Activities of Josef WEIDENHOLZER related to 2013/2188(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and impact on EU citizens' fundamental rights (debate)
Amendments (38)
Amendment 18 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas mutual trust and, understanding and partnership are key factors in the transatlantic dialogue;
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D – point 8
Recital D – point 8
· the increasingly blurred boundaries between law enforcement and intelligence activities due to bulk collection of untargeted data - such as data retention, leading to every citizen being treated as a suspect and disregarding the presumption of innocence;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. the general believe that untargeted surveillance is a necessary means to insure national security even though studies show the opposite;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the US authorities have denied some of the information revealed but not contested the vast majority of it; whereas the public debate has developed on a large scale in the US and in a limited number ofcertain EU Member States; whereas EU governments too often remain silent and fail to launch adequate investigations;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas in comparison to actions taken by both EU institutions and by certain EU Member States, the European Parliament has taken very seriously its obligation to shed light on the revelations on the indiscriminate practices of mass surveillance of EU citizens and, by its resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security Agency surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens, instructed its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to conduct an in-depth inquiry into the matter;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas in its report of 12 December 2013, the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communication Technology proposes 456 recommendations to the President of the US; whereas the recommendations stress the need simultaneously to protect national security and personal privacy and civil liberties; whereas in this regard it invites the US Government to end bulk collection of phone records of US persons under Section 215 of the Patriot Act as soon as practicable, to undertake a thorough review of the NSA and the US intelligence legal framework in order to ensure respect for the right to privacy, to end efforts to subvert or make vulnerable commercial software (backdoors and malware), to increase the use of encryption, particularly in the case of data in transit, and not to undermine efforts to create encryption standards, to create a Public Interest Advocate to represent privacy and civil liberties before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to confer on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board the power to oversee Intelligence Community activities for foreign intelligence purposes, and not only for counterterrorism purposes, and to receive whistleblowers’ complaints, to use Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to obtain electronic communications, and not to use surveillance to steal industry or trade secrets;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. Whereas, according to an open memorandum submitted to President Obama by Former NSA Senior Executives/Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) on 7th January 2014 27 a the massive collection of data does not enhance its ability to prevent future terrorist attacks; whereas, they stress that mass surveillance conducted by the NSA has resulted in the prevention of zero attacks and that billions have been spent in programs which are less effective and hugely more intrusive on citizens' privacy than an in- house technology called THINTHREAD that was built in 2001; __________________ 27a http://consortiumnews.com/2014/01/07/ nsa-insiders-reveal-what-went-wrong/
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital M
Recital M
M. whereas fundamental rights, notably freedom of expression, of the press, of thought, of conscience, of religion and of association, private life, data protection, as well as the right to an effective remedy, the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial and non-discrimination, as enshrined in the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the European Convention on Human Rights, are cornerstones of democracy; and whereas mass surveillance of human beings is incompatible with these cornerstones;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital AC
Recital AC
AC. whereas according to the information revealed and to the findings of the inquiry conducted by the LIBE Committee, the national security agencies of New Zealand and Canad, Canada and Australia have been involved on a large scale in mass surveillance of electronic communications and have actively cooperated with the US under the so called ‘Five eyes’ programme, and may have exchanged with each other personal data of EU citizens transferred from the EU;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Considers it very doubtful that data collection of such magnitude is only guided by the fight against terrorism, as it involves the collection of all possible data of all citizens; points therefore to the possible existence of other power motives such as political and economic espionage and the constant threat of abuse;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Calls on the US to give amnesty to Edward Snowden for initiating the process of rethinking the course of intelligence agencies;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18b. Calls on EU Member States to thoroughly examine the possibility of granting whistleblowers international protection from prosecution;
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Calls on the US authorities and the EU Member States to prohibit blanket mass surveillance activities and bulk processing of personal data as well as to stop all on- going indiscriminate practices of mass surveillance;
Amendment 191 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Paragraph 19 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Calls on all EU Member States, and in particular those participating in the so- called "9-eyes" and "14-eyes" programmes, to comprehensively evaluate and revise their national legislation and practices governing the activities of intelligence services – including their (strategic) surveillance powers, authorisation procedures and oversight mechanisms - so as to ensure that they are in line with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and comply with their fundamental rights obligations as regards data protection, privacy, presumption of innocence, the necessity and proportionality of surveillance activities, as well as parliamentary and judicial oversight, as also set out in the UN compilations of good practices 38e and the recommendations of the Venice Commission 38f; __________________ 38e UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Combating Terrorism 2010, Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies, UN General Assembly, A/HRC/14/46, 17 May 2010. 38f European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Report on Democratic Oversight of the Security Services in Council of Europe States, Study 388/2006, June 2007 (update due in spring 2014).
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Calls on the UK to revise its national legislation and practices governing the activities of intelligence services so as to ensure that they are in line with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and comply with their fundamental rights obligations as regards data protection, privacy and presumption of innocence; in particular, given the extensive media reports referring to mass surveillance in the UK, would emphasise that the current legal framework which is made up of a 'complex interaction' between three separate pieces of legislation – the Human Rights Act 1998, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 – should be revised;
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19b. Calls on Germany to revise the law on the German foreign intelligence service (BND) and the G-10 Law by making them more specific, reinforcing the rights of all persons whose communications are intercepted, providing for more public information in particular as to the activities of the G10 Commission, reinforcing the technical capabilities and investigative powers of the parliamentary oversight bodies, and adjusting the laws to the developments regarding internet technology and use;
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 c (new)
Paragraph 19 c (new)
19c. Calls on France to reinforce the system of checks and balances in the field of intelligence activities so as to ensure it is in line with the European Convention on Human Right's requirements, to strengthen its general oversights mechanisms, both as regards the ex ante authorisation procedures, the involvement of the Parliament in monitoring of intelligence activities and the reinforcement of technical capabilities and investigate powers of the latter. Moreover encourages the National Commission for the Control of Security Interceptions (CNIS), independent administrative authority to monitor more closely and effectively the processing of data collected by the various intelligence agencies. Urges France to clarify the situation on allegations regarding potential agreements between intelligence services and telecommunication companies as regard access to and exchange of personal data and access to communication facilities including Transatlantic cables. Takes notes of the adoption of the "Loi de programmation militaire 2014-2019" in December 2013 clarifying the framework according to which intelligence services may have access to communication data, with regards to fighting against terrorism;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 d (new)
Paragraph 19 d (new)
19d. Calls on Sweden to revise the internet laws which authorised the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) to monitor communications traffic into and out of Sweden, cable bound as well as in the ether (radio and satellite), including emails, text messages and telephone calls and Act on signals intelligence which allows for the bulk transfer of data to other states if authorised by the Government, in order to specify the means and the scope of the surveillance and to improve the foreseeability of law which would enable an individual to foresee whether their communication or data about their communication is collected by FRA; recommends further to reinforce the system of checks and balances in oversight of the signals intelligence by including at the composition of the Inspection for Defence Intelligence Operations the parliamentarians in office;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 e (new)
Paragraph 19 e (new)
19e. Takes note of the review of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Act 2002 (report by the "Dessens Commission" of 2 December 2013); supports those recommendations of the review commission which aim to strengthen the transparency of and the control and oversight on the Dutch intelligence services; calls on the Netherlands to refrain from extending the powers of the intelligence services so that untargeted and large-scale surveillance could also be performed on cable-bound communications of innocent citizens, especially given the fact that one of the biggest Internet Exchange Points in the world is located in Amsterdam (AMS-IX); calls for caution in defining the mandate and capabilities of the new Joint Sigint Cyber Unit, as well as for the presence and operation by US intelligence personnel on Dutch territory;
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 f (new)
Paragraph 19 f (new)
19f. Calls on Poland to revise data protection legislation in particular as far as their access by different (law enforcement or intelligence) authorities to citizens' personal data from various sources is concerned) and introduce an independent supervisory mechanism over their activity, notably in the area of intelligence and general crime prevention; strongly recommends that Poland properly applies freedom of information laws with respect to national security issues ; recommends further that any freedom of information requests shall be duly and adequately treated, notably when relevant for explaining government involvement in programs of mass surveillance and for thereby holding decision-makers accountable;
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
46. Calls on the European Commission to react to concerns that three of the major computerised reservation systems used by airlines worldwide are based in the US and that PNR data are saved in cloud systems operating on US soil under US law, which lacks data protection adequacy; states that this, in addition to other points, undermines the legitimacy of the EU US PNR agreement and therefore calls on the European Commission to immediately start a consultation procedure with their US counterparts under Article 24 of the agreement with a view to clarify whether or not PNR data have been compromised; Calls on the European Commission to make full use of their powers under Article 24 to suspend the application of the Agreement if no satisfactory answers can be obtained or PNR data have indeed been compromised;
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
Paragraph 53
53. Notes that trust in US cloud computing and cloud providers has been negatively affected by the abovementioned practices; emphasises, therefore, the development of European clouds as an essential element for growth and employment and trust in cloud computing services and providers and for ensuring a high level of personal data protection, as they entail a serious violation of the fundamental right of EU citizens and residents to privacy and data protection, as well as of the right to private and family life, the confidentiality of communications, the presumption of innocence, freedom of expression, freedom of information, and the freedom to conduct business; emphasises, therefore, the development of European clouds as an essential element for growth and employment and trust in cloud computing services and providers and for ensuring a high level of personal data protection; takes the view, therefore, that public authorities, as well as non- governmental services and the private sector, should, as far as possible, rely on EU cloud providers when processing sensitive data and information until satisfactory global rules on data protection have been introduced, ensuring the security of sensitive data, and of data bases, held by public entities;
Amendment 278 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 54 a (new)
Paragraph 54 a (new)
54a. Stresses the need to address the challenges raised by cloud computing at an international level, in particular as regards government intelligence surveillance and necessary safeguards; stresses in particular that EU citizens subject to intelligence surveillance by third country authorities should benefit from at least the same safeguards and remedies as are available to citizens of the third country concerned;
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 56 a (new)
Paragraph 56 a (new)
56a. Urges the Commission, when negotiating international agreements that involve the processing of personal data, to take particular note of the risks and challenges that cloud computing poses to fundamental rights, in particular – but not exclusively – the right to private life and to the protection of personal data, as laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; urges, furthermore, the Commission to take note of the negotiating partner's domestic rules governing the access of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to personal data processed through cloud computing service, in particular by demanding that such access for law enforcement and intelligence authorities only be granted with full respect for the due process of law and on an unambiguous legal basis, as well as the requirement that the exact conditions of access, the purpose of gaining such access, the security measures put in place when handing over data and the rights of the individual, as well as the rules for supervision and for an effective redress mechanism, be specified;
Amendment 284 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 57
Paragraph 57
57. Recalls that all companies providing services in the EU must, without exception, comply with EU law and are liable for any breaches and underlines the importance of having effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative sanctions that may be imposed on 'cloud computing' service providers that do not comply with EU data protection standards;
Amendment 288 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58 – a (new)
Paragraph 58 – a (new)
58-a. Calls on the Commission to suspend the TTIP negotiations until the Umbrella Agreement between the EU and US has successfully been conducted;
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 58
Paragraph 58
58. Recognises that the EU and the US are pursuing negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which iscould be of major strategic importance for creating further economic growth and for the ability of both the EU and the US to set future global regulatory standards;
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61 a (new)
Paragraph 61 a (new)
61a. Considers that the European Parliament must have full powers to conduct parliamentary inquiries and is of the opinion that the powers conferred to it by its current Rules of Procedure cannot be compared to such a proper oversight mechanism which would include at least the right to summon witnesses and hear them under oath;
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 62
Paragraph 62
62. Calls for the setting up of a high-level group to strengthen cooperation in the field of intelligence oversight at EU level, combined with a proper oversight mechanism ensuring both democratic legitimacy and adequate technical capacity; stresses that the high- level group should cooperate closely with national parliaments in order to propose further steps to be taken for increased oversight collaboration in the EU;
Amendment 377 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 82
Paragraph 82
82. Points out that both telecom companies and the EU and national telecom regulators have clearly neglected the IT security of their users and clients; calls on the Commission to make full use of its existing powers under the ePrivacy and Telecommunication Framework Directive to strengthen the protection of confidentiality of communication by adopting measures to ensure that terminal equipment is compatible with the right of users to control and protect their personal data, and to ensure a high level of security of telecommunication networks and services, including by way of requiring state-of-the-art encryption of communications and making the manufacturer liable for the systems' insecurities;
Amendment 427 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 93
Paragraph 93
93. Calls for the overall architecture of the internet in terms of data flows and storage to be reconsidered, striving for more data minimisation and, transparency and less centralised mass storage of raw data, as well as avoiding unnecessary routing of traffic through the territory of countries that do not meet basic standards on fundamental rights, data protection and privacy;
Amendment 435 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 95
Paragraph 95
95. Calls on the Commission, by September 2014, to evaluate the possibilities of encouraging to implement binding rules for software and hardware manufacturers to introduce more security and privacy through default features in their products, including the possibility of introducing legal liability on the part of manufacturers for unpatched known vulnerabilities or the installation of secret backdoors, and disincentives for the undue and disproportionate collection of mass personal data, and if appropriate to come forward with legislative proposals;
Amendment 442 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 100
Paragraph 100
100. Recognises, in light of the global challenges facing the EU and the US, that the transatlantic partnership needs to be further strengthened, and that it is vital that transatlantic cooperation in counter- terrorism continues; insists, however, on a new basis of trust based on true common respect of the rule of law and the rejection of all indiscriminate practices of mass surveillance; insists therefore that clear measures need to be taken by the US to re- establish trust and re-emphasise the shared basic values underlying the partnership;
Amendment 443 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 101
Paragraph 101
101. Is ready actively to engage in a dialogue with US counterparts so that, in the ongoing American public and congressional debate on reforming surveillance and reviewing intelligence oversight, the privacy rights of EU citizens are addressed, equal information rights and privacy protection in US courts guaranteed and the current discrimination not perpetuated; Calls on the US to revise its legislation in this field without delay in order to bring it into line with international law and to recognise the privacy and other rights of EU citizens. The call for legislative correction should include reform of its Electronic Communications Privacy Act as regards warrantless access to content, changes in federal law to provide for judicial redress for EU citizens and to sign the Additional Protocol allowing for complaints by individuals under the ICCPR;
Amendment 446 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 102
Paragraph 102
102. Insists that necessary reforms be undertaken and effective guarantees given to Europeans to ensure that the use of surveillance and data processing for foreign intelligence purposes is limited by clearly specified conditions and related to reasonable suspicion orand probable cause of terrorist or criminal activity; stresses that this purpose must be subject to transparent judicial oversight;
Amendment 463 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 108
Paragraph 108
108. Is aware that some EU Member States are pursuing bilateral communication with the US authorities on spying allegations, and that some of them have concluded (United Kingdom) or envisage concluding (Germany, France) so-called ‘anti-spying’ arrangements; underlines that these Member States need to observe fully the interests of the EU as a whodeems such bilateral arrangements as counterproductive due to the need of a European solution for this problem;
Amendment 467 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 109 a (new)
Paragraph 109 a (new)
109a. Believes that the expansion of a surveillance society within the EU as a direct result of EU legislation has to be prevented under all circumstances; Therefore calls on the Council and the European Parliament when acting as legislators in the field of justice and home affairs to ensure that practices that are designed to collect en masse data from EU citizens with a view to combatting terrorism and serious crime are fully in line with the requirements of the rule of law and the EU's human rights obligations; Points out that this for example applies to Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data which seems to be incompatible with Articles 7 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as well as on the Commission proposal 2011/0023 (COD) on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime;
Amendment 506 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 114 – point 6
Paragraph 114 – point 6
Action 6: Develop a European strategy for IT independence (at national and EU level) and security standards for IT products;