64 Amendments of Siegfried MUREŞAN related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2
Citation 2
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 1221, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 136, 310, 311, 329 and 352 thereof,
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
Citation 5 a (new)
– having regard to the European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 on amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro,
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
– having regard to the Commission Communication ‘A Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU – Launching a European Debate’ of 28 November 2012,
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 b (new)
Citation 8 b (new)
– having regard to the Four Presidents’ Report ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ of 5 December 2012,
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the Europeconomic and Monetary Union of the European Union currently consists of 19 m28 Members, two of whom States, out of these only 19 Member States shavre opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join; whereasthe common currency and form part of the euro area; whereas of the nine Member States whose currency is not the euro, one Member has an opt-out and one Member has an opt-in from joining the common currency and no financial liability will be incurred by the twose countries with opt-outs from EMU in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area; whereas the remaining seven EU Member States are bound by their Treaties of Accession to the European Union to join the common currency once they fulfil the necessary criteria;
Amendment 48 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the European Monetary Union established under the Maastricht Treaty was not complemented by a genuinMaastricht Treaty established the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Economic Union;
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations, the EU budget is dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level; and shall be in balance, as laid down in Article 310 TFEU;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas keeping the Balance of Payments Facility for non-euroArticle 123 and 125 TFEU were put in place to avoid and prevent moral hazard and ensure fiscal sustainability and prudency of euro area Member States; while depriving euro area Member States of this instrument as a consequence of the no-bail-out clause reflects one of the original flaws of EMUereas the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) constitutes the crisis resolution mechanism for countries of the euro area and has the function of a shock absorbent; whereas non-euro area Member States are not covered by the ESM but by the Balance of Payment Facility which supports non- euro countries in difficulties or when seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments, as laid down in Article 143 TFEU, as non-euro countries experience higher risks due to exchange rate fluctuations;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks; countries which did not comply with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which did not budget responsibly but triggered large budget deficits through high spending and had postponed relevant reforms of their labour markets and public administration, were more vulnerable and could not effectively handle economic shocks; whereas it became apparent that the lack of responsibility of one Member of the euro area is a risk for the euro area as a whole, meaning that one country not adhering to the rules can affect the economy of all Member States of the Union; whereas the currency union is only as strong as its Members, which requires all participating countries to respect economic and financial rules at national level and at the same time to strengthen their economies in their own interest and in that of the whole euro area, thus guaranteeing the well-being of all citizens in the long-term, as the consequences of irresponsible policies at national level have to be borne by the Union as a whole;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks in the absence of Member States’ compliance with fiscal surveillance frameworks and structural reforms to increase competitiveness and resilience of their economies, and full labour and capital market integration, both of which play an important shock absorbing function in a monetary union;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, following real convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching- up process; re has been no process of real convergence among the countries that adopted the euro between 1999 and 2009, due to the fact that some countries did not sufficiently reform to improve their productivity and competitiveness, but increased public spending without investing in a sustainable manner; whereas the causes of structural divergence between euro area Member States were numerous: convergence of government bond yields led to an artificially low level of interest rates, which disclosed discrepancies in competitiveness between countries and eliminated incentives to reform, improve competitiveness and budget responsibly; whereas low interest rates triggered irresponsible behaviour on the part of some euro countries, which took advantage of the free rider effect of low interest rates and increased salaries and public expenditure without simultaneously increasing productivity, and therefore worsened the competitiveness of their economies; whereas not respecting and enforcing the rules of the SGP left several euro countries without fiscal margins to counter the crisis, in addition to macroeconomic imbalances accumulating inside several euro countries over decades, both being crucial elements leading to the sovereign debt crisis; whereas weak institutions, structural rigidities, weak productivity growth and insufficient policies to address asset price booms made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas economic mismanagement at national level was a reason for the worsening of the crisis, not the euro as a currency; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but several factors still appear crucial for ensuring real convergence in the EMU, such as macroeconomic stability, sound fiscal policy, a high degree of flexibility in product and labour markets, favourable conditions for an efficient use of capital and labour in the economy, supporting total factor productivity growth, economic integration within the euro area, and a more active use of national policy tools to prevent asset price and credit boom-bust cycles; whereas some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching-up process, provided by the European Union through European structural and investment funds to foster convergence in addition to the implementation of instruments during the crisis, which prevented the collapse of the economy, in an effort of securing jobs, fostering investment and growth as well as safeguarding the savings of citizens;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas substantial progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws ofimproving and strengthening the governance of the EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) including the Fiscal Compact and the Euro-Plus Pact, thereby making the EMU more resilient against possible shocks in the future, however, these instruments cannot fulfil their function if they are not enforced;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas some Member States dramatically lack the willingness to implement the Country Specific Recommendations, given on the yearly basis by the Commission, and, hence, undermine the economic growth that the EU currently strives for;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Community method was abandonsuspended in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapidurgent and timely responses during the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelinedinstruments such as the ESM were not possible to be established inside the Treaties due to its limits given Article 125 TFEU; whereas decisions had to be taken outside the existing institutions as later confirmed by the Pringle case; whereas in the long-term all of the instruments established during the crisis and the actions being taken now to prevent future crises should be inserted within the Community framework;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas Member States that failed to adhere to the SGP and enforce fiscal rules at national level have lost credibility of financial markets and herewith the possibility to finance themselves and a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM is consistent with the TFEU and opened the dodue to the limits of the Treaties no new decision powers can be conferred to the institutions of the European Union; whereas under the current framework to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautairehe EU institutions and the ESM are limited to decisions taken by the finance ministers of the euro area; whereas the European Commission is able to participate in the administrative work in relation with in the current limits of the Treatiesstruments such as the ESM; whereas the incorporation of the ESM into Community law would require Treaty change;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 1
Subheading 1
Historical background and shortcomings ofof the EMU
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary unionn EMU would require all ‘the essential features of national public budgets tothe whole of the public budgets, and in particular variations in their volume, the size of balances and the methods of financing or utilizing them, will be decided at Community level’;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that the MacDougall Report in 1977 stressed that the establishment of a monetary union would require a significant Community budget amounting to 5-7 % of GDP in order to absorb economic shocks and provide a minimum degree of incomexplores the idea of a Community budget amounting to 2-2.5% of GDP in a pre-federal integration stage, with Community action taken in the areas of structural and cyclical policies, and 5-7 % of GDP at a later stage, to ensure that the benefits of closer integration favour all and that there is growing convergence in the econvergenceomic performance of Member States;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception undtronger enforcement of existing fiscal rules such as the SGP, the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack is necessary, and not the transfer of more financial means; whereas the SGP is a set of rules designed to ensure that EU Member States pursue sound public finances and coordinate their fiscal policies, however, the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policiesmain shortcoming is the non-implementation of existing rules as well as the underestimation of macroeconomic imbalances, which were not addressed in a sufficient and timely manner; whereas governments of euro countries are required by European economic governance rules to submit their draft budgetary plans for the following year to the European Commission by October 15 each year to ensure the coordination of fiscal and economic policies among euro countries and that EU economic governance rules are respected, but the implementation rate of the guidelines put forward by the European Commission subsequently has to be improved;
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuation; reiterates that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechanisms to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mix; emphasises however that the three percent deficit rule under the enhanced Stability and Growth Pact provides sufficient fiscal space to cope with asymmetric shocks, under condition that EU Member States strictly observe the structural budgetary balance rule in the medium term;
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuafluctuation risks, exchange costs as well as risks and lack of transparency in cross- border transactions; reiteratstresses that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechbenefits of the euro are interconnected, as economic stability creates trust and credibility, reduces uncertainty for businesses and encourages companismes to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mixinvest, creates more employment and better-quality jobs for citizens and allows for long-term planning of governments; stresses that the need for convergence and competitiveness are conditions for the functionality of a common currency area, since a country cannot restore its competitiveness in a sustainable manner by simply devaluating its currency;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalancthe causes of the sovereign debt crisis were mainly unsustainable levels of public and private debt, lack of competitiveness and proper regulation in the banking and financial sectors; underlines, triggered by capital flows fhat high levels of debt limited the space of manoeuvre for eurom core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereuntries and led to an increase in financing costs, which impeded the repayment of debt at maturity; stresses that high costs of servicing debt due to high interest rates were too big of a burden given the overall debt level of some euro countries; whereas too hignh debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the merelevels entail high interest rates which have to be served instead of being able to invest in growth enhancing measures, social spending, healthcare and education; whereas the causes of the crises differed in existence of thet among euro area Member States;
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro areaalone cannot lead to balanced growth or counter the lack of competitiveness of some euro countries, but supports cyclical recovery which facilitates the introduction of structural policies, as has repeatedly been called for by the President of the ECB; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies wi, notably throut credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economgh adhering to the fiscal rules such as the SGP and transposing relevant reforms as outlined in the country specific recommendations (CSRs), is necessary to boost competitiveness and structural convergence, making Member States more resilient against asymmetric shocks;
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively onRecalls first and foremost that the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, laid down in Article 127 (1) TFEU, and thereby contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU; recalls that the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measuresims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term; recalls that when inflation rates dropped below 0% in December 2014, the ECB acted by introducing its asset purchase programme in 2015, in addition to fighting possible deflation and slowing growth by reducing the three key interest rates, which had the collateral effect of slightly increasing growth; stresses that the ECB pursued its mandate of price stability with the instruments defined in the Treaties to tackle weak growth and low inflation in the euro area, making use of all instruments at its disposal to steer inflation closer to 2%; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reforms to improve the resilience and competitiveness of their economies, pursuing growth enhancing policies while at the same time pursuing fiscal consolidation and budget discipline;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that in the absence of the willingness of euro area Member States’ governments to take action to rapidly consolidate their public finances and modernise their economies the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policyfiscal surveillance framework on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentarynotes that due to the constraints of the Treaties the ESM had to be established at intergovernmental level with parliamentary control primarily taking place at national level, national governments being responsible vis-à-vis their national parliaments, within the limits set by the Constitutional Court of each countrol, and hence ownership; y; stresses that in the long- term all of the established instruments shall be inserted within the Community framework in order to also ensure parliamentary control through the European Parliament;
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States,Instrument (CCI) for euro area Member States, whereby ‘the implementation of structural reforms in the euro area Member States would be facilitated by the set-up of contractual arrangements to be agreed between them and the Commission’, building on the existing EU surveillance framework and the CSRs; states further that ‘by promoting structural reforms that enhance the adjustment capacity of a Member State the CCI would improve the economy’s capacity to absorb asymmetric shocks through enhancing market functioning’; whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro areaEMU’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 136 or alternatively Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; demands from the European Commission to reflect upon further measures to improve the implementation rate of CSRs, as currently only 4% of CSRs are fully implemented while nearly half of the recommendations have not been implemented at all or only in a limited manner due to the non-binding character of CSRs, and should be followed up within the European Semester;
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. RecallNotes that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; however, points out in this context to the serious risk of moral hazard and to potentially distorted incentives, in fact encouraging Member States to wait with necessary reforms until financial support from the EU is secured; therefore, if this idea is to be implemented, strong safeguards against potential moral hazard need to be included;
Amendment 249 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls the four pillars of an Economic Union of convergence, growth and jobs, set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: cthe creation of a euro area system of Completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union andtiveness Authorities, a strengthened implementation of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, a greater focus on employment and social performance, and on stronger coordination of economic policies within a revamped European Semester; recalls the content of the Five Presidents’ Report on completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union, strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting as well as the social dimension of the EMU; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisis; ny fiscal capacity ‘should not lead to permanent transfers between countries or to transfers in one direction only, which is why converging towards Economic Union is a precondition for participation. It should also not be conceived as a way to equalise incomes between Member States’, it should further prevent moral hazard by being tightly linked to compliance with the EU governance framework, ‘be open and transparent vis-à-vis all EU Member States’, and not fulfil the function of the ESM as a crisis management instrument, but ‘improve the overall economic resilience of the EMU’;
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Makes it clear that rapidfurther action is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets; stresses that the responsibility of transposing reforms to complete the EMU lies primarily with the Member States;
Amendment 267 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. BelievStresses that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this entthe introduction of the euro led to closer economic and monetary cooperation that allowed the internal market to develop further, for the whole European economy to perform better, bringing more jobs and greater prosperity for European citizens benefiting individuals, businesses and whole economies in the euro area, including greater choice and stable prices for consumers and citizens, greater security and more opportunities for businesses and markets, promoting trade and investment, improving economic stability and growth, more integrated financial markets and stronger priese, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked tnce for the EU in the global economy; underlines that the single currency brings new strengths and opportunities arising from integration and scale of the euro aresponsibilita economy, meanaking that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria; e single market more efficient and doing business in the euro area more cost-effective and less risky; stresses that the euro remains an attractive reserve currency for third countries and a trustworthy currency for new Member States, which was proven by the fact that, despite the economic crisis, several countries recently decided to join the euro area: Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015;
Amendment 283 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro- area and national level are key, notably to preventingthe enforcement of fiscal rules, the implementation of CSRs and good governance at euro area and national level are key to pursue sound fiscal responsibility, address macroeconomic imbalances, implement structural reforms and boost investment, in addition there is a need for monitoring and evaluating transposed reforms, notably to prevent and avoid any form of permanent transfers and moral hazard;
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shockstrengthen the resilience of the Member States' economies by increasing competitiveness;
Amendment 329 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources; more resources than a fiscal capacity could provide, thus it is too small to address shocks of this dimension and will not be able to rescue large euro area Member States, just as little as the ESM would be on its own merits; stresses that Member States are responsible for servicing their own debt and that the fiscal capacity should not have the task of rescuing euro countries in difficulties, which is explicitly forbidden by Article 125 TFEU; adds that the scope of any potential fiscal capacity should be to increase the competitiveness and resilience of an economy, therefore limit the extent of shocks that hit the economy and prevent future crises;
Amendment 346 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’' structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in thmore efforts have to be made to stabilise business cycle movements of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a wholeover time, since business cycle fluctuations across euro countries are highly correlated, but differ in variance, which explains why shocks in the euro area are of a more symmetric nature with differences in the boom-bust dynamics of growth rates in individual Member States, especially experienced by euro countries of the periphery; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed at national level, while respecting the SGP and maintaining budgetary discipline, by making economies more competitive so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole; adds that in the reform of the SGP in 2005, the European Council asked EU Member States to strengthen their domestic fiscal governance through fiscal rules and institutions at national level and further reinforced national fiscal frameworks following the adoption of the Budgetary Frameworks Directive, the Fiscal Compact and the Two-Pack;
Amendment 367 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academiathe current Treaties, especially considering the subsidiarity principle laid down in Article 5 TEU;
Amendment 389 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’'s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’' report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that endwith respect to the ESM Treaty concluded inter alia that the ESM does not fall within the remit of the exclusive competence of the EU over monetary policy, that the conferral of new tasks on the Commission and ECB is compatible with their powers as those do not entail any powers to make decisions of their own and that the operation of the ESM is not precluded by general principle of effective judicial protection, as EU treaties do not establish a specific competence for the EU to set up the ESM and hence this is not an implementation of EU law to which the EU Charter of Fundamental rights would be applicable; emphasises that the ECJ further ruled that stability support is only granted subject to strict conditionality and when such support 'is indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole'; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament in the long-term by inserting the established instrument into the Community framework;
Amendment 417 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to aAdds that the mandate and limitations of the ESM are clearly defined in the ruling of the ECJ Pringle case (C- 370/12) and the European Council Decision of 25 March 2011; stresses that the creation of any European Monetary Fund is not possible under the current Treaty framework; any euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affecthould have a clear mandate, not fulfilling the same function as the ESM as a crisis instrument, and be subject to strict conditionality, with a concrete but limited funding source and amount yet to be defined;
Amendment 449 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Considers that the EFSM and the balance of payment facility should be integrated into the same budgetary chapter as the ESM once the latter is integrated into Community law, for which a Treaty change is necessary, thereby providing resources for financial assistance to countries outside the euro area but committed to joining on the basis of the agreed rules;
Amendment 450 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Emphasises that the current design of the EMU foresees the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 123 TFEU), the prohibition of privileged access to financial institutions (Article 124 TFEU), the no-bail-out clause (Article 125 TFEU), the fiscal provisions to avoid excessive government deficits (Article 126 TFEU, including the excessive deficit procedure), and the Stability and Growth Pact (secondary legislation based on Articles 121 and 126 TFEU) and any fiscal capacity should be set up under the current Treaty framework;
Amendment 459 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMFinancial assistance from the fiscal capacity; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;
Amendment 485 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Suggests that reforms advocated in the CSRs can be incentivised through financial and technical assistance facilitated by a fiscal capacity without Treaty change and therefore be realisable in the short-term; considers that fundamental attention should be given to the CSRs, which already emphasize thoroughly the areas in need of reform, however, since the implementation rate of these measures is not satisfactory and recent reflections have not yielded to any significant tools able to improve it, the fiscal capacity could leverage the transposition of CSRs by providing positive incentives in form of financial assistance for Member States to implement reforms, especially in years of economic growth; stresses that no compensation should be granted to countries that did not pursue budgetary discipline and postponed necessary reforms; emphasizes that convergence towards the level of the most competitive countries in the euro area should be fostered through reforms that are conducive to more investment, profitable projects, productivity enhancing and have the objective of reaching full employment;
Amendment 497 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘'convergence code’', as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies, such as the CSRs, into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester;
Amendment 507 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
26. Suggests that the convergence code defines criteria to be reached within five years, building onin a realistic time frame without the need for a Treaty change, building on Articles 121 and 126 TFEU and the merits of the Maastricht criteria, and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding: taking into account the CSRs as a basis; calls on the European Commission to explore and make concrete proposals on the possibilities and limits of implementing this first pillar, based on the principle of conditionality and conceivable within the current Treaty framework; suggests the following areas for reform for Member States, based on the CSRs with no or only limited progress in their transposition, which should attain further progress in their implementation through the support of a fiscal capacity on top of existing instruments; stresses that existing policies should not be replaced but complemented by a fiscal capacity in the short term:
Amendment 522 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
– taxation: base and rate of corporate taximprove the balance and fairness of the overall tax system and prepare a comprehensive tax reform that will allow shifting taxes away from labour, especially away from low-income earners, towards more growth friendly bases, simplify the tax system, fight tax evasion, close loopholes, increase VAT efficiency, broaden tax bases, reduce tax expenditures, reduce fiscal disincentives to work,
Amendment 534 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
– labour market, including minimum wages: strive for full employment, improve the functioning of the labour market by reducing financial disincentives to work, increase labour market participation, increase labour market access for disadvantaged groups such as the young and people with a migrant background, provide flexible forms of employment for elderly people, facilitate female labour market participation, improve professional mobility and address skills shortages and mismatches as well as early school leaving; strengthen partnerships of public authorities, public employment services and education institutions to provide early and tailor-made support to the young; training of personnel,
Amendment 541 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 a (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 a (new)
– competitiveness: improve the investment climate, restore competitiveness by reforming the wage- setting system, including wage indexation, in consultation with the social partners and in accordance with national practice, ensure that wage evolutions are in line with productivity developments at sectorial and/or company levels as well as economic circumstances and to provide for effective automatic corrections when needed; strengthen competition in the retail sectors, remove excessive restrictions in services, including professional services and addressing the risk of further increases of energy distribution costs; improve the business environment, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises, by cutting red tape, promoting e- government, streamlining insolvency procedures and implementing the legislation on late payments, improve SMEs access to bank credit and non-bank finance; improve the public procurement system by taking concrete steps for the implementation of e-procurement; enhance the quality and independence of the judiciary and step up the fight against corruption,
Amendment 542 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 b (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 b (new)
– pension: contain future public expenditure growth relating to ageing, in particular from pensions and long-term care, by stepping up efforts to reduce the gap between the effective and statutory retirement age; promote active ageing and lifelong learning, align the retirement age to changes in life expectancy, improve the cost-effectiveness of public spending on long-term care, equalise the statutory retirement age for men and women,
Amendment 543 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 c (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 c (new)
– health care: ensure cost effective provision of healthcare including by improving the pricing of healthcare services while linking hospitals' financing to outcomes, accelerate the optimisation of the hospital network,
Amendment 544 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 d (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 2 d (new)
– public administration: balance local government revenues against devolved responsibilities, improve the efficiency of local governments and ensure the provision of quality public services at local level, especially social services complementing activation measures,
Amendment 552 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
– investment, notably in research and developmentnovation: investment in research, development, innovation, digitalisation and e-governance; promote innovation through streamlined incentive schemes and reduced administrative barriers, ;
Amendment 563 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
Amendment 593 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetricshocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; notes, in addition, that given the economic and financial interrelation of the European economy with global markets and other economic areas, there will always be a risk that the European Union and the euro area in particular are hit by economic, often exogenous, shocks, withich can impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stressesnever be fully anticipated, prevented or avoided, nor can their size be; notes that shocks affect countries differently, due to the diverse economic structures and strengths of individual countries, which cannot be made equal; stresses that no instrument or mechanism, like the ESM or any fiscal capacity, has sufficient means to stabilise the euro area as a whole in face of shocks that endanger the solvency of countries or the euro area as a whole, therefore, the need to have an instrument available best way to prepare, prevent and minimize shocks is to strengthen the economy at national level; stresses, therefore, this emergencyat introducing a fiscal capacity as a support mechanism for structural reforms which improvides an immediate stabilisation effecte the competitiveness of economies in the long-term can increase the resilience against symmetric and asymmetric shocks;
Amendment 612 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most promshocks in the euro area are of a less asymmetric nature than assumed, but rather symmetric with a high correlation of business cycles of euro area Member States and stronger differences in the intensity of the business cycles, some countries experiencing more intently ise boom-bust cycles than othe academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Schemers; stresses that countries with high levels of debt, high liabilities in the banking sector or countries that postponed the transposition of relevant reforms, were hit harder by the crisis and recover more slowly; concludes that in this case a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme creates at the same time an economic and a political problem, by forcing Member States in recession to transfer resources to Member States experiencing stronger recessions; notes that these developments have led to an increase of euro-sceptics and the emergence of right-wing parties in the recent past and should be avoided;
Amendment 624 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
Amendment 642 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
Amendment 660 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
Amendment 679 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with anotherif Member States do not adhere to the SGP and only make limited progress in transposing the CSRs; notes that since the crisis of 2009, the European Union has introduced several new instruments in order to increase resilience against possible crisies of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shockin the future, notably the ESM, the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, the Fiscal Compact, the Euro-Plus Pact, launched the Banking Union and introduced the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to further complete the EMU; is further convinced that symmetric shocks should be addressed at national level, while respecting the SGP and maintaining budgetary discipline; recalls that the EMFfiscal capacity should be used as an appropriate financial resource; to incentivise structural reforms;
Amendment 694 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower boundon these grounds the President of the ECB has repeatedly demanded from Member States to complement monetary policy by implementing structural reforms; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, the administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growth; considers that the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) launched by the European Investment Group and the European Commission already constitutes an initiative at European level to overcome the current investment gap in the European Union by mobilising private financing for strategic investments reduced and thereby reaching the objective of growth and more jobs in the European Union;
Amendment 709 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improving the competitiveness of the euro area via appropriate financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending, Member States should be further incentivised to increase public and private investment in R&D and innovation, also in light of accomplishing the goals set out in the Europe 2020 strategy;
Amendment 737 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
Amendment 807 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special statuEmphasizes that the seven EU Member States that do not have an opt-out or opt-in from joining the common currency, but are bound to join the euro area by their Treaties of Accession to the European Union, should have full rights of participating in the governance structure of any fiscal capacity, be able to contribute and benefit financially, receive technical and financial assistance in transposing needed structural reforms in their countries, thereby making their economies more competitive especially vis-à-vis current euro area Member States, increasing resilience, thus ensuring the sound transition into the euro area and avoid economic and financial crises in the future by fostering a stronger euro area with stronger Member States;
Amendment 825 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reformsis not yet conducive to achieve and complete the EMU; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, as laid out in the Five Presidents' Report, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMU;