Activities of Marco VALLI related to 2015/2344(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on budgetary capacity for the Eurozone PDF (616 KB) DOC (93 KB)
Shadow opinions (1)
OPINION on budgetary capacity for the eurozone
Amendments (36)
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Observes that the European Economic and Monetary Union lacks the fundamental requirements of an optimal currency area and the adjustment mechanisms required in order to absorb asymmetric shocks, as the crisis has demonstrated that self-corrective market forces alone cannot be relied on to prevent Member States from becoming over-indebtedthereby leading to the build-up of unsustainably large macroeconomic imbalances; points out that,as the crisis has demonstrated, in the absence of the self-corrective mechanism of a flexible exchange rate, the weaker euro area economies have to bear disproportionately high costs of adjustment through internal devaluation and fiscal austerity in order to maintain a currency that is overvalued, while stronger economies can benefit from the competitive advantage of an undervalued currency to expand their exports and accumulate large current account surpluses;
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
Citation 1
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), especially Article 3 thereof, which establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euros 3 and 50 thereof,
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that, as illustrated by the crisis, a common currency cannot Stresses that further fiscal, economic and political integration necessarily entails further loss of fiscal, economic and political sovereignty, therelby solely on a central bank to control the money supply, without further fiscal, economic and political integrationdepriving Member States of the democratic control over fundamental macroeconomic policy instruments strongly believes that respecting the national sovereignty on monetary and fiscal policy is the only way to ensure that Member States have the economic and political power to react in times of crisis;
Amendment 10 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls Parliament’s position thatBelieves that the proposal on the establishment of a fiscal capacity should go hand in hand with a proper discussion at the institutional level about the need to provide for democratic withdrawal and opt-out mechanisms for any country that wishes to leave or remain outside the EMU; stresses that any further deepening of European institutional and economic integration is necessary to ensure the stshould be done on a voluntary basis and following a democratic consultation through a referendum to be held in each Member State, in order to ensure the political and social sustainability of the eEurozone and of thepean Union as a whole;
Amendment 11 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Is concerned that the instruments developed in recent years to tackle the crisis are intergovernmental in nature, are not integrated into the Community acquis, and lack democratic oversight and accountability to Parliament;
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Emphasises that the establishment of a budgetary and fiscal capacity within the eurozone is necessary to complete the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); believes that the stabilisation function of a fiscal capacity is the most feasible of the fiscal policy functions, while a redistribution function could be envisaged in a more integrated polineeds massive permanent fiscal transfers from countries running excessive current account surpluses to economically depressed areas; believes nevertheless that such fiscal capacity based on a more integrated political and economic union is not politically acceptable nor economically efficient; stresses therefore that alternative options, such as an orderly and coordinated break- up of the monetary union, shall be urgently explored in order to protect the EU cooperation from effects of a chaotical and eunconomic uniontrolled break-up of the Euro Area;
Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. StressBelieves that such a capacity should be established as part of the Union budget, outside the multiannual financial framework (MFF), and implemented by the Commission; recalls its position that any fiscal or budgetary capacity developed specifically for the eurozone must be developed within the Union frameworkMember States could accept an European fiscal capacity only after public consultation in every Member State with a referendum;
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the Treaty requires the Union to foster sustainable development based on economic growth, aiming at full employment and social progress and promoting economic, social and regional cohesion and solidarity between Member States;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the European Monetary Union established under the Maastricht Treaty whas not complemented by a genuine European Economic Unionin fact blocked the development of Member States and is the reason why they are now in a recession and face deflation and soaring unemployment rates;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations, the EU budget is dependent principally on contributions from Member State level to EU level;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, following realthe forced convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed an increase in structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which madereduced the euro area a's a whole less resilientbility to respond to shocks; whereas the regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching-up processimposed since 2009 at both European and national level have, furthermore, aggravated the already difficult economic and social situation;
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislationthe flaws of EMU have been aggravated because of measures such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a wholthe EU institutions and the Union as a whole have not in any way taken into account the devastating effects of their political and economic choices for citizens and small businesses in Europe;
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that that structural shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policdue to the fact that it is not an optimal currency area and has, over the years, generated unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances especially for many peripheral countries;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix;
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States,caused by the introduction of the single currency, and massive public interventions to rescue the financial sector aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro areademocratic mechanisms to exit the eurozone, the very survival of the EU;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal'one-size-fits-all' common monetary policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shock and that the inability to devalue the currency shifts the burden of adjustment to the weaker eurozone economies which are forced to perform the most painful internal devaluation to restore competitiveness;
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reformRegrets the fact that since the beginning of the crisis the ECB has initiated unconventional monetary policy measures that have not had any effect in stabilising the economic cycle and have triggered a cycle of deflation which is dangerous for the real economy;
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Makes it clear that rapid action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part ofat Member States wishing to leave the euro may do so; stresses furthermore that the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and marketsshould start to provide for measures and plans for a coordinated dismantling of EMU;
Amendment 271 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro mustthe euro has failed to deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteriafurther failed attempt to save an economic and monetary approach which has failed;
Amendment 307 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specia fiscal capacity for the euro area would be absolutely incapable of solving the very serious structural problems of EMU and the resultant internal macroeconomic imbalances; considers that such a system would run the risk of transforming deficit concerns for the euruntries on the periphery into area in the case of absorbing shockgions structurally dependent on transfers from the central creditor countries;
Amendment 323 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that creating a fiscal capacity must be created on top of existing EU funding instruments, within its legal framework, in order to ensure consistent development between euro and non-eurofor the euro area would set the seal on a definitive split between those countries that adopt the single currency and those that have kept their own currencies, undermining the principles of social and territorial cohesion and solidarity between Member States;
Amendment 345 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 363 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 385 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 399 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 424 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. IConsistders that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for, apart from the problems of economic sustainability and the consequent macroeconomic imbalances, EMU is suffering from a serious and profound democratic deficit; stresses that the governance institutions of the euro area, should be integrated into the EU budget, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)uch as the ECB and the Euro Group, have shown, particularly at times of crisis, that they act without even the most basic democratic control and, by means of blackmail and through their actions, control the decisions of the democratically elected governments of the Member States; considers furthermore that intergovernmental arrangements such as ESM are a further threat to democracy;
Amendment 472 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
Amendment 572 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
Amendment 729 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges foralls for the Banking Union project to be abandoned, because it has not so far proved itself effective for the purpose of increasing the resilience of the eEuro area as a whole; urgespean financial system; calls on the European Institutions to completion ofe the Bbanking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM; separation project, which, by means of a genuine and compulsory division of investment operations from retail operations, is the only way of gaining the confidence of European consumers;
Amendment 732 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Paragraph 36 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Does not consider the sources of instability and systemic risk in the financial sector to have been adequately addressed by means of an ambitious reform based on the lessons learned from the crisis; notes with concern, in this context, the proposal to establish a Capital Markets Union, intended to promote the further financialisation of the economy and the restoration of the shadow banking system and securitisation, in other words the same perverse systems and instruments which caused the crisis; recalls furthermore that the further development of the financial sector adversely affects the functioning of the real economy, as demonstrated by much empirical research;
Amendment 756 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Stresses that the Community method should prevail in the development ofe need to review the existing economic governance rules for the euro area; urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structures, to ensure that Member States can implement the economic and fiscal policies necessary to promote recovery and combat growing unemployment and poverty;
Amendment 782 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
Amendment 811 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special statuit necessary to allow an opt-out for all countries that do not wish to belong to the euro area and EMU, with complete regard for the principle of respect for the sovereignty of peoples;
Amendment 820 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and completEMU has been a serious source of division and conflict within the EMU; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, shouldmust be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro areaEU Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMUget through this phase and return to a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, guaranteeing the various specific characteristics, so as to return to the path of growth which was interrupted by the creation of the single currency;