BETA

Activities of Marco VALLI related to 2016/2247(INI)

Plenary speeches (2)

Banking Union - Annual Report 2016 (debate) IT
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2016/2247(INI)
Banking Union - Annual Report 2016 (debate) IT
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2016/2247(INI)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on Banking Union - Annual Report 2016 PDF (323 KB) DOC (73 KB)
2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2016/2247(INI)
Documents: PDF(323 KB) DOC(73 KB)

Amendments (32)

Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
— having regard to the Commission Action plan on a Capital Markets Union of 30 September 2015,deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4
— having regard to the ECOFIN Council conclusions of 17 June 2016 on a roadmap to complete the Banking Union,deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the establishment of the Banking Union has been a fundamental step taken towards the completion of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the "too big to fail" and the "too interconnected to fail" issues remain largely unaddressed;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas the Banking Union is acting on the consequences of the crisis and not on the causes;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D c (new)
Dc. whereas a proper structural reform of banks based on a clear separation between trading and credit activities is the only way to prevent the risk of bail-out at the expense of taxpayers and ensure financial stability;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in some jurisdictions; considerdeplores that this issue is crucial and has yet to be solved; welcomes the work of the SSM and its draft guidance on this issue; looks forward to the results of the work on a minimum EU insolvency framework; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and to stimulate growth the result of the bad management of the crisis through wrong economic policies; considers that this issue is crucial and the underlying macroeconomic problem associated with the chronic lack of demand and the collapse in households' purchasing power has yet to be solved; calls on Member States to improve their insolvency legislation and adopt anti- cyclical policies to stimulate growth and support internal demand in order to tackle NPLs;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that there arDeplores the recent attitude to consider the risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment couldwill have a significant negative effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution in reform efforts; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will be neededperipheral countries that are still suffering the consequences of the crisis, without actually providing a better assessment of banks' effective risks; calls for a framework providing a clear mapping of financial risk, taking into consideration banks' exposure in Level 3 assets, as they pose the greatest risk to financial stability;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Recalls the importance of avoiding within the new Basel framework that higher capital requirements unduly constrain the lending capacity of banks to the real economy, as long as the imbalances in the euro area remain unsolved;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Points out that the current supervisory framework is strongly biased towards addressing the credit risk and totally ignores the exposure in risky financial derivatives associated with trading activities, thereby promoting the wrong business model;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 153 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Underlines the importance of introducing the use of the Standardized Model Approach in order to put an end to the attitude of banks to manipulate risk- weighted assets and capital requirements;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 155 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 171 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that national options and discretions are hindering the creation of a level playing field between Member States; welcomes the ECB guidance and regulation harmonising the exercise of some of these within the Banking Union; looks forward to the upcoming amendments to the CRR as a means of closing the most significant ones;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Recalls the necessity to ensure a level playing field at the European level but believes that supervision and resolution are better managed at the national level;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls the need to clarify the objectives of Pillar 2 and its place within the stacking order of capital requirements; is of the view that the use of capital guidance is a relevant way forward in order to balance financial stability concerns with flexibility needs;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Recalls the necessity to find a proportional methodology in order to assess the real financial risk associated with the investment banking model without unfairly penalizing commercial banks that really provide financing to the real economy;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Points out that easier delegation of decision-making on some routine issues from the Supervisory Board to relevant officials could contribute to making ECB banking supervision more efficient;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls the need to find, in the exercise of supervision, a balance between the need for proportionality and the need for a consistent approach;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Condemns the creation of the SSM inside the ECB and is concerned about the conflict of interest entailed;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Believes that the SSM is not be able to conduct effective banking supervision; deplores the results of the stress test conducted by the ECB, together with EBA, as they have failed to capture the real risk associated with speculative activities and exposures in Level 3 assets and demonstrated to be not reliable and incomplete; regrets that the focus on credit risk resulted in penalising the safer commercial banking models with respect to big investment banks that pose the greatest risk to financial stability;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 255 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9c. Considers that the insufficiency of the SRF is one of the main causes of the non-credibility of the project of the Banking Union;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. RecCalls the need to adfor the re to State aid rules in the context of bank resolution; takes the view that enough flexibility is embedded within the current framework to address specific situations and might be better exploited, in particular in the case of preventive measures involving the use of DGS fundspeal of the BRRD considering that this Directive already demonstrated to be ineffective and dangerous for investors, bondholders and depositors and for the stability of the financial system as a whole;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 312 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Recalls that the BRRD in any case does not exclude the possibility of bail-out as provided by Articles 56 and 57 and that it does not break the link between the banks and sovereigns, given that State aid is still allowed, as provided by Article 32 of the BRRD; believes that this raises questions about the credibility and effectiveness of the new rules;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 328 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Warns that the BRRD requirement of contractual recognition for bail-in powers on liabilities governed by non-EU legislation proves cumbersome to implement; calls for clarification of the type of liabilities to which such requirement applies;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 333 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls that the substance of the IGA on the SRF is to be ultimately incorporated into the Union legal framework; calls on the Commission to reflect on ways of doing so; stresses that the upcoming incorporation of the fiscal compact into EU law could provide a useful template;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 336 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Points out that swift and effective exchange of information between supervision and resolution authorities is paramount in order to ensure smooth crisis management; welcomes the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between the ECB and the SRM in respect of cooperation and information exchange;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 345 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposal; stands ready, however, to seize the opportunity generated by the proposal to discuss the DGSD and address some of the options and discretions it includes;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 356 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Recalls that EDIS needs a public backstop to be credible; asks for a full and unlimited ECB guarantee on European deposits, in order to make this mechanism fully effective; recalls that this is in line with the objective enshrined in its mandate to keep the stability of the financial system;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 372 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Is aware of the potential benefits of an EDIS with a full and unlimited coverage and with the public backstop provided by the ECB; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should preferably precede risk sharing;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 395 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Recommends that the Commission, the ECB and the EBA study the possibility and suitability of accompanying the introduction of the EDIS with an assessment of the capital and liquidity situation of banks in order to better quantify the risks to be insurdeleted;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 421 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle and that the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term, should continue step by step;deleted
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 432 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Calls for an ambitious structural reform of banks based on a true and clear separation between credit and trading activities, together with a stricter regulation of shadow banking and financial speculation, as the only way forward to prevent the accumulation of systemic risks and ensure financial stability; strongly condemns the reluctance of the European institutions to conclude these reforms;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON