Activities of Marco VALLI related to 2016/2063(INI)
Plenary speeches (3)
European Central Bank annual report for 2015 (A8-0302/2016 - Ramon Tremosa i Balcells) IT
European Central Bank annual report for 2015 (debate) IT
European Central Bank annual report for 2015 (debate) IT
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the European Central Bank Annual Report for 2015 PDF (281 KB) DOC (58 KB)
Amendments (31)
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas, according to the Commission’s latest spring forecast, euro area real growth is expected to be modest – 1.6 % in 2016 and 1.8 % in 2017, following 1.7 % in 2015 euro area real growth continues to be minimal;
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas, according to the same forecast, unemployment in the euro area is expected to record a slow decrease, from 10.9 % at the end of 2015 to 9.9 % at the end of 2017; unemployment in the euro area has increased steeply in all euro area countries and whereas disparities between the unemployment rates of the Member States continued to widen in 2015alarmingly, with figures ranging from 4.6 % in Germany to 24.9 % in Greece;
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas, again according to the same forecast, the government deficit in the euro area will gradually decline from 2.1 % in 2015 to 1.9 % in 2016 and 1.6 % in 2017 and the debt-to-GDP ratio is also forecast to decline for the first time since the beginning of the crisis, even though there are still four countries involved in the Commission’s excessive deficit procedure (France, Spain, Greece and Portugal):in the light of recent developments, there are still four countries involved in the Commission’s excessive deficit procedure (France, Spain, Greece and Portugal), while the Commission has not triggered any infringement proceedings for other countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, which continue to accumulate trade surpluses;
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the forecasts the Commission makes each year are unreliable in that they are – consistently – subject to being revised downwards as they are too unrealistic;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the inflation target is getting harder to reach owing to consolidation ofnot so much to demographic trends and the full impact of trade globalisation on a high-unemployment European societybut more to the impact of the unconventional monetary policies launched by the ECB;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth of close to zero, which is the result of the lack of public sector investment since the beginning of the crisis; notes that the high level of public debt and the huge number of non- performing loans in the banking sector in some Member States are still fragmenting the euro area financial market, thus reducing room for manoeuvre to support the most fragile economies; stresses that this situation has been made all the more difficult by the implementation of the BRRD and the ensuing Bail-in and therefore requests that they immediately be suspended;
Amendment 73 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Denounces the fact that this has arisen from the adoption of the single currency, which has imposed a system of fixed exchange rates across 19 Member States in a currency area with too many differences; also deplores the fact that the euro has generated and continues to generate balance of payment imbalances with excessive surpluses on the part of countries which continually go unpunished by the Commission;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Considers the EMU to have shown itself vulnerable during the global economic and financial crisis, which exacerbated the unsustainable imbalances generated by the introduction of the single currency, and the wholesale public interventions to rescue the financial sector led to a sovereign debt crisis in which government borrowing costs increased dramatically in some Member States, and believes that the EMU suffers from structural deficiencies by virtue of the fact that it is not an optimal currency area, which over the years has generated unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances, especially for many periphery countries;
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Denounces the fact that the introduction of the single currency has exacerbated the increase in structural divergence and made it more difficult to respond to crises; stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated the option of intervening in response to asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuations, shifting the adjustment burden to the weaker euro area economies; urges that an opt-out procedure be introduced for states which might democratically express the need to withdraw from the euro area, as optimal economic and monetary integration has stalled for many years now owing to thorny political disagreements and the economic and social crisis in the peripheral countries is strongly intensifying; considers also that a controlled dissolution plan should be organised for the whole common currency area, so as not to be taken unaware by an uncontrolled dissolution, while at the same time promoting positive cooperation between European states in a manner respecting their respective national constitutions;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Denounces the fact that the monetary policy measures launched by the ECB after the crisis (such as LTRO, TLTRO, ABSPP and QE) have not had the stated effects because the huge liquidity injected into the markets has remained locked in the financial system and has been used by the banks for speculative purposes rather than for financing and supporting the real economy; is concerned that the ABS market is becoming more risky and less transparent; deplores the fact that the ECB itself is responsible for greater systemic risk, an increase in inequalities and a growing risk of speculative bubbles;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Agrees wiconsiders that the ECB President Mario Draghi that the single monetary policy cannot stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by sound fiscal policies and ambitious structural reform programmes at Member State level; recalls that the main benefit ofshould refrain from giving opinions on the need for Member States to launch structural reforms, and deplores the fact the main aim of the ECB's monetary policy is to safeguard price stability in order to guarantee a stable environment for investment; considers that monetary policy is not the appropriate tool to solve the structural problems of the European economyrather than full employment; considers that the ECB should be the lender of last resort;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Considers it necessary for the Member States to take back their tax and monetary autonomy in order to pursue the requisite expansive economic policies and make public investments in support of economic growth;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes, however, that even though the impact of un that the current reconventional measures has been significant, inflation is not expected to converge to the 2 % medium- term objective at the 2017 horizon; notes that the current recovery in bank and market lending has not wholly produced the expected effect on the existing investment gap in the euro area so farry in bank and market lending has not wholly produced the expected effect on the existing investment gap in the euro area so far because of the lack of internal demand due to the low interest rates set by the ECB; regrets that the huge liquidity injected into the markets has served mainly the major European banking groups for speculative purposes;
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Deplores the existing, albeit gradually decreasing, gaps between the financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies, between lending rates on small and large loans, and between credit conditions for SMEs located in different euro area countries, but recognises the limits of what monetary policy can achieve in this respect;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines that athe prolonged period of ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy creates potential risks for financial stability and ultimately the whole economy; warns that a decline in the profitability of banks will dampen their willingness to develop lending activity; points particularly to the effect of such an interest rate policy on local and regional banks and savings banks with little funding from financial markets, and to risks in the insurance sectorfor which the ECB is responsible is creating serious risks for financial stability and, ultimately, for the whole real economy;
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Understands the reason why negative rates have been implemented, but remains concerned about the potential consequences of negative interest rate policy for individual savers and the financial equilibrium of pension schemes; believes that owing to demographic trends and cultural preferences for saving,Believes that these negative effects on income mayare leading to an increase in the household saving rate, which could beis detrimental to domestic demand in the euro area and will soon turn into property bubbles;
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Asks the ECB to study how the transmission of monetary policy differs in those Member States with centralised and concentrated banking sectors and those with a more diverse network of local and regional banks; calls, moreover, on the ECB to make its findings public;
Amendment 174 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Calls on the ECB to carefully assess the risks of a future resurgence of housing bubblestake prompt action to prevent housing bubbles from being formed on the market owing to its ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy, particularly in big cities, and to design specific macroprudential recommendations in this regard;
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. RecogniseCondemns the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies, which can be perceived asare leading to increasing inequalities, but believes that the ECB policies are the right ones to lower the costs of credit for citizens and SMEs and enhance employment in the euro area among Member States and within Member States;
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomes the publication of the minutes of the Council meeting and the decision to disclose the agreements on net financial assets (ANFA) between the ECB and the national central banks; encourages the ECB to pursue its transparency effort; hopes that in the near future the minutes will incorporate information on who made each statement; recognises that much can still be done in terms of transparency; points out that the monetary dialogue is an important opportunity to ensure the transparency of monetary policy, vis-à-vis Parliament and the wider public and therefore calls on the representatives of the ECB to give precise and detailed replies to questions by MEPs; calls on ECB officials also to provide additional information in writing where answers given during the discussions are not fully satisfactory and/or comprehensive;
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Deplores the role played by the ECB in the SSM as the European systemic bank watchdog body, given that this could lead to possible conflicts of interest; takes the view that the optimal solution would have been to entrust supervision to a separate body, independent of the ECB, when the SSM was established;
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. Regrets that the ECB has gone too far in interpreting its mandate as regards its role in the Troika; urges the ECB to take a step backwards and to reinforce its independence from political decisions; stresses the ECB’s independence in the field of monetary policy and the need to avoid any conflict of interest in the execution of its functions;
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16c. Strongly deplores the Capital Markets Union project because further financialisation would make the economic system more fragile, interconnected and exposed to systemic risks and to fresh crises, to the detriment of the real economy;
Amendment 248 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 d (new)
Paragraph 16 d (new)
16d. Rejects the Banking Union project and its completion. The steps taken so far have been testament to the umpteenth failure on the part of the EU institutions. Supervision has turned out to be imprecise and punitive for some Member States, given that the first assessment exercise (AQR and stress tests) did not take due account of the derivatives held by some banking groups and adopted national methods of assessment; resolution – which, moreover, is incomplete given that the SRF has not yet been set up – has turned out even to be punitive in respect of consumers, as shown by the first applications of the bail- in mechanism; ultimately, EDIS risks being a further failure unless it is backed up by a public ECB guarantee;
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 e (new)
Paragraph 16 e (new)
16e. Considers it necessary to implement Bank Structural Reform as soon as possible, with a clear and compulsory separation between retail and investment activities to reduce interdependencies and risks in the banking sector and to increase its resilience; deplores the lack of interest shown by the European institutions in proceeding with such reform; considers it necessary, moreover, to draw up a serious set of rules concerning shadow banking;