Activities of Sophie MONTEL related to 2015/2344(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on budgetary capacity for the Eurozone PDF (616 KB) DOC (93 KB)
Amendments (55)
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the European Monetary Union established under the Maastricht Treaty was not complemented by a genuine European Economic Union, which is impossible to implement politically;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas, therefore, the introduction of the single currency was a serious error;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas keeping the Balance of Payments Facility for non-euro Member States while depriving euro area Member States of this instrument as a consequence of the no-bail-out clause reflects one of the original flaws of EMUthe introduction of the single currency, sold with promises – later proved false – of exponential growth in trade between the participating states, was a mistake of which those responsible should be ashamed given the amount of suffering it has caused in Europe;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments – first and foremost an economic policy – to deal effectively with shocks;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, following real convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessby adopting a common currency, the euro area reduced the ability of each participant member to react to a crisis, since the monetary tool, which had hitherto normally been the tool used to adjust one economy against another, had disappeared; whereas the euro, as a common currency for economies with differing needs, also created structural divergences between 1999 and 2009, which made ithe euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching-up proceshaving the same monetary policy for the countries in the South of the euro area and those in the North led inexorably to a balance of payments crisis;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas progresit seems thas been achieved in addret the only escape route from the morass ing the flaws of EMUto which the euro has turned is a headlong race forward through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM, which are nothing less than a gun held to the head of the sovereignty of states and peoples;
Amendment 105 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Community method was abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament has been sidelined, and its national counterparts have been sidelinalways been excluded;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas, a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whos the disaster spread and deepened, some Member States have revealed the hypocrisy of a European project which claims to favour solidarity but in which some countries fiercely defend their own interests while others naively serve a fantasy 'European interest'; whereas people have become aware that the European project is not viable;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary union would require all the essential features of national public budgets to be decided at Community level, which is not politically desirable;
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that the McDougall Report in1977 stressed that the establishment of a monetary union would require a significant Community budget amounting to 5-7 % of GDP in order to absorb economic shocks and provide a minimum degree of income convergence, but that this is not politically desirable;
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies, which already represent infringements of national sovereignty which are hard for peoples to tolerate, thus demonstrating that any step forward is politically inconceivable;
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix, and that the costs of this latter alternative would be astronomical;
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Considers that EMU exposed its 5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by unsustainable capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States,due to the existence of the single currency, were aggravated and led to a sovereign debtbalance of payments crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro arearequired Member States to intervene and led to a perilous increase in public debt in a context where states can no longer have recourse to borrowing from their central banks;
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks; whereas the obvious choice seems to be to return to national currencies;
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, as well as on some factors in the world economic situation, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reforman increase in public investments in the euro area;
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creatingNotes the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations, the creation of the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; considers, however, that this forms part of a post-national reasoning which disregards the sovereignty of states and the rights of peoples to decide for themselves the policies they want;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisis (i.e. they are insufficient and need to be complemented by the monetary tool);
Amendment 261 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euroabolish the euro and save the peoples who are its victims; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and marketswork together;
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 285 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro- area and national level are key, notably tothe best way of preventing permanent transfers and moral hazard is to go back to national currencies;
Amendment 306 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shockselements that are detrimental to the sovereignty of the Member States; considers that a fiscal capacity is not politically viable given that the concept is so firmly rejected by the peoples of Europe;
Amendment 320 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that a fiscal capacity muscannot be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, without the backing order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-euro Member Statesf the peoples of Europe concerned;
Amendment 336 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources, and that the huge scale of the task makes it politically impracticable to carry it out;
Amendment 358 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times must be allowed full freedom to judge what is in the best interests of each Nation; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole, and that this instrument must be the monetary instrument, and must be the simplest, most flexible and least costly option;
Amendment 377 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia;
Amendment 400 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 421 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
Amendment 445 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
Amendment 451 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
Amendment 466 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Subheading 4
Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence and incentivise the implementation of structural reformRestoring their liberty to the Member States
Amendment 474 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensablethe States are the best placed to defend their own interests, which can only ever be national interests;
Amendment 494 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘convergence code’, as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies withinCalls for the abolition of the European Semester;
Amendment 502 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 576 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that a financial instrument is needed towhich works as an incentive- based mechanism for convergence and sustainable structural reforms with clear conditionality; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacity is a means of blackmailing European countries with their own money; emphasises that this is unacceptable;
Amendment 590 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5
Subheading 5
Pillar 2: Absorption of asymmetric shocks using the monetary policy tool
Amendment 594 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States, with a view to absorbing asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect, monetary adjustment is the simplest, most flexible and least costly tool;
Amendment 615 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit SchemeStates have always used the monetary tool to absorb shocks;
Amendment 623 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
Amendment 640 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
Amendment 657 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
Amendment 673 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6
Subheading 6
Amendment 677 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
Amendment 693 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
Amendment 706 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
Amendment 718 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
Amendment 733 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
Amendment 753 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Stresses that the Community method should prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structuresdemocracy is founded on sovereignty;
Amendment 765 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in ordcomprehensive decision-making powers to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRsbe restored to Nations in the area of budgetary policy;
Amendment 776 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Argues that national ownership could be improved by including national parliaments Points out that, historically, it was by claiming the procedures; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoidedright to exercise scrutiny over budgets that parliaments became fully-fledged democratic institutions;
Amendment 783 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
Amendment 802 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
Amendment 815 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMU; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMU;
Amendment 826 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Paragraph 43 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Takes the view that any proposal to that effect must be submitted to the European peoples concerned for approval;