may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. 2. The institution which has commenced an internal procedure for deciding whether to revoke a delegation of power shall endeavour to inform the other institution and the Commission within a reasonable time before the final decision is taken, indicating the delegated power which could be subject to revocation. 3. The decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect immediately or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of the Regulatory prudential standards already in force. It shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation Citation 6 Acting in accordance with a
Amendment 680 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 d (new) Amendment 681 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 e (new) Article 8e Non-endorsement or amendment of draft Regulatory prudential standards 1. In the event that the Commission does not endorse a draft Regulatory prudential standard or amends it as provided for in Article 8a, the Commission shall inform the ECS, the European Parliament and the Council, stating its reasons. 2. Where appropriate, the European Parliament or the Council may invite the responsible Commissioner, together with the Chairperson of the ECS, within 1 month of the notice referred to in paragraph 1, for an ad hoc meeting of the competent committee of the European Parliament or the Council to present and explain their differences.
Amendment 682 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 8 f (new) Amendment 683 #
Proposal for a regulation Section -1 a (new) – Article 8 g (new) SECTION -1a DECISIONS Article 8g Decisions In order to carry out the tasks entrusted to the ECB, the ECS shall submit a proposal to the ECB to take the decisions necessary for carrying out the tasks entrusted in accordance with this Regulation.
Amendment 684 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB may by simple request or by decision require the following legal or natural persons of the participating Member States to provide all information that is necessary in order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, including information to be provided at
Amendment 685 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB may on behalf of EBA by simple request or by decision require the following legal or natural persons to provide all information that is necessary in order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, including information to be provided at recurring intervals and in specified formats for supervisory and related statistical purposes:
Amendment 686 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB may by simple request or by decision require the following legal or natural persons of participating Member States to provide all information that is necessary in order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, including information to be provided at recurring intervals and in specified formats for supervisory and related statistical purposes:
Amendment 687 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, may by simple request or by decision require the following legal or natural persons to provide all information that is necessary in order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, including information to be provided at recurring intervals and in specified formats for supervisory and related statistical purposes:
Amendment 688 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. Insurance undertakings do not fall within the scope of paragraph 1.
Amendment 689 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 2 2. The persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall supply the information requested. Professional secrecy provisions do not exempt those persons from the duty to supply the information. The supply of the information shall not be deemed to be a breach of professional secrecy.
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital -1 (new) (-1) The present financial and economic crisis has seen Europe's banking system brought close to collapse. The integrity of the single currency and the single market is threatened by the fragmentation of the financial sector. It is now essential to intensify the integration of the banking sector in order to bolster European unity, restore financial stability and lay the basis for economic recovery.
Amendment 690 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 9 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The ECB's Supervisory Board is exclusively competent to request the information referred to in paragraph 1, unless this task is explicitly delegated to the national competent authorities within the supervisory framework referred to in Article 5(3). The national competent authority shall be able to obtain all information related to the tasks conferred upon the ECB by this Regulation. In case the information is not available at the ECB, the relevant competent authority may request the information directly from the legal or natural persons referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment 691 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB may conduct all necessary investigations of persons of participating Member States referred to in Article 9 (1) (a) to (g). To that end, the ECB shall have the right to:
Amendment 692 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB may at the request of EBA conduct all necessary investigations of persons referred to in Article 9 (1) (a) to (g). To that end, the ECB shall have the right to:
Amendment 693 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB may conduct all necessary investigations of persons referred to in Article 9 (1) (a) to (g) in cooperation with national supervisory authorities. To that end, the ECB shall have the right to:
Amendment 694 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, may conduct all necessary investigations of persons referred to in Article 9 (1) (a) to (g). To that end, the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, shall have the right to:
Amendment 695 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 The persons referred to in Article 9 (1) (a)
Amendment 696 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 10 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 When a person obstructs the conduct of the investigation, the participating Member State where the relevant premises are located shall afford the necessary assistance, including access by the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, to the business premises of the legal persons referred to in Article 9(1) (a) to (g), so that the aforementioned rights can be exercised.
Amendment 697 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB may conduct all necessary on-site inspections at the business premises of the
Amendment 698 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB may on behalf of EBA conduct all necessary on-site inspections at the business premises of the legal persons referred to in Article 9(1) (a) to (g), in accordance with Article 12. Where the proper conduct and efficiency of the inspection so require, the ECB may carry out the on-site inspection without prior announcement.
Amendment 699 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB in cooperation with national supervisory authorities may conduct all necessary on- site inspections at the business premises of the legal persons referred to in Article 9(1) (a) to (g), in accordance with Article 12. Where the proper conduct and efficiency of the
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital -1 (new) (-1) The rapid establishment of a banking union is the critical first step in a process which leads to fiscal union and eventually to political union. The constitutional importance of this legislation for the long- term evolution of the European Union should not be underestimated. While a well-designed and well-managed banking union will succeed in its goals of raising market and political confidence in the process of European integration, a badly designed or badly managed banking union would risk opening up grave divisions between Member States, the collapse of the euro and even the dissolution of the Union.
Amendment 700 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the EC
Amendment 701 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 1 1. In order to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, may conduct all necessary on-site inspections at the business premises of the legal persons referred to in Article 9 (1) (a) to (g), in accordance with Article 12. Where the proper conduct and efficiency of the inspection so require, the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, may carry
Amendment 702 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 2 2. The officials of and other persons authorised by the ECB to conduct an on- site inspection may enter any business premises and land of the legal persons subject to an investigation decision adopted by the ECB and shall have all the powers stipulated in Article 10 (1).
Amendment 703 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 2 2. The officials of and other persons authorised by the EC
Amendment 704 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 2 2. The officials of and other persons authorised by the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, to conduct an on-
Amendment 705 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 3 3. The legal persons referred to in Article 9(1) (a) to (g) shall submit to on-site inspections ordered by decision of the ECB.
Amendment 706 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 3 3. The persons referred to in Article 9(1) (a) to (g) shall submit to on-site inspections ordered by decision of the EC
Amendment 707 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 3 3. The persons referred to in Article 9 (1) (a) to (g) shall submit to
Amendment 708 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 4 4. Officials of, as well as those authorised or appointed by, the national competent authority of the Member State where the inspection is to be conducted shall,
Amendment 709 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 4 4. Officials of, as well as those authorised or appointed by, the competent authority of the Member State where the inspection is to be conducted shall, upon the request of the EC
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) Over the past decades, and in line with the principle of free movement of capital and services, the Union has made considerable progress in creating an internal market for banking services. Consequently, in many Member States, especially the new Member States outside of the Euro area, banking groups with their headquarters established in other Member States hold a significant market share, and credit institutions
Amendment 710 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 4 4. Officials of, as well as those authorised or appointed by, the competent authority of the Member State where the inspection is to be conducted shall, upon the request of the ECB or national competent authority, acting in the framework of the single European supervisory system, actively assist the officials of and other persons authorised by the ECB. To that end, they shall enjoy the powers set out in paragraph 2. Officials of the competent authority of the participating Member State concerned may also attend the on-site inspections
Amendment 711 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 5 5. Where the officials of and other accompanying persons authorised by the EC
Amendment 712 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 11 – paragraph 5 5. Where the ECB acting in the framework of the single supervisory mechanism carries out the duties conferred on it and where the officials of and other accompanying persons authorised by the ECB find that a person opposes an inspection ordered pursuant to this Article, the competent authority of the participating Member State shall afford them the necessary assistance.
Amendment 713 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 2 2. Where authorisation as referred to in paragraph 1 is applied for, the national judicial authority shall control that the decision of the ECB is authentic and that the coercive measures envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the subject matter of the inspection. In its control of the proportionality of the coercive measures, the national judicial authority may ask the ECB for detailed explanations, in particular relating to the grounds the ECB has for suspecting that an infringement of the relevant acts of Union law has taken place and the seriousness of the suspected infringement and the nature of the involvement of the person subject to the coercive measures.
Amendment 714 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 2 2. Where authorisation as referred to in paragraph 1 is applied for, the national judicial authority shall control that the decision of the ECB is
Amendment 715 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 – paragraph 2 2. Where authorisation as referred to in paragraph 1 is applied for, and the decision to carry out an on-site inspection was taken by the ECB within the SSM, the national judicial authority shall control that the decision of the ECB is authentic and that the coercive measures envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the subject matter of the inspection. In its control of the
Amendment 716 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 12 a (new) Article 12a Reporting obligation The ECB and the national competent authorities shall inform the competent entities of offences which come to their notice because of their functions within the SSM and that occur outside the SSM's competences.
Amendment 717 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – title Authorisation of systemically important credit institutions
Amendment 718 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Any application for an authorisation to take up the business of a systemically important credit institution to be established in a participating Member State shall be introduced with the national competent authorities of the Member State where the credit institution is to be established in accordance with the requirements set out in relevant national legislation.
Amendment 719 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 If the credit institution complies with all conditions of authorisation set out in national law of that Member State, the national competent authority shall take a draft decision to
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) Over the past decades, the Union has made
Amendment 720 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 If the
Amendment 721 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 If the credit institution complies with all conditions of authorisation set out in national law of that Member State, the national competent authority shall take, within the period provided for by national law, a decision to propose to the ECB to grant the authorisation. The decision shall be notified to the ECB
Amendment 722 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 If the credit institution which falls in the scope of Article 4(1a) complies with all conditions of authorisation set out in national law of that Member State, the national competent authority shall take a decision to propose to
Amendment 723 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 Whe
Amendment 724 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 When the ECB receives the proposal from the national competent authority referred to in the second subparagraph, it shall
Amendment 725 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 When the E
Amendment 726 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 The
Amendment 727 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 728 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 729 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Where the national competent authority which has proposed the authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 considers that the authorisation must be withdrawn in accordance with the national law, it shall submit a proposal to the ECB to that end.
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) Over the past decades, the Union has
Amendment 730 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Where the national competent authority which has proposed the authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 considers that the authorisation must be withdrawn in accordance with the national law, it shall submit a proposal to
Amendment 731 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph -1 (new) -1. The existence of Colleges of Supervision, under the exclusive guidance and control of the ECB, shall continue to exist for credit institutions with cross- border activity, for the purposes of regular supervision and most particularly for the purposes of dealing with a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or stability of the financial system.
Amendment 732 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new) Even where the procedures for credit institutions wishing to carry on their activities within the territory of another Member State and the related competences of home and host Member States do not apply in accordance with the first subparagraph, the college of supervisors foreseen in the Directive 2006/48/EC shall be set up. Before taking any decision, the ECB shall consult that college of supervisors.
Amendment 733 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 2. The provisions set out in Union acts in relation to the cooperation between competent authorities from different Member States for conducting supervision on a consolidated basis shall not apply to the extent that the ECB is the only competent authorit
Amendment 734 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 2.
Amendment 735 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new) Even where the provisions in relation to the cooperation between competent authorities from different Member States for conducting supervision on a consolidated basis do not apply in accordance with the first subparagraph, the college of supervisors foreseen in the Directive 2006/48/EC shall be set up. Before taking any decision, the ECB shall consult that college of supervisors.
Amendment 736 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Where the ECB does not exercise directly itself the tasks conferred upon it by Article 4 for a given credit institution, such tasks may only be exercised by the competent authority responsible for the supervision of that credit institution on an individual basis as determined by Regulation (EU) No .../2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms.
Amendment 737 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. In fulfilling its task as defined in Article 4 the ECB shall respect a fair balance between the home and host rights of participating Member States. In particular the ECB shall take into account the following considerations with regard to the Member States concerned: i) the preservation of financial stability; ii) the stability of the supply of credit; iii) macro-economic conditions.
Amendment 738 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 14 a (new) Article 14a Corrective powers 1. The ECS shall have the power at an early stage to address unsafe and unsound practices or activities that could pose risks to banks or to the banking system. The supervisor shall have at its disposal an adequate range of supervisory tools to bring about timely corrective actions. Where the ECS requests a bank to take significant corrective actions, these shall be addressed in a written document to the bank's Board. The ECS shall require the bank to submit regular written progress reports and checks that corrective actions are completed satisfactorily. The ECS shall act where a bank falls below established regulatory threshold requirements, including prescribed regulatory ratios or measurements. The ESC shall also intervene at an early stage to require a bank to take action to prevent it from reaching its regulatory threshold requirements. The ECS shall provide clear prudential objectives or and will set out the actions to be taken, which may include restricting the current activities of the bank, imposing more stringent prudential limits and requirements, withholding approval of new activities or acquisitions, restricting or suspending payments to shareholders or share repurchases, restricting or requiring asset transfers, barring individuals from the banking sector, replacing or restricting managers or directors, Board members or controlling owners, appointing an administrator to take control and manage the firm or parts of its business; pursuing claims against responsible persons including the recovering of variable remuneration; facilitating a takeover by or merger with a healthier institution, providing for the interim management of the bank, and revoking or recommending the revocation of the banking licence.
Amendment 739 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – title Sanctions or other administrative measures
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) Over the past decades, the Union has made considerable progress in creating an internal market for banking services. Consequently, in many Member States, banking groups with their headquarters established in other Member States hold a significant market share, and credit institutions have geographically diversified their business,
Amendment 740 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under directly applicable Union law, the ECB may impose administrative pecuniary sanctions in accordance with national administrative procedural law of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined, or up to 10% of the total annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business year.
Amendment 741 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under Union law, the ECB may impose administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to
Amendment 742 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where
Amendment 743 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under Union law, the ECB may impose administrative pecuniary sanctions
Amendment 744 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under Union law, the ECB may impose administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined, or up to
Amendment 745 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 1. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial holding companies, intentionally or negligibly,
Amendment 746 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new) In the situation foreseen in the first subparagraph, the competent authorities under Union law shall not apply the available administrative pecuniary sanctions to the same credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company for the same breach.
Amendment 747 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The upper limit of the administrative pecuniary sanctions applied to an institution, in a one year period, is of up to 5% of the annual turnover of a legal person in the preceding business year.
Amendment 748 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 Amendment 749 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2 Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) Over the past decades, the Union has made considerable progress in creating an internal market for banking services. Consequently, in many Member States, banking groups with their headquarters established in other Member States hold a significant market share, and credit institutions have geographically diversified their business
Amendment 750 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 751 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 5. In the cases not covered by paragraph 1, where necessary for the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB may require national competent authorities to
Amendment 752 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 5. In the cases not covered by paragraph 1, where necessary for the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation,
Amendment 753 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 5.
Amendment 754 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 The first subparagraph shall be applicable in particular to
Amendment 755 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 6 6.
Amendment 756 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 6 6. The ECB shall publish any sanction referred to paragraph 1 without undue delay including information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of persons responsible for it, unless such publication would seriously jeopardise the stability of the financial markets.
Amendment 757 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 7 7. Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 to 6, for the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, in case of breaches of E
Amendment 758 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. A credit institutions, financial holding company, or mixed financial holding company shall have the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice when it considers that the pecuniary sanction applied to it is disproportionate and likely to affect its sustainability.
Amendment 759 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 a (new) Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 a (new) (1 a) As a consequence of the deregulation of financial markets unsustainable profit-maximisation has taken place. Market actors have fuelled excessive speculation with different kinds of financial products, which often had only limited positive added value from a macro-economic perspective. This behaviour can be seen as one of the main reasons for the current financial and sovereign debt crisis. In a number of EU Member States supervisors have either failed to detect these problems or have not reacted appropriately.
Amendment 760 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 a (new) Article 15 a Appeal 1. Any natural or legal person, including competent authorities, may appeal against a decision of the ECB in accordance with this Regulation, which is addressed to that person, or against a decision which, although in the form of a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to that person. 2. The appeal, together with a statement of grounds, shall be filed in writing at the EBA within 2 months of the date of notification of the decision to the person concerned, or, in the absence of a notification, of the day on which the Authority published its decision. The EBA shall decide upon the appeal within 2 months after the appeal has been lodged if it considers the challenged decision as a breach of Union law. In that case EBA shall address a decision to the ECB to revoke its decision. 3. An appeal lodged pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not have suspensive effect.
Amendment 761 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 a (new) Amendment 762 #
CHAPTER IIIa BOARD OF APPEAL WITHIN THE ECB Article 15 a Composition and operation 1. The Board of Appeal shall be composed of six members and six alternates who shall be individuals of a high repute with a proven record of relevant knowledge and professional experience, including supervisory experience, to a sufficiently high level in the fields of banking or other financial services, excluding current staff of the ECB, or other national or Union institutions and authorities involved in the activities of the SSM. The Board of Appeal shall have sufficient legal expertise to provide expert legal advice on the legality of the ECB's exercise of its powers. The Board of Appeal shall designate its President. 2. The members of the Board of Appeal shall be appointed by the Supervisory Board of the ECB from a short-list proposed by the Commission, following a public call for expressions of interest published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and after consultation of the Board of Supervisors of the EBA. 3. The term of office of the members of the Board of Appeal shall be 5 years. That term may be extended once. 4. A member of the Board of Appeal shall not be removed during his term of office, unless he has been found guilty of serious misconduct and the Supervisory Board takes a decision to remove the member. 5. The decisions of the Board of Appeal shall be adopted on the basis of a majority of at least four of its six members. 6. The Board of Appeal shall be convened by its President when necessary. 7. The ECB shall ensure adequate operational and secretarial support for the Board of Appeal.
Amendment 763 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 a (new) Amendment 764 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 b (new) Article 15b Actions before the Court of Justice of the European Union 1. Member States and the Union institutions, as well as any natural or legal person, may institute proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union against decisions of the ECB, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU. 2. Before proceedings against decisions of the ECB are brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with Article 263 TFEU the person affected by the decision has to try to solve the case by an appeal pursuant to Article 15a. Only when an appeal pursuant to Article 15a was not possible or successful proceedings contesting a decision taken by the ECB may be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union. 3. In the event that the ECB has an obligation to act and fails to take a decision, proceedings for failure to act may be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with Article 265 TFEU. 4. The ECB shall be required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Amendment 765 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 b (new) Article 15b Actions against the national competent authorities before the national courts 1. Proceedings may be brought before the national courts contesting a decision taken by a national competent authority within the scope of this Regulation. 2. Any natural or legal person and, where applicable, Member State affected by a decision taken by a national competent authority within the scope of this Regulation may institute proceedings before the national courts against the decision of the national competent authority. 3. If a national competent authority has an obligation to act and fails to take a decision, proceedings for failure to act may be brought before the national courts. 4. National competent authorities shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the national courts.
Amendment 766 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 b (new) Amendment 767 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 c (new) Article 15c Appeals 1. Any natural or legal person, including competent authorities, may appeal against a decision of the ECB referred to in Articles 9, 10, 11, 13 and 15 and any other decision taken by the ECB in accordance with the Union acts referred to in Article 4 which is addressed to that person, or against a decision which, although in the form of a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to that person. 2. The appeal, together with a statement of grounds, shall be filed in writing at the ECB within 2 months of the date of notification of the decision to the person concerned, or, in the absence of a notification, of the day on which the ECB published its decision. The Board of Appeal shall decide upon the appeal within 2 months after the appeal has been lodged. 3. An appeal lodged pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not have suspensive effect. However, the Board of Appeal may, if it considers that circumstances so require, suspend the application of the contested decision. 4. If the appeal is admissible, the Board of Appeal shall examine whether it is well- founded. It shall invite the parties to the appeal proceedings to file observations on its own notifications or on communications from the other parties to the appeal proceedings, within specified time limits. Parties to the appeal proceedings shall be entitled to make oral representations. 5. The Board of Appeal may confirm the decision taken by the competent body of the ECB, or remit the case to the competent body of the ECB. That body shall be bound by the decision of the Board of Appeal and that body shall adopt an amended decision regarding the case concerned. 6. The Board of Appeal shall adopt and make public its rules of procedure. 7. The decisions taken by the Board of Appeal shall be reasoned and shall be made public.
Amendment 768 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 15 d (new) Article 15d Actions before the Court of Justice of the European Union 1. Proceedings may be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU, contesting a decision taken by the Board of Appeal or, in cases where there is no right of appeal before the Board of Appeal, by the ECB within the SSM. 2. Member States and the Union institutions, as well as any natural or legal person, may institute proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union against decisions of the ECB, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU. 3. In the event that the ECB within the SSM has an obligation to act and fails to take a decision, proceedings for failure to act may be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with Article 265 TFEU. 4. The ECB shall be required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Amendment 769 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 1. When carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB shall act independently. This independence shall be without prejudice to the ECB's obligation to abide by the decisions of the EBA and its accountability referred to in Article 17.
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic recovery in the Union and adequate funding of the real economy. However this proves increasingly challenging. Evidence shows that the integration of banking markets in the Union is coming to a halt, partly as a result of inequalities regarding access to money markets by Member States and borrowing costs for businesses.
Amendment 770 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 1. When carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB shall act independently. The national competent authorities within the SSM shall act independently.
Amendment 771 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 1. When carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB shall act independently. This independence does not prevent appearance in court proceedings or Parliaments.
Amendment 772 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 1. When carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB
Amendment 773 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 1 1.
Amendment 774 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 2 2. Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the governments of the Member States shall respect th
Amendment 775 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 2 2. Neither Member States, the Union institutions
Amendment 776 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The Supervisory Board of the ECS shall put in place a Code of Conduct including rules of conflict of interest that applies to its staff and management.
Amendment 777 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 16 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The ECB shall allow EU citizens to monitor the independence of policy- making and supervisory functions from private interests by participating in the inter-institutional Transparency Register, together with the European Parliament and Commission.
Amendment 778 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 (1) The ECB shall be accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council for the implementation of this Regulation, in accordance with this Chapter (1a) The ECB shall, at the request of the European Parliament, the Council or a Member State arrange for an independent person to conduct an inquiry where, in the opinion of the person requesting the inquiry events have occurred in relation to a credit institution falling within the ECB's supervisory remit: (a) which posed or could have posed a serious threat to the stability of, or confidence in, the financial system of one or more Member States; (b) indicate or may indicate a significant supervisory failure on the part of the ECB; (c) had or could have had a significant adverse effect on competition in one or more Member States; or (d) caused or could have caused detriment to costumers of a credit institution. (1b) On the completion of an inquiry, the person holding the inquiry shall make a written report to the European Parliament and the Council: (a) setting out the results of the inquiry, and (b) making such recommendations, if any, as the person considers appropriate.
Amendment 779 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 The EC
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Maintaining and deepening the efficiency and competitiveness of an internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic recovery
Amendment 780 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The European Parliament, the Council or an affected Member State or national parliament of an affected Member State, may hold an inquiry or require the setting up of an independent inquiry into the actions or failure to act of the ECB that have or may have led to a significant event in relation to financial stability, confidence or failure of a credit institution. Any such inquiry shall produce a report that is made available to the instigator and also the European Parliament and the Council. Any independent inquiry shall be paid for by the ECB.
Amendment 781 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 a (new) Article 17a Legal safeguards In order to safeguard uniform and accessible legal protection for credit institutions in the participating Member States, the Commission shall, before entry into force of this Regulation, propose a uniform, effective, material and procedural legal framework under which credit institutions can challenge decisions of the ECB taken under this Regulation.
Amendment 782 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 a (new) Article 17a Due process and decision making procedure for adopting supervisory decisions 1. Before taking supervisory decisions in accordance with Article 4 and Section 2, the ECB shall give the persons which are the subject of the proceedings the opportunity of being heard. This shall not apply if urgent action is needed in order to prevent significant damage to the financial system. In such a case, the ECB may adopt an interim decision and shall give the persons concerned the opportunity to be heard as soon as possible after having taken its decision. 2. Where applicable, the rights of defence of the persons concerned shall be fully respected in the proceedings. They shall be entitled to have access to the ECB's file, subject to the legitimate interest of other persons in the protection of their business secrets. The right of access to the file shall not extend to confidential information. 3. The decisions of the ECB shall state the reasons on which they are based.
Amendment 783 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 17 a (new) Article 17a Reporting of Violations The ECB shall ensure that effective mechanisms are put in place to encourage reporting of breaches of this Regulation to the Commission, including at least specific procedures for the receipt of reports of breaches and their follow-up. Such procedures shall ensure that the following principles are complied with: (a) appropriate protection, including full anonymity, for persons who report potential or actual breaches, in particular and without prejudice to national provisions regulating judicial proceedings, the confidentiality of the identity of those persons during all stages of the procedure; (b) protection of personal data concerning both the person who reports the potential or actual breaches and the accused person in compliance with the principles laid down in Directive 95/46/EC; (c) appropriate protection for the accused person; and (d) appropriate protection from adverse treatment at work for, and provision of legal assistance to, both the person who reports and the accused person. The Commission shall adopt, by means of delegated acts measures to specify the procedures referred to in the first subparagraph, including the modalities of reporting and the modalities for following-up of reports and the measures for the protection of persons.
Amendment 784 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this regulation shall not interfere with the ECB's tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. The ECB staff engaged in implementing this Regulation shall be separate in terms of organisation from other ECB staff and shall be subject to separate reporting lines.
Amendment 785 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this regulation shall not interfere with the ECB's tasks relating to monetary policy
Amendment 786 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this regulation
Amendment 787 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation without prejudice and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this regulation shall not interfere with the ECB's tasks relating to monetary policy
Amendment 788 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this regulation shall not interfere with the ECB's tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this Regulation do not alter the ongoing monitoring of the solvency of its borrowers.
Amendment 789 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new) For this purpose the ECB shall guarantee that the supervisory board is organisationally completely independent and has separated reporting lines from the entities which are tasked with monetary policy and other tasks. This entity shall share its offices with the European Banking Authority, which shall have its seat in Frankfurt am Main.
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2)
Amendment 790 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Concerning the task conferred on the ECB by this Regulation a separate supervision unit shall be established within the ECB. It shall be organisationally independent from the rest of the ECB and it shall have a separate budget line under the budget of the Commission.
Amendment 791 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Where individuals are found to be in serious breach of the requirements of this Article, this shall be duly recorded and they shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
Amendment 792 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the ECB shall adopt
Amendment 793 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the ECB shall adopt any necessary internal rules, including rules regarding professional secrecy and to prevent inside information originating from the areas responsible for monetary policy implementation from reaching the areas responsible for the supervisory policy.
Amendment 794 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the ECB shall adopt any necessary internal
Amendment 796 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – title Supervisory board and Executive Committee
Amendment 798 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State (hereinafter
Amendment 799 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB, who may not be members either of the Executive Board or of the Governing Council, and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic recovery in the Union. However this proves increasingly challenging. Evidence shows that
Amendment 800 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and
Amendment 801 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and
Amendment 802 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The
Amendment 803 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The decisions concerning the planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of
Amendment 804 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the supervisory tasks
Amendment 805 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB after approval by the European Parliament and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State (hereinafter ‘supervisory board’).
Amendment 806 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be
Amendment 807 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of
Amendment 808 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of
Amendment 809 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of f
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic recovery in the Union. However this proves increasingly challenging. Evidence shows that the integration of banking markets in the Union is coming to a halt largely due to uncertainties relating to stability within the Eurozone.
Amendment 810 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State, two representatives of EBA and six members of the European Parliament (hereinafter
Amendment 811 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State (hereinafter ‘supervisory board’). The supervisory board shall be required to have a 50-50 gender balance including for the roles of Chair and Vice- Chair.
Amendment 812 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The
Amendment 813 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new) The Chair, the Vice-chair and the other members of the Supervisory Board shall be appointed by the European Parliament following a hearing of the candidates designated by the Council from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in banking matters. The list of candidates shall be gender-balanced.
Amendment 814 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 b (new) Only nationals of Member States participating in this regulation may be members of the Supervisory Board.
Amendment 815 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. The decisions concerning execution and planning pursuant to Article 1 shall be deemed adopted unless and until the Governing Council provides to the supervisory board, and publishes, a written and reasoned objection.
Amendment 816 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. The Executive Board of the ECB shall submit to the European Parliament a short list of candidates to the Supervisory Council composed of an equal number of men and women.
Amendment 817 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 Amendment 818 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the
Amendment 819 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic recovery in the Union. However this proves increasingly challenging. Evidence shows that the integration of banking markets in the Union is coming to a halt, as banks are in difficulties in some countries.
Amendment 820 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair
Amendment 821 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair
Amendment 822 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair and a Vice-Chair elected by the members of the Governing Council f
Amendment 823 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the Governing Council from the members, with the exception of the President, of the Executive Board, and a Vice-Chair elected by and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECB. The European Parliament shall approve the election of the Chair and the Vice-Chair.
Amendment 824 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a
Amendment 825 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair
Amendment 826 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair
Amendment 827 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the Governing Council from the members, with the exception of the President, of the Executive Board, and a Vice-Chair elected by and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECB. Both positions shall be approved by the European Parliament after a hearing in the responsible committee.
Amendment 828 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the
Amendment 829 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic
Amendment 830 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new) Amendment 831 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. Gender balance shall be taken into consideration for the election of the Chair and the Vice-Chair.
Amendment 832 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 Amendment 833 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 Amendment 834 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 3. The
Amendment 835 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 3. The
Amendment 836 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 3. The
Amendment 837 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 838 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 3. The Governing Council of the ECB
Amendment 839 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) At the same time, in addition to the adoption of more stringent legislation in the EU, supervisors must step up their supervisory scrutiny to take account of the lessons of the financial crisis
Amendment 840 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. There shall be a clear division of competences between the supervisory board and the Governing Council of the ECB, which shall be made public.
Amendment 841 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new) 3a. There shall be a clear division of competences between the supervisory board and the governing council of the ECB.
Amendment 842 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 Amendment 843 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 Amendment 844 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 Amendment 845 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 Amendment 846 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 4. The supervisory board may appoint from among its members a steering committee with a more limited composition which supports its activities, including preparing the meetings. Among the members of the committee, there shall be a proportional representation of euro area Member States and Member States which have established a close cooperation. If there is at least one Member States in close cooperation, it shall be ensured that no less than one member of the committee is a representative of the national competent authority of such a Member State.
Amendment 847 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 4. The supervisory board may appoint from among its members a steering committee with a more limited composition which supports its activities, including preparing the meetings, but shall not have any decision-making powers.
Amendment 848 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 Amendment 849 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) At the same time national and EU level supervisors must step up their supervisory scrutiny to take account of the lessons of the financial crisis in recent years, and be able to oversee highly complex and inter-connected markets and systemically important financial institutions.
Amendment 850 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 Amendment 851 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 Amendment 852 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 5. The representatives of the competent authority of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with Article 6 shall
Amendment 853 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 5. The representatives of the competent authority of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with Article 6 shall take part
Amendment 854 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 6 Amendment 855 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 6 6. The Chair of the
Amendment 856 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 6 6. The Chair of the European Banking Authority and
Amendment 857 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 6 6. The Chair of the European Banking Authority and a member of the European Commission may participate as observers in the meetings of the supervisory board. Where relevant, the Chairs of the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board may also participate as observers.
Amendment 858 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 6 6. The Chair of the European Banking Authority and a member of the European Commission may participate as observers in the meetings of the supervisory board. The same right shall be ensured for non- participating Member States, when the supervisory board takes decisions relating to credit institutions operating within jurisdictions of the Member States concerned, or when the supervisory board takes decisions on broader matters of policy, such as structure or decision- making process of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
Amendment 859 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 6 6. T
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) At the same time supervisors must step up their supervisory scrutiny to take account of the lessons of the financial crisis in recent years, and be able to oversee highly complex and potentially dangerous inter-connected markets and institutions.
Amendment 860 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 6 6. The Chair of the European Banking Authority
Amendment 861 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 7. The Governing Council shall adopt
Amendment 862 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 7. The Governing Council shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board including rules on the term of office of the
Amendment 863 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 7. The Governing Council shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board
Amendment 864 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 7. The Governing Council shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board
Amendment 865 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 7. The Governing Council, in accordance with its rules of procedure and voting mechanism shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board including rules on the term of office of the Chair and the Vice-Chair. Each Member of the Supervisory Board shall have one vote. The term of office shall not exceed five years and shall not be renewable.
Amendment 866 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 7. The Governing Council shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board including rules on the term of office of the Chair and the Vice-Chair.
Amendment 867 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 7. The Governing Council shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board including rules on the term of office of the Chair and the Vice-Chair and the modalities for observers on the Governing Council from non-euro participants in the supervisory mechanism when discussing prudential supervision. The term of office shall not exceed five years and shall not be renewable. These rules of procedure shall be made public.
Amendment 868 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. The Supervisory Board shall make its minutes public.
Amendment 869 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. The composition of the Euro area Supervisory Board (EASB) and of the Steering Committee shall be sufficiently diverse with regards to expertise, gender and geographical balance.
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This
Amendment 870 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. The minutes of the supervisory board and decisions taken relating to prudential supervision including voting records and the minutes and voting records of the Governing Council with regard to supervisory matters shall both be made public within a month, with due regard to Article 20 of this Regulation.
Amendment 871 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. The supervisory board shall carry out the preparation of the decisions regarding the tasks conferred upon the ECB and propose to the Governing Council the decisions to be adopted. The Governing Council, acting by qualified majority, may reject a decision of the Supervisory board.
Amendment 872 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. A cooling-off period of 1 year shall be introduced for the former members of the Supervisory Board.
Amendment 873 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7a. The supervisory board shall agree a set of minutes for every meeting. A comprehensive set of non-attributable minutes, together with a record of votes taken, shall be published on the ECB website within eight weeks of the meeting date.
Amendment 874 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 a (new) Article 19a Decision-making procedure The Supervisory Board, acting by simple majority, shall make proposals to the Governing Council of the ECB in the form of draft decisions. The Governing Council may adopt these draft decisions, refer them back with comments to the Supervisory Board, or reject them. In the case that the Governing Council rejects the draft decisions of the Supervisory Board it shall act by a two-thirds majority of its members having a voting right, as defined in Article 10 of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB. A draft decision shall be deemed adopted unless the Governing Council acts within three weeks.
Amendment 875 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 a (new) Article 19a Parliamentary Board A board shall be established comprising ten members of the competent committee of the European Parliament whose role shall be to observe the planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB by this Regulation. To this end, the board may submit written contributions to the supervisory board and conduct regular dialogue with the Executive Committee.
Amendment 876 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 a (new) Article 19a Board of Appeal 1. The Board of Appeal shall be an internal body composed of six members and six alternates appointed by the Governing Council of the ECB. Four members and four alternates shall not currently be members of the staff of the ECB or other national bodies or Union bodies, and shall be individuals of high repute with a proven record of relevant knowledge and professional, including supervisory, experience at a sufficiently high level in the field of banking. The members of the Board of Appeal may not also be members of the body responsible for issuing instructions or making decisions. The Board of Appeal shall appoint its President. 2. National competent authorities shall have the right to appeal against instructions and decisions addressed to them or to credit institutions for which they are competent and against decisions addressed to other national authorities or to credit institutions for which they are not competent if these decisions directly concern them. 3. The Board of Appeal shall examine the appeal within a period appropriate to the urgency of the matter. 4. The Board of Appeal may either confirm the instruction or decision or refer the matter back to the body responsible for issuing instructions or making decisions. The decisions taken by the Board of Appeal shall be reasoned. Where the Board of Appeal confirms the instruction or decision, it shall enter into force without delay. Where the Board of Appeal refers the instruction or decision back to the body responsible for issuing instructions or making decisions, that body shall be bound by the decision of the Board of Appeal and shall amend its decision in the matter concerned. 5. The term of office of the members of the Board of Appeal shall be five years. That term may be extended once. 5. The Governing Council of the ECB shall draw up the rules of procedure of the Board of Appeal.
Amendment 877 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 20 – paragraph 1 1. Members of
Amendment 878 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 20 – paragraph 1 1. Members of the Supervisory Board and staff of the EC
Amendment 879 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 20 – paragraph 2 2. For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, the ECB shall be authorised, within the limits and under the conditions set out in the relevant acts of Union law, to exchange information with the national competent authorities within the SMM and with national or European authorities and bodies in the cases where Union law allows national competent authorities to disclose information to those entities or where Member States may provide for such disclosure
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) Competence for day-to-day supervision of individual banks in the Union re
Amendment 881 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall submit
Amendment 882 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall submit
Amendment 883 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 1 1. The EC
Amendment 884 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall submit each
Amendment 885 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 2 2. The Chair of the supervisory board of the ECB shall present this report to the European Parliament and to the Eurogroup in the presence of representatives from
Amendment 886 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 2 2. The Chair of the supervisory board of the ECB shall present this report in public to the European Parliament and to the Eurogroup in the presence of representatives from any non participating Member State in relation to which a close cooperation in accordance with Article 6 is in place. The written report shall be made public and include details of compliance with the requirement of separation from monetary policy and of adherence to protection of the single market.
Amendment 887 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 2 2. The Chair of the supervisory board of the EC
Amendment 888 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 3 3. The
Amendment 889 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level.
Amendment 890 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 3 3.
Amendment 891 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 3 3. The Chair of the supervisory board may, at the request of the European Parliament,
Amendment 892 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 3 3. The
Amendment 893 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 3 3. The Chair of the supervisory board
Amendment 894 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 4. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament
Amendment 895 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 4. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament or by the
Amendment 896 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 4.
Amendment 897 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 4. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the
Amendment 898 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 4. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament, the Council or by the Eurogroup or any Member State.
Amendment 899 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 4. The EC
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level.
Amendment 900 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 4. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament
Amendment 901 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. This report shall include a statement as to the extent to which, in the opinion of the ECB, it has advanced its objective(s) in performing its supervisory tasks and had regard to the matters referred to in Article 1a.
Amendment 902 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. This Regulation is without prejudice to the right of the European Parliament to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law pursuant to Article 226 TFEU.
Amendment 903 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. The European Parliament shall have the right to require the Chair and the Supervisory Board to carry out specific inquiries or investigations against individual institutions and national supervisory authorities in participating Member States where appropriate. This decision shall be taken by the majority of the Members of the European Parliament from the participating Member States.
Amendment 904 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4a. The Supervisory board shall also examine specific issues at the invitation of the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission.
Amendment 905 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. Reports produced in accordance with this Article shall be made public.
Amendment 906 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. The European Parliament may on its own initiative commission an independent investigation into any aspect of the execution by the ECB of the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation.
Amendment 907 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 b (new) 4b. The Chair of the Supervisory board shall hold confidential oral discussions at least twice a year and more often if deemed appropriate, behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on the ongoing activity of the ECB. An agreement shall be concluded between the European Parliament and the ECB on the detailed modalities of organising those meetings, with a view to ensuring full confidentiality. The ECB shall provide the Council with a copy of that agreement.
Amendment 908 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 a (new) Article 21a Appeals A competent authority from a participating State may lodge an appeal against a decision of the ECB at the Board of Appeal as provided for in Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority).
Amendment 909 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 22 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. An ECB official assigned to perform tasks pursuant to this Regulation shall, after leaving the service, continue to be bound by the duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. Officials intending to engage in an occupational activity, whether gainful or not, within two years of leaving the service shall inform the ECB thereof. If that activity is related to the work carried out by the official during the last three years of service and could lead to a conflict with the legitimate interests of the ECB, the ECB may, having regard to the interests of the service, either forbid him or her from undertaking it or give its approval subject to any conditions it thinks fit. The ECB shall notify its decision within 30 working days of being so informed. If no such notification has been made by the end of that period, this shall be deemed to constitute implicit acceptance.
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common understanding of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the Union. In order to
Amendment 910 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB's expenditure for carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation shall be entered into a separate
Amendment 911 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB's expenditure for carrying out
Amendment 912 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall, as part of the report referred to in Article 22, report in detail on the supervisory section of
Amendment 913 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 23 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The annual accounts for the supervisory section of the budget shall be subjected to a full financial and value for money (economy, effectiveness, efficiency) audit which shall be published.
Amendment 914 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall levy fees on credit institutions which shall cover expenditures relating to its tasks
Amendment 915 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall levy fees on credit institutions which shall
Amendment 916 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 2. The amount of a fee levied on a credit institution of any of the participating Member States shall be proportionate to the importance and risk profile of the credit institution concerned.
Amendment 917 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The ECB shall publish a policy statement which may be regularly updated with respect to the amount of fees to be levied in accordance with this Article.
Amendment 918 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The ECB shall publish its policy on fees and shall consult on its draft policy.
Amendment 919 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The fees levied shall be transferred to the EU Budget. The total amount shall be disclosed, and serve as assigned revenue for the execution of the tasks conferred by this Regulation.
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common understanding of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the Union. In order to
Amendment 920 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Before issuing each policy statement the ECB shall consult on its draft policy statement.
Amendment 921 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 a (new) Article 24a Declaration of interests regarding gifts and hospitality Members of the supervisory body and the Governing Council shall make public meetings held, hospitality received and record publicly all expenses claims over EUR 250.
Amendment 922 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph -1 (new) -1. The ECB shall foster a common supervisory culture amongst all participating Member States and those which have established close cooperation pursuant to Article 6. Therefore it shall: - ensure an appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among national competent authorities; - facilitate the possibility for staff to take different posts in the same competent authority or another competent authority; - ensure regular rotation of staff within all competent authorities with regard to this Regulation, including within the ECB supervision unit.
Amendment 923 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 1 Amendment 924 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall ensure an appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among national competent authorities of the participating Member States.
Amendment 925 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall ensure an appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among national competent authorities and set up a system of national peer reviews to demonstrate that it is exercising its powers on an equal basis across all supervised firms. The ECB shall also participate in any EBA exchange and peer review procedures.
Amendment 926 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 1 1. The EC
Amendment 927 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1a. By 1 January 2015 no less than 5% of the human resources of each national supervisor should be seconded to work within the ECB single supervisor.
Amendment 928 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 2 2. The EC
Amendment 929 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2a. The ECB shall create a standing ethics committee to assess possible conflicts of interest resulting from post- office employment of ECB staff members engaged in supervisory activities. The committee will be responsible for elaborating comprehensive and formal procedures for assessment. The results of such assessments shall be publicly disclosed.
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common understanding of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the Union. In order to preserve and increase the positive effects of market integration on growth and welfare, integration of supervisory
Amendment 930 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 2 b (new) 2b. Former ECB staff members who have been engaged in supervisory activities, and who intend to engage in an occupation during the two years after they have ceased to hold office, shall inform the ethics committee in good time. The committee shall make a decision by one month since receiving the information on the compatibility of the employment offer with the need to ensure the integrity and independence of staff. Former ECB staff members can engage in the occupation only after approval of the ethics committee.
Amendment 931 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 – paragraph 2 c (new) 2c. Members of the supervisory board shall be prohibited from taking paid work in private sector institutions for which the ECB has supervisory responsibility during the two years after they have ceased to hold office.
Amendment 932 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 a (new) Article 25a Conflict of interest 1. The ECB shall create a standing ethics committee to assess possible conflicts of interest resulting from post-office employment of ECB staff members engaged in supervisory duties. The committee shall be responsible for elaborating comprehensive and formal procedures for assessment. The results of such assessments shall be publicly disclosed. 2. Former ECB staff members who have been engaged in supervisory duties, and who intend to engage in an occupation during the two years after they have ceased to hold office, shall inform the ethics committee in good time. The committee shall make a decision on the compatibility of the employment offer with the need to ensure the integrity and independence of staff. 3. Members of the supervisory board shall be prohibited from taking paid work in private sector institutions for which the ECB has supervisory responsibility during the two years after they have ceased to hold office.
Amendment 934 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part By 31 December 2015, a permanent supervisory structure shall be in place to take over all tasks conferred to the ECB through this Regulation. By 31 December 2013, the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation. That report shall evaluate, inter alia:
Amendment 935 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part By 31 December 201
Amendment 936 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part By 31 December 201
Amendment 937 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part Amendment 938 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point -a a (new) (-aa) a detailed legal analysis how a single supervisory mechanism can be implemented for the EU as a whole;
Amendment 939 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point -a b (new) (-ab) if for this single supervisory mechanism a new body needs to be created or if existing institutions or agencies can fulfil the tasks currently assigned to the ECB under Article 4;
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 a (new) (4 a) The ECB should incorporate the expertise and best practices of national competent authorities when undertaking its responsibilities and tasks as outlined in this Regulation.
Amendment 940 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point -a c (new) (-ac) the functioning of the SSM regarding the division of tasks between the ECB and the national competent authorities;
Amendment 941 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a Amendment 942 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a (a) the functioning of the ECB
Amendment 943 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (aa) the effects on non-participating Member States;
Amendment 944 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point b Amendment 945 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point c Amendment 946 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point c (c) the interaction between the ECB
Amendment 947 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (ca) the interaction between the ECB and the national competent authorities of non participating Member States;
Amendment 948 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point d Amendment 949 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point d (d) the appropriateness of governance arrangements, including the composition of the supervisory board and the collaboration between euro area Member States and Member States which have established a close cooperation.
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 a (new) (4 a) Leaving the competence for supervision of individual banks within large and interconnected banking groups at national level precludes the possibility for a smooth and sound overview over an entire banking group and its overall health. This can lead to different interpretations and contradictory decisions on the individual entity level.
Amendment 950 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new) (da) the impact of the supervisory activities of the ECB on the interests of the Union as a whole and on the coherence and integrity of the single market in financial services.
Amendment 951 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 2 Amendment 952 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 2 The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council. The Commission shall make accompanying proposals, as appropriate, including the integration of all current supervisory authorities and mechanisms into a single EU financial services authority covering the whole sector.
Amendment 953 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 2 The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council. The Commission shall make accompanying proposals
Amendment 954 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 2 The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council.
Amendment 955 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 2 The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council. The Commission shall make accompanying proposals,
Amendment 956 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 2 The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council.
Amendment 957 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 2 a (new) By 31 July 2013 the Commission shall publish a roadmap setting out by when and on what basis the supervisory arrangements are to cover all the EU Member States.
Amendment 958 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 a (new) Article 26a 1. The ECB shall ensure that none of its supervisory decision impinges in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of non- participating Member States. 2. Where a Member State considers that a decision taken by ECB impinges on its fiscal responsibilities, it may notify the ECB, the Commission and the Council within 3 working days after notification of the ECB's decision. In its notification, the Member State shall clearly and specifically explain why and how the decision impinges on its fiscal responsibilities. In the case of such notification, the decision of the ECB shall be suspended. The Council shall, within 10 working days, convene a meeting and take a decision, by a simple majority of its members, as to whether the ECB's decision is revoked. Where the Council, after having considered the matter, does not take a decision to revoke the ECB's decision, the suspension of the ECB's decision shall be terminated.
Amendment 959 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 a (new) Article 26a Board of Appeal 1. The ECB shall establish a Board of Appeal for the purposes of discharge of its responsibilities under this Regulation. The Board of Appeal shall be composed of individuals of high repute, with a proven record of relevant knowledge and professional experience, including supervisory experience, to a sufficiently high level in the fields of banking or other financial services, excluding current staff of the ECB, competent authorities or other national or Union institutions. The Board of Appeal shall have access to sufficient legal expertise to provide expert legal advice on the legality of the Authority's exercise of its powers. 2. Members of the Board of Appeal and two alternates shall be appointed by the ECB for a non renewable term of five years, following a public call for expressions of interest published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Board of Appeal shall establish and make public the modalities for decision making. The members of the Board of Appeal shall be independent in making their decisions. They shall not be bound by any instructions. They shall not perform any other duties in relation to the ECB. 3. Members of the Board of Appeal shall not take part in any appeal proceedings in which they have any personal interest, if they have previously been involved as representatives of one of the parties to the proceedings, or if they have participated in the decision under appeal. The members of the Board of Appeal shall undertake to act independently and in the public interest. For that purpose, they shall make a declaration of commitments and a public declaration of interests indicating any direct or indirect interest which might be considered prejudicial to their independence. 4. Any natural or legal person, including competent authorities, may appeal against a decision of the ECB under this Regulation. The Board of Appeal shall decide upon the appeal within 2 months after the appeal has been lodged. An appeal lodged pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not have suspensive effect. However, the Board of Appeal may, if it considers that circumstances so require, suspend the application of the contested decision. The Board of Appeal may confirm the decision taken by the ECB, or remit the case to the ECB who shall comply with the decision or explain the reasons for not complying.
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 a (new) (4 a) The single supervisory mechanism should not affect Member States prospects to impose higher prudential capital requirements for credit institutions above the minimum levels set out by EU law. Member States should also have the ability to put in force these higher requirements. This should apply for Member States regardless if a it joins the single supervisory mechanism or not.
Amendment 960 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 b (new) 1. The Commission shall monitor the functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism on an ongoing basis. 2. In the case of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union or threaten to distort competition in the internal market, especially in relation to the non- participating Member States, the Commission shall actively facilitate and, where deemed necessary, coordinate any actions undertaken by the relevant competent authorities including the ECB. 3. The Commission shall issue a warning or use other remedial action in response to the risks identified. 4. The Commission shall submit the warning, together with any appropriate proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council. 5. In order to be able to perform its role, the Commission shall be fully informed of any relevant developments, and shall participate as an observer in the supervisory board of the ECB.
Amendment 961 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 Amendment 962 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 Amendment 963 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 1. From the 1st of July 2013, the ECB shall carry out the supervisory tasks conferred on it also in relation to the most significant credit institutions
Amendment 964 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 1. From
Amendment 965 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 1. From
Amendment 966 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 1. From the 1st of July 2013, provided that the supervisory framework, modalities and conditions referred to in Article 5(3), as well as all other practical organizational settings are in place, the ECB shall carry out the supervisory tasks conferred on it also in relation to the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, based on their size as reflected in, the sum of exposure values of all assets and off-balance sheet liabilities not deducted when determining the common equity tier 1 capital for regulatory purposes, and their cross-border activity as reflected in cross-jurisdictional claims such as deposits and other assets in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country and cross- jurisdictional liabilities such as loans and notes in respect of customers or other financial operators located in another country, which together cover at least half of the banking sector in the Euro area as a whole, on 1 January 2013. The ECB shall adopt and make public the list of those institutions before 1 March 2013.
Amendment 967 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 1. From the 1st of J
Amendment 968 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 1. From the 1st of July 2013, the E
Amendment 969 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 1. From 1 July 2013 until 31 December 2015, the ECB shall carry out the supervisory tasks conferred on it also in relation to the most significant credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies of European systemic importance at the highest level of consolidation, based on their size as reflected in, the sum of exposure values of all assets and off- balance sheet liabilities
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The solidity of domestic credit institutions, unlike cross-border banks, is in many instances still closely linked to the creditworthiness of the individual Member States in which they are established or depends on the financial stability of the Euro area as a whole. Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually reinforcing market trends and spill over effects between the Euro area and non-Euro area Member States. This may lead to risks for the viability of some credit institutions as well as for the stability of the financial system, and may impose a heavy burden for already strained public finances of the Member States concerned. The problem poses specific risks within the
Amendment 970 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 1 1. From the 1st of July 2013, the ECB shall carry out the supervisory tasks conferred on it
Amendment 971 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 Amendment 972 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 Amendment 973 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall assume in full the tasks conferred on it by this regulation on the 1 January 2014 at
Amendment 974 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall assume in full the tasks conferred on it by this regulation on the 1 January 201
Amendment 975 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 3 Amendment 976 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 3 Amendment 977 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 3 3. Before 1 J
Amendment 978 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 3 3. Before 1 January 2014 the ECB may, by a decision addressed to the credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company and the national competent authority of the participating Member States concerned, start carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, in particular where a credit institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company has received or requested public financial assistance involving the ESM.
Amendment 979 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 4 4. From the entry into force of this Regulation, in view of the assumption of its tasks
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The solidity of credit institutions is in many instances still closely linked to the economic performance and financial capacities of the Member State in which they are established. Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually reinforcing market trends. This, together with the fact that taxpayers bear liability for the banking sector, may lead to risks for the viability of some credit institutions as well as for the stability of the financial system, and may impose a heavy burden for already strained public finances of the Member States concerned (as the example of Ireland shows). The problem poses specific risks within the euro area where the single currency increases the likelihood that negative developments in one Member State can create risks for economic development and the stability of the Euro area as a whole.
Amendment 980 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1 By derogation from Article 4 (3), from the entry into force of this regulation and until the repeal of Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC and their replacement by new Union acts, the ECB shall exercise the tasks
Amendment 981 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 Amendment 982 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 27 – paragraph 6 a (new) 6a. Any decision and/or measure adopted by national competent authorities before the entry into force of this Regulation in the domains where the ECB is conferred prudential surveillance tasks as defined in Article 4 remain in force until the ECB modifies or repeals it in accordance with the conditions to be defined as laid out in Article 5.
Amendment 984 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 January 201
Amendment 985 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 J
Amendment 986 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 28 – paragraph 1 This Regulation shall enter into force on 1
Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The solidity of credit institutions is in many instances still closely linked to the Member State in which they are established. Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually reinforcing market trends. This link affects specifically the use of the euro as a single currency because it causes financial fragmentation which impedes that the different members of private and public sectors being financed according their own creditworthiness altering the level playing field and may lead to risks for the viability of some credit institutions as well as for the stability of the financial system, and may impose a heavy burden for already strained public finances of the Member States concerned. The
source: PE-498.138
2012/11/12
AFCO
104 amendments...
Amendment 100 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point h (h) To carry out in close cooperation with EBA supervisory stress-tests on credit institutions to support the supervisory review;
Amendment 101 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 3 3. Subject to and in compliance with any relevant Union law rule and in particular any legislative and non-legislative act, including the single rulebook and the single supervisory handbook developed by EBA as well as the technical standards developed by EBA and adopted by the Commission, the ECB may adopt regulations and recommendations and take decisions to implement or apply Union law, to the extent necessary to carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation, and only where those Union acts do not deal with certain aspects necessary for the proper exercise of the ECB's tasks or do not deal with them in sufficient detail.
Amendment 102 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of EBA, the ECB and national competent authorities.
Amendment 103 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 4. National competent authorities shall
Amendment 104 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 4. National competent authorities shall follow the instructions given by the ECB
Amendment 105 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. National competent authorities shall continue to be responsible for supervisions of institutions that fall outside the scope of Art 4. (1a) until a single supervisory body has been set-up for the whole European Union.
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 b (new) Amendment 107 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 c (new) 4 c. The ECB may take a decision to take over the supervision of a credit institution falling outside the scope of Article 4(1a) in the following cases: (a) where the national competent authorities fail to perform their duties under this Regulation; (b) where there is evidence that the credit institution, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, may pose or is likely to pose a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of the Union financial market and/or to the stability of the financial system, or may exacerbate or is likely to exacerbate such a situation; (c) where a credit institution falls or will fall within the scope of Article 4(1a).
Amendment 108 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 5 – paragraph 4 d (new) 4 d. In case of conflicts between the ECB and the national competent authorities under the cases of Article 4 (1a) and Article 5 paragraph 2, 3, 4b and 4c a Conciliation Committee has to been set up by EBA. Details shall be specified in separate Rules of procedure.
Amendment 109 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 Amendment 110 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 6 – paragraph 3 3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall determine, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB, the conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with this Article shall take part to the activities of the
Amendment 111 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 If the credit institution complies with all conditions of authorisation set out in national law of that Member State, the national competent authority shall take, within the period provided for by national law, a decision to propose to the ECB to grant the authorisation. The decision shall be notified to the ECB
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 When the ECB receives the proposal from the national competent authority referred to in the second subparagraph, it shall
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 Amendment 114 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 Where the national competent authority which has proposed the authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 considers that the authorisation must be withdrawn in accordance with the national law, it shall submit a proposal to the ECB to that end. In that case, the ECB
Amendment 115 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this regulation shall not interfere with the ECB's tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. The staff involved in carrying out the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation shall be organizationally and disciplinary separated and subject to separate decision and reporting lines.
Amendment 116 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 2 2. The ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred upon it by this Regulation separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks. The tasks conferred upon the ECB by this regulation shall not interfere with the
Amendment 117 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 18 – paragraph 3 3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the ECB shall adopt any necessary internal rules, including rules regarding professional secrecy and rules to ensure the establishment of 'Chinese walls'.
Amendment 118 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 1. The planning and execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB, shall be undertaken by an internal body composed of four representatives of the ECB appointed by the Executive Board of the ECB and one representative of the national authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in each participating Member State two representatives of EBA and six members of the European Parliament (hereinafter
Amendment 119 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. The supervisory board shall be responsible for preparing the decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB on supervisory matters. The Governing Council should justify deviations from the proposals and draft decisions prepared by the Supervisory Board.
Amendment 120 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the
Amendment 122 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 2 2. In addition, the supervisory board shall include a Chair elected by the members of the Governing Council, after the approval of the European Parliament, from the members, with the exception of the President, of the Executive Board, and a Vice-Chair elected by and from the members of the Governing Council of the ECB.
Amendment 123 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 3. The Governing Council of the ECB
Amendment 124 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3 3. The Governing Council of the ECB may delegate clearly defined supervisory tasks
Amendment 125 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 4 4. The supervisory board may appoint from among its members a steering committee with a more limited composition which supports its activities
Amendment 126 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 5 5. The representatives of the competent authority of the Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with Article 6 shall take part to the activities of the supervisory board in accordance with the conditions set out in the decision adopted in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6, in compliance with the Statute of ESCB and of the ECB. These conditions should ensure their full and equal representation with the representatives of the competent authorities of the participating Member States, including in what regards the voting rights.
Amendment 127 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 6 6. T
Amendment 128 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 7. The Governing Council shall adopt
Amendment 129 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 7. The Governing Council shall adopt the rules of procedure of the supervisory board including rules on the term of office of the
Amendment 130 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7 a. The supervisory board publishes a set of minutes including a record of votes taken after every meeting.
Amendment 131 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7 a (new) 7 a. The Supervisory Board shall make its summary of the minutes public.
Amendment 132 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 1 1. The ECB shall submit each
Amendment 133 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 3 3. The Chair of the supervisory board may, at the request of the European
Amendment 134 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 4. The ECB shall reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the European Parliament
Amendment 135 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. The European Parliament possesses control, inquiry and file inspection rights regarding issues related to the execution of supervisory tasks under this regulation.
Amendment 136 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 21 – paragraph 4 a (new) 4 a. At the request of the parliaments of the participating Member States and of the Member States which have established close cooperation with the ECB, a representative of the supervisory board of the ECB, together with the national competent authority, may be heard in the competent committees of the national parliaments concerned, on the execution of its supervisory tasks.
Amendment 137 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 24 – paragraph 2 a (new) 2 a. With respect to the receipt of any regulatory fees under this regulation the European Parliament exercises a right of budgetary control.
Amendment 138 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 25 a (new) Article 25 a Conflict of interest 1. The ECB shall create a standing ethics committee to assess possible conflicts of interest resulting from post-office employment of ECB staff members engaged in supervisory duties. The committee will be responsible for elaborating comprehensive and formal procedures for assessment. The results of such assessments shall be publicly disclosed. 2. Former ECB staff members who have been engaged in supervisory duties, and who intend to engage in an occupation during the two years after they have ceased to hold office, shall inform the ethics committee in good time. The committee will make a decision on the compatibility of the employment offer with the need to ensure the integrity and independence of staff. 3. Members of the supervisory board shall be prohibited from taking paid work in institutions for which the ECB has supervisory responsibility during the two years after they have ceased to hold office. .
Amendment 139 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 a (new) Article 26 a 1. The ECB shall ensure that none of its supervisory decision impinges in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of non- participating Member States. 2. Where a Member State considers that a decision taken by ECB impinges on its fiscal responsibilities, it may notify the ECB, the Commission and the Council within 3 working days after notification of the ECB's decision. In its notification, the Member State shall clearly and specifically explain why and how the decision impinges on its fiscal responsibilities. In the case of such notification, the decision of the ECB shall be suspended. The Council shall, within 10 working days, convene a meeting and take a decision, by a simple majority of its members, as to whether the ECB's decision is revoked. Where the Council, after having considered the matter, does not take a decision to revoke the ECB's decision, the suspension of the ECB's decision shall be terminated.
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 b (new) Article 26 b 1. The Commission shall monitor the functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism on an ongoing bases. 2. In the case of adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union or threaten to distort competition in the internal market, especially in relation to the non- participating Member States, the Commission shall actively facilitate and, where deemed necessary, coordinate any actions undertaken by the relevant competent authorities including the ECB. 3. The Commission shall issue a warning or use other remedial action in response to the risks identified. 4. The Commission shall submit the warning, together with any appropriate proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council. 5. In order to be able to perform its role, the Commission shall be fully informed of any relevant developments, and shall participate as an observer in the supervisory board of the ECB.
Amendment 141 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part By 31 December 201
Amendment 142 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new) (a a) a detailed legal analysis how a single supervisory mechanism can be implemented for the EU as a whole;
Amendment 143 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point a b (new) (a b) an analysis if for this single supervisory mechanism a new body needs to be created or if existing institutions or agencies can fulfil the tasks currently assigned to the ECB under Art 4 of this regulation;
Amendment 144 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new) (d a) the division of responsibilities between the ECB and the national competent authorities of participating Member States;
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 26 – paragraph 2 The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council.
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a regulation Citation 1 a (new) Having regard to the second paragraph of Article 1, Articles 10 and 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
Amendment 43 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 (1) Over the past decades, the Union has made considerable progress in creating an internal market for banking services while deregulating significantly financial markets. Consequently, in many Member States, banking groups with their headquarters established in other Member States hold a significant market share, and credit institutions have geographically diversified their business, especially within the Euro area.
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 1 a (new) (1 a) As a consequence of the deregulation of financial markets market actors have fuelled excessive speculation with different kinds of financial products, which often had no added value from a macro-economic perspective. This behaviour can be seen as one of the main reasons for the current financial and sovereign debt crisis. In a number of EU Member States supervisors have either failed to detect these problems or have not reacted appropriately.
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2)
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 2 (2) Maintaining and deepening the internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic recovery in the Union. However this proves increasingly challenging. Evidence shows that the integration of banking markets in the Union is coming to a halt. It is expected that there will be a greater concentration of the banking system within the European Union and therefore a very significant reduction in the number of credit institutions operating in all eurozone Member States.
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 3 (3) At the same time supervisors must step up their supervisory scrutiny to take account of the lessons of the financial crisis in recent years, and be able to oversee highly complex and potentially dangerous inter-connected markets and institutions.
Amendment 48 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 (4) Competence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level. This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common understanding of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the Union. In order to
Amendment 49 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 (5) The solidity of credit institutions is in many instances still closely linked to the Member State in which they are established. Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating negative, mutually reinforcing market trends. This may lead to risks for the viability of some credit institutions as well as for the stability of the financial system, and
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 (6) The European Banking Authority (EBA), established in 2011 by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), and the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of that Regulation and of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EIOPA), and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA) have significantly improved cooperation between banking supervisors within the Union. EBA is making important contributions to the creation of a single rulebook for financial services in the Union, and has
Amendment 51 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 a (new) (7 a) The principle of sincere cooperation between the European institutions is enshrined in the Treaties, specifically in Article 13(2) TEU,
Amendment 52 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9)
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 9 (9) A European banking union should therefore be set up, underpinned by a true single rulebook for financial services for the Single Market as a whole and composed of a single supervisory mechanism, and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework. . In view of the close links and interactions between Member States participating in the common currency, the banking union should apply at least to all Euro area Member States. With a view to maintaining and deepening the internal market, and to the extent that this is institutionally possible, the banking union should also be open to the participation of other Member States
Amendment 54 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 10 (10) A
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out specific supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system
Amendment 56 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the Euro area's central bank with extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial stability issues, the ECB is well placed to carry out supervisory tasks with a focus on protecting the stability of Europe's financial system. Indeed
Amendment 57 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 (11) As the
Amendment 58 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) The ECB should be conferred those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with national authorities. For this tasks and credit institutions which fall outside the scope of direct ECB supervision Member States have to ensure an effective and coherent supervision by national competent authorities within the framework of the single supervisory mechanism. The ECB's tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macro-prudential stability.
Amendment 59 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 12 (12) The ECB should be conferred those specific supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a coherent and effective implementation of the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, while other tasks should remain with national authorities. The ECB's tasks should include measures taken in pursuance of macro-prudential stability. Consequently the assignment of supervisory tasks to a monetary authority should not divert it from its primary objective, which is to ensure the stability of price levels.
Amendment 60 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 13 (13) S
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 14 (14) Prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities.
Amendment 62 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 16 (16) An assessment of the suitability of any new owner prior to the purchase of a
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 17 (17) Compliance with Union rules requiring credit institutions to hold certain levels of capital against risks inherent to the business of credit institutions, to limit the size of exposures to individual counterparties, to publicly disclose information on a credit institutions' financial situation, to dispose of sufficient liquid assets to withstand situations of market stress, and to limit leverage is a prerequisite for credit institutions' prudential soundness.
Amendment 64 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 18 (18) Additional capital buffers, including a capital conservation buffer
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 19 (19) The safety and soundness of a credit institution depend also on the allocation of adequate internal capital, having regard to the risks to which it may be exposed, and on the availability of appropriate internal organisation structures and corporate governance arrangements.
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 (21) In order to preserve financial stability, the deterioration of an institution's financial and economic situation must be remedied before that institution reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative than to resolve it.
Amendment 67 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 (24) The conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB for some of the Member States should be consistent with the framework of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) set up in 2010 and its underlying objective to develop the single rulebook and enhance convergence of supervisory practices across the whole Union. Cooperation between the banking supervisors and the supervisors of insurance and securities markets is important to deal with issues of joint interest and to ensure proper supervision of credit institutions operating also in the insurance and securities sectors. The ECB should therefore be required to cooperate closely with the EBA, the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, within the framework of the EFSF. The ECB should carry out its supervisory tasks without prejudice to the competences of the other participants of the ESFS.
Amendment 68 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 24 a (new) (24 a) In order to preserve the integrity of the single financial market, the EBA shall maintain its role and retain all its existing powers and tasks: it should continue developing and ensuring the implementation of the single rulebook applicable to all Member States and enhance convergence of supervisory practices across the whole Union. In addition, EBA should now be tasked with the preparation of a single supervisory handbook to complement the EU's single rulebook and ensure consistency in bank supervision.
Amendment 69 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 25 (25) In order to ensure consistency between supervisory responsibilities conferred on the ECB and decision making within the EBA, the ECB should coordinate a common position amongst representatives of the national authorities of the participating Member States in relation to matters falling within its competence. The ECB must fully respect the role of the EBA.
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 26 (26) The ECB should carry out its tasks subject to and in compliance with any Union law rule including the whole of primary and secondary Union law, Commission decisions in the area of State aids, competition rules and merger control
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 28 (28) National supervisors have important and long-established expertise in the supervision of credit institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural specificities. They have established a large body of dedicated and highly qualified staff for
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 (29) As regards the supervision of cross- border banks active both inside and outside the Euro area the ECB should cooperate closely with the competent authorities of non participating Member States. As a competent authority the ECB should be subject to the related obligations to cooperate and exchange information under Union law and should participate fully in the colleges of supervisors. In addition, since the exercise of supervisory tasks by a European institution brings about clear benefits in terms of financial stability and sustainable market integration, Member States not participating in the common currency should therefore also have the possibility to participate in the new mechanism. However, it is a necessary pre- condition for an effective exercise of supervisory tasks, that supervisory decisions are implemented fully and without delay. Member States wishing to participate in the new mechanism should
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 29 a (new) (29 a) The conditions under which representatives of the competent authorities of the Member States which established a close co-operation take part to the activities of the Supervisory Board should ensure their full and equal representation with the representatives of the competent authorities of the participating Member States, including in what regards the voting rights.
Amendment 74 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 33 (33) In its decision-making procedures, the ECB should be bound by Union rules and general principles on due process and transparency. The right of the addressees of the ECB's decisions to be heard should be fully respected. The Supervisory Board should publish its summary of the minutes.
Amendment 75 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 a (new) (34 a) At the request of the parliaments of the participating Member States and of the Member States which have established close cooperation with the ECB, a representative of the supervisory board of the ECB, together with the national competent authority, may be heard in the competent committees of the national parliaments concerned, on the execution of its supervisory tasks.
Amendment 76 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 34 b (new) (34 b) Pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the Court of Justice must be enabled to review the legality of acts of the ECB, acting in its supervisory capacity, that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 (35) The ECB is responsible for carrying out monetary policy functions with a view to maintaining price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. The exercise of supervisory tasks has the objective to protect the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In order to avoid conflicts of interests and to ensure that each function is exercised in accordance with the applicable objectives, the ECB should ensure they are carried out in full separation. Staff involved in carrying out the tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation should be organisationally separated from other ECB staff and should be subject to separate reporting lines.
Amendment 78 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 35 a (new) (35a) .The design of the institutional, organizational and operational framework for the exercise by the ECB of supervisory tasks in respect of eurozone credit institutions should include the establishment of 'Chinese walls' within the ECB in order to ensure the effective separation of monetary and other tasks of the ECB from (future) supervisory tasks.
Amendment 79 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair and a Vice-Chair
Amendment 80 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should
Amendment 81 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 (36) In particular, a supervisory board responsible for preparing decisions on supervisory matters should be set up with the ECB encompassing the specific expertise of national supervisors. The board should therefore be chaired by a Chair
Amendment 82 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 36 a (new) (36 a) The supervisory board should be responsible for preparing the decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB. The Governing Council should justify deviations from the proposals and draft decisions prepared by the Supervisory Board.
Amendment 83 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 38 (38) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence, in particular from
Amendment 84 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 39 (39) In order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB should dispose of adequate resources. Those resources should be obtained in a way that ensures the ECB's independence from
Amendment 85 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 41 (41) Given the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should carry out its tasks in respect of international standards and in dialogue and close cooperation with supervisors outside the Union, without duplicating or restricting the international role of the EBA. It should be empowered to develop contacts and enter
Amendment 86 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 44 (44) In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non- prudential considerations and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market developments concerns banks and Member States is addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate phasing-in period should be provided for.
Amendment 87 #
Proposal for a regulation Recital 47 a (new) (47 a) Whereas the pending financial crisis contributed immensely to the fragmentation of European financial markets, it is indispensable to enhance the common integrated financial framework. However, it should be borne in mind that the deepening of integration in the EMU cannot give rise to new, not outlined in the Treaties, convergence criteria, which can create additional barriers to entry for countries under a temporary derogation
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (1)
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new) (3 a) "Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)" means institutions as defined in CRD IV/CRR;
Amendment 90 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 The ECB, in its role within the SSM, shall cooperate closely with the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board, which form part of the European System of Financial Supervision established by Article 2 of Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, and (EU) No 1095/2010. The ECB shall carry out its tasks without prejudice to the competences of the other participants of the ESFS.
Amendment 91 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new) The ECB shall co-operate closely with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any other similar facility for participating Member States whose currency is not the Euro where a credit institution has received or applied for financial assistance from that facility.
Amendment 92 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, as well as in accordance with the single rulebook and the single supervisory handbook developed by EBA, be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
Amendment 93 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part 1. The ECB shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Union law, be
Amendment 94 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new) 1 a. The ECB shall carry out the tasks under paragraph 1 for credit institutions, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and financial conglomerates which: (a) have received public funds under a re- capitalisation programme or (b) are of systemic importance as defined in CRD IV.
Amendment 95 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b (b) To assess acquisitions and disposals of holdings in credit institutions except those executed by public authorities of Member States or by their regional branches;
Amendment 96 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new) (c a) To assess business models of SIFIs and to ensure that they do not pose a systemic threat to the functioning of European economies;
Amendment 97 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point d Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e Amendment 99 #
Proposal for a regulation Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point e (e) To impose capital buffers to be held by credit institutions in addition to own funds requirements referred to in (c), including setting countercyclical buffer rates, a SIFI buffer as agreed in CRD IV and any other measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks in the cases specifically set out in Union acts;
source: PE-500.478
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The European Parliament adopted amendments on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. The matter has been referred back to the committee responsible. The vote has been postponed. The main amendments adopted in plenary are the following : Subject matter and scope: the ECB is conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the EU and each Member State, with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage. When fulfilling its tasks, and without prejudice to the objective to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions, the ECB shall have full regard to the different types, business models and sizes of credit institutions. The exercise of the ECB's tasks should: (i) contribute in particular to ensure that credit institutions fully internalise all costs caused by their activities so as to avoid moral hazard and the excessive risk taking arising from it ; (ii) take full account of the relevant macroeconomic conditions in Member States, in particular the stability of the supply of credit and facilitation of productive activities for the economy at large. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): this is defined as a European system of financial supervision composed by the European Central Bank and national competent authorities of participating Member States. ‘Participating Member State’ shall mean a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established a close cooperation in accordance with this Regulation. The ECB and the national competent authorities of non-participating Member States shall conclude a memorandum of understanding describing in general terms how they will cooperate with one another in the performance of their supervisory tasks. Where necessary the ECB shall enter into memoranda of understanding with competent authorities of Member States responsible for markets in financial instruments. Such memoranda shall be made available to the European Parliament, the Council and competent authorities of all Member States. Tasks conferred on the ECB: the ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB and national competent authorities. The ECB shall be responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the single supervisory mechanism. Both the ECB and national competent authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and an obligation to exchange information. Within this framework, the ECB shall be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
The ECB should have the supervisory power to remove a member of a management body in accordance with the provisions of this regulation. For the carrying out of its tasks and the exercise of its supervisory powers, the ECB should apply the material rules relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. Those rules are composed of the relevant Union law, in particular directly applicable Regulations or Directives, such as those on capital requirements for banks and on financial conglomerates. Macroprudential tasks and tools: whenever appropriate or deemed required, the competent or designated authorities of the participating Member States shall apply requirements for capital buffers to be held by credit institutions at the relevant level in accordance with relevant Union law in addition to own funds requirements. The ECB may, if deemed necessary, instead of the national competent or national designated authorities of the participating Member State, apply higher requirements for capital buffers than applied by the national competent or national designated authorities of participating Member States to be held by credit institutions at the relevant level. Early intervention and precautionary powers: within the scope of the tasks conferred on the ECB, national law confers on national competent authorities certain powers which are currently not required by Union law, including certain early intervention and precautionary powers. The ECB should be able to require national authorities to make use of these powers, in order to ensure the performance of full and effective supervision within the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Close cooperation with the competent authorities of participating Member States whose currency is not the Euro: the ECB may address instructions to the national competent authority of the participating Member State whose currency is not the Euro. It may decide to issue a warning to the Member State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken in certain cases. If a non-euro participating Member State disagrees with a draft decision of the Supervisory Board, it shall inform the Governing Council of its reasoned disagreement. The Governing Council shall then decide about the matter within five working days, taking fully into account those reasons, and explain in writing its decision to the Member State concerned. The Member State concerned may request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation with immediate effect and will not be bound by the ensuing decision. Role of national parliaments: the role for national parliaments is appropriate given the potential impact that supervisory measures may have on public finances, credit institutions, their customers and employees, and the markets in the participating Member States. In this regard, the ECB should also forward the reports, which it addresses to the European Parliament and the Council, to the national parliaments of the participating Member States. National parliaments of the participating Member States should be able to address any observations or questions to the ECB on the performance of its supervisory tasks, to which the ECB may reply. The parliament of a participating Member State should also be able to invite the Chair or a representative of the Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of views in relation to the supervision of credit institutions in that Member State together with a representative of the national competent authority. Monetary and supervisory functions: these should be carried out separately. The ECB shall ensure that the operation of the Governing Council is completely differentiated as regards monetary and supervisory functions. Organisational separation of staff should ensure that the exercise of the tasks conferred by this Regulation is fully subject to democratic accountability and oversight as provided for by this Regulation. Supervisory Board: this should be an essential body in the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB. The Council should be given the power to adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board. After hearing the Supervisory Board, the ECB should submit a proposal for the appointment of the Chair and the Vice-Chair to the European Parliament for approval. Following the approval of this proposal, the Council should adopt that implementing decision. The Chair should be chosen on the basis of an open selection procedure, on which the European Parliament and the Council should be kept duly informed. The term of office should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. New
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted, within the framework of a special legislative procedure (consultation with Parliament), the report by Marianne THYSSEN (EPP, BE) on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. The parliamentary committee proposed that the European Parliament amend the Commission proposal as follows: Clearly defined tasks: Members specify that the Regulation entrusts the ECB with clearly defined tasks in relation to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and in each Member State participating in the Union, with full regard to a duty of care. “Participating Member State” means a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which chooses to participate in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) foreseen by the Regulation. In fulfilling its tasks, the ECB shall respect the different types and size of credit institutions. It should also take care to ensure that the national competent authorities of all participating Member States shall be treated on an equal footing and to respect afair balance between the rights of participating Member States. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): this is defined as a European system of financial supervision composed by the European Central Bank and national competent authorities of participating Member States. Within the SSM, the ECB and competent national authorites should cooperate faithfully and be obliged to exchange information. Whilst always ensuring supervisory consistency within the SSM, the ECB shall request the national competent authorities to assist the ECB in the performance of the tasks conferred on it as well as the powers and obligations in relation to all credit institutions, in particular in relation to credit institutions: · which have not received or sought direct or indirect financial support from theEuropean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any other future European financial assistance facility: or · which do not pose a systemic risk, as defined in EU law, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies. Draft supervisory decisions of the national competent authorities shall be deemed adopted by the ECB unless it rejects them within a deadline not exceeding 10 working days. The ECB shall monitor national competent authorities on an ongoing basis. National competent authorities shall inform the ECB without delay where: · there are serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB; · the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB. Moreover, the ECB may at any time and under any circumstances assume the responsibilities of the national competent authorities and carry out all or specific supervisory tasks directly. Participation in the SSM of Member States whose currency is not the euro (close cooperation): the ECB shall carry out its tasks in relation to credit institutions established in a participating Member State whose currency is not the euro. A close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a Member State whose currency is not the euro choosing to participateshall be established, by a decision adopted by the ECB, where certain conditions are met. Where these conditions are no longer met, the ECB may decide to issue a warning to the national competent authority of the Member State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken. If no such corrective action is undertaken, the ECB may suspend or terminate the close cooperation with that Member State. Board of Appeal: Members propose that the ECB establish an Administrative Board of Appeal (composed of five individuals) for the purposes of settling appeals against decisions by the ECB acting as a single supervisor under this Regulation. Members of the Board of Appeal and two alternates shall be appointed by the ECB for a term of five years, which may be extended once, following a public call for expressions of interest published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and after consultation of the Banking Supervisory Board. They shall not be bound by any instructions. A decision by the ECB within the MSU by the Board of Appeal or, in cases where there is no right of appeal to the Board of Appeal, may be contested before the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with Article 263 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Accountability and reporting: Members make the following requests: · at the requestof theEuropean Parliament, the Chairof theSupervisory Board shall participate in a hearing on the execution of its supervisory tasks, including the fees levied and the expenditure incurred, by the competent committees of the Parliament; · upon request the Chair of the Banking Supervisory Board shall provide the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in camera any confidential information concerning its tasks which are required for the exercise of the European Parliament’s powers under the Treaty and under this regulation; · at the request of a national parliament of a participating Member State, a representative of the Banking Supervisory Board, together with a representative of the competent national authority, shall appear before that parliament and answer questions about the performance of supervisory tasks. Moreover, this Regulation is without prejudice to the right of the European Parliament: · to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law pursuant to Article 226 TFEU; · or to require the setting up of an independent inquiry into actions or failure to act of the ECB that have or may have led to a significant event in relation to financial stability, confidence or failure of a credit institution. Reporting of Violations: the ECB shall ensure that effective mechanisms are put in place for reporting of breaches of this Regulation, including specific procedures for the receipt of reports of breaches and their follow-up. Banking Supervisory Board: the amendments state that the Banking Supervisory Board shall include a Chairman or Chairwoman, appointed by the Governing Council after an open selection procedure on the basis of merit, skills and thorough knowledge of financial institutions and financial supervision and after approval by the European Parliament. When exercising its tasks, the Banking Supervisory Board shall take account of all relevant facts and circumstances in the participating Member States and shall perform its duties in the interest of the Union as a whole. All members of the Banking Supervisory Board shall have equal voting rights. By the 1 January 2014, the ECB shall carry out in full the supervisory tasks conferred on it by this Regulation. |
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The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted, within the framework of a special legislative procedure (consultation with Parliament), the report by Marianne THYSSEN (EPP, BE) on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. The parliamentary committee proposed that the European Parliament amend the Commission proposal as follows: Clearly defined tasks: Members specify that the Regulation entrusts the ECB with clearly defined tasks in relation to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and in each Member State participating in the Union, with full regard to a duty of care. “Participating Member State” means a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which chooses to participate in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) foreseen by the Regulation. In fulfilling its tasks, the ECB shall respect the different types and size of credit institutions. It should also take care to ensure that the national competent authorities of all participating Member States shall be treated on an equal footing and to respect afair balance between the rights of participating Member States. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): this is defined as a European system of financial supervision composed by the European Central Bank and national competent authorities of participating Member States. Within the SSM, the ECB and competent national authorites should cooperate faithfully and be obliged to exchange information. Whilst always ensuring supervisory consistency within the SSM, the ECB shall request the national competent authorities to assist the ECB in the performance of the tasks conferred on it as well as the powers and obligations in relation to all credit institutions, in particular in relation to credit institutions: · which have not received or sought direct or indirect financial support from theEuropean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any other future European financial assistance facility: or · which do not pose a systemic risk, as defined in EU law, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies. Draft supervisory decisions of the national competent authorities shall be deemed adopted by the ECB unless it rejects them within a deadline not exceeding 10 working days. The ECB shall monitor national competent authorities on an ongoing basis. National competent authorities shall inform the ECB without delay where: · there are serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB; · the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB. Moreover, the ECB may at any time and under any circumstances assume the responsibilities of the national competent authorities and carry out all or specific supervisory tasks directly. Participation in the SSM of Member States whose currency is not the euro (close cooperation): the ECB shall carry out its tasks in relation to credit institutions established in a participating Member State whose currency is not the euro. A close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a Member State whose currency is not the euro choosing to participateshall be established, by a decision adopted by the ECB, where certain conditions are met. Where these conditions are no longer met, the ECB may decide to issue a warning to the national competent authority of the Member State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken. If no such corrective action is undertaken, the ECB may suspend or terminate the close cooperation with that Member State. Board of Appeal: Members propose that the ECB establish an Administrative Board of Appeal (composed of five individuals) for the purposes of settling appeals against decisions by the ECB acting as a single supervisor under this Regulation. Members of the Board of Appeal and two alternates shall be appointed by the ECB for a term of five years, which may be extended once, following a public call for expressions of interest published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and after consultation of the Banking Supervisory Board. They shall not be bound by any instructions. A decision by the ECB within the MSU by the Board of Appeal or, in cases where there is no right of appeal to the Board of Appeal, may be contested before the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with Article 263 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Accountability and reporting: Members make the following requests: · at the requestof theEuropean Parliament, the Chairof theSupervisory Board shall participate in a hearing on the execution of its supervisory tasks, including the fees levied and the expenditure incurred, by the competent committees of the Parliament; · upon request the Chair of the Banking Supervisory Board shall provide the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in camera any confidential information concerning its tasks which are required for the exercise of the European Parliament’s powers under the Treaty and under this regulation; · at the request of a national parliament of a participating Member State, a representative of the Banking Supervisory Board, together with a representative of the competent national authority, shall appear before that parliament and answer questions about the performance of supervisory tasks. Moreover, this Regulation is without prejudice to the right of the European Parliament: · to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law pursuant to Article 226 TFEU; · or to require the setting up of an independent inquiry into actions or failure to act of the ECB that have or may have led to a significant event in relation to financial stability, confidence or failure of a credit institution. Reporting of Violations: the ECB shall ensure that effective mechanisms are put in place for reporting of breaches of this Regulation, including specific procedures for the receipt of reports of breaches and their follow-up. Banking Supervisory Board: the amendments state that the Banking Supervisory Board shall include a Chairman or Chairwoman, appointed by the Governing Council after an open selection procedure on the basis of merit, skills and thorough knowledge of financial institutions and financial supervision and after approval by the European Parliament. When exercising its tasks, the Banking Supervisory Board shall take account of all relevant facts and circumstances in the participating Member States and shall perform its duties in the interest of the Union as a whole. All members of the Banking Supervisory Board shall have equal voting rights. By the 1 January 2014, the ECB shall carry out in full the supervisory tasks conferred on it by this Regulation. New
The European Parliament adopted amendments on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. The matter has been referred back to the committee responsible. The vote has been postponed. The main amendments adopted in plenary are the following : Subject matter and scope: the ECB is conferred specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, with a view to contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the EU and each Member State, with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage. When fulfilling its tasks, and without prejudice to the objective to ensure the safety and soundness of credit institutions, the ECB shall have full regard to the different types, business models and sizes of credit institutions. The exercise of the ECB's tasks should: (i) contribute in particular to ensure that credit institutions fully internalise all costs caused by their activities so as to avoid moral hazard and the excessive risk taking arising from it ; (ii) take full account of the relevant macroeconomic conditions in Member States, in particular the stability of the supply of credit and facilitation of productive activities for the economy at large. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): this is defined as a European system of financial supervision composed by the European Central Bank and national competent authorities of participating Member States. ‘Participating Member State’ shall mean a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established a close cooperation in accordance with this Regulation. The ECB and the national competent authorities of non-participating Member States shall conclude a memorandum of understanding describing in general terms how they will cooperate with one another in the performance of their supervisory tasks. Where necessary the ECB shall enter into memoranda of understanding with competent authorities of Member States responsible for markets in financial instruments. Such memoranda shall be made available to the European Parliament, the Council and competent authorities of all Member States. Tasks conferred on the ECB: the ECB shall carry out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism composed of the ECB and national competent authorities. The ECB shall be responsible for the effective and consistent functioning of the single supervisory mechanism. Both the ECB and national competent authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and an obligation to exchange information. Within this framework, the ECB shall be exclusively competent to carry out, for prudential supervisory purposes, the following tasks in relation to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States:
The ECB should have the supervisory power to remove a member of a management body in accordance with the provisions of this regulation. For the carrying out of its tasks and the exercise of its supervisory powers, the ECB should apply the material rules relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. Those rules are composed of the relevant Union law, in particular directly applicable Regulations or Directives, such as those on capital requirements for banks and on financial conglomerates. Macroprudential tasks and tools: whenever appropriate or deemed required, the competent or designated authorities of the participating Member States shall apply requirements for capital buffers to be held by credit institutions at the relevant level in accordance with relevant Union law in addition to own funds requirements. The ECB may, if deemed necessary, instead of the national competent or national designated authorities of the participating Member State, apply higher requirements for capital buffers than applied by the national competent or national designated authorities of participating Member States to be held by credit institutions at the relevant level. Early intervention and precautionary powers: within the scope of the tasks conferred on the ECB, national law confers on national competent authorities certain powers which are currently not required by Union law, including certain early intervention and precautionary powers. The ECB should be able to require national authorities to make use of these powers, in order to ensure the performance of full and effective supervision within the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Close cooperation with the competent authorities of participating Member States whose currency is not the Euro: the ECB may address instructions to the national competent authority of the participating Member State whose currency is not the Euro. It may decide to issue a warning to the Member State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken in certain cases. If a non-euro participating Member State disagrees with a draft decision of the Supervisory Board, it shall inform the Governing Council of its reasoned disagreement. The Governing Council shall then decide about the matter within five working days, taking fully into account those reasons, and explain in writing its decision to the Member State concerned. The Member State concerned may request the ECB to terminate the close cooperation with immediate effect and will not be bound by the ensuing decision. Role of national parliaments: the role for national parliaments is appropriate given the potential impact that supervisory measures may have on public finances, credit institutions, their customers and employees, and the markets in the participating Member States. In this regard, the ECB should also forward the reports, which it addresses to the European Parliament and the Council, to the national parliaments of the participating Member States. National parliaments of the participating Member States should be able to address any observations or questions to the ECB on the performance of its supervisory tasks, to which the ECB may reply. The parliament of a participating Member State should also be able to invite the Chair or a representative of the Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of views in relation to the supervision of credit institutions in that Member State together with a representative of the national competent authority. Monetary and supervisory functions: these should be carried out separately. The ECB shall ensure that the operation of the Governing Council is completely differentiated as regards monetary and supervisory functions. Organisational separation of staff should ensure that the exercise of the tasks conferred by this Regulation is fully subject to democratic accountability and oversight as provided for by this Regulation. Supervisory Board: this should be an essential body in the exercise of supervisory tasks by the ECB. The Council should be given the power to adopt an implementing decision to appoint the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board. After hearing the Supervisory Board, the ECB should submit a proposal for the appointment of the Chair and the Vice-Chair to the European Parliament for approval. Following the approval of this proposal, the Council should adopt that implementing decision. The Chair should be chosen on the basis of an open selection procedure, on which the European Parliament and the Council should be kept duly informed. The term of office should not exceed five years and should not be renewable. |
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OBJECTIVE: to confer specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the context of creating a banking union. PROPOSED ACT: Council Regulation. BACKGROUND: the creation of the European Banking Authority (EBA) by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), and of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) already contributed to improved cooperation between national supervisors and to the development of a single rulebook for financial services in the EU. However, supervision of banks remains to a large extent within national boundaries and thereby fails to keep up with integrated banking markets. In May 2012 the Commission has therefore called for a banking union to restore confidence in banks and in the euro. Among the key elements of the banking union will be a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) with direct oversight of banks. The European Council conclusions of 29 June 2012 invited the President of the European Council to develop a road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. The European Parliament called on various occasions for a European body to be directly responsible for certain supervisory tasks over financial institutions, starting with its resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the Commission communication on implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan, and of 21 November 2002 on prudential supervision rules in the European Union. The present proposal accompanies a related proposal amending the Regulation establishing the EBA towards a new bank monitoring system in order to ensure that EBA decision-making structures continue to be balanced and to preserve fully the integrity of the Single Market. IMPACT ANALYSIS: the Commission has taken into account the analysis done in the context of the adoption of the "supervisory package" creating the European Supervisory Authorities, which assessed operational, governance, financial and legal aspects relevant to the establishment of a SSM. LEGAL BASIS: Article 127 (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). CONTENT: the proposal foresees that the ECB will be responsible for specific tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions which are established in Member States whose currency is the Euro (participating Member States) with the objective to promote the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. After a transitional period, the ECB: · will be responsible for carrying out key supervisory tasks for all credit institutions established in participating Member States, regardless of their business model or size; · shall be the host supervisor for credit institutions established in non-participating Member States, which establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a participating Member State . The ECB will carry out its tasks within the framework of the ESFS and will cooperate closely with national supervisors and the EBA. The EBA will keep its powers and tasks to further develop the single rulebook and ensure convergence and consistency of supervisory practice. Tasks of the ECB: the ECB will be exclusively competent for key supervisory tasks which are indispensable to detect risks for banks' viability and require them to take the necessary action. It will, inter alia, be the competent authority for licensing and authorizing credit institutions: · assessing qualifying holdings, · ensuring compliance with the minimum capital requirements, ensuring the adequacy of internal capital in relation to the risk profile of a credit institution (Pillar 2 measures), · supervising financial conglomerates. However, the ECB will be only responsible for carrying out its tasks for the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates on a group-wide basis, while the prudential supervision of the individual insurance undertaking itself will be carried out by national competent authorities. Role of national supervisors: National supervisors will continue to play an important role with the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): 1) all tasks not conferred on the ECB will remain with national supervisors. for example, national supervisors will remain in charge of consumer protection and the fight against money laundering, and of the supervision of third country credit institutions establishing branches or providing cross-border services within a Member State; 2) even for the tasks conferred on the ECB, most day-to-day verifications and other supervisory activities necessary to prepare and implement the ECB's acts could be exercised by national supervisors operating as an integral part of the SSM. Powers of the ECB: the ECB will have the supervisory powers that those authorities shall have in accordance with the EU banking legislation. Those include supervisory powers: · the authorisation of credit institutions and the withdrawal of authorisations and the removal of a member of a credit institution's management board; · the power to impose pecuniary sanctions and periodic penalty payments; · all necessary investigatory powers, including on-site inspections, to be able to carry out its tasks. Relationship with Member States whose currency is not the Euro: as regards the supervision of cross-border banks active both within and outside the Euro area, the proposal does not affect in any way the position of non participating Member States in the Colleges of Supervisors set up under Directive 2006/48/EC. The provisions on those colleges and the obligation to cooperate and exchange information in consolidated supervision and between home and host supervisors will apply fully to the ECB – as the competent authority for the participating Member States. Subject to meeting specific conditions Member States that have not adopted the euro but wish to participate in the banking union will be able to enter into a close supervisory cooperation with the ECB. Entry into force: due to the urgency of setting up an effective SSM, the regulation will enter into force on 1 January 2013. A phasing-in approach is envisaged: · as of 1 January 2013, the ECB will be able to to apply its supervisory tasks to any banks, in particular banks which have received or requested public financial assistance; · as of 1 July 2013, the most significant credit institutions of European systemic importance shall be subject to ECB supervision; · in relation to all other banks, the ECB will assume in full its tasks as from 1 January 2014 at the latest. BUDGETARY IMPLICATION: this proposal has no implication for the Union budget, since in accordance with the Treaty the ECB's budget is not part of the Union budget. New
OBJECTIVE: to confer specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the context of creating a banking union. PROPOSED ACT: Council Regulation. BACKGROUND: the creation of the European Banking Authority (EBA) by Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), and of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) already contributed to improved cooperation between national supervisors and to the development of a single rulebook for financial services in the EU. However, supervision of banks remains to a large extent within national boundaries and thereby fails to keep up with integrated banking markets. In May 2012 the Commission has therefore called for a banking union to restore confidence in banks and in the euro. Among the key elements of the banking union will be a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) with direct oversight of banks. The European Council conclusions of 29 June 2012 invited the President of the European Council to develop a road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. The European Parliament called on various occasions for a European body to be directly responsible for certain supervisory tasks over financial institutions, starting with its resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the Commission communication on implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan, and of 21 November 2002 on prudential supervision rules in the European Union. The present proposal accompanies a related proposal amending the Regulation establishing the EBA towards a new bank monitoring system in order to ensure that EBA decision-making structures continue to be balanced and to preserve fully the integrity of the Single Market. IMPACT ANALYSIS: the Commission has taken into account the analysis done in the context of the adoption of the "supervisory package" creating the European Supervisory Authorities, which assessed operational, governance, financial and legal aspects relevant to the establishment of a SSM. LEGAL BASIS: Article 127 (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). CONTENT: the proposal foresees that the ECB will be responsible for specific tasks concerning the prudential supervision of credit institutions which are established in Member States whose currency is the Euro (participating Member States) with the objective to promote the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. After a transitional period, the ECB: · will be responsible for carrying out key supervisory tasks for all credit institutions established in participating Member States, regardless of their business model or size; · shall be the host supervisor for credit institutions established in non-participating Member States, which establish a branch or provide cross-border services in a participating Member State . The ECB will carry out its tasks within the framework of the ESFS and will cooperate closely with national supervisors and the EBA. The EBA will keep its powers and tasks to further develop the single rulebook and ensure convergence and consistency of supervisory practice. Tasks of the ECB: the ECB will be exclusively competent for key supervisory tasks which are indispensable to detect risks for banks' viability and require them to take the necessary action. It will, inter alia, be the competent authority for licensing and authorizing credit institutions: · assessing qualifying holdings, · ensuring compliance with the minimum capital requirements, ensuring the adequacy of internal capital in relation to the risk profile of a credit institution (Pillar 2 measures), · supervising financial conglomerates. However, the ECB will be only responsible for carrying out its tasks for the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates on a group-wide basis, while the prudential supervision of the individual insurance undertaking itself will be carried out by national competent authorities. Role of national supervisors: National supervisors will continue to play an important role with the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): 1) all tasks not conferred on the ECB will remain with national supervisors. for example, national supervisors will remain in charge of consumer protection and the fight against money laundering, and of the supervision of third country credit institutions establishing branches or providing cross-border services within a Member State; 2) even for the tasks conferred on the ECB, most day-to-day verifications and other supervisory activities necessary to prepare and implement the ECB's acts could be exercised by national supervisors operating as an integral part of the SSM. Powers of the ECB: the ECB will have the supervisory powers that those authorities shall have in accordance with the EU banking legislation. Those include supervisory powers: · the authorisation of credit institutions and the withdrawal of authorisations and the removal of a member of a credit institution's management board; · the power to impose pecuniary sanctions and periodic penalty payments; · all necessary investigatory powers, including on-site inspections, to be able to carry out its tasks. Relationship with Member States whose currency is not the Euro: as regards the supervision of cross-border banks active both within and outside the Euro area, the proposal does not affect in any way the position of non participating Member States in the Colleges of Supervisors set up under Directive 2006/48/EC. The provisions on those colleges and the obligation to cooperate and exchange information in consolidated supervision and between home and host supervisors will apply fully to the ECB – as the competent authority for the participating Member States. Subject to meeting specific conditions Member States that have not adopted the euro but wish to participate in the banking union will be able to enter into a close supervisory cooperation with the ECB. Entry into force: due to the urgency of setting up an effective SSM, the regulation will enter into force on 1 January 2013. A phasing-in approach is envisaged: · as of 1 January 2013, the ECB will be able to to apply its supervisory tasks to any banks, in particular banks which have received or requested public financial assistance; · as of 1 July 2013, the most significant credit institutions of European systemic importance shall be subject to ECB supervision; · in relation to all other banks, the ECB will assume in full its tasks as from 1 January 2014 at the latest. BUDGETARY IMPLICATION: this proposal has no implication for the Union budget, since in accordance with the Treaty the ECB's budget is not part of the Union budget. |
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The Council discussed proposals aimed at establishing a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for credit institutions in the eurozone and in other EU Member States choosing to participate. The two proposed regulations are a key element of a broader plan to establish a banking union for the euro area.
The October European Council set 1 January 2013 as the deadline for agreeing on the legal framework set out in the two regulations, whilst indicating that work on operational implementation would take place during 2013. According to the Presidency’s progress report of 6 November 2012, consensus is emerging on a number of issues, in particular the separation within the ECB of monetary policy and supervisory functions (Article 18 of the ECB Regulation), subject to finalisation of the drafting. Nevertheless, certain other matters remain open: 1. The equitable treatment of euro-area and non-euro area Member States. There are two important issues in this regard: (i) The status and role of non-euro area Member States who choose to participate in the SSM (under Articles 6 and 19 of the ECB proposal): the Presidency has amended the Commission’s proposal to allow for all participating Member States to be treated equally in the Supervisory Board (i.e. non-euro area participating Member States will be voting members). Furthermore, the Presidency has already introduced a number of safeguards for participating non-euro area Member States. More work is needed to meet the concerns of delegations. Nonetheless the Presidency finds that these safeguards should lay the foundations for a satisfactory compromise, subject to further guidance from the Council, especially on the voting rights in the supervisory board. (ii) The changes to voting modalities in the EBA (Article 1(7) of the EBA proposal):a number of Member States consider that the voting rules should still be further (thoroughly) reviewed, and allow for additional safeguards, e.g. in terms of double majority requirements, in all cases (including qualified majority voting). Against this backdrop, the Presidency considers that further political guidance from the Council is needed to find the adequate balance between anti-discrimination safeguards for non-participating Member States and effective decision-making. The Presidency has decided in its forthcoming compromise to make it clear that when the EBA engages in binding mediation, all competent authorities, including the ECB acting in its supervisory capacity, will be treated equally. 2. The distribution of tasks between the ECB and the NCAs: the Commission proposal assigned a wide range of tasks to the ECB with regard to all credit institutions established in the Member States participating in the SSM. Most of them have proved uncontroversial, except in particular those referring to so-called "macroprudential tools" (especially, the setting of buffers under the ECB Proposal) and to the coordination of a single position of NCAs from Member States participating in the SSM. The Commission proposal was not very explicit in regard to the respective roles of the ECB and the NCAs in their foreseen cooperation within the SSM. Without touching the basic principle of the ECB's exclusive responsibility, the Presidency has introduced a number of significant changes, which aim to establish the supervisory architecture, without prejudice to further specifications. A certain number of improvements were proposed, especially on the exact competences to be granted to the ECB and on the modalities for cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs. Lastly, the question of granting and withdrawal of authorisation has given rise to concerns by some delegations which find that the key issue of access to and removal from the market should remain within the remit of national authorities. 3. Phasing in of the SSM (Article 27 of the ECB proposal): some delegations have questioned the phasing-in arrangements proposed by the Commission and suggestions have been made to seek a more flexible phasing-in arrangement, thus leaving the ECB more time to prepare for the taking over of its new supervisory tasks. New
The Council discussed proposals aimed at establishing a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for credit institutions in the eurozone and in other EU Member States choosing to participate. The two proposed regulations are a key element of a broader plan to establish a banking union for the euro area.
The October European Council set 1 January 2013 as the deadline for agreeing on the legal framework set out in the two regulations, whilst indicating that work on operational implementation would take place during 2013. According to the Presidency’s progress report of 6 November 2012, consensus is emerging on a number of issues, in particular the separation within the ECB of monetary policy and supervisory functions (Article 18 of the ECB Regulation), subject to finalisation of the drafting. Nevertheless, certain other matters remain open: 1. The equitable treatment of euro-area and non-euro area Member States. There are two important issues in this regard: (i) The status and role of non-euro area Member States who choose to participate in the SSM (under Articles 6 and 19 of the ECB proposal): the Presidency has amended the Commission’s proposal to allow for all participating Member States to be treated equally in the Supervisory Board (i.e. non-euro area participating Member States will be voting members). Furthermore, the Presidency has already introduced a number of safeguards for participating non-euro area Member States. More work is needed to meet the concerns of delegations. Nonetheless the Presidency finds that these safeguards should lay the foundations for a satisfactory compromise, subject to further guidance from the Council, especially on the voting rights in the supervisory board. (ii) The changes to voting modalities in the EBA (Article 1(7) of the EBA proposal):a number of Member States consider that the voting rules should still be further (thoroughly) reviewed, and allow for additional safeguards, e.g. in terms of double majority requirements, in all cases (including qualified majority voting). Against this backdrop, the Presidency considers that further political guidance from the Council is needed to find the adequate balance between anti-discrimination safeguards for non-participating Member States and effective decision-making. The Presidency has decided in its forthcoming compromise to make it clear that when the EBA engages in binding mediation, all competent authorities, including the ECB acting in its supervisory capacity, will be treated equally. 2. The distribution of tasks between the ECB and the NCAs: the Commission proposal assigned a wide range of tasks to the ECB with regard to all credit institutions established in the Member States participating in the SSM. Most of them have proved uncontroversial, except in particular those referring to so-called "macroprudential tools" (especially, the setting of buffers under the ECB Proposal) and to the coordination of a single position of NCAs from Member States participating in the SSM. The Commission proposal was not very explicit in regard to the respective roles of the ECB and the NCAs in their foreseen cooperation within the SSM. Without touching the basic principle of the ECB's exclusive responsibility, the Presidency has introduced a number of significant changes, which aim to establish the supervisory architecture, without prejudice to further specifications. A certain number of improvements were proposed, especially on the exact competences to be granted to the ECB and on the modalities for cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs. Lastly, the question of granting and withdrawal of authorisation has given rise to concerns by some delegations which find that the key issue of access to and removal from the market should remain within the remit of national authorities. 3. Phasing in of the SSM (Article 27 of the ECB proposal): some delegations have questioned the phasing-in arrangements proposed by the Commission and suggestions have been made to seek a more flexible phasing-in arrangement, thus leaving the ECB more time to prepare for the taking over of its new supervisory tasks. |
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The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted, within the framework of a special legislative procedure (consultation with Parliament), the report by Marianne THYSSEN (EPP, BE) on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. The parliamentary committee proposed that the European Parliament amend the Commission proposal as follows: Clearly defined tasks: Members specify that the Regulation entrusts the ECB with clearly defined tasks in relation to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and in each Member State participating in the Union, with full regard to a duty of care. “Participating Member State” means a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which chooses to participate in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) foreseen by the Regulation. In fulfilling its tasks, the ECB shall respect the different types and size of credit institutions. It should also take care to ensure that the national competent authorities of all participating Member States shall be treated on an equal footing and to respect afair balance between the rights of participating Member States. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): this is defined as a European system of financial supervision composed by the European Central Bank and national competent authorities of participating Member States. Within the SSM, the ECB and competent national authorites should cooperate faithfully and be obliged to exchange information. Whilst always ensuring supervisory consistency within the SSM, the ECB shall request the national competent authorities to assist the ECB in the performance of the tasks conferred on it as well as the powers and obligations in relation to all credit institutions, in particular in relation to credit institutions: · which have not received or sought direct or indirect financial support from theEuropean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any other future European financial assistance facility: or · which do not pose a systemic risk, as defined in EU law, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies. Draft supervisory decisions of the national competent authorities shall be deemed adopted by the ECB unless it rejects them within a deadline not exceeding 10 working days. The ECB shall monitor national competent authorities on an ongoing basis. National competent authorities shall inform the ECB without delay where: · there are serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB; · the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB. Moreover, the ECB may at any time and under any circumstances assume the responsibilities of the national competent authorities and carry out all or specific supervisory tasks directly. Participation in the SSM of Member States whose currency is not the euro (close cooperation): the ECB shall carry out its tasks in relation to credit institutions established in a participating Member State whose currency is not the euro. A close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a Member State whose currency is not the euro choosing to participateshall be established, by a decision adopted by the ECB, where certain conditions are met. Where these conditions are no longer met, the ECB may decide to issue a warning to the national competent authority of the Member State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken. If no such corrective action is undertaken, the ECB may suspend or terminate the close cooperation with that Member State. Board of Appeal: Members propose that the ECB establish an Administrative Board of Appeal (composed of five individuals) for the purposes of settling appeals against decisions by the ECB acting as a single supervisor under this Regulation. Members of the Board of Appeal and two alternates shall be appointed by the ECB for a term of five years, which may be extended once, following a public call for expressions of interest published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and after consultation of the Banking Supervisory Board. They shall not be bound by any instructions. A decision by the ECB within the MSU by the Board of Appeal or, in cases where there is no right of appeal to the Board of Appeal, may be contested before the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with Article 263 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Accountability and reporting: Members make the following requests: · at the requestof theEuropean Parliament, the Chairof theSupervisory Board shall participate in a hearing on the execution of its supervisory tasks, including the fees levied and the expenditure incurred, by the competent committees of the Parliament; · upon request the Chair of the Banking Supervisory Board shall provide the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in camera any confidential information concerning its tasks which are required for the exercise of the European Parliament’s powers under the Treaty and under this regulation; · at the request of a national parliament of a participating Member State, a representative of the Banking Supervisory Board, together with a representative of the competent national authority, shall appear before that parliament and answer questions about the performance of supervisory tasks. Moreover, this Regulation is without prejudice to the right of the European Parliament: · to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law pursuant to Article 226 TFEU; · or to require the setting up of an independent inquiry into actions or failure to act of the ECB that have or may have led to a significant event in relation to financial stability, confidence or failure of a credit institution. Reporting of Violations: the ECB shall ensure that effective mechanisms are put in place for reporting of breaches of this Regulation, including specific procedures for the receipt of reports of breaches and their follow-up. Banking Supervisory Board: the amendments state that the Banking Supervisory Board shall include a Chairman or Chairwoman, appointed by the Governing Council after an open selection procedure on the basis of merit, skills and thorough knowledge of financial institutions and financial supervision and after approval by the European Parliament. When exercising its tasks, the Banking Supervisory Board shall take account of all relevant facts and circumstances in the participating Member States and shall perform its duties in the interest of the Union as a whole. All members of the Banking Supervisory Board shall have equal voting rights. By the 1 January 2014, the ECB shall carry out in full the supervisory tasks conferred on it by this Regulation. New
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted, within the framework of a special legislative procedure (consultation with Parliament), the report by Marianne THYSSEN (EPP, BE) on the proposal for a Council regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. The parliamentary committee proposed that the European Parliament amend the Commission proposal as follows: Clearly defined tasks: Members specify that the Regulation entrusts the ECB with clearly defined tasks in relation to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and in each Member State participating in the Union, with full regard to a duty of care. “Participating Member State” means a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which chooses to participate in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) foreseen by the Regulation. In fulfilling its tasks, the ECB shall respect the different types and size of credit institutions. It should also take care to ensure that the national competent authorities of all participating Member States shall be treated on an equal footing and to respect afair balance between the rights of participating Member States. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): this is defined as a European system of financial supervision composed by the European Central Bank and national competent authorities of participating Member States. Within the SSM, the ECB and competent national authorites should cooperate faithfully and be obliged to exchange information. Whilst always ensuring supervisory consistency within the SSM, the ECB shall request the national competent authorities to assist the ECB in the performance of the tasks conferred on it as well as the powers and obligations in relation to all credit institutions, in particular in relation to credit institutions: · which have not received or sought direct or indirect financial support from theEuropean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any other future European financial assistance facility: or · which do not pose a systemic risk, as defined in EU law, individually or as part of a group of credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies. Draft supervisory decisions of the national competent authorities shall be deemed adopted by the ECB unless it rejects them within a deadline not exceeding 10 working days. The ECB shall monitor national competent authorities on an ongoing basis. National competent authorities shall inform the ECB without delay where: · there are serious concerns about the safety and/or soundness of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB; · the stability of the financial system is or is likely to be endangered by the situation of any credit institution for which they are performing tasks on behalf of the ECB. Moreover, the ECB may at any time and under any circumstances assume the responsibilities of the national competent authorities and carry out all or specific supervisory tasks directly. Participation in the SSM of Member States whose currency is not the euro (close cooperation): the ECB shall carry out its tasks in relation to credit institutions established in a participating Member State whose currency is not the euro. A close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent authority of a Member State whose currency is not the euro choosing to participateshall be established, by a decision adopted by the ECB, where certain conditions are met. Where these conditions are no longer met, the ECB may decide to issue a warning to the national competent authority of the Member State concerned that the close cooperation will be suspended or terminated if no decisive corrective action is undertaken. If no such corrective action is undertaken, the ECB may suspend or terminate the close cooperation with that Member State. Board of Appeal: Members propose that the ECB establish an Administrative Board of Appeal (composed of five individuals) for the purposes of settling appeals against decisions by the ECB acting as a single supervisor under this Regulation. Members of the Board of Appeal and two alternates shall be appointed by the ECB for a term of five years, which may be extended once, following a public call for expressions of interest published in the Official Journal of the European Union, and after consultation of the Banking Supervisory Board. They shall not be bound by any instructions. A decision by the ECB within the MSU by the Board of Appeal or, in cases where there is no right of appeal to the Board of Appeal, may be contested before the Court of Justice of the European Union in accordance with Article 263 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Accountability and reporting: Members make the following requests: · at the requestof theEuropean Parliament, the Chairof theSupervisory Board shall participate in a hearing on the execution of its supervisory tasks, including the fees levied and the expenditure incurred, by the competent committees of the Parliament; · upon request the Chair of the Banking Supervisory Board shall provide the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in camera any confidential information concerning its tasks which are required for the exercise of the European Parliament’s powers under the Treaty and under this regulation; · at the request of a national parliament of a participating Member State, a representative of the Banking Supervisory Board, together with a representative of the competent national authority, shall appear before that parliament and answer questions about the performance of supervisory tasks. Moreover, this Regulation is without prejudice to the right of the European Parliament: · to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law pursuant to Article 226 TFEU; · or to require the setting up of an independent inquiry into actions or failure to act of the ECB that have or may have led to a significant event in relation to financial stability, confidence or failure of a credit institution. Reporting of Violations: the ECB shall ensure that effective mechanisms are put in place for reporting of breaches of this Regulation, including specific procedures for the receipt of reports of breaches and their follow-up. Banking Supervisory Board: the amendments state that the Banking Supervisory Board shall include a Chairman or Chairwoman, appointed by the Governing Council after an open selection procedure on the basis of merit, skills and thorough knowledge of financial institutions and financial supervision and after approval by the European Parliament. When exercising its tasks, the Banking Supervisory Board shall take account of all relevant facts and circumstances in the participating Member States and shall perform its duties in the interest of the Union as a whole. All members of the Banking Supervisory Board shall have equal voting rights. By the 1 January 2014, the ECB shall carry out in full the supervisory tasks conferred on it by this Regulation. |
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The Council held a policy debate on proposals aimed at establishing a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for the oversight of credit institutions, as part of a broader plan to establish a banking union. The proposals involve two regulations:
In its conclusions of 18 and 19 October 2012, the European Council set 1 January 2013 as the deadline for agreeing on the legal framework set out in the two regulations, while indicating that work on operational implementation would take place during 2013. The European Council emphasised the need to:
Lastly, the Council agreed to hold an extra meeting on a date yet to be set before the European Council on 13 and 14 December 2012 in order to reach an agreement that would enable negotiations with the European Parliament to start with the aim of approving the texts before the end of the year. New
The Council held a policy debate on proposals aimed at establishing a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for the oversight of credit institutions, as part of a broader plan to establish a banking union. The proposals involve two regulations:
In its conclusions of 18 and 19 October 2012, the European Council set 1 January 2013 as the deadline for agreeing on the legal framework set out in the two regulations, while indicating that work on operational implementation would take place during 2013. The European Council emphasised the need to:
Lastly, the Council agreed to hold an extra meeting on a date yet to be set before the European Council on 13 and 14 December 2012 in order to reach an agreement that would enable negotiations with the European Parliament to start with the aim of approving the texts before the end of the year. |
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